

A HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT

BOGARDUS

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HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT



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A HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT

BY

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PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION

THIS BOOK is written for the world of students. In it any seriously-minded person should find a fundamental background for understanding the central themes of human progress, a substantial basis for attacking the most important problems of the day, and a call to renew his faith in the soundness of human aspirations.

Inasmuch as this treatise is written for students, it is not intended to be the last word on the subject, but simply a first word. The theme of each chapter is in itself a subject for further investigation. In fact, the student with an alert mind will find in each chapter many subjects concerning which he will want to learn more. If the discussions in this book stimulate the student to make inquiries on his own initiative, they will have accomplished more than the author could have expected.

June 1, 1921

TO THE SECOND EDITION

IMPORTANT source materials have been added to each chapter. They may well be given primary consideration. They will serve to introduce the student to further readings in the sources, and at the same time help to make clear the main context of each chapter.

The discussion in each chapter has been revised and perfected. Recent developments in social thought have been added to each of the eleven concluding chapters. Altogether the book has been almost doubled in size, and improved, it is hoped, equally as much in quality.

Topics for discussion have been appended to each chapter. These may be assigned as the basis of a discussion period at the beginning of each class meeting. If all the members of the class will regularly prepare themselves for these discussion periods, special interest will be generated. It is important also that these discussions be conducted in terms of facts and their meanings rather than on the level of opinions and arguments.

EMORY S. BOGARDUS

January 1, 1928

University of Southern California

A HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT



CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL THOUGHT

MAN faces a world of complex social problems. As a result he is perplexed beyond description; his thinking often ends in confusion. Inasmuch as the average citizen, for the first time in the world's history, is beginning to attack social problems, he is entitled to all the aid that can be made available. Upon the success of the average person in mastering the intricacies of social thinking, the cause of democracy and probably its success depends.

A large proportion of the analyses of social questions has been academic. These discussions have often terminated in quibbles or erudite generalizations. In so far as social theories have been correct they have unfortunately been reserved for the theorists alone. The people themselves have not understood the nature of social thought; they have not benefited; and hence, they have held social thought in contempt. Sound social thought needs to be democratized, that is, to be made available for all people.

In thinking about social problems, the so-called practical person has proceeded in his own way. He has had personal experience—and that to him has been sufficient. He has been motivated by a sense of injustice, and stung into fervid thought by circumstances which seemed to him unfair; he has concocted a makeshift remedy, or impulsively accepted a ready-made program. Perhaps he has urged a single cause for all social ills and prescribed a single

remedy for all social diseases. Usually, he has been very limited in his observations, untrained in making proper inductions, and hence, narrow and intolerant in his conclusions. He has been entirely baffled, or else he has felt cocksure.

The practicalist is often a poor theorist. He may be even the most dangerous type of theorist. He has scoffed at theory and then fallen into the pit of incorrect theory. He has failed to see, for example, that a good bridge does not project itself across a chasm, but that a correct bridge-building theory is essential. With social practicalists and theorists calling each other names, instead of cooperating and giving the world of people the benefit of their combined points of view, the world has floundered and its social problems have piled up, mountains high.

Another difficulty in the pathway of sound social thinking is found in an absence of proper backgrounds. People are prone to offer solutions for social questions without first equipping themselves with a knowledge of foundational elements. Moreover, they are often unwilling to acquaint themselves with these necessary factors. It is only by accident, however, that current social movements can be understood unless the historical sequences of social cause and effect are perceived. Nearly all social problems are essentially the outcroppings of tendencies which have had a long human history. A current social maladjustment is generally indicative of a long line of antecedent factors. A knowledge of societary fundamentals is essential to sound thinking about present-day evils. A history of social thought furnishes a minimum social background for the understanding of current social processes and problems.

SOCIAL THOUGHT DEFINED

Social thought, in the strict sense, is the product of the thinking together of *socii* or of associates. Most social thought is like that of the ordinary dinner table type—

casual and desultory. Discussion group thinking would illustrate social thinking on its higher levels, but discussion group thinking is not yet extensive. Most social thought in the sense of group thought about social questions has not contributed much to knowledge. A great deal may be expected from it in the future, in fact, it promises to become ultimately the main type of thought.

Social thought, as far as the past and the present are concerned, amounts as a rule to the thought about social questions by individual persons. In this sense, social thinking is thinking about group problems by one or a few persons. Since this book is a history of social thought it will necessarily deal for the most part with the thinking of certain persons about associative life and its problems. It is in this sense that the term will hereafter be used, unless otherwise designated.

The thinking of persons about social life falls into two categories, that involving the advancement of one's fellows, and that referring to the manipulation of one's fellows to one's own gain or to the gain of a special clique or group. The latter type of thinking, being socially destructive, has ultimately been disapproved by the larger group, hence the other field has remained as the real field of social thought—namely, the field of constructive social thought, or what has been somewhat generally rated as such. It is this field with which this treatise deals.

In recent decades the constructive social thinking of certain persons has taken on a scientific nature, and social processes have been analyzed. A definitely technical or sociological vocabulary has been created to meet the need, and sociological social thought has arisen. In this book the account of the constructive social thought of outstanding persons here and there naturally shades into an account of sociological social thinking.

Social thought is both concrete and abstract. Concrete thinking rarely goes deep. It asks few questions, raises few doubts, and perceives few connections. Abstract think-

ing seeks causal explanations, classifies concreteness, penetrates relationships, and proposes well-balanced procedures. The distinction, however, is largely one of degree. Concrete thinking is characteristic of every normal person, but abstract reasoning is uncommon. The ability to do abstract thinking, to get at the deeper meanings of phenomena, to penetrate the mysteries of life, is rare. Concrete thinking constitutes the major sector of the thought-life of every person, nearly all the time.

Here and there, however, in human history we find persons who have been freed or who have freed themselves from daily struggle for a living, from the race to make money, or from the useless enticements of life-long loafing, and have joined the world of scholars, seeking to know the truth, the truth which makes men and women free—free to develop useful personalities in a vast, changing complex of human living. When man, having leisure to think abstractly, has set himself to the task of thought research, his mind has ventured along at least five pathways.

FIVE LINES OF THOUGHT

(1) Man has given considerable attention to his relation to the universe. Primitive man conceived of a personal universe, peopled with spirits. Throughout human history man has been a religious being, trying to solve the problems of a universe ruled by spirits and gods or by one supreme God. This type of thought has produced polytheisms, monotheisms, theocracies. It has formulated theological creeds and led to bitter ecclesiastical controversies. It has created fears, hopes, faiths, social ideals, and sacrificial standards.

(2) Irrespective of religious needs, man has endeavored to discover proper relations to his universe. He has philosophized. He has tried to reduce to terms of thought this baffling, intangible universal environment. He has searched for a specific ground for explaining the universe.

He has sought unity in change and monism in multiplicity. He has proclaimed that change itself is Lord of the universe, or perhaps he has found solace in a creative evolution. At any rate, he has sought ultimate meanings in as unbiased an interpretation of the universe as is humanly possible.

(3) From the far-flung horizons of religious and philosophic theory, man has turned his thought in an opposite direction—he has directed his thought upon itself. He has maneuvered his thought processes introspectively. He has puzzled over the structure and functions of his own mind. These series of studies have led on the one hand to treatises such as the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and on the other hand to the current expressions of behavioristic psychology or of psychoanalysis.

(4) Man has sought to fathom the material secrets of the earth. Since the Industrial Revolution in England, inquiring minds have focused tremendous energies upon attempts to master the physical elements. Rocks and strata of rocks have been caused to yield a wealth of ores, and subterranean caverns have been made to pour forth reservoirs of gas and oil. Modern transportation has been made possible by the use of steam, gasoline, electricity. Mechanical inventions have followed one another in unanticipated fashion, paying awe-inspiring tribute to the genius of man. Abstract thinking has given man a marvelous degree of control over the material side of life.

(5) Recently, the problem of man's adjustment and responsibility to his fellow men is being accorded a worthy hearing at the bar of scientific thought. For millenniums man has pondered hard over his relations and obligations to his God and to his universe, over the nature of his mind and spirit, over ways and means of acquiring individual success through a manipulation of the material resources of the earth. Incomprehensible as it may seem, it is true, however, that man has neglected almost wholly, until recently, the very heart of all successful living, namely, his

relations and obligations to his fellow men and to society. Social thinking, or as the term is here used, the constructive thinking of persons about social problems, and the center of all complete thinking, has been ignored. Consequently, the world, beneath its load of social ills, has slipped backward nearly as often as it has advanced.

In the present age, however, the world is making unprecedented demands upon social thought, long before social thought is adequately prepared for its gigantic tasks. Religion is seeking revitalization through socialized thinking. In its modern endeavor to win the world, Christianity is making tremendous demands upon applied sociology.

After many vain searches among false theories and impersonal ends, philosophy is seeking to find itself in a social universe. Psychology, likewise, is no longer individual, structural, and formal; it is now trying to interpret itself in terms of human behavior. Group processes are being searched for the origins of stimuli that will explain personal behavior.

Economic thought, too, has reached a stage where it is endeavoring to redefine its concepts in the light of sociological knowledge. The material resources of the earth as well as industrial and business enterprises, in fact all economic values, are being measured and revalued in terms of their societal significance. The meaning of industrial democracy is being sought in sociological terms.

In the distinctively associative life enormous demands are being made upon sociology. It is invited to formulate the criteria by which the worth of an educational system may be determined. Groups are trying to provide for the use of the leisure time of their members by methods that are socially valuable. Many attempts are being made for restoring to the family its fundamental prerogatives as a social institution. Communities are taking inventories of themselves, and striving to supplant the failures of the family and the neighborhood by new procedures.

Social thought is in large part an outgrowth of social conditions. To understand it, it is necessary to understand the times which furnish its setting. The compensatory rôle that it plays has never been fully appreciated—compensatory for social weaknesses and injustices.¹

The history of social thought rises out of the beginnings of human life on earth and with jagged edges extends along the full sweep of the changing historical horizon. It finds expression through some of the world's best minds. Our quest will bring us in contact with the most vital moments of the world's most valuable thinkers.

DISCUSSION GROUP TOPICS

1. The different senses in which the term, social thought, is used.
2. The special marks of sociological thought.
3. Reasons for the general lack of true social (group) thinking.
4. Distinctions between a practically-minded person and a scientifically-minded one.
5. The dangers of being only practically-minded in matters involving social processes.
6. The respective merits of concrete and abstract thinking.
7. The main lines of human thought.
8. The distinguishing traits of a social problem.
9. The particular requirements for discussion group thinking.

¹ In J. P. Lichtenberger's *Development of Social Theory*, Century, 1923, the procedure of first depicting social conditions and then of describing the resultant social thought is maintained throughout. This scholarly volume contains valuable supplementary materials for the readers of this HISTORY OF SOCIAL THOUGHT.

CHAPTER II

EARLIEST SOCIAL THOUGHT

PRIMITIVE PEOPLE were inquisitive. They thought about what happened and they sought explanations. Their attention was centered on the tangible phenomena of life. Their imagination worked out fantastic and superstitious interpretations. They reasoned about the daily occurrences of life in concrete, graphic, and personal terms.

Primitive people everywhere, apparently, sensed in a piecemeal and microscopic way the meaning of social relationships. Archeological records disclose crude and simple, but nevertheless genuine social implications. Early mythologies recognize the importance of social bonds. Out of the dim dawn of tribal life there appeared a roughhewn sense of social property. The proverbs of primitive people include implications, if not definite statements, of social responsibility.

Primitive people exemplified simple group behavior. If the paternal relationship was not always known or recognized, the maternal relationship functioned for at least a few years. The loose family ties harbored a degree of social responsibility. Wherever ancestor worship developed, the family group assumed large proportions and manifested strong social characteristics. The clan, or *gens*, betokened social fealty.

Communal property testified to communal thinking. The existence of common hunting grounds and tribal flocks was indicative of folk thought. Group dances, feasts, building enterprises, celebrations, delineated the social spirit. Warfare produced bursts of tribal loyalty. An examination of the folkways reveals indistinct but incipient notions of societal welfare. Such a treatise as Sumner's

Folkways chronicles a vast amount of elemental folk thinking.

FOLK THINKING

Folk thinking permeated primitive religions. The earliest forms of religion presupposed societies of spirits or gods. The conduct of a person was regulated by his ideas concerning the ways in which he had pleased or offended the spirits or gods. An infant was born into a society peopled with human and spirit beings. The latter were often more numerous than the former; they frequently were more feared; and hence were more powerful. The living people, the departed spirits, and the gods in a hierarchal order constituted an effective society for the exercise of many vigorous forms of social control.

If pestilence came, it was because the gods had been offended by some human being. As a result of the offense of one person, the whole tribe was considered to be liable to punishment. Consequently, the tribe in turn would punish the offending member and through the use of force and fear would exert a tremendous power over personal conduct and thought.

Primitive people were dominated by custom. They were subject to the autocracy of the past. They were hopelessly caught between ancestral ascendance and current fears. They threaded their way, mentally, through tantalizingly uncertain and narrow apertures. They learned the meaning of obedience, but obedience to a harsh and rigorous past and a fickle and disconcerting future. Leadership was drastic and capricious; followership was frantic and tremulous.

Some of the incipient social concepts of primitive peoples have been preserved in the form of proverbs. Many of the subtler social relationships of life were recognized by early man. His limited thinking drifted into simple formulae. His vocabulary was scanty; his ideas were few. He spoke

in conventional sayings. "Primitive man spoke in proverbs."

Many folkthoughts, or primitive conceptions of social obligations, have been preserved. The early proverbs of man reveal the beginnings of social thought. Equally valuable and similar materials are found in the sayings of the tribes which today are in a state of arrested development. A few illustrations of embryonic social thought will be given here.¹

AFRICAN FOLKTHOUGHT

The first examples will be selected from the folkthoughts of the Africans of the Guinea Coast. The proverb, Ashes fly back in the face of him who throws them, recognizes that evil deeds return upon the doer, or as moderns declare, Curses come home to roost. In the saying, Cowries are men, primitive man roughly but succinctly stated the theory of the economic determination of human history. It is cowries, or money, which molds human thought, determines human evaluations and attitudes, gives social power, and "makes the man." An age-long conception, indicative of a low sense of social feeling but possessing great force in society, is revealed in the dictum, Full-belly child says to hungry-belly child, "Keep good cheer." Throughout human history, the fortunate glutton has always recommended patience and tranquillity to the unfortunate, hard-working brother. X An eminent American financier of the multimillionaire class expressed pity for telephone girls who undergo hard labor, but declared that their harsh conditions were what the good Lord had made for them. But how far has this well-groomed citizen of our century advanced beyond the "full-belly" social philosophy of savage man?

In the observation, A fool of Ika and an idiot of Iluka meet together to make friends, the African has noted that

¹ Cf. W. I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, University of Chicago Press, 1909, pp. 161 ff.

2. friends are persons of similar types,^x of similar minds, of similar prejudices, and that "birds of a feather flock together." Whether conscious or unconscious, association occurs among persons of a kind, among fools of Ika and idiots of Iluka.

3. ^x Romantic love, evidently, has always been fickle,^x for the African has discovered that "quick loving a woman means quick not loving a woman." If this naïve but shrewd reflection concerning love-making were taken at its real worth at the present time, it would be crystallized into a federal marriage law requiring that a license to marry should be obtained at least fifteen or thirty days before the marriage could be celebrated.

A rather keen sense of social injustice is expressed in the monologue: "The ground-pig said: 'I do not feel so angry with the man who killed me as with the man who dashed me on the ground afterward.'"^x Here the injustice of striking a person when he is down is depicted.⁴ Even primitive man has a sense of sympathy for the defeated and helpless.

"Three elders cannot all fail to pronounce the word *ekulu* (antelope); one may say *ekúlu*; another *ekulú*; but the third will say, *ékulu* (which is correct)."^x In other words, several heads are better than one; or, in a multitude of counsellors there is safety.⁵ It was this simple social precept which a highly individualistic man like Roosevelt used frequently to the advantage of himself and the nation. When a perplexing problem would confront President Roosevelt, he was wont to invite to the White House persons whose beliefs were contrary to his own in order to secure their opinions. He acted independently, but after taking counsel with several "elders."

In *Thinking Black*, Daniel Crawford has presented phases of the colored man's philosophy.² While much is individual, more is social philosophy. Custom imitation prevails. The social philosophy of the African Negro is

² Daniel Crawford, *Thinking Black*, Doran, 1913.

summarized in the rule: Follow your leader. Social precedent, not principle, is the guide to conduct. If you are a follower, follow patiently; if you are a leader, lead drastically. "If thou art an anvil, be patient . . . but if thou art a hammer, strike hard."

The African understands the social psychology of language. He watches the eyes more carefully than the voice. To him the human eye speaks all languages under the sun. Mr. Crawford says that the wary eye of the African "can easily fish news out of the two liquid pools of your eyeballs." If your eye says one thing and your tongue another, then the African "will plump for the verdict of the eye."

The aphorism, There is no pocket in a shroud, warns a person against the possibility of taking his material goods into the next world. To share with other persons is rated a higher act than to store for others. He is richest who shares most. Among the Africans with whom Mr. Crawford worked, the word for criminal was not applied to the person who had stolen property or who had taken life, but to one who eats alone. "The high crime and misdemeanor of the town was to dine alone"; the criminal above other criminals is "Mr. Eat-Alone." He who refuses to share his food with those who are less fortunate than himself is an arch devil. Such a vice is common among beasts; it is beneath the dignity of man—according to the African. When several primitives were taken to London and shown the wealthy and the poor sections of that city, they were dumbfounded. They were utterly unable to understand how any persons with the slightest spark of human nature in them could endure to live to themselves in wealth when in the same city there were the wretched and prostrated multitudes of Whitechapel and the other cheerless slums.

"What baby lion ever trembled at his father's roaring?" A few mornings ago, I heard an angry parent yelling at his son, but the disobedient child kept on in his own way. I wondered how far this father had advanced in parental in-

fluence and discipline beyond the stage represented by the African seer who drew his social images from a lion-frequented environment. "If a tree has grown up crooked, it is because no one straightened it when young." This statement postulates social responsibility for juvenile delinquency and even for adult crime. The underlying principle is the same as that in the Hebraic injunction: Train up a child in the way he should go; and when he is old, he will not depart from it. The principle has received current recognition in the doctrine of contributory negligence of parents. The modern observation, full of socially dangerous implications that parents are blind to the weaknesses of their children, has its African counterpart: The beetle is a beauty in the eyes of its mother. A gleam of light is thrown upon the current discussions concerning social parasitism by the African's assertion: The parasite has no roots.

The Australian Blackfellow who goes upon a journey, sometimes takes a handful of mother earth with him. In this way he testifies to his loyalty to home, and provides against the rise of lonesomeness which he will experience during tribal hunts. His act crudely represents the essence of the concept of patriotism. A sense of justice is common to primitive Australians. Among the Whayook of Australia a man who has wounded a fellow tribesman is required to present himself to the injured in order to receive a similar wound.³ Among the Wumbias, a person who is absent when a relative dies must not speak on his return to camp to anyone until he has had spears thrown at him.⁴ Spencer and Gillen report that the Australian primitive regards any offense as wiped out by a suitable proffer of atonement.

³ E. M. Curr, *The Australian Race*, Melbourne, 1883, 1:339.

⁴ A. M. Howitt, *The Organization of Australian Tribes*, p. 452.

FILIPINO FOLKTHOUGHT

The Filipino declares: A piece of green wood will burn if placed near the fire. In other words, temptation is a subtle element that ultimately may destroy even persons who are supposedly temptation-proof. In the proverb, Boastfulness drives away wisdom, the Filipino has pointed out that the desire to make a strong impression upon associates hinders intellectual progress. The chief danger of luxury is stated in the saying: He who is raised in ease, is usually destitute. The leading result of being financially fortunate is summarized thus: Easy earning means quick spending. The evils of hypercriticism are bluntly phrased: The fault-finder has the biggest faults. The law of social compensation is stated as follows: You laugh today; I laugh tomorrow. The organic nature of society is implied in the truism: The pain of a finger is the suffering of the whole body. The need for independent thinking is urged in the declaration: Whoever believes everything said, has no mind of his own. On the other hand, the ego-centric mind receives solemn warning in the dictum: He who despises counsel is on the way to misfortune. The value of helpful attitudes is proclaimed as follows: Kindness is a great capital; and again, Good deeds are more precious than gold or silver. A gentle hint of social importance is given in the formula: Kindness is with kindness to be paid, not with gold or silver. In these and related proverbs the earliest social thought of the Filipino mind is indicated.

JAPANESE FOLKTHOUGHT

Let us now examine a few ancient Japanese axioms: (1) The mouth of the mass melts gold. This proverb refers to the fundamental force of public opinion. (2) The world is like a looking-glass; if you smile, others also smile. Here is depicted the elemental character of unconscious imitation. (3) What the ruler wants, the ruled also wants.

In other words, what the upper classes desire, the lower classes long for; or, as Tarde has said: "The superior are imitated by the inferior." (4) Three men get together and have knowledge equivalent to that of Monju (a famous Buddhist thinker). The African, Filipino, and English equivalents of this adage have already been given. All races, apparently, have early observed the safety which comes from taking counsel. (5) The net of Heaven is rough, but will never miss one victim. Our equivalent, of Graeco-Latin origin, is: The mills of the gods grind slowly, but exceedingly small. Evil brings its own rewards sooner or later. The law of retribution cannot be overcome, even by social manipulations. (6) If one dog barks a falsehood, ten thousand others spread it as a truth. In these words, gossip is condemned, and the humanity-wide tendency of hearsay evidence to gain social force is pictured. (7) The tongue is but three inches long, but it can kill a man six feet high. Again, the vicious nature of gossip is shown. Further, the severest punishment is not always physical; it may come from the human tongue. (8) A man takes a drink; then the drink takes the man. In this dramatic description, the drinking of intoxicating liquors is effectively indicted. (9) Applause is the root of abuse. Even the Japanese have recognized the force of opinion in influencing the individual, and of favorable opinion in unduly expanding the ego. A unique characteristic of many Japanese proverbs is the fundamental and deep-moving knowledge of social psychology which they show. Judged by their proverbs, the Japanese possess an unusual understanding of human nature.

MISCELLANEOUS FOLKTHOUGHT

Bulgarian proverbs disclose social thought. The "full-belly" philosophy of the African, or the pig-trough philosophy that has been analyzed by T. N. Carver, has its Bulgarian counterpart: The satiated man cannot believe the

hungry man. The South Slavs are noted for their weddings which often continue for three days. When these festivities are over, the bride enters upon a more or less monotonous round of bearing and rearing children. These social conditions are aptly described:

Dum! Dum! for three days;
Oh dear! Oh dear! for all days.

Patience is enjoined in the Bulgarian adage: Endure, O horse, until the time of green grass. Hope that rises in the heart of man is paid homely but genuine tribute in the rural Slavic proverb: The hungry hen dreams of millet.

The Danes have many sayings which emphasize social dependence. A person is instructed: Act so in the valley that you need not fear those that stand on the hill. The shrewd man is socially dangerous, for: Cunning has little honor. Gossip is shown as a swift messenger in the axiom: A man's character reaches town before his person. The most serious result of cheating others is the effect upon the cheater, or: He is most cheated who cheats himself. The common character of sin is recognized in the Danish proverb: He must be pure who would blame another. Custom is a powerful agency of control. The Danes command: Follow the customs, or fly the country.

The Portuguese have a social saying to the effect: He buys very dear who begs. The unscientific nature of love is indicated in the Portuguese declaration: Love has no law. The frequent antithesis between money lending and friend making is succinctly phrased: Money lent, an enemy made.

Few Arabian proverbs state social ideas. The laws of intersocial stimulation can be found in the following axiom: A wise man associating with the vicious becomes an idiot; a dog traveling with good men becomes a rational being. The strength which comes from unity is forcibly phrased: Three if they unite against a town will ruin it. The transforming power of love is recognized: Love can

make any place agreeable. An idealistic social standard is set for the individual in the aphorism: It is more noble to pardon than to punish. On the other hand, mercy may be misplaced: Mercy to the criminal may be cruelty to the people. A person must beware of being an ingrate; he must not permit his egoistic desires to crush out the spirit of gratitude: A tree that affords thee shade, do not order it cut down. The omnipresence of envy is understood: Envy assails the noblest; the winds howl around the highest peaks. The antisocial tendency of a vicious habit is well described: A hand accustomed to take is far from giving. Perhaps the Malthusian advocate will find solace in the simple dictum: If the sailors become too numerous, the boat will sink. He who pleases everybody has done so at the expense of his own character, or as the Arabs say: He deserves no man's good will of whom all men speak well.

From Ceylon comes the philanthropic request: When you eat, think of the poor. The Cingalese, however, recognize the importance of maintaining the scientific attitude in charity, for they have a saying: He who gives alms must do it with discretion. The blighting influence of wealth is stated in the Cingalese axiom: A covetous man has two sources of iniquity—how to amass money, and how to use it.

Among the Mexican proverbs, social ideas are not missing. The reader will catch the social significance of the following: (1) A howling cat is not a good hunter; (2) Everybody can climb up the limbs of the fallen tree; (3) A rich widow cries with one eye and rings the wedding bells with the other; (4) The tongue slow, the eyes quick; (5) From January to January the bankers have all the money.

The illustrations which have been given from several racial sources will suffice to show the nature of the earliest social thought of primitive peoples. By way of comparison, a few social proverbs which are common among Eng-

lish, Scotch, French, and German speaking peoples, and which are of various origins, will be appended to this chapter.

A SUMMARY

The nature of the primitive social thought that has been preserved through proverbs and sayings justifies the following observations: (1) Primitive social thought was exceedingly simple, crude, and undeveloped. (2) It was uncorrelated and unsystematic. (3) A classification of the total number of the proverbs of any primitive people into individual and social types shows that not more than a small per cent are social. Primitive thinking was done primarily in terms of the welfare of the individual himself. The social thought was commonly of individualistic origin. A social idea was originally not suggested for its own sake or disinterestedly, but for the reason that its observance would enable persons to live together more harmoniously and prosperously. (4) Social proverbs employ figures of speech. Similes from nature are frequent; physical analogies are not uncommon. Many of these figures disclose a rural or bucolic mind. (5) Frequently, the social proverbs of the various races pertain to family and community relationships. The sense of social responsibility does not penetrate as a rule beyond the small group. The responsibility of group to group, is rarely expressed or implied. The social vision does not extend to large groups. (6) A comparative study of primitive social sayings indicates countless similarities, and testifies to the uniformity of human experiences and social needs, irrespective of racial distinctions. These resemblances do not imply collaboration, collusion, or imitation. They mean that the needs of primitive persons in various and unrelated parts of the world have everywhere led the human mind out in search of socially satisfactory explanations. Primitive thinking produced fundamental social concepts, such as kinship, authority, dependence, and tribal loyalty.

SOCIAL PROVERBS⁵

That is not lost which a friend gets.
The shortest road is where the company is good.
A man is known by the company he keeps.
Do unto others as you would have others do unto you.
A man who would have friends must show himself friendly.
One bad example spoils many precepts.
Honesty is the best policy.
One good turn deserves another.
Birds of a feather flock together.
As the twig is bent, the tree is inclined.
People who live in glass houses mustn't throw stones.
Bare is the gift without the giver.
What is not good for the swarm is not good for the bee.
He laughs best who laughs last.
To make a happy couple, the husband must be deaf and the wife blind.
Charity gives itself rich; covetousness hoards itself poor.
Many hands make light work.
He that has never known adversity is but half acquainted with others, or with himself.
A slave has but one master; the ambitious man has as many masters as there are persons whose aid may contribute to the advancement of his fortune.
Thirst teaches all animals to drink but drunkenness belongs only to man.
Opinion is the main thing that does good or harm in the world.
Praise, like gold and diamonds, owes its value only to its scarcity.
It is to be doubted whether he will ever find the way to heaven who desires to go thither alone.
The slander of some people is as great a recommendation as the praise of others.
Nothing is more dangerous than an imprudent friend.
He who receives a good turn should never forget it; but he who does one, should never remember it.
He is happiest, be he king or peasant, who finds peace in his home.

⁵ These social proverbs are chiefly of English origin. Many are anonymous or of unknown origin; many are found in the writings of Spenser and Shakespeare. Some go back to Roman or earlier origins; they are found in the sayings of such writers as the Stoics, i. e., Seneca, Aurelius, and Epictetus. Many interesting comparisons may be made between them and the social proverbs of the Japanese, the Filipinos, or the Africans—already discussed in this chapter.

Study to be what you wish to seem.

To be as good as our fathers, we must be better.

He that does good to another does good also to himself.

The universe is but one great city, full of beloved ones, divine and human, by nature endeared to each other.

He is the richest who is content with the least.

We may have many acquaintances, but we can have few friends.

There would not be so many mouths if there were not so many open ears.

Language most shows a man, speak that I may see thee.

A friend is never known till a man have need.

Love me, love my dog.

It is a wise father that knows his own child.

Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown.

DISCUSSION GROUP TOPICS

1. The range of primitive social thought.
2. The forms in which earliest social thought are preserved.
3. African proverbs of greatest social significance.
4. Filipino, Japanese, and Mexican proverbs of largest social meaning.
5. Comparisons of the social thought of different people as evidenced in their social proverbs.
6. Select three social proverbs from those given in this chapter that you consider the most important, and give a reason for each selection.
7. The most significant conclusions concerning primitive social thought.

CHAPTER III

SOCIAL THOUGHT OF ANCIENT CIVILIZATIONS

IN THIS CHAPTER the discussion of earliest social thought will be presented from the standpoint of the ancient civilizations of Egypt, Babylonia and Assyria, India, China, and Persia. The evidences of social thought are meagre and inchoate. Nevertheless, there are data which cannot be ignored. Inferential evidence and proverbial references constitute the main portion of these data.

(1) The ancient Egyptian social order was bureaucratic and autocratic. The king was supreme. With the rise of the Theban hierarchy, the priestly class came to power and established a theocratic régime. Then military leaders came into prominence and overthrew the theocracy of the priests.

With the historical rise of Egypt, about 4000 B.C., the emphasis upon law as the basis of the social order stands out prominently. The books of laws early acquired sacred significance. They were reputed to be of divine and monarchical origins; they provided courts of justice; and they prescribed punishments for offenses.

The social ideas are to be gleaned almost entirely from proverbial sayings. Egyptian scholars refer to collections of these moral precepts as being of a practical rather than a systematic philosophical nature. The most frequently mentioned of the Egyptian books of proverbs are the Proverbs of Ptah-hotep, and the Prescriptions of Ani.

The social order was dominated as a rule by the king, who was supposed to be divine. The king and a relatively small number of nobles owned the land. The large percentage of the people were serfs and slaves. Throughout ancient Egyptian history, the middle class must have been weak, and small in numbers. When the lands passed un-

der the control of the temple authorities no change occurred in the social conditions of the masses. The priests shared the authority with their auxiliaries, the soldiers. The unprivileged classes included the farmers, boatmen, mechanics, tradespeople, besides the slaves.¹

Egyptian life was rural. Commerce was undeveloped. Higher education was reserved for the very few, although it appears that elementary education was widespread. The priests often used their educational advantages to prey upon and excite the superstitions of the people, thereby strengthening the social control which they enjoyed.

An anomalous phase of the Egyptian mind was that it shifted back and forth from a hedonistic enjoyment of the moment to a serious contemplation of the future life. Amusements were fostered; the drinking of intoxicating liquors was extensive, and music was promoted. The game of draughts was perhaps the national pastime. The people were not warriors. They employed mercenaries, who ultimately became socially powerful.

Polygamy was countenanced and practised, but only of course among the wealthy. A relatively high degree of freedom was granted the women among the privileged classes. They appeared in public with their husbands; they publicly engaged in religious ceremonies; and they were given unusual property rights. At one time it is reported that Egyptian women could not only own property, but could dispose of it as they wished, or could loan money at interest to their husbands. At another time the following injunction seems to have been issued: "Thou shalt not forget thy mother, and what she has done for thee, that she bore thee, and nurtured thee in all ways." Children were enjoined to obey their parents, to be respectful to their superiors, and to be reserved. Greatness was identified with kindness. Justice and kindliness were urged upon the leaders.²

¹ "Boulak Papyrus," translated by Griffith, p. 534, *La Moral Egyptienne*.

² *The Instruction of Ptah-hotep*, translated by Gunn, "Wisdom of the East Series."

The belief in the future world claimed a lion's share of the attention of the Egyptian. As a result, sculpture flourished. It was believed that if the human figure were copied and the copy preserved, the spirit and the body of the departed person could be more easily reunited. Architecture developed, but with the tombs or pyramids and other monuments as the chief forms. Urban mural divisions and fortified walls are still to be found as evidences of Egyptian social institutions.

It was taught that in the next world a person would be held accountable for his deeds in this life. This belief acted as a powerful social control; it involved specific social obligations. A person must deal openly with his fellow men. He must observe the rights of the weaker members of society. For example, he must not make false charges against a slave to the master of the slave. He must show that he has respected the social rights that were invested in property. From the moral and social writings of the Egyptian scribes, it is apparent that in religious matters, a person was moved to give thought to his duties as a citizen and as a neighbor.

(2) The ancient Babylonian and Assyrian social order was similar in many ways to Egyptian civilization. The Babylonian description of a great deluge resembles the account of the Flood that is given in the Old Testament, and indicates thought about morals and social life. Both Babylon and Assyria developed a religion which was expressed in terms of the nation-group. The boundaries of one, with Merodach at the head, and of the other with Assur in supreme control, marked the national group divisions. Merodach, it was believed, accompanied the king in wars and fought for the nation. He was concerned entirely, according to traditions, with the welfare of Babylonia as a population group.

The attitude in Babylonian society toward the institution of slavery was distinctly different from that in Rome, but similar to the Egyptian practices. The slave was con-

sidered in a more social way than by the Romans. He was frequently regarded as one of the family; he could even become a free member of society. "Slavery was no bar to his promotion." Moreover, slavery did not necessarily imprint a social stigma upon the slave.

The social rights of women were similar to the Egyptian customs. The married woman of the ruling classes possessed definite property rights. She could use the property that she owned as she saw fit; she could even bequeath it as she chose. Her dowry gave her economic independence; it was her absolute property, which she could bequeath by will in any way that she desired.

The earliest well-known Babylonian ruler was Hammurabi (2124-2081 B.C.). He is known best through his famous book of laws, the *Code of Hammurabi*. The Code bespeaks for the author the desire to rule Babylonian society justly. There are minute regulations of private business and of labor conditions which give the Code some of the characteristics of modern mercantilistic thought.

The Code contains perhaps the earliest forms of labor legislation that were enacted. Hammurabi sought through legislation to determine wages for different classes of labor. The Code prescribed severe punishment for anyone who sheltered a runaway slave. In this and similar ways, property rights were protected and human elements subordinated. It was not until the Deuteronomic Code was written that the rights of labor received legislative recognition.

Hammurabi stood for a paternalistic control of society. His idea of justice was literally that of an eye for an eye. "If a man has caused the loss of a patrician's eye, his eye shall one cause to be lost."³ Justice, moreover, was subject to the law of social gradation. An offense against a man of lower rank might be atoned by paying money. "If a man has caused a poor man to lose his eye, he shall pay

³ *Code of Hammurabi*, Section 196.

one mina of silver.”⁴ Additional light is thrown on the concept of justice by other passages from the Code, especially by this one: “If a builder has built a house for a man and has not made strong his work, and the house he has built has fallen, and he has caused the death of the owner of the house, that builder shall be put to death.”⁵

The intellectual progress and the inventions of the Babylonians are indicative of social status. The development along artistic lines, particularly in architecture and sculpture, must have exerted an indirect but important social influence. Significant advances in surgery had been made preceding the reign of Hammurabi. In medicine, however, the demonic theory of the causes of disease enslaved the people.

The Assyrians, who lived to the north of the Babylonians, were less social in type. They were little concerned about the future life; their religion was relatively undeveloped. The Assyrian artists gave their attention chiefly to the king, the court, and to war. They reproduced in artistic form the king and the soldier, but ignored the life and customs of the people.

(3) When we turn to early East Indian records, we find a higher development of social ideals than among any peoples which have thus far been considered. In the Vedic documents there is considerable evidence of communal life and of a remarkable degree of social spirit and brotherliness. In the East Indian account of a deluge—similar to the Deluge that is described in Genesis—there is a conception of punishment that falls upon the group because of the sins of individuals. Sacrifice, among the Vedic believers, had acquired a positive social function. It was considered as a social act, in which the worshipper and the god took part. The food strengthened the god and the spiritual contact strengthened the worshipper. Hence, mutual sympathy was generated.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Section 198.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Section 229.

With the rise of Brahmanism, the caste system developed. It divided society. It gave structure to the concept that some people are naturally—and artificially—superior to other people. In the laws of Manu, several social concepts are broached. The nature of marriage and the duties of a householder are explained. The duties of a woman are prescribed. The nature of private and public law is noteworthy, and the recognition of the obligation of one caste to another in times of distress marks the beginning of a reaction against the caste system. It was considered possible for a person to fall from a caste to the one below, but not for a person to rise in caste. The moral standards for individuals reached a level comparable to those represented in certain of the teachings of Jesus. For example, notice this instruction:

“Let him patiently bear hard words, let him not insult anybody, nor become anybody’s enemy for the sake of this perishable body. Against an angry man let him not in return show anger; let him bless when he is cursed.”

Buddhism inaugurated a set of social ideas which involved the abolition of the caste system. In the fourth of the “Four Noble Truths” the principles which are formulated are partly of social import. Commendation is extended to right speech—speech that is friendly and sincere toward others. The requirements include right conduct—conduct which is peaceable and honorable toward other persons. Stress is placed upon right means of securing livelihood—methods which do not involve injury of others or the taking of life. There are types of modern business enterprise that are extolled in our Christian America which would fall under the ban of the “Noble Truths” in pagan India.

Among the “ten commandments” of Buddha, eight represent social ideas and obligations:

- (1) Not to kill any living being.
- (2) Not to take that which is not given (not to steal).
- (3) To refrain from adultery.

- (4) To speak no untruth (not to lie to other people).
- (5) To abstain from intoxicating liquors.
- (6) Not to slander.
- (7) Not to covet.
- (8) Not to be angry.

Buddha taught that hatred is to be repaid by love, that life is to be filled with kindness and compassion, that the widest toleration is to be practised. The teachings of Buddha engendered a delicate social consciousness regarding the relation of a person to his fellows. The precepts were strong enough to break down rigid class barriers. The underlying conception was broadly human.

Additional light is thrown on the social thought of Buddha by the following sayings which are credited to him:

Pity and sympathy is the Buddha's mind.

Pity to his parents is the Supreme Law.

Honesty is the Paradise of the Bodhisattva.

O my disciples, flee from fornication, know how to be content with your own wife, and do not even for a single moment lust after another woman.

A state without a ruler is like a body without a head; it cannot exist very long.

The king looks upon his subjects with a heart of mercy, as if they were his children; and the people regard the king as their father.

If there is no Buddha in the world, be good to your parents; for to be good to one's parents is to minister unto Buddha.

Nursing a sick man is the great field where the righteous tree of mind grows.

Even a strong man cannot lift himself.

Ten people have ten colors (opinions).

The paint which is painted by ten fingers (men) is accurate. (In the multitude of counsellors there is safety.)

The sayings of Buddha may be summed up in the statement that, like many of the teachings of Jesus, they accent the gentle virtues and the passive traits of a people bearing a yoke against which they are powerless to revolt, the

virtues of obedience, respect to those in authority, long-suffering, patience, even resignation.

(4) The social thought of early China can best be gleaned from the writings of Confucius (551-448 B.C.). This scholar was not a reformer nor a religious leader, but primarily a conserver. He was interested in civil and political affairs. His books reflect not his own ideas, for his originality was not great, but the concepts which had been worked out before his time. In the *Lo Ki*, or Record of Rites, there are many social and domestic precepts. In a way the *Lo Ki*, "the Chinaman's manual of conduct," is a treatise on social as well as individual ethics. Around the family group, Chinese social ideas revolved. On the death of his mother, Confucius, for example, went into seclusion for twenty-seven months. On sacrificial occasions the living members and the departed spirits of the household were accustomed to gather in one filial communal group. The welfare of the individual was completely subordinated to the interests of the family group of spirits.

The Chinese worship, or honor, their ancestors. The worship of the past has paralyzed new thought. Custom imitation has ruled and tradition has been revered.

Marriage receives special attention, but the arrangements are made by parents or "go-betweens." Socially, the sexes do not intermingle. The parents exercise complete control over their children; the mother bears a considerable portion of the burden of parental discipline. Filial piety is the cardinal virtue. Although polygamy is discountenanced, concubinage is permitted. The sexes dress very much alike, except in headdress and footgear. The style of wearing apparel is not only simple and aesthetic, but it "minimizes the visible distinctions of sex."

Confucius, or Kung-fu-tsze, believed in the efficacy of setting good examples. Imitation would then accomplish the desired results. By these methods, Confucius expected that society would be improved. Fundamental principles of a stable social order, more than of social progress, were

in the mind of Confucius. He conceived of the universe as a perfect order. Likewise, he thought of the state as a perfect order. Confucius urged that a person should strive for perfection. According to the Confucian doctrine of the Superior Man, a person should master his own passions and desires, substituting an enjoyment of music, ceremony, and of friendship, for the enjoyment that comes from the exercise of the bodily passions. He should seek salvation through the study of nature and of things.

Moral character and intelligence if accompanied by bravery will produce the highest type of personality.

In Chinese social thought the family and state were early recognized as the two leading institutions in society. In the civil organization it is worth while to note the *hien*, or city district. The *hien* has been pronounced "the real unit of Chinese corporate life"; and the *hien* magistrate, "the heart and soul of all official life." Since this magistrate keeps closely in touch with the masses, he is called by the people "the father and mother officer." The *hien* contains some of the germ ideas of democracy; it emphasizes local self-government.

The ancient laws were elaborate, giving an unusual degree of power to the judges. Although customs ruled, the judges often possessed a liberal margin of freedom in determining the nature of punishments. Contrary to Western procedure, the Chinese consider an accused man guilty until proved otherwise. Excessive corporal punishment is deplored.⁶ Confucius objected to the maintenance of a government by the use of fear and of coercive measures. He predicted that capital punishment (even in a land ruled by custom) would be abolished in a hundred years.

The ideas of peace and harmonious social relationships have long held sway in China. Militarism has been scorned, and war held in contempt. It is ironical that as China begins to function as a world power in contact with

⁶ *Shoo King*, 27:3.

Western and Christian nations, she is compelled to find her chief defense in an uncivilized and un-Christian militarism.

Sympathy is a fundamental concept among the Chinese. Industry and patience are characteristic social virtues. Lao-tse, the founder of Taoism and a contemporary of Confucius, taught the social precept: Recompense injury with kindness. Confucius, who disagreed, taught that kindness should be paid with kindness, and injury with injury. This conception led Confucius to formulate his golden rule of human conduct: Do not do to others what you would not have others do to you.

Obedience to authority has been for centuries a cardinal social principle of the Chinese. It was enunciated by Confucius, who spoke as a representative of the ruling classes. In stressing obedience to temporal authorities and in shunning the gods, Confucius has been accused of fostering a materialistic philosophy. This charge is partly offset by his ethical teachings. Confucius was a humanitarian rather than a materialist; he was a utilitarian rather than an idealist. In these attitudes he reflects not his own opinions so much as the thought of the generations which preceded him.

Mencius, who lived shortly after Confucius, was an environmentalist in the sense that he believed that external evil influences have corrupted man's original good nature. On the other hand, Mencius urged progress through regeneration of the heart. Mencius was a more thoroughgoing humanist than Confucius, for he made the happiness of the people the supreme goal for the individual. He condemned war and warriors alike and declared that generals are criminals. He asserted that it is wrong to conquer a territory against the will of the people of that territory.

Of the different peoples which have thus far been considered, the Chinese have furnished the most elaborate degree of social thought. While the social ideals of the Chi-

nese are largely unsystematic, they accent the family and the state as essential social institutions. They also reveal even a significant conception of world brotherliness. The Chinese have probably created more social proverbs than any other people, past or present. For the stage of civilization that is represented by proverbs and sayings, the social thought of the Chinese is unsurpassed. In this regard the Chinese have but one close competitor, the ancient Hebrews.

(5) The Persians, who after their defeat by Alexander the Great in 331 B.C., have been credited with having turned over the torch of civilization to the Greeks, made a contribution to social thought similar to that of the other ancient peoples. Under Cyrus the Great, Darius, and Xerxes, a system of state education was fostered which was designed chiefly to train soldiers. It did not stress social and intellectual development, although it existed in a land that produced the Magi. The persons who were not in the army received slight educational benefits.

It is in the teachings of Zoroaster of the sixteenth century B.C. that we first find the main trend of Persian social thought. The *Zend Avesta*, the document from which Zoroastrianism and the modern Parsee religion have evolved, emphasizes the principle of kindliness in all important human relationships. Sanitation, business honesty, and chastity in family relationships are sought.

The ancient Hebrews and the Greeks each made such large contributions to social thought that separate chapters will be devoted to these peoples. In a summary of the social thought of the Egyptians, Babylonians and Assyrians, East Indians, Chinese, and Persians, it may be said that there is a rather uniform emphasis upon the elemental virtues, particularly upon kindliness. While a person's salvation is given prominence, persons are urged to be socially considerate and to cultivate sympathetic relationships with the gods and with each other.

CHINESE SOCIAL PROVERBS⁷

If a cat cries after eating the mouse, this is false sympathy.

Follow good, learn good; follow beggar, learn to beg.

Gentlemen use heart; lesser men use strength.

New clothes but old friends are good.

Within the four seas all are brothers.

If two people were 1,000 miles apart and be like-minded, they will come together; if they sit opposite one another and are not like-minded there will be no mutual acquaintance.

Speak language fitting to the station of the man you meet.

All under heaven is one home.

Although a man is away from home, his heart is there.

The big fish eat the little ones, the little ones eat the shrimps, and the shrimps are forced to eat mud [applied to the classes of society who pay taxes].

He who praises me on all occasions is a fool who despises me or a knave who wishes to cheat me.

Govern yourself, and you will be able to govern the world.

The hearts of the people are the only legitimate foundations of an empire.

By nature all men are alike; but by education, widely different.

For the sake of one good action, a hundred evil ones should be forgotten.

To forget one's ancestors is to be a brook without a source, a tree without a root.

Rogues differ little; each began first as a disobedient son.

Of all men's actions, there is none greater than filial piety.

When they saw an old man, people walking or driving gave him the road.

Men who had white hairs mingling with the black did not carry burdens along the highways [care for the aged].

When the man of high station is well instructed, he loves men; when the man of low station is well instructed, he is easily ruled.

Three friendships are advantageous: friendship with the upright, friendship with the sincere, and friendship with the man of observation. Three are injurious: friendship with a man of spurious airs, friendship with the insinuatingly soft, and friendship with the glib-tongued.

Who taught you politeness? The impolite.

To be a successful monarch, one must be a just monarch.

⁷ Of anonymous origin.

BUDDHA'S SOCIAL THOUGHT⁸

Hard it is to understand: By giving away our food, we get more strength, by bestowing clothing on others, we gain more beauty; by founding abodes of purity and truth, we acquire great treasures.

There is a proper time and a proper mode in charity; just as the vigorous warrior goes to battle, so is the man who is able to give. He is like an able warrior, a champion strong and wise in action.

Loving and compassionate he gives with reverence and banishes all hatred, envy, and anger.

The charitable man has found the path of salvation. He is like the man who plants a sapling securing thereby the shade, the flowers, and the fruit in future years. Even so is the result of charity, even so is the joy of him who helps those that are in need of assistance; even so is the great Nirvana.

The immortal can be reached only by continuous acts of kindness, and perfection is accomplished by compassion and charity. (pp. 63, 64)

Our good or evil deeds follow us continually like shadows.

That which is most needed is a loving heart!

Regard your people as we do an only son. Do not oppress them, do not destroy them; keep in due check every member of your body, forsake unrighteous doctrine and walk in the straight path; do not exalt yourself by trampling down others. But comfort and befriend the suffering.

Neither ponder much on kingly dignity, nor listen to the smooth words of flatterers.

There is no profit in vexing oneself by austerities, but meditate on Buddha and weigh his righteous law. (p. 73)

All acts of living creatures become bad by ten things, and by avoiding the ten things they become good. There are three evils of the body, four evils of the tongue, and three evils of the mind.

The evils of the body are, murder, theft, and adultery; of the tongue, lying, slander, abuse, and idle talk; of the mind, covetousness, hatred, and error.

I teach you to avoid the ten evils:

1. Kill not, but have regard for life.
2. Steal not, neither do ye rob; but help everybody to be master of the fruits of his labor.

⁸ Reprinted with permission from *The Gospel of Buddha*, edited by Paul Carus, The Open Court Publishing Company, 1909.

3. Abstain from impurity, and lead a life of chastity.
4. Lie not, but be truthful. Speak the truth with discretion, fearlessly and in a loving heart.
5. Invent not evil reports, neither do ye repeat them. Carp not, but look for the good sides of your fellow-beings, so that you may with sincerity defend them against their enemies.
6. Swear not, but speak decently and with dignity.
7. Waste not the time with gossip, but speak to the purpose or keep silence.
8. Covet not, nor envy, but rejoice at the fortunes of other people.
9. Cleanse your heart of malice and cherish no hatred, not even against your enemies; but embrace all living beings with kindness.
10. Free your mind of ignorance and be anxious to learn the truth, especially in the one thing that is needed, lest you fall a prey either to scepticism or to errors. Scepticism will make you indifferent and errors will lead you astray so that you shall not find the noble path that leads to life eternal. (pp. 106-107)

Let a man overcome anger by love, let him overcome evil by good; let him overcome the greedy by liberality, the liar by truth!

For hatred does not cease by hatred at any time; hatred ceases by love, this is an old rule.

Speak the truth, do not yield to anger; give, if thou art asked; by these three steps thou wilt become divine. (p. 115)

The greatest happiness which a mortal man can imagine is the bond of marriage that ties together two loving hearts. But there is a greater happiness still: it is the embrace of truth. Death will separate husband and wife, but death will never affect him who has espoused the truth.

Therefore be married unto the truth and live with the truth in holy wedlock. The husband who loves his wife and desires for a union that shall be everlasting must be faithful to her so as to be like truth itself, and she will rely upon him and revere him and minister unto him. And the wife who loves her husband and desires for a union that shall be everlasting must be faithful to him so as to be like truth itself; and he will place his trust in her, he will honor her, he will provide for her. Verily, I say unto you, their wedlock will be holiness and bliss, and their children will become like unto their parents and will bear witness to their happiness. (pp. 181-182)

CODE OF HAMMURABI⁹

Sec. 141. If a man's wife living in his house, has made up her mind to leave that house, and through extravagance run into debt, have wasted her house, and neglected her husband, one may proceed judicially against her; if her husband consent to her divorce, then he may let her go her way. If her husband do not consent to her divorce and take another wife; the former wife shall remain in the house as a servant. (p. 66)

Sec. 142. If a wife quarrel with her husband, and say, Thou shalt not possess me; then the reasons for her prejudices must be examined. If she be without blame, and there be no fault on her part, but her husband have been tramping around, belittling her very much; then this woman shall be blameless, she shall take her dowry and return to the house of her father. (p. 66)

Sec. 143. If she be not frugal, if she gad about, is extravagant in the house, belittle her husband, they shall throw that woman into the water. (p. 66)

Sec. 148. If a man take a wife, and sickness attack her, if he then set his face to take a second one, he may; but he shall not put away his wife, whom disease has attacked; on the other hand, she shall dwell in the house he has built, and he shall support her as long as she lives. (p. 68)

Sec. 150. If a man give his wife a field, garden, house, or goods, and give her a sealed deed for the same, then, after the death of her husband, her sons cannot present claims; the mother may will what she leaves to that one of her sons whom she may prefer, but to the brothers (her other sons) she need not give. (p. 69)

Sec. 195. If a son strike his father, one shall cut off his hands. (p. 85)

Sec. 196. If a man destroy the eye of another man, one shall destroy his eye. (p. 85)

Sec. 203. If a free-born strikes a man of his own rank, he shall pay one mina of silver. (p. 87)

Sec. 204. If a freeman strike a freeman, he shall pay ten shekels of silver. (p. 87)

Sec. 205. If a slave of a freeman strike a freeman, one shall cut off his ear. (p. 87)

Sec. 233. If a builder build a house for any one, and have not entirely completed the work; if the wall become rickety, the builder shall strengthen that wall at his own expense. (p. 94)

⁹ Reprinted with permission from *The Codes of Hammurabi and Moses*, edited by W. W. Davies, Jennings and Graham, Cincinnati, 1905.

SOCIAL THOUGHTS OF CONFUCIUS¹⁰

The ancients . . . wishing to be sincere in their thoughts, first extended to the utmost their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge lay in the investigation of things. Things being investigated, knowledge became complete. Their knowledge being complete, their thoughts were sincere. Their thoughts being sincere, their hearts were then rectified. Their hearts being rectified, their persons were cultivated. Their persons being cultivated, their families were regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the whole empire was made tranquil and happy. (p. 92)

It is not possible for a man to teach others who cannot teach his own family. Therefore a ruler, without going beyond his family, completes the lessons for the State. There is filial piety; therewith the sovereign should be served. There is fraternal submission, with which the elders and superiors should be served. There is kindness, with which the multitude should be served. There is kindness, with which the multitude should be treated. . . . From the loving example of one family the whole State becomes loving; and from its courtesies, the whole State becomes courteous; while from the ambition and perverseness of one man, the whole State may be led to rebellious disorder—such is the nature of influence. (p. 116)

From the Emperor downwards all must have friends. Friendship is the first of the social relationships, and may not be abandoned for a single day. (p. 129)

What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others. (p. 143)

The superior man enjoys security, but he does not dispense with caution; he preserves what he possesses, yet does not forget that he may lose it; he rules in peace, but does not forget that rebellion is possible; then it is that personal tranquillity may be enjoyed, and the subjects of a state be protected. (p. 140)

With what then will you recompense kindness? Recompense injury with justice, and recompense kindness with kindness. (p. 144)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The chief elements in the social thought of the ancient Egyptians.
2. The nature of the social thought in the Code of Hammurabi.
3. The law of social gradation and its evaluation.

¹⁰ Reprinted with permission from *Confucianism and Taoism*, edited by R. K. Douglas, Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, London, 1906.

4. The social thought elements in Buddha's writings.
5. The leading phases of the social thought of Confucius.
6. The chief social proverb of the Chinese.
7. The most important contributions to social thought of ancient civilizations.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL THOUGHT OF THE HEBREWS

ANCIENT Egyptian, Babylonian and Assyrian, East Indian, Chinese, and Persian records disclose a set of elemental and yet more or less passive social backgrounds against which the social ideals of the Hebrew prophets shine forth like stars of the first magnitude. The Pentateuch and the writings of the Hebrew wise men are rich in gleams of a social spirit, while the Hebrew prophets, notably, Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, and Jeremiah, uttered flaming indictments of social evils.

The Hebrews stood head and shoulders above their contemporaries in social thinking. They left a series of historical documents, covering several centuries and revealing a specific evolution in social concepts. They expressed the fundamentals from which Christian social thought developed, and from which much of the ethical and social thinking of Western civilization on its practical side has evolved.

The social thought of the Hebrews was born of group suffering. Through the mists of the earliest Hebrew traditions we discern that conflicts occurred in the Euphrates Valley which sent Abraham out on his perilous journey toward unknown and hostile Canaan. The gaunt spectre, famine, brought distress to the household of the domestic-loving Abraham and drove him to Egypt where he sojourned for a time. Abram, exalted father, or Abraham, father of a multitude, became the founder in a sense of three world religions, for to him Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism trace their origins.

Throughout the years of migration, exile, and suffering, Abraham maintained his religious faith and belief. By

means of his simple religion he was able to interpret sanely the troubles and conflicts of life. Out of suffering interpreted religiously, Abraham developed a remarkably well-balanced and social personality. From this beginning, Hebrew social thought evolved. Ultimately, Israel created social concepts which have won for her the distinction of being "the leading social teacher of the human race."¹

As a social entity the Hebrews were the result of "a titanic social struggle"; they arose out of an industrial crisis. The scene was laid in Egypt. The descendants of Jacob were working long hours with little pay, as slaves, and under harsh social conditions. One of their number, more favored than the rest by heredity and environment, saw a Hebrew workman being beaten by an Egyptian "boss." The favored one, Moses, felt the surging passions of social injustice rising within his breast—and he slew the boss. Moses thereby became the founder of the world's labor movement. . By an act of violence in the impassioned days of youth, Moses became "a social agitator"; by years of patient service of his people in the name of Jehovah, he became one of the world's greatest social seers.

Rameses II was "an unprincipled captain of industry." He was haughty, hard-hearted, and without social conscience. Moses was sympathetic, socially sensitive, and keenly religious. Rameses II was a leading representative of an ancient aristocracy; Moses was the first great exponent of an incipient democracy, and "the first man in history with a well-developed social consciousness."

According to the Exodus record, Moses, as the murderer of an Egyptian boss, felt no qualms of conscience, but he did fear the mighty Pharaoh. At that time in history it was a minor matter to kill a slave; but to have killed a boss was vastly different. The slave represented weakness; the boss was the official representative of political and financial power. Consequently, Moses fled the coun-

¹ C. F. Kent, *The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus*, Scribner, 1917, p. 4.

try. In Egypt he was helpless, and in danger of losing his life. He fled to Midian.

In Midian, Moses pondered over the economic and social injustices to which his people were being subjected. He communed with God, from whom he received the motive power to correct a gigantic social wrong. His vision of Jehovah gave him the conviction that Jehovah is a God of justice and mercy who understands social and industrial evils and sympathizes with the socially defeated classes. Moses reports this remarkable social message from Jehovah:

"I have surely seen the affliction of my people that are in Egypt, and have heard their cry of anguish because of their taskmasters, and I am come down to deliver them out of the power of the Egyptians."²

In other words, against the union of great wealth and political power in the hands of an unjust man, God revolted, and God said to Moses: "Rescue this Israelitish people from the heels of autocracy." Moses conceived of Jehovah as a God who is "full of sympathy for the afflicted and dependent, and ever eager to champion their cause against cruel oppression." Moses' conception of Jehovah as a socially spirited God is unique for that day in human history. God is described as a lover of justice and even a lover of mankind. When God speaks, it is usually in terms of democracy. The first social teachings of the Old Testament, considered chronologically, are those against social and industrial oppression.

A momentous conflict ensued. Fired by the promises and presence and power of Jehovah, Moses journeyed back to Egypt. He proceeded to organize the first labor strike known to mankind. Thereupon, the angry Pharaoh commanded the workers to make brick without straw. And when the workers cried out against the impositions and burdens, the agents of "the first great captains of industry"

² Exodus 3:7, 8.

taunted the workers and cried at them: "Ye are idle, ye are idle." But God and Moses won against the hosts of autocracy and plutocracy. The workers were freed.

Out of these struggles the Hebrew nation took form. Group loyalty, or patriotism, became a conscious Hebrew concept. The idea of kinship was supplemented by an appreciation of the meaning of national life. Furthermore, a sense of social and economic justice received a clear-cut and positive human expression and divine approval. For the first time the social problem was defined.

SOCIAL PROPHETS

The major social chord which the Hebrew prophets kept vibrating was justice. Some of the recurring interpretations of the needs of the hour were: Let justice roll down like waters. Rulers shall govern in justice. Hear, I pray you, ye heads of Israel, is it not for you to know justice?

The Hebrew word for the English "justice" is *mishpat*. It is used in various senses, such as, justice, order, law, right, legal right. Amos wanted *mishpat* established in the land. Micah asserted that Jehovah requires the individual to do *mishpat*, and to love kindness, and to walk humbly with his God. Isaiah urged the people to do well and to seek *mishpat*; he pronounced woe upon those who turned aside the needy from *mishpat*; he declared Jehovah to be a God of *mishpat*. Jeremiah made plain that Jehovah exercises mercy and *mishpat* among the people.

Amos protested vigorously against special class privileges. He denounced the wealthy classes because of their social arrogance and economic injustice. In describing them, he points out a fundamental principle of social revolution. By their repression of those who are protesting, they "are heaping up violence"; that is, autocratic repression will never right injustice, but will foster ultimate revolution. Amos charged the rulers and all persons in positions of social power with the primary obligation of seeing that the poor and the outcast are protected from ex-

ploitation. What satire in a day when rulers were noted for their exploitation of the weak social classes!

A special responsibility rests upon judges. Amos severely arraigned all who turn judgment to wormwood and cast righteousness to the ground. Anathemas were heaped upon the takers of bribes, especially if they sit in places of public authority and wear the robes of law and patriotism. Hot denunciation fell also upon the private doer of injustice; upon the merchant who makes smaller the measure and perverts the balances; upon all who trample in any way upon the needy, who trample on the head of the poor, who sell the righteous for silver, who turn aside the way of the humble.³ The concept of justice was vividly defined by Amos. Moreover, the shepherd-prophet of Tekoa had the courage and ability to make the concept clear to all who would listen to him. Amos spoke for justice on the throne, on the judge's bench, in the activities of the wealthy, in the transactions of merchants, and in the daily dealings of persons with one another.

The campaign against injustice is carried forward by the first Isaiah, the statesman and orator. In the Kingdom of Judah, Isaiah found the same social evils that Amos had earlier preached against in the Northern kingdom. The boldness of his attack is startling:

"Thy princes are rebellious, and companions of thieves: everyone loveth gifts, and followeth after rewards: they judge not the fatherless, neither does the cause of the widow come unto them."⁴

Then Isaiah enters upon perhaps the most open, daring, and indignant challenge to doers of social iniquity that is to be found anywhere:

"Ye have eaten of the vineyard; the spoil of the poor is in your houses. What mean ye that ye beat my people to pieces, and grind the faces of the poor?"⁵

³ Amos 2:6, 7, 8; 3:10; 4:1, 2; 5:7, 15; 6:4.

⁴ Isaiah 1:23.

⁵ Isaiah 3:14, 15.

After the manner of Amos, Isaiah protested vigorously against the judges and officers of the law who for a bribe vindicate the wicked and deprive the innocent man of his innocence. He denounced in no doubtful language the scribes who devote themselves to writing oppression, who turn aside the dependent from securing justice, who prevent Jehovah's followers from receiving honest treatment, who prey upon widows and despoil orphans. Special condemnation was heaped upon those who set up iniquitous decrees.

Isaiah was a forerunner in an indirect sense of Henry George, for he vehemently rebuked land monopolists. His new principle is contained in a pronouncement of woes upon the persons who join house to house and add field to field, until there is no land left except for the monopolist who dwells as a lord over all. Isaiah protested against social injustice not only because of the harmful effects upon persons but also because of the destructive and enervating national results.

After the manner of Amos and Isaiah, Micah conceived of Jehovah as a just God. Micah depicts the social injustice of his day in terms of the persons who hate the good and love the evil, who pluck off the skin of the weak, even the flesh from the bones of Jehovah's followers; "who also eat the flesh of my people, and flay their skin from off them; and they break their bones, and chop them in pieces, as for the pot, and as flesh within the caldron."⁶

Micah unhesitatingly condemns the priests who are giving oracles for a reward, and the prophets who are divining for silver and who are trusting in Jehovah to protect them. Micah was perhaps the first person to describe the activities of the criminaloid which have been so carefully analyzed by Edward A. Ross. He grasped the concept of the social sinner who keeps within the law. He attacked wealthy landowners who crush the small holders; he spared

⁶ Micah 3:2, 3.

neither high officials, nor priests. He presented his social concepts with precision and effectiveness.

The invectives against social injustice are carried into the teachings of Jeremiah. They appear later in the Deuteronomic Code. The Psalmists deprecated injustice. The wisdom teachers uttered profound warnings on the subject. The writer of Job deplored injustice. Throughout the Old Testament the almost countless references justify the conclusion that justice is the leading concept which is presented by ancient Hebrew thought.

DIATRIBES AGAINST LUXURY

The Old Testament parallels its denunciation of unjust social relationships with diatribes against luxury. The evil effects of great riches are again and again described. Amos boldly pointed the finger of scorn at the idle rich, at those who "lie upon beds of ivory and stretch themselves upon their couches."

The possession of vast wealth has usually been considered by those persons who are immediately concerned as an expression of divine favor. Amos exposed the fallacies in this belief, commanded the owners of wealth to assume social responsibility, and instantly to cease their unholy practices of securing gain.

Isaiah united with Amos in treating the possession of wealth not as a matter of favor or luck, but as a social trust. With one stroke Jeremiah tore off the gilded frame from about the life of the self-indulgent, luxury-loving King Jehoiakim. What powerful and autocratic monarch was ever charged with indulging in luxury in such relentless and uncompromising language as this?

Woe unto him that buildeth his house by unrighteousness, and his chambers by injustice. . . .

Shalt thou reign, because thou closest thyself in cedar? . . .

But thine eyes and thine heart are not but for thy covetousness, and for to shed innocent blood, and for oppression, and for violence, to do it.⁷

⁷ Jeremiah 22:13, 15, 17 (*Modern Reader's Bible*).

The ways of the dishonest rich are vividly described by Jeremiah. They set snares and catch people with lying. Their houses are full of evidences of their crooked dealings. They maintain themselves in luxury despite wanton expenditures by violating the needs of the fatherless and the needy.

Zephaniah was no less direct in pointing out the dangers in wealth. He declared that ill-gotten gains shall themselves become a prey and that the houses of the sinful rich shall become desolate. All their silver and their gold shall not be able to deliver them from their ultimate desolation.

In a beautiful and effective style the Wisdom writer in Proverbs unconsciously sums up the Old Testament philosophy concerning wealth:

Labor not to become rich; cease from thine own wisdom. Wilt thou set thine eyes upon that which is not? For riches certainly make themselves wings; they fly as an eagle toward heaven.

The Old Testament with surprising uniformity supports the cause of labor. The welfare of the slave is frequently espoused. According to the Deuteronomic Code a runaway slave who was caught did not necessarily need to be returned to his owner. In fact, a person who harbored such a slave was expressly enjoined not to return him. By this injunction the rights of property and vested interests in slaves were ignored. Such an attitude was in opposition to the Code of Hammurabi and to the codes of vested interests throughout history. Slavery, however, was a well-established institution among the ancient Hebrews.⁸

Although the law book of Hammurabi fixed the wages of laborers, the Old Testament law book restricted the hours of labor. Not only is the master to limit his labor to six days a week, but he is commanded to see that his slaves, male and female, do not work more than six days.

⁸ Louis Wallis, *Sociological Study of the Bible*, University of Chicago Press, 1912, Ch. VII.

Modern industry, even twentieth-century manufacturing enterprise in the United States, has been persistently violating the labor rules of the Hebrew lawgivers. Employers are commanded not to take advantage of poor and needy hired servants. They shall not oppress labor simply because they are powerful and labor is weak. Even the poor immigrant laborer is not to be exploited!

The first legislation in behalf of immigrants is found in Deuteronomy. Employers must respect the needs of alien workers. The foreigner shall not be oppressed. In the ordinary dealing between citizens and foreigners, justice must not be perverted. The Hebrew lawmakers even went so far as to issue the command: Love ye therefore the strangers, for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.

MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY

The institution of marriage is early accented in the Old Testament. In the second chapter of Genesis divine approval is placed upon marriage. In accordance with biological and social needs the institution of marriage is made sacred. Although the Hebrews are noted for their emphasis upon the responsibility of children to parents, the husband is ordered to forsake his father and his mother and cleave unto his wife. A man's obligations to his helpmate exceed even his obligations to his father and mother.

The concept of a long-suffering, patient husband is extensively elaborated in the teachings of Hosea. This prophet of the eighth century B.C. demonstrated the sanctity of the marriage relation by remaining true to it even after his wife bore children of whom he was not the father. It is remarkable that Hosea should not have divorced his wife at once when he learned of her unfaithfulness to the marriage vow. Hosea taught, by example, that divorce should be the last resort after all the means of love have been used in trying to win back the erring partner.

The description of Hosea's domestic difficulties, whether allegorical or not, is an early protest against the double standard of morals for man and woman. The attitude of people in modern society who blame and shun the fallen woman but permit the guilty man to continue to enjoy the company of respectable men and women is vigorously challenged by Hosea.

The last word against sex immorality was pronounced by Hosea. His description of the effects of widespread sex immorality is brief but incisive:

Whoredom and wine and new wine take away the heart.

Their glory shall fly like a bird, from the birth, and from the womb, and from the conception.

Their root is dried up, they shall bear no fruit.⁹

In the Deuteronomic laws we find the duties of parents to children and of children to parents carefully outlined. Parents, primarily, are made responsible for moral and religious education in the home; and children are under obligations to obey their parents. This teaching is summed up in the injunction: "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee"¹⁰; and in the imprecation: "Whoso curseth his father or his mother, his lamp shall be put out in obscure darkness."¹¹

The Wisdom writers dwell at considerable length upon the proper relationships of husbands and wives and of parents and children. They point the finger of shame at the quarrelsome woman. They warn against the woman whose chief asset is her beauty. "A virtuous wife is a crown to her husband, but an immoral wife is as rottenness in his bones."¹²

The Wisdom teachers do not minimize the importance of parental discipline. On occasion parents must act with

⁹ Hosea 4:11; 9:11, 16.

¹⁰ Exodus 20:12.

¹¹ Proverbs 20:20.

¹² Proverbs 12:4.

force. Correction of children is commanded. The situation is pictured in the following language:

The word and reproof bring wisdom; but a child left to himself bringeth his mother to shame.¹³

In other words, it is necessary that parents assume a positive, definite attitude in regard to child nurture. They must see that their children are actually trained in the ways in which they should go. Even the loving parent must sometimes show his affection for his child by chastising the child. Only by such a procedure do children grow up to be a comfort to parents in their old age.

On the other hand the child must assume his share of responsibility. It is the part of wisdom for children to receive willingly the instruction that parents can give. The wise son loves parental advice. He listens gladly to his father; he does not despise his mother's counsels.

It has already been intimated that the Old Testament writers frequently stress the importance of high standards of conduct for women. Amos rebuked the wives of nobles and the wealthy who fritter away their best impulses in idleness and sinful living and who dissipate their deepest instincts in debauchery. Amos and Isaiah agreed, apparently, that a nation's welfare depends on the attitudes of its women. The wrath of God will fall upon women who are haughty, who walk with heads held high and with wanton glances, who go tripping along, "making a tinkling with their feet."

The antisocial character of sin was pointed out in Genesis. Cain was the first to raise naïvely and blandly the question: "Am I my brother's keeper?" Sinful living narrows the soul, increases selfishness, and vitiates a genuine social attitude. Sinning is repudiating social responsibility. Amos advanced the idea that selfish living was nothing less than disloyalty to one's own country. To dis-

¹³ Proverbs 29:15.

sipate one's energy is to undermine one's usefulness to his country.

Intemperance was deplored. Isaiah has been called the first temperance reformer of the world. His impassioned and classic utterances are well represented by the following lines:

Woe unto them that rise up early in the morning that they may follow strong drink; that continue until night, till wine inflame them.¹⁴

Isaiah warned especially the priests and prophets of the evils of intemperance. Wine will swallow them up, it will put them out of the way, it will cause them to err in wisdom and to stumble in judgment.

In both Leviticus and Numbers the danger that lurks in the wine cup is recognized. The special servants of Jehovah are commanded to separate themselves from wine and strong drink. In Proverbs the Wisdom writer declares:

Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging and whoever is deceived thereby is not wise.¹⁵

The same authority admonishes rulers and judges not to drink wine lest they forget the law and pervert judgment of the afflicted. On the other hand, a reversion to a lower standard is made in Proverbs when the legitimacy of giving strong drink to the poor and miserable is recognized, so that they may forget their poverty and misery.¹⁶ The general teaching, however, is that strong drink leads to social inefficiency and the disintegration of human personalities.

The cities of refuge represent a new social idea. A person who has taken life without intention may flee to and find protection in the cities of refuge. The altar and the sanctuary are designated as places to which persons may flee who are not wilful murderers.¹⁷

¹⁴ Isaiah 5:11.

¹⁵ Proverbs 20:1.

¹⁶ Proverbs 31:7.

¹⁷ Exodus 21:13; I Kings 1:50; 2:28.

The social concept of democracy occupies an interesting place in the Old Testament literature. In the days of Abraham the kinship group prevailed. Within this group there were many households, ruled by patriarchs. Within the kinship groups standards of honor were maintained, but antisocial attitudes toward outside and foreign groups were encouraged. It was justifiable, for example, to lie to foreign groups and even to kill the representatives of such peoples.

The concept of democracy developed *pari passu* with the evolution of the idea of Jehovah. In the minds of the Hebrews, Jehovah, or Jahweh, was first a tribal god, then a national god; and finally, a universal God, that is, a being who is interested in the welfare of all peoples, and not simply in the welfare of "the chosen people."

The Hebrew conception of the state contained several democratic elements. The fundamental purpose of the state was declared to be the welfare not of an irresponsible monarch, but of the people themselves. This idea stands out in marked contradiction to the practices of the Canaanites, who submitted themselves helplessly to capricious and autocratic rulers.

The Hebrews treated the state as a part of a theocracy. But when Jehovah spoke, he usually arraigned false wealth, arbitrary political power, selfish ambition of kings, luxurious living, and special privileges. Jehovah spoke for the oppressed, the poor, the defeated, the laborer, in short, for humanity.

Consequently, loyalty to the nation was positive and persistent. Consider this statement from Psalm 137 of Hebrew patriotism on the part of exiled Hebrews who longed for their native land:

By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept, when we remembered Zion.

We hanged our harps upon the willows in the midst thereof. . . .

If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning.

If I do not remember thee, let my tongue cleave to the roof of my mouth; if I prefer not Jerusalem above my chief joy.

According to Hosea, Jehovah charged the citizens of the land to deal with one another on the basis of fidelity and true love, and to stamp out all social evils, such as perjury, stealing, committing adultery, and mob violence. The writer of the Book of Job portrayed a good citizen as one who delivers the poor, who helps those about to perish, who causes the widow's heart to sing for joy.¹⁸ He is eyes to the blind, feet to the lame, and a father to the needy. He searches out the cause of social evils. Moreover, he breaks the jaws of the unrighteous, and plucks the prey from their mouths. He defends the blameless. He does not put his confidence in gold or rejoice at his enemies when evils beset them or they are destroyed. It may be truly said that fundamental ideas of democracy were originated by the Hebrews.

INTERNATIONALISM AND PEACE

Amos raised the question of internationalism. For the first time in history, the idea of a universal God was postulated. Amos pronounced Jehovah the God of other peoples besides the Israelites. "Have not I brought up Israel out of the land of Egypt?" said Jehovah, "and the Philistines from Caphtor, and the Syrians from Kir?"¹⁹ The day would come, according to Isaiah and Micah, when Jehovah would judge over many peoples and rebuke strong nations. The conception of Jehovah as a Being who transcends both time and space gave to the Hebrew mind at its best a broader cast and a more universal comprehension than the peoples of contemporary tribes and nations possessed.

The concept of universal peace was invented by the Hebrews. Isaiah and Micah share the honor of being the

¹⁸ Job 31.

¹⁹ Amos 9:7.

first persons to advocate world peace, and to predict the day when all nations shall worship a just God and thereby be enabled to beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning-hooks, when nation shall not stand against nation, and when the methods of warfare shall no longer be taught. The spirit of hatred and of blind, egoistic antagonism shall pass away. No modern writer has ever spoken the doom of militarism so trenchantly as the Old Testament prophet, Isaiah, who said, according to the translation by Charles Foster Kent:

For every boot of the warrior with noisy tread,
And every war-cloak drenched in the blood of the slain
Will be completely burned up as fuel for the flame.²⁰

The Hebrews strongly emphasized love as a social dynamic. Love will make socialized individuals. It will demonstrate to a person his responsibilities as a member of society and his duties to his fellow human beings. It will stifle hatred. It will even return good for evil. It is the cardinal virtue and an eternal principle of right living.

The Old Testament teaches social salvation. Jehovah is fundamentally interested in the improvement of social and living conditions. He commanded the socialization of all human relationships. His teachings, as given by the prophets and Wisdom writers, take cognizance of the influence of environment upon character.

Hebrew social thought deals largely with social injustice. Social evils are vividly described and evil-doers, chiefly kings and judges, are vigorously and fearlessly arraigned. The family is made the chief social institution, and love is crowned servant of all. Education is centered in the home, and moral discipline is made the keynote of education; hence the Hebrews survived the Greeks and Romans. A new and perfect social order, directed by a just Jehovah, and motivated throughout all its individual and social relationships by love, is prophesied.

²⁰ Isaiah 9:5; cf. Kent, *The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus*, p. 112.

SOCIAL COMMANDMENTS²¹

Honor your father and your mother, that you may live long on the land which Jehovah your God gives you.

You shall not murder.

You shall not commit adultery.

You shall not steal.

You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor.

You shall not covet your neighbor's household; you shall not covet your neighbor's wife, nor his male servant, nor his female servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything that belongs to your neighbor.
(p. 91)

THE CITY AS A PROBLEM

Hark! Jehovah calls to the city!

Hear, O tribe and council of the city,

Whose rich men are given to deeds of violence,

And whose citizens speak only falsehood;

Can I forget the riches in the house of the wicked,

And the accursed scant measure?

Or condone the wicked balances,

And the bag of short weights?

I indeed have begun to crush you,
To destroy you because of your sins.

You shall eat, but not be satisfied,

You shall store away, but not save,

You shall sow but shall reap nothing,

Press out olives, but not anoint yourself,

And make new wine, but drink none of it. (p. 375)

TRUE DEMOCRACY

Behold, a ruler shall rule uprightly,

And officials also shall govern justly.

Each shall be as a shelter from the wind,

Like a hiding-place from the driving storm,

Like streams of water in ground that is dry,

Like the shadow of a great rock in a weary land.

²¹ The following excerpts (with the exception of the last) are reprinted by permission from *The Old Testament (Shorter Bible)*, translated and arranged by Charles Foster Kent, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925.

The eyes of those who can see shall not be closed,
And the ears of those who can hear shall be attentive;
The mind of the impetuous shall understand knowledge,
And the tongues of stammerers shall speak without halting.

No more shall the ignoble be called noble,
Nor the knave be hailed as princely.
For the ignoble speaks ignobly,
And his mind plans villainy:
To do what is impious,
To speak error regarding Jehovah,
To keep the hungry soul empty,
To withhold drink from the thirsty.
But the noble man makes noble plans,
By his noble acts shall he stand. (p. 415)

THE VALUE OF EDUCATION

He who gains knowledge is a friend to himself,
He who cherishes insight shall prosper.
Wisdom is better than gold,
And insight more desirable than silver.

The tongues of the wise dispense knowledge,
But the mouths of fools pour out folly.
The mind of the wise guides his mouth,
And adds persuasiveness to his lips.
Good sense is rewarded with favor,
But the conduct of the faithless destroys them. (p. 537)

RESPONSIBILITY OF PARENTS TO THEIR CHILDREN

Train a child in the way he should go,
When he is old he will not depart from it.
Correct your son, and he will bring you comfort,
And give you exquisite delight.
Better is open rebuke
Than love that is hidden.

A righteous man who lives a blameless life,—
Blessed are his children after him! (p. 539)

THE RELATIVE VALUE OF WEALTH

Better is a poor man who lives a blameless life
Than one who is dishonest, though he be rich.
Better is a little with righteousness
Than great revenues with injustice.
Better is a modest spirit with the humble,
Than to divide spoil with the arrogant.
A good name is better than great riches,
More highly esteemed than silver and gold.
Treasures unjustly acquired profit nothing,
But righteousness delivers from death.
He who trusts in riches shall fail,
But the upright flourish like a green leaf.
Toil not that you may become rich;
Cease through your own understanding.
Should you set your eyes upon it, it is gone!
For riches take their flight
Like an eagle that soars toward heaven.
Better is little with reverence for the Lord
Than great treasures and trouble as well. (pp. 545-6)

TEMPERANCE IN EATING AND DRINKING

Wine is a mocker, strong drink is turbulent,
And whoever is misled by it is not wise.
Who cries, "Woe"? who, "Alas"?
Who has contentions? Who complains?
Who has wounds without cause?
Who has redness of eyes?
They who linger long over wine,
They who go in to taste mixed wine.
So look not on wine when it is red,
When it sparkles in the cup,
And glides down smoothly.
At last it bites like a snake,
And stings like an adder.
Then you will see strange things,
And your mind utter distorted ideas.
You will be like one sleeping at sea,
Like one asleep in a violent storm.

"I have been struck, but I feel no pain;
I have been beaten, I am not conscious of it.
When shall I awake, from my wine?
I will seek it yet again." (p. 550)

THE SOCIAL CITIZEN²²

When the ear heard, then it blessed me;
When the eye saw, it gave witness to me,
Because I delivered the poor who cried,
The fatherless also, who had none to help him.
The blessing of him who was ready to perish came upon me,
And I caused the widow's heart to sing for joy.
I put on righteousness and it clothed me;
My justice was as a robe and a turban,
I was eyes to the blind,
And feet to the lame.
I, indeed, was a father to the needy,
And the cause which I knew not I searched out.
And I broke the jaws of the unrighteous,
And plucked the prey out of his teeth.

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. Origins of the social thought of the Hebrews.
2. Abraham's main rôle as a world character.
3. The first labor strike in history.
4. Moses as a radical.
5. The type of social consciousness possessed by Moses.
6. The keynote of Amos' social thought.
7. Isaiah as a forerunner of Henry George.
8. Isaiah as a precursor of the Eighteenth Amendment.
9. Micah as an advance spokesman for E. A. Ross.
10. The "social duet" of Isaiah and Micah.
11. Social thought stressed by Jeremiah and Zephaniah.
12. The social theme of the Book of Hosea.
13. The social thought of the story of Cain.
14. Social thought significance of the Book of Job.
15. Phases of Old Testament labor legislation.
16. Old Testament attitude toward marriage.
17. The filial duty concept of Old Testament writers.
18. A summary of Hebrew social thought in two words.

²² Reprinted by permission from *The Social Teachings of the Prophets and Jesus*, by Charles Foster Kent, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1917.

CHAPTER V

PLATO AND GRECIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT

IN TURNING to a study of Grecian civilization we find a development of social thought which on the rational side excels in many particulars the social thinking of the Hebrews, but which in its affective elements falls far below the quality of Hebrew social thought. We may expect to find, therefore, in Grecian social thought important new contributions which are complementary to the legacies from the Hebrews, and which when taken in conjunction with the early Christian forms of Hebrew social thought constitute the main foundations of modern social thought.

The thought life of the Greeks reached the crescendo in the idealism of Plato (427-347 B.C.) and in the opportunism of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.). In an idea-world Plato depicted an ideal society. After studying 158 constitutions, Aristotle formulated rules of practical social procedure, Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics* are the two leading source-books of Grecian social thought.

Plato and Aristotle were the first two thinkers in history who left definitely organized analyses of society life. Although in point of time they stand close together, in content of social thought they are at many places antagonistic. However, their high rank as thinkers need not blind anyone to the fact that their social thought was in part an outgrowth of theories held by predecessors. Antecedent to Plato were Socrates and the Sophists; antecedent to these scholars was a large number of thinkers who, incidentally to their main intellectual efforts, gave expression to isolated but significant social ideas.

EARLIEST GREEK THOUGHT

As early as the ninth century B.C., Lycurgus declared that the state owned the child, and urged a system of education which would prepare the child for the state. In spite, however, of a similar emphasis by many later Greek leaders, "Hellas" never developed a genuine national unity. She experienced a temporary national patriotism only when attacked by the Persians and at the seasons when the national games were at their height.

It was Hesiod, the founder of Greek didactic poetry, who about 700 B.C., described the Golden Age and the subsequent ages of society. Hesiod protested mildly against the social injustice in his time.¹ In the following century, Anaximander, the philosopher, and Theognis, the elegiac poet,² discussed the value to society of providing that children should be well born and well trained—the fundamental concepts of current eugenics and eugenics.

Solon, the Athenian lawgiver, about 590 B.C., began to put into legislative practice certain ideas of social reform, thereby preventing revolution. At that time it was customary to sell persons into slavery who could not pay their debts—a procedure which Solon ended. The cost of living was very high, consequently Solon forbade the export of food products and thereby reduced prices for the consumer. He introduced a measure which today would be considered revolutionary, namely, the limiting of the amount of land which a person might hold. For the classification of people on the basis of wealth, he substituted a classification on the basis of income. He lessened the severity of the laws of Draco, and in other ways increased the freedom of the individual. Although Solon's régime was followed by a tyranny, Solon is credited with initiating certain essential ideas of democracy.

¹ Hesiod, *Work and Days*, translated by A. W. Mains, Oxford, 1908.

² *The Works of Hesiod, Calimachus, and Theognis*, translated by Banks, Bohn's Classical Library, p. 227.

BEGINNINGS OF DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT

After the Tyrants, Athens under the leadership of men like Cleisthenes became "a pure democracy." Cleisthenes democratized the Athenian Constitution. For the four phylae he substituted ten phylae, or units of government, thus securing a new and better distribution of authority. He is credited with introducing ostracism as a mode of punishment; he, it is alleged, was the first person to be ostracized by his government.

The fifth-century precursors of Plato and Aristotle were numerous. Aeschylus (525-456 B.C.), the first of the famous Athenian tragic poets, described in general terms the evolution of civilized society.³ The artistic historian, Herodotus, developed through his imagination a world point of view. From an almost unlimited store of legendary and ethnological materials, he elaborated a planetary theme which had its beginning in the Trojan War and its culmination in the conflict between Eastern and Western civilizations. The basic social principle in the writings of Herodotus is that downfall awaits the insolent autocrats of earth. Herodotus describes the customs and habits of the peoples whom he visited on his numerous foreign travels in such a detailed and elaborate fashion that he has been styled the world's first descriptive sociologist.⁴

Pericles (495?-429 B.C.), perhaps the greatest statesman of Greece, furthered the cause of democracy. His conception of democracy led him to make the entire body of citizens eligible to officeholding. Pericles initiated a social program which in certain aspects was paternalistic. He instituted the plan of granting allowances for performing public duties. As a result, true public service was minimized and political morale was weakened. Pericles was led into this error⁵ by the desire to compete for public es-

³ Botsford and Sihler, *Hellenic Civilization*, p. 64.

⁴ George Rawlinson, translator, *History of Herodotus*, 4 vols.

⁵ Plutarch's *Pericles*, revised by Clough, 1:234 ff.

teem with Cimon, who made extensive gifts to the poor in the form of dinners and clothes.

In his tragedies, Euripides (480-406 B.C.), aroused interest in the experiences, not of legendary characters as many of his predecessors had done, but of the ordinary members of Athenian society. He was a spokesman for the emancipation of woman;⁶ his writings reveal the social changes that were occurring in the fifth century in Athens. Likewise, the comedies of Aristophanes reflected social changes, and, in addition, caricatured social conditions.

Hippocrates, the so-called father of medical science, wrote several works which attracted the studious attention of Plato. He gave as the first of two chief causes of disease, the influence of climate, seasons, weather, on the individual.⁷ He might be called the first anthropo-geographer. At any rate he opened the field which has been so well covered by Ellen C. Semple in the *Influences of Geographic Environment*, and by Ellsworth Huntington in his recent studies on civilization in relation to climate.

By their disconcerting and sceptical teachings the Sophists, who also lived in the fifth century B.C., stimulated the intellectual activities of Socrates. The influence of the Sophist leaders, such as Protagoras, Gorgas, Callicles, Thrasymachus, brought forward the problem of training pupils to solve civic questions rather than scientific or philosophical questions. According to Plato, Callicles believed that government was an instrument for exploiting the masses. Thrasymachus argued that so-called justice is that type of activity which favors the interest of the strongest members of society, and that might determines what is called right.⁸ Epaminondas, the Theban statesman, personified in his own career an unusually high in-

⁶ Botsford and Sihler, *Hellenic Civilization*, p. 340.

⁷ *On Air, Water, and Places*, in the genuine "Works of Hippocrates," translated by Adams, Vol. I.

⁸ Plato I, 338 B, C. All references to Plato's *Dialogues* in this chapter or in later chapters are to Jowett's translation.

terpretation of the concept of patriotism, perhaps a more unselfish expression of patriotism than is represented by any other political spokesman of the Hellenic states.

SOCRATIC THOUGHT

The argument of the Sophists that what is best for the individual is best for society aroused the antagonism of Socrates (469-399 B.C.), whose ideas are reported by Plato and Xenophon. Socrates, the son of an Athenian sculptor, asserted that the qualities of justice, wisdom, temperance, and courage which make an individual a good member of society and which increase social welfare, are the same qualities which make an individual a good person and secure his personal advancement. Socrates spent many years at the market places, on the streets where people congregate and at the public resorts in studying the actions of persons and in engaging them in conversation concerning their moral life. As a result Socrates evolved a significant social philosophy. The heart of this philosophy is found in the statements that virtue is knowledge, not in the sense of mere memorized facts but of a thorough understanding. If a person understands completely the good and evil phases of a proposed act, he will choose the right. For example, when one is completely convinced of the harmful effects of poor teeth, he will employ the regular services of a dentist to keep his teeth in good condition. When he perceives the evil effects of dishonesty, he will establish honest habits. The conclusion might be drawn that social virtue rests upon societary knowledge.

Socrates was convinced that something was fundamentally wrong with Athenian society. Everywhere he saw that ignorance led to vice. Only in the mechanical and professional activities did he discover correct action, but this was preceded by correct knowledge.⁹

⁹ Adela M. Adam, *Plato, Moral and Political Ideals*, p. 10.

A good carpenter is an individual who thoroughly understands carpentry; a good man is an individual who truly knows the value of good actions. Similarly, it might be said that a good urban resident is a person who deeply appreciates what it means to have a city of mutually developing people.

Socrates wished to make all men intelligent. His teachings raised the deep-seated social question: How can social organization be made highly advantageous to a person, and a person made so aware of these advantages that he will always act socially?¹⁰ Inasmuch as Socrates left no writings, it is impossible to explain with certainty his teachings. Fortunately, he left a permanent impress of his personality on the lives of his associates, and particularly, upon his able and brilliant pupil, Plato.

In the fundamental dictum that virtue is knowledge, Socrates is theoretically correct, but practically he ignores the overpowering influence that oftentimes is exerted by the inherited and acquired behavior patterns. He underestimates the power that is represented by deeply ingrained behavior patterns, for these are firmly established neurologically, whereas knowledge is often new to a person and merely a veneer on the surface of his life. The acquisition of knowledge is no guarantee that instinctive tendencies centuries old will be promptly overcome or redirected.

Furthermore, with a young child the instinctive tendencies begin to assert themselves and to give direction to the growth of the character of the child, long before his mentality has unfolded and developed to the point where he is capable of genuinely understanding the real meaning of many forms of activity, and where many phases of knowledge are entirely beyond his ability to comprehend.

¹⁰ The reader will find in Will Durant's *Philosophy and the Social Problem*, Ch. I, a unique although ideocentric interpretation of Socrates.

PLATO'S SOCIAL THOUGHT

Little is known concerning Plato's early life and training. The most influential factors were the life and teachings of Socrates. The strong Socratic personality left its indelible impress upon the thought-life of Plato. As a young man, Plato became greatly interested in Athenian social and civic life. When he was perhaps twenty-three years of age, the self-styled "Fair and Good" rulers came into control of Athens. The failure of these men, whom history calls the Thirty Tyrants, to govern wisely, produced an attitude of thorough disgust in the mind of Plato. Further, the legalized murder of Socrates by the restored democracy in 399 B.C. aroused the bitter antagonism of Plato to the existing forms of government. In the years which followed the death of Socrates, popular rule produced loose and licentious social conditions. As a consequence, Plato turned to the realms of the thought world in order to find a perfect society. As a result of his contact with everyday life and government, Plato evolved in his mind an ideal republic.

The Socratic principle that virtue is knowledge was accepted by Plato. In Plato's thinking this proposition led to the generalization that education is the most important thing in the world. Upon this doctrine more than any other, Plato's twentieth-century influence thrives.

What shall be the nature of a world-molding education? Theoretically, Plato gives his answer in his epistemology. Ideas are the ruling forces in life. Over against the uncertain fluctuating sense world, Plato set up a realm of eternal, changeless ideas. An individual man is simply an ephemeral expression of Man. Plato created a concept of unchangeable reality which he found in Ideas. These, alone, are the permanent, worth-while elements which man must seek to know and understand.

Because of his aristocratic attitudes and of his early disgust with the experiments in democracy in his day, Plato

turned away in his social philosophy from the direct study of the people, such as had engaged the attention of Socrates, to a search for a just society in the world of ideas. This line of thinking found expression chiefly in the *Republic*, written during Plato's mature manhood. A discussion of these idealistic concepts is found in the *Laws* and the *Politicus*, the latter being written in Plato's old age and representing a partial reaction from the idealism of the *Republic*. Because of its consideration of nearly every aspect of social life from a specific viewpoint, the *Republic* may be called the first treatise in social philosophy. While it falls below the social writings of the Hebrews in its dynamic and practical phases, it excels them in its unity, its profundity, and its philosophic quality.

AN IDEAL SOCIETY

Inasmuch as Plato had turned away from an inviting though strenuous public career to a private life of scholarly thought, his perfect society assumed characteristics that were far from mundane. Because Plato lived in a day of small political groups and in a country of limited size, he limited his ideal society to a group represented by 5,040 heads of families.¹¹ Consequently it is impossible to apply Plato's social ideas with accuracy to a modern metropolitan center of 5,000,000 people, or to a nation-state of 100,000,000 people. Several phases of Plato's thought, however, were given a practical turn in the *Laws*. In revealing Plato's social philosophy, the *Politicus*, or *Statesman* ranks third.¹²

In Plato's ideal society there is a hierarchy of rank, which includes three classes of people: the rulers, or true guardians; the soldiers, or auxiliaries; and the artisans, or the industrial and agricultural workers. In introducing the ideal state Plato uses mature individuals.¹³ Out of the

¹¹ *Laws*, 738.

¹² The beginning student of Plato's social thought should first read *The Republic*, especially V:472A to VII:541B.

¹³ *Republic*, 369 B.

needs and through the activities of fully developed persons, Plato builds an ideal commonwealth.

SOCIAL CLASSES

No individual is self-sufficing. Each has his peculiar bias, or ability. By uniting, all will profit. There are not only specialized classes, but there is specialization within the occupational groups. An essential rule for the building of a just society is that each person shall find his place in the social order and shall fulfil his special function. Plato recognized the need for correlating the diversities of nature and the different types of occupation.¹⁴

The common people are engaged in the foundational occupations as skilled artisans. The advantages of a special education are not open to them. They receive the common education, including gymnastic and music training. But, in accordance with the aristocratic strain in Plato's social philosophy, it is useless to try to give a higher education to that large proportion of the population who are mentally incapable of profiting by higher education. The logic is good but the major premise is faulty in this pedagogical rule.

The second class, the soldiers, will maintain order at home, repel invaders, and conduct territorial wars. The growth of population will create a demand for more territory. Other states likewise will need more territory, and war will become inevitable.¹⁵ Plato frankly admits the territorial basis of wars. From this factor he sees no escape, although he declares peace to be better than war.¹⁶ In his *Tamias* and *Critias* he pictured a peace-state, "Atlantis."

The soldier's occupation is an art which requires years of training. The chief physical trait of a true soldier is courage. The social psychological significance of a mili-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 370 B.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 373.

¹⁶ *Laws*, 803.

tary régime is that soldiers are continually inciting their country to go to war. Such a régime raises up enemies against itself, many and mighty, and results either in ruining the specific people or in enslaving the foes of these people.¹⁷ On the other hand, the non-soldier classes, since they prefer to lead a peaceful life and seek to conduct their affairs quietly, unduly endeavor to avoid war. By degrees, they become unwarlike; their children develop a like attitude. Eventually, they find themselves at the mercy of their enemies and are enslaved.¹⁸

Among the members of the state there will be a few especially able persons, destined by birth and reinforced by training to be rulers and true guardians of the welfare of all.¹⁹ They are lovers of wisdom and philosophy. Flabbiness of character, drunkenness, selfishness, are unbecoming to them.²⁰ Egoistic living is condemned.²¹ The guardians are characterized, according to Plato, by the greatest eagerness to do what is for the good of their country. They show utter repugnance to anything that is contrary to the best interests of the state.²²

The guardians, however, rule aristocratically.²³ They do not inquire of the citizens the kind of laws which they want passed, for the same reason that a physician does not ask the patient the kind of medicine which he wants. In the *Republic*, the *Laws*, and the other dialogues where the nature of rulers and philosophers is discussed, Plato's "best men" show an indifference to earthly or material things and uniformly seek righteousness, even social righteousness.

LEADERSHIP TESTS

The candidates for guardianship receive first the elements of education. At twenty years of age they must pass a general education test, in order that they may go

¹⁷ *Statesman*, 308.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 307.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 297.

²⁰ *Republic*, 398 E, 412.

²¹ *Laws*, 731, 732.

²² *Republic*, 412.

²³ *Statesman*, 303.

on with a special course, including arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy.²⁴ At thirty they are subjected to a further examination, after which the successful individuals devote five years to the study of philosophy. At thirty-five they enter practical life, hold minor offices, balance their theoretical training by practical studies, and submit to diverse temptations.²⁵ They undergo a civil service examination which extends over a period of years. At the close they are subjected to a final series of threefold tests. The first test is that of logic: they must argue successfully that it pays an individual, especially a guardian, to serve society. The second test is that of fear: they are faced with dangers, for example, the dangers to life, which beset those who undertake to rule without favoritism and without compromising their principles when confronted with the ambitions and desires of powerful vested interests. The third test is that of pleasure: they are submitted to all the pleasures which thrill the heart of man. In other words, they must show proof that the highest interest of the state is to be the ruling interest of their lives.²⁶ Neither pain nor threats must affect their loyalty. The temptations which come from pleasures and enchantments must not disturb their self-control nor weaken their qualities of guardianship. From these requirements it will be seen that Plato provided for a long period of intensive and extensive training for the rulers. His idea varied widely from the ancient theory of the divine right of kings and from the current practice of distributing political spoils to friends.

Plato saw that the rulers once selected and installed in office would be tempted to become avaricious at the expense of the state. Instead of becoming and remaining allied to all the citizens, they will be prone to become tyrannical.²⁷ Plato perceived that it would be difficult, after good rulers had been selected, to keep them on the plane

²⁴ *Republic*, 525 cf. *Laws*, 818.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 537, 539, 540.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 413.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 416.

of good rulership. In order to preserve their virtue as guardians and to remove the powerful temptation to wink at exploitation that is carried on by the economically powerful, Plato indicated certain protective devices. The guardians shall be permitted no private property beyond a few incidentals. They shall not live in private houses, but shall dwell and eat together. They shall receive a fixed salary, sufficient to meet necessary expenses but no more. They shall not be allowed to touch gold and silver or to wear gold and silver ornaments. They shall be taught that they are made of divine gold and silver, and therefore shall have no need of the earthly dross. They shall not be subject to pollution from any earthly contacts. If the guardians should acquire lands or moneys or homes of their own, they would be unable to give their undivided attention to the state, and they would become not guardians of the welfare of the citizens, but tyrants, plotting and being plotted against.²⁸ In his zealous care that the rulers might not be distracted from guarding with undivided attention the interests of the state, Plato advocated community of wives and children for the rulers.²⁹

PUBLIC OPINION AND EDUCATION

The question arose: Will the people be content to accept the division of the population into hierarchal classes? In reply, Plato suggested that the power of public opinion be utilized, and that all the inhabitants of the state be taught that they are brothers, that is, children of their common Mother Earth. This instruction will serve to keep the masses in a humble attitude. Further, they are to be told that different metals have been used by Mother Earth in making different individuals. Those persons in whose make-up gold has been mingled have the power of command and may become rulers. Others who are made

²⁸ *Republic*, 416, 417.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 457C, 464C.

of silver may become auxiliaries, or soldiers; while the masses, being made of brass and iron, are destined to become artisans.³⁰

The objection is raised that people will not believe this "audacious fiction." The truth of the objection is admitted, and a solution of the problem is offered. Teach the children the gold, silver, brass and iron fiction; and they will believe it. When they grow to maturity, they will tell their children, who in turn will teach it. Posterity, thus, will accept it.³¹ In this way Plato founded his social philosophy upon education. Plato made clear that any kind of social or economic theory can be foisted upon a whole people through the utilization of the educational processes. A few antisocial exploiters, by controlling the educational system, can ruin a nation in a generation.

VOCATIONAL SELECTION

The guardians are instructed to examine the children in order to discover of what metals they are made. Plato admitted a democracy of talent in the sense that talent is likely to appear in the children of brass and iron parents, while gold parents may beget brass and iron children. If a gold child is found among the children of the artisans, he is to be encouraged and trained to become a guardian. If a brass and iron child is found among the children of the gold parents, he must descend the social scale and be trained for husbandry or artisanship.³² Plato foresaw the fact, now scientifically established, that geniuses are born indiscriminately among all classes of society from the highest to the lowest. They are just as likely to be born in the hovel or overcrowded tenement as in the spacious and luxuriant palace. Consequently, society should seek out potential genius and give it opportunities commensu-

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 414, 415.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 415.

³² *Loc. cit.*

rate with its possibilities and not allow its dynamic and divine spark to be snuffed out in a heavy-laden tenement atmosphere.

Furthermore, according to Plato, the guardians are to seek out the imperfect children and put them out of the way as easily as possible and without attracting public attention.³³ If the capable must devote their energies to the care of imperfect children, they would presumably be wasting their ability and would be prevented from devoting themselves to upbuilding the state. This doctrine neglects the consideration of the harsh, unsympathetic attitude which it would engender. Although rigorously eugenic, the doctrine is undemocratic and unchivalric. It is thoroughly aristocratic.

The guardians are to supervise marriage. Plato especially deplors the fact that almost all persons choose their life-partners in marriage without proper regard to the kind of children that will be procreated.³⁴ The marriage relationship should not be primarily an individual affair, but should be governed by the thought of the children that are not yet born and by due regard to the welfare of the state and society.³⁵ The true purpose of marriage is not found in wealth or power or rank, but in the procreation of healthy minded children. Marriage is sacred in the highest degree because it is socially necessary. Plato deplors class marriages, that is, marriage within temperamentally similar groups. Persons of gentle nature seek persons of gentle nature; the courageous seek the courageous. It would be better if the gentle would seek the courageous in marriage, and vice versa.³⁶ Marriage is sacred, and hence should be subjected to strict eugenic safeguards.

³³ *Republic*, 460 C, 461 C.

³⁴ *Statesman*, 310.

³⁵ *Laws*, 773.

³⁶ *Statesman*, 310.

POVERTY AND WEALTH

The guardians shall prevent the extremes of poverty and riches. With farsighted social wisdom Plato points out that poverty is the parent of meanness and viciousness, and that wealth leads to luxury and indolence.³⁷ Both result in discontent and both cause the deterioration of the arts. The poor man cannot properly equip or train himself, or enter into his work painstakingly; the rich man will grow careless and no longer act diligently when he comes into the possession of unlimited wealth.³⁸

In the acquisition of wealth the laws of imitation function powerfully. One person accumulates property; others are immediately stimulated to do likewise. In consequence, all the citizens may become lovers of money.³⁹ But a money-loving public would be disastrous to the state.

The larger amount of wealth that a person accumulates, the more he will want to accumulate. The momentum of the desire for money-getting is socially destructive. The more a person is hypnotized by the wealth-getting delusion, the less attention does he give to the maintenance of virtue. When the desire for virtue is in competition with the desire for riches, the former decreases as the latter increases.⁴⁰

When the state becomes established on a property basis, the rich exercise power and the poor are deprived of it.⁴¹ In ordinary times the rich are as indifferent to the welfare of the poor as to the development of virtue, but in times of group crises they will not despise the poor. In the days of prosperity and peace the poor man is given the hindmost position, but when war comes, "the wiry, sunburnt poor man" is placed in battle at the side of the wealthy man⁴²—and social democracy obtains. But in battle the poor man fights longer and better than the rich man "who has never

³⁷ *Republic*, 422 A; *Laws*, 744, 745.

³⁸ *Republic*, 421.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 550 D, E; *Laws*, 742, 791.

⁴⁰ *Republic*, 550.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 550 C.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 556.

spoilt his complexion and has plenty of superfluous flesh." In the words of the poor man Plato draws the astounding conclusion that many persons are rich because no one has the courage to despoil them.⁴³ At this point Plato has given a striking explanation of the rise of socialism, syndicalism, and economic radicalism.

When you see paupers, according to Plato, you may safely conclude that somewhere there are also present thieves, robbers of temples, and malefactors.⁴⁴ The causes of pauperism are given as (1) a lack of proper education, (2) ill-training, and (3) unjust social laws and an unjust constitution of the state.⁴⁵

Plato suggested two instruments for preventing extreme wealth and poverty—legislation and education. Each person is to be guaranteed a minimum amount of property. He may acquire as much as four times this amount, but above the maximum a one hundred per cent excess tax operates.⁴⁶ Plato planned a form of communism, not primarily to secure the material well-being of the state, but to safeguard the rulers against falling before selfish temptations. Plato also wanted to protect the state from splitting asunder because of the distractions that arise from labor-capital controversies. By educational means the children are to be trained to be satisfied with the necessities of life⁴⁷—at least some children are to be so trained. Parents should bequeath to their children not riches but the spirit of reverence.⁴⁸

CENSORSHIP

The guardians shall be censors. They shall establish a censorship over the arts in order to protect the children from seeing indecent sights and hearing vulgar sounds. The works of fiction shall be censored in order to prevent

⁴³ *Republic*, 556.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 552 D.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 552 E.

⁴⁶ *Laws*, 744, 745.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 729.

⁴⁸ *Loc. cit.*

the children from reading and adopting bad ideas. The creative artists shall be prevented from exhibiting forms of vice and intemperance, in order that the future guardians may not grow up in an atmosphere contaminated by images of moral deformity, and in order that all children may develop in an environment of fair sights and should and may receive unhindered and unhampered the good in everything.⁴⁹

The guardians shall protect the *mores*. Since Plato described a perfect state, any change in the established customs would mean retrogression.⁵⁰ Hence, the rulers should jealously guard the customs, allowing no insidious innovations. Further, if any change is permitted to take place in small things, there may be no stopping the spirit of change.

Plato rested his argument for an ideal society upon the education of wise leaders. Their judgment is better even than government by law. Law is too rigid and inflexible. In view of the changeable character of human conditions, which Plato recognized, no final or absolute laws can be laid down.⁵¹ The chief advantage of laws, however, is not that they make men honest but that they make men act uniformly, and hence in a socially reliable way. Laws are to be respected because they represent the ripe fruits of long experience.⁵²

Considerable attention is given to penology in the *Laws*.⁵³ In view of the sanctity of custom and of the necessity of law, obedience is a highly important social virtue. In theory Plato is modern and scientific, for he advocated punishment, not as a vindictive but as a preventive and reformatory measure.⁵⁴ Reformation is the true aim of punishment.⁵⁵ In practice Plato is rigid and harsh. For example, beggars are simply to be sent out of the city

⁴⁹ *Republic*, 377, 401.

⁵⁰ *Laws*, 772.

⁵¹ *Statesman*, 294.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 300.

⁵³ In books IX-XII.

⁵⁴ *Laws*, 934.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 862 ff.

and out of the country.⁵⁶ The death penalty is utilized freely.⁵⁷

Plato opened all occupations to women as well as men, even the highest, that of ruling.⁵⁸ The only difference between the sexes that needs to be recognized occupationally is that men are stronger physically than women.⁵⁹ One individual is fitted for one kind of vocation; another for some other type of work.

Although the fundamental importance of bearing children is appreciated, Plato observed that it is unnecessary that a woman devote her whole life to the rearing of children. All women should have opportunities for the development of their personalities. Those women who have special talent for public service should enter thereupon. Although a social conservative Plato admits an innovation in the ideal republic—universal woman suffrage.

Since women have the same duties as men, they receive the same opportunities for training. Women must share in the toils of war and the defense of their country.⁶⁰ Women are priestesses;⁶¹ they serve on committees for the regulation of marriage, and for deciding divorce cases.⁶²

ROLE OF EDUCATION

Although Plato was averse to change, he advocated a dynamic type of education. This educational system, however, is to be definitely controlled by the guardians. It is also paternalistic. Common education shall be of two kinds: gymnastic, for the body; music for the soul.⁶³ Gymnastic training will produce a temper of hardness, and music will lead to gentleness. The extreme of the one is ferocity and brutality; the extreme of the other is softness and effeminacy.⁶⁴ When taken together, they produce a

⁵⁶ *Laws*, 936.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 955.

⁵⁸ *Republic*, 455, 456; *Laws*, 805.

⁵⁹ *Republic*, 451.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 475 A; *Laws*, 814.

⁶¹ *Laws*, 759.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 929, 930.

⁶³ *Republic*, 457 A; *Laws*, 795 ff., 813 ff., 830 ff.

⁶⁴ *Republic*, 410.

well-ordered personality. The one sustains and makes bold the reason, the second moderates and civilizes the wildness of passion.⁶⁵ Gymnastic exercises provide for the care and training of the body through childhood and youth so that in maturity the body may best serve the soul.⁶⁶ Music, including literature, trains through the influence of its qualities of harmony and rhythm. For example, through exercises in harmony the child develops a harmonious temperament.

Education is not a process of acquisition, but of the development of the powers within the individual.⁶⁷ It is a lifelong process; it begins with birth and continues until death. It, however, slows up as the individual grows old. An aged person cannot learn much, any more than he can run much.⁶⁸ Education in the early years of life is the most important. As a child is educated, so will his future be determined.⁶⁹ A child should be taught early to respect his parents. Great care should be given to the first years of life. From three to six years of age the children in Plato's republic come under the supervision of chosen matrons and nurses.

Education shall be universal, but not compulsory, that is, all shall be taught, but not compelled to learn. Education shall be made attractive, almost a form of government.⁷⁰ The laws of imitation shall be utilized. The tutor shall carry out his teachings in practice.⁷¹

A well-trained individual is a replica of a just society. Plato draws a parallelism, which is inaccurate, between the three classes in society and three traits of the individual. The rulers, soldiers, and artisans are compared respectively to the reason, the spirit, and the passions of the individual. The passions must be subordinated to the spirit, and both must be controlled by reason. The result will be a just

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 441.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 498 B.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 518.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 536.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 425; *Laws*, 643.

⁷⁰ *Republic*, 537.

⁷¹ *Laws*, 729.

person.⁷² In society a similar hierarchal relation shall hold between the rulers, soldiers, and artisans. The fundamental aim in education shall be to secure a change in the attitudes of people. Such changes are more important than modification in external matters. Thus, according to Plato, the divine foundations of a state are laid in education.

Religion plays a basic rôle in the ideal republic. Plato held that belief in God superseded in importance the doctrine that might is right. Impiety undermines the strength of the social kingdom. God created the individual for the whole, but not the whole for the individual. The worship of God is necessary for a person in order to prevent him from reverting to selfishness and from making his humanitarian beliefs purely egoistic phenomena.⁷³

SOCIAL CHANGE

Inasmuch as Plato outlined at the start a perfect republic, any change would likely constitute a deterioration. But even an ideal state is not immune to the entry of destructive ideas. The wise men, the rulers, are not proof against the temptations of absolute power. To remove the stirrings of self-interest in the minds of the guardians, Plato planned a communistic order. He overlooked, however, the weaknesses of communism, but these were pointed out at a later time by Aristotle.

In spite of excellent safeguards the wisdom of the best rulers will occasionally fail them. Sooner or later they will err. In examining the youth they will allow warrior youth to be trained for the guardian class. With their spirit of contention and of ambition for honor these adventitious guardians will start the perfect state upon the downward road.⁷⁴ When the rulers seek personal power and honor, the ideal republic will be superseded by a timocracy.

⁷² *Republic*, 435 ff.

⁷³ *Laws*, 903.

⁷⁴ *Republic*, 545-549.

In a timocracy the ruler with the most private wealth will possess the greatest personal power and receive the highest honor. Moreover, other persons will be stimulated, thereby, to acquire wealth and power. In the meantime the masses will lose nearly everything. The result is an oligarchy in which the wealthy are honored and made rulers.⁷⁵ The poor are treated with dishonor and deprived of position.

In such an oligarchic state there is a fundamental division; there are two states instead of one. In spirit, the rich and the poor comprise separate states. They live in the same territory but are conspiring against one another.⁷⁶ Social stability is destroyed by the conflicts between the extremes of countless riches and utter poverty. The propertyless hate and conspire against the propertied.⁷⁷ Civil war ensues. Because the wealthy have fallen into carelessness and extravagance, and because the poor possess superior numbers, the poor are the victors. A democracy—the rule of Demos—comes into being. Everyone rules.

But the populace is not fitted to rule. They are without experience. Since the drones are numerous among the common people, the drones manage almost everything in a democracy.⁷⁸ Excess of liberty among people untrained for liberty leads to anarchy. Persons will set themselves up as the special friends of the common people. These self-appointed friends of the people will prove to be self-seeking tyrants; the democracy will be transformed into a tyranny—the lowest state of all in Plato's fivefold devolution.

With distrust of the masses and with a paternalistic government, Plato coupled a belief that a person must participate in the life of society. Social justice does not consist in doing good to one's friends and ill to one's enemies,

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 550, 551.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 555.

⁷⁶ *Loc. cit.*

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 564.

or in catering to the interests of the most powerful. The theory that might is right is repudiated.⁷⁹ A just society is one in which every person has found his place of greatest usefulness to the state and fulfils his entire obligations in that place. On the whole Plato exhibited an impassioned faith in the moral and social order.

Plato believed that Ideas are real and that they are the tools with which the world is made over. He perceived perfect Forms, even a perfect social Form. Through intellectual control, Plato planned a new social order.

PLATO'S SOCIAL THOUGHT⁸⁰

ORIGIN OF SOCIETY

A State, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

There can be no other.

Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these partners and helpers are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

True, he said.

And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

Very true.

Then, I said, let us begin and create in idea a State; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention. (369 B, C)

ROLE OF HEREDITY

True, I replied, but there is more coming; I have only told you half. Citizens, we shall say to them in our tale, you are brothers, yet God has framed you differently. Some of you have the power of command, and in the composition of these he has mingled gold, wherefore also they have the greatest honour; others he has made of silver, to be auxiliaries; others again who are to be husbandmen and craftsmen he has composed of brass and iron; and the species

⁷⁹ *Republic*, 339; *Laws*, 714.

⁸⁰ Reprinted by permission from *The Republic*, by Plato, translated by Jowett, third edition, two volumes, Oxford, at the Clarendon Press, 1909.

will generally be preserved in the children. But as all are of the same original stock, a golden parent will sometimes have a silver son, or a silver parent a golden son. And God proclaims as a first principle to the rulers, and above all else, that there is nothing which they should so anxiously guard or of which they are to be such good guardians, as of the purity of the race. They should observe what elements mingle in their offspring; for if the son of a golden or silver parent has an admixture of brass and iron, then nature orders a transposition of ranks, and the eye of the ruler must not be pitiful towards the child because he has to descend in the scale and become a husbandman or artisan, just as there may be sons of artisans who having an admixture of gold or silver in them are raised to honour, and become guardians or auxiliaries. For an oracle says that when a man of brass or iron guards the State, it will be destroyed. Such is the tale; is there any possibility of making our citizens believe in it?

Not in the present generation, he replied; there is no way of accomplishing this; but their sons may be made to believe in the tale, and their sons' sons, and posterity after them. (415 A-D)

KNOWLEDGE AND LEARNING

Until philosophers are kings, or the kings and princes of this world have the spirit and power of philosophy, and political greatness and wisdom meet in one, and those common natures who pursue either to the exclusion of the other are compelled to stand aside, cities will never have rest from their evils,—no, nor the human race, as I believe,—and then only will this our state have a possibility of life and behold the light of day. (473 D)

And may we not say of the philosopher that he is a lover, not of a part of wisdom only, but of the whole?

Yes, of the whole.

And he who dislikes learning, especially in youth, when he has no power of judging what is good and what is not, such an one we maintain not to be a philosopher or a lover of knowledge, just as he who refuses his food is not hungry, and may be said to have a bad appetite and not a good one?

Very true, he said.

Whereas he who has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied, may be justly termed a philosopher? (475 C)

Do we admit the existence of opinion?

Undoubtedly.

As being the same with knowledge, or another faculty?

Another faculty.

Then opinion and knowledge have to do with different kinds of matter, corresponding to this difference of faculties?

Yes. (477 B)

COURAGE

The city will be courageous in virtue of a portion of herself which preserves under all circumstances that opinion about the nature of things to be feared and not to be feared in which our legislator educated them; and this is what you term courage.

I should like to hear what you are saying once more, for I do not think that I perfectly understand you.

I mean that courage is a kind of salvation.

Salvation of what?

Of the opinion respecting things to be feared, what they are and of what nature, which the law implants through education; and I mean by the words "under all circumstances" to intimate that in pleasure or in pain, or under the influence of desire or fear, a man preserves, and does not lose this opinion. (429 C, D)

TEMPERANCE

Two virtues remain to be discovered in the State—first, temperance, and then justice which is the end of our search. (430 D)

Temperance, I replied, is the ordering or controlling of certain pleasures and desires; this is curiously enough implied in the saying of "a man being his own master"; and other traces of the same notion may be found in language.

No doubt, he said.

There is something ridiculous in the expression "master of himself"; for the master is also the servant and the servant the master; and in all these modes of speaking the same person is denoted.

Certainly.

The meaning is, I believe, that in the human soul there is a better and also a worse principle; and when the better has the worse under control, then a man is said to be master of himself; and this is a term of praise: but when, owing to evil education or association, the better principle, which is also the smaller, is overwhelmed by the greater mass of the worse—in this case he is blamed and is called the slave of self and unprincipled. (430 E, 431 A, B)

JUSTICE

Well then, tell me, I said, whether I am right or not: You remember the original principle which we were always laying down at

the foundation of the State, that one man should practice one thing only, the thing to which his nature was best adapted;—now justice is this principle or part of it.

Yes, we often said that one man should do one thing only.

Further, we affirmed that justice was doing one's own business, and not being a busybody; we said so again and again, and many others have said the same to us. (432 B)

TRAINING OF THE GUARDIANS OR LEADERS

And would not a really good education furnish the best safeguard?

But they are well educated already, he replied.

I cannot be so confident, my dear Glaucon, I said; I am much more certain that they ought to be, and that true education, whatever that may be, will have the greatest tendency to civilize and humanize them in their relations to one another, and to those who are under their protection.

Very true, he replied.

And not only their education, but their habitations, and all that belongs to them, should be such as will neither impair their virtue as guardians, nor tempt them to prey upon the other citizens. Any man of sense must acknowledge that.

He must.

Then now let us consider what will be their way of life, if they are to realize our idea of them. In the first place, none of them should have any property of his own beyond what is absolutely necessary; neither should they have a private house or store closed against any one who has a mind to enter; their provisions should be only such as are required by trained warriors, who are men of temperance and courage; they should agree to receive from the citizens a fixed rate of pay, enough to meet the expenses of the year and no more; and they will go to mess and live together like soldiers in a camp. Gold and silver we will tell them that they have from God; the diviner metal is within them, and they have therefore no need of the dross which is current among men, and ought not to pollute the divine by any such earthly admixture; for that commoner metal has been the source of many unholy deeds, but their own is undefiled. And they alone of all the citizens may not touch or handle silver or gold, or be under the same roof with them, or wear them, or drink from them. And this will be their salvation, and they will be the saviours of the State. But should they ever acquire homes or lands or moneys of their own, they will become housekeepers and husbandmen instead of guardians, enemies and tyrants instead of allies of the other citizens; hating and being hated, plotting and being

plotted against, they will pass their whole life in much greater terror of internal than of external enemies, and the hour of ruin, both to themselves and to the rest of the State, will be at hand. For all which reasons may we not say that thus shall our State be ordered, and that these shall be the regulations appointed by us for our guardians concerning their houses and all other matters?

Yes, said Glaucon. (415 C, 416 B)

WEALTH AND POVERTY

There seem to be two causes of the deterioration of the arts.

What are they?

Wealth, I said, and poverty.

How do they act?

The process is as follows: When a potter becomes rich, will he, think you, any longer take the same pains with his art?

Certainly not.

He will grow more and more indolent and careless?

Very true.

And the result will be that he becomes a worse potter?

Yes; he greatly deteriorates.

But, on the other hand, if he has no money, and cannot provide himself with tools or instruments, he will not work equally well himself, nor will he teach his sons or apprentices to work equally well.

Certainly not.

Then, under the influence either of poverty or of wealth, workmen and their work are equally liable to degenerate?

That is evident.

Here, then, is a discovery of new evils, I said, against which the guardians will have to watch, or they will creep into the city unobserved.

What evils?

Wealth, I said, and poverty; the one is the parent of luxury and indolence, and the other of meanness and viciousness, and both of discontent. (421 D, 422 B)

OCCUPATIONAL COMPLEXES

Then we may begin by assuming that there are three classes of men: lovers of wisdom, lovers of honour, lovers of gain?

Exactly.

And there are three kinds of pleasures, which are their several objects?

Very true.

Now, if you examine the three classes of men, and ask of them in turn which of their lives is pleasantest, each will be found praising his own and depreciating that of others; the money-maker will contrast the vanity of honour or of learning if they bring no money with the solid advantages of gold and silver?

True, he said.

And the lover of honour—what will be his opinion? Will he not think that the pleasure of riches is vulgar, while the pleasure of learning, if it brings no distinction, is all smoke and nonsense to him?

And are we to suppose, I said, that the philosopher sets any value on other pleasures in comparison with the pleasure of knowing the truth, and in that pursuit abiding, ever learning, not so far indeed from the heaven of pleasure? Does he not call the other pleasures necessary, under the idea that if there were no necessity for them, he would rather not have them?

There can be no doubt of that, he replied.

Since, then, the pleasures of each class and the life of each are in dispute, and the question is not which life is more or less honourable, or better or worse, but which is the more pleasant or painless—how shall we know who speaks truly?

I cannot myself tell, he said.

Well, but what ought to be the criterion? Is any better than experience and wisdom and reason?

There cannot be a better, he said.

Then, I said, reflect. Of the three individuals, which has the greatest experience of all the pleasures which we enumerated? Has the lover of gain, in learning the nature of essential truth, greater experience of the pleasure of knowledge than the philosopher has of the pleasure of gain?

The philosopher, he replied, has greatly the advantage; for he has of necessity always known the taste of the other pleasures from his childhood upwards: but the lover of gain in all his experiences has not of necessity tasted—or I should rather say, even had he desired, could hardly have tasted—the sweetness of learning and knowing truth.

Then the lover of wisdom has a great advantage over the lover of gain, for he has a double experience?

Yes, very great.

Again, has he greater experience of the pleasures of honour or the lover of honour of the pleasures of wisdom?

Nay, he said, all three are honoured in proportion as they attain their object; for the rich man and the brave man and the wise man alike have their crowd of admirers, and as they all receive honour

they all have experience of the pleasures of honour; but the delight which is to be found in the knowledge of true being is known to the philosopher only.

His experience, then, will enable him to judge better than any one?
Far better.

And he is the only one who has wisdom as well as experience?

Certainly. (581, 5:2, C-E, 583 A-D)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The meaning of Socrates' dictum: Virtue is knowledge.
2. Plato's application of the Socratic dictum.
3. Plato as an idealist.
4. Socrates and Plato as complementary exponents of social thought.
5. Plato and the Hebrew prophets as complementary social thought representatives.
6. The differences between a utopian and a prophet.
7. An ideal society according to Plato.
8. Plato's reactions to war.
9. Plato's concept of an aristocratic rulership.
10. Plato's plan to keep rulers efficient.
11. Plato's attitude toward wealth and poverty.
12. Plato's view of censorship.
13. The place of law in society according to Plato.
14. The complementary rôle of gymnastics and music in personality training.
15. The place of education in an ideal society.
16. Plato's notion of democracy.
17. A summary of Plato's social thought.

CHAPTER VI

ARISTOTLE AND GRECIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT

ARISTOTLE (384-322 B.C.), the distinguished pupil of Plato, did not make, like his master, a unified contribution to social thought. He sacrificed unity for the examination of parts. Aristotle was an opportunist, a pragmatist, and a practical student of conditions and constitutions. Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not look for Ideas separate from but in things.

Aristotle studied 158 constitutions inductively and comparatively. His primary attention was given to what is, rather than to what ought to be. His eyes were directed first of all to the parts, and then to the whole. In this examination he found that the parts are related, and further, that they hold a developmental relation. Instead of Plato's perfection, we shall now consider Aristotle's process of becoming. Although unsystematic, the social ideas of Aristotle reveal the concepts of process and progress.

VIRTUE AS A MEAN

In Aristotle's *Ethics* the discussion of virtue is socially valuable. Virtue is a mean. Virtue is an impulse which is expressed neither in excess nor in deficiency. It is an impulse expressed temperately until it becomes habitual. Excess and deficiency are equally fatal. The coward is he who avoids and fears anything; the foolhardy he who rushes into danger anywhere.¹ Liberality is the mean between prodigality and avarice; civility is the mean between obsequiousness and insolence. Virtue itself is the mean between self-indulgence and asceticism. In virtue lies happiness, man's *summum bonum*.

¹ *Ethics*, translation by Weldon, II, 2.

Aristotle's *Politics* affords a searching analysis of many phases of societary life. The family and the state are by nature prior to the individual, since the whole must exist before any individual part.² When isolated, the individual is not self-sufficient. Thus, the state is founded on the social needs of the individual. By virtue of these social needs, man possesses the gregarious, or social instinct. By nature, man is a political animal,³ that is, he is a being who by nature or necessity lives in association with his kind. Man can attain his highest good only as a member of society.

Property is accorded by Aristotle a fundamental social position. Physical necessities can best be provided through the efforts of individuals. Communal ownership of property on a large scale will fail. In referring to Plato's communism, Aristotle declared: "For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it."⁴ Further, when one feels a thing to be his own, how much greater is his pleasure in it.⁵ Then, if one has private property, he may have the great pleasure which comes from making gifts to others. Moreover, communism will lead to an unusual amount of quarreling; those who work faithfully will feel aggrieved when they see that those who work dilettantishly receive and consume a full portion.⁶

Aristotle deprecated land equalization. Equalization of the desire for land is urged. Instead of dividing land equally or of establishing communism in land, Aristotle advocated that the higher classes be trained not to desire more land. He also stated that speculators and land schemers should be prevented from getting more land.⁷

The communism in wives and children that Plato suggested, Aristotle denounced as impracticable and foolish.

² *Politics*, translation by Jowett, I, 2.

⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 5.

³ *Loc. cit.*

⁶ *Loc. cit.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, II, 3.

⁷ *Ibid.*, II, 7: VII, 10.

Such a procedure will weaken friendship and destroy love. Moreover, it will break up the unity of the state.⁸

Aristotle held the prevalent disdainful attitude toward manual labor, and theoretically justified slavery. A slave is a person who by nature is a slave, a person who by nature expresses himself through bodily action. He is unable to guide himself by means of reason.⁹

SOCIAL CONTROL

The subject of social control and government received extended treatment from Aristotle. After considering a great variety of forms of government, he avoided a dogmatic choice of any particular form. He arrived at what is the modern, scientific conclusion, namely, that no one form of government is to be worshipped to the exclusion of all other types. A successful, or virtuous, government depends on the attitude of the people. Human nature must be changed. All people must become socially virtuous before a perfected government can be established.

Theoretically, Aristotle believed that the best government would come through the absolute rulership of one man, provided that there is available a man pre-eminently wise and virtuous. But practically, Aristotle held that in choosing a form of government which will succeed, it is necessary to consider the actual social conditions, the state of development of the people, and the attitude of the ruler or rulers. It does not matter whether one person, or a few persons, or a large number of persons perform the function of ruler so long as the best interests of the state are kept uppermost. If the interests of the entire group are the guiding principles, then royalty, aristocracy, or constitutionalism is commendable. The one, the few, or the many are good rulers, providing they are dominated by the common interests. In these declarations Aristotle overlooked

⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 4.

the fact that participation in government by the governed is essential. He also neglected the fact that a "best" ruler would be subjected to very many temptations as a result of personifying in himself all the forms of political, economic, and social power that exist within the state. After a period of time he would probably yield to some interests which are inimical to the welfare of the whole.¹⁰

When private interests control the government, the resultant forms of government are either tyranny, oligarchy, or democracy. According to Aristotle the chief difference between oligarchy and democracy is that an oligarchy is the rule of the rich and a democracy is the rule of the poor. Evidently he believed that the poor are as egoistic as the rich and that the poor are incapable of being trained to the levels of virtuous citizenship.

Although Aristotle is aristocratic in his political science and advocated frequently the rule of the best few, he endorsed a constitutional republic. Such a form of government will succeed where there are many wise and virtuous persons. He admitted that in large numbers there is stability of judgment and that common sense bulks large. Under constitutional government, the extremes will cancel one another, and the virtuous mean will rule. Large numbers of persons are less likely to be corrupted than a few persons or even the one best person.¹¹

There are two fundamentals in a good government: first, actual obedience to the laws by the citizens; second, the social goodness of the laws. Aristotle's formula for an ideal society is this: virtuous people and good laws, both judged by the common welfare. And practically, the form of political organization—a monarchy, an aristocracy, or a constitutional republic—depends upon the place of the members of the social order on the incline of socialization.

If a constitutional republic is established, then rotation in office should be practiced. The tenure of office should

¹⁰ *Politics*, III, 7.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, III, 15.

be restricted to six months.¹² An office should rarely be held more than once by the same person.

On the other hand, the laws should be changed slowly.¹³ Law has no power to make people obey in spirit, except through force of habit. The state must guard itself against small changes in laws. Any apparently slight neglect or disregard of law is insidious; transgression creeps in unperceived.¹⁴ At first, small transgressions may not be observed; then, they may gain such momentum that they will ruin the state. Hence, there should be at all times strict observance of laws.

THE SOCIAL MEAN

The major chord in Aristotle's ideal society is the social mean. The existence of two classes only, the very rich and the very poor, will bring disaster to the state. The very wealthy consider themselves above legalistic or social authority; the very poor are too degraded to understand the necessity for and the reason for authority.¹⁵ In fact, all who possess, not simply an unusual degree of wealth, but great beauty, great strength, or a "noble" birth feel that they should be accorded special privileges. Further, not only those who are very poor, but also the persons who are very weak, or very disgraced find it difficult to follow the dictates of law or of social reason. With the privileged characters who possess a superabundance of advantages, arrogant attitudes developed when they were yet children. At home, they received special considerations; they did not learn obedience within the small family group. In consequence, how could they be expected to be obedient citizens within the larger nation-group? The rich are likely to become insolent and avaricious; they will rule despotically.¹⁶ Not everyone can bear either prosperity or

¹² *Ibid.*, V, 8; VII, 2.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, IV, 11.

¹³ *Ibid.*, II, 8.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, V, 7.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, V, 8.

adversity. An increase in prosperity in any part of society should be carefully noted, and that part of society should be placed under surveillance. No one should receive extraordinary power, either from friends or through money. Even the pre-eminent are not above egotism.

A society is safest when the middle class is in control.¹⁷ The states will likely be well administered in which the middle class is numerous. Persons of about equal condition do not plot against others; neither are they plotted against. A middle class prevent both the arrogant wealthy and the impetuous proletariat from dominating the state. "Inequality is the source of all revolutions."

CAUSES OF REVOLUTION

Poverty is a cause of revolution and crime.¹⁸ In time of war, it is important that the poor be well fed else they will cause disturbances. Aristotle might have added that in time of peace the poor should be able to feed themselves well else they will in due season cause revolution.

But poverty is not the only cause of crime. Riches often lead to crime. Wealth causes the commitment of greater crimes than does poverty. The greatest offenses are not occasioned by necessity but by excess.¹⁹ In order to gratify some passion or desire, crime is often committed. Of the passions ambition and avarice are the chief causes of crime.²⁰ Intoxication produces crime.²¹

The causes of social revolution are manifold. The desire for equality and the desire for inequality are common factors.²² Inferiors revolt in order that they may attain a state of equality with other persons. Equals revolt in order that they may gain superior levels of honor and status. Aristotle cited a long list of additional factors in social revolution: insolence, fear, political graft, a disproportionate increase of wealth in some part of the state, neg-

¹⁷ *Politics*, IV, 11.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 6.

¹⁹ *Loc. cit.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*, II, 9.

²¹ *Ibid.*, II, 12.

²² *Ibid.*, V, 1.

lect of trifles in the observance of laws, dissimilarity in elements such as racial. The fundamental cause, however, of social revolution is love of gain and honor.

Aristotle was not a militarist, for he believed that war in itself is not a social good. No people should be trained to conquer and obtain dominion over neighboring states.²³ Military states are safe only when they are at war. After they declare peace the weight of their military burdens brings about their downfall.²⁴

The principle of social teleosis, which has been recently developed by Lester F. Ward, was foreseen by Aristotle. A society of persons, as in the case of a single person, has a work to do.²⁵ It should adapt itself to its task.

Aristotle was a public health advocate. The location for an ideal city should be carefully chosen. It should be selected, first of all, with reference to the health of the citizens. This point is of greater importance than that of locating a city wisely for the purpose of public administration or war.²⁶ The importance of a pure water supply is given almost a modern emphasis.

The question of eugenics received the attention of Aristotle. In order that children may be as physically sound as possible, legislators should give special attention to the institution of marriage. Youthful marriages are condemned because the children that are born to such unions will be wanting in respect for their parents.²⁷ Late marriages will be unsatisfactory because there will be too great differences between the ages of the parents and their children. The marriage of a man and a woman whose ages are widely disproportionate will lead to misunderstandings and quarrels. According to the rigorous, unsympathetic dictum of Aristotle, no deformed child shall be permitted to live.²⁸ Even the advocates of modern birth control may turn for encouragement to Aristotle.

²³ *Ibid.*, VII, 14.

²⁴ *Loc. cit.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, VII, 4.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, VII,

²⁷ *Ibid.*, VII, 15.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, VII, 16.

In the marriage relation there is inequality. The man is by nature better fitted to command than the woman.²⁹ The chief characteristic of a good wife is obedience to her husband—a doctrine which is patriarchal. Unfaithfulness of either sex in marriage is disgraceful.³⁰

Aristotle, like Plato, considers education the leading social force. There is a fundamental educational problem: Shall youth be trained primarily (1) to do useful work, (2) to be virtuous, or (3) to gain higher knowledge?³¹ No final answer is given. Aristotle's conception of education, however, is paternalistic.

Utilitarian education possesses a danger line. To be seeking always after the useful prevents one from developing a free and exalted soul.³² Utilitarian education should cease when it cramps the body or spirit and makes either less fit for the practice of virtue.

Gymnastic education should never be professionalized or allowed to hinder a person's higher education.³³ The excessive training which leads to Olympic victories is anti-social, because the constitution of the given person is exhausted. Music is valuable inasmuch as it has the power of forming character.³⁴ The persons who are engaged in seriously-minded occupations need amusements which will give relaxation.

In summary of Aristotle's social thought it may be said that the Stagirite introduced the comparative method of studying human institutions. He demonstrated the relative value of institutions, showing that those which are best for one age of society will be worthless for a later period. In order to meet changing social needs and conditions, institutions must change. There is a fundamental evolution in social changes.

A communistic social organization, according to Aristotle, is psycho-sociologically untenable. The importance

²⁹ *Politics*, I, 12.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, VII, 16.

³¹ *Ibid.*, VIII, 2.

³² *Ibid.*, VII, 3.

³³ *Ibid.*, VIII, 4.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, VIII, 5.

of the middle classes is socially inestimable. Laws should be respected in small particulars. The attitudes of the members of society toward their social organizations are more important than the type of organization itself. Human conduct in the mass is to a degree predictable.

POST-ARISTOTELIAN THOUGHT

After the time of Aristotle, Hellenic life degenerated. Political corruption, military intrigue, and intellectual scepticism vitiated the Hellenic morality that was founded on custom. The ideal, held by Plato and Aristotle, of man as an integral part of a constructive social order was supplanted by a philosophy of pure individualism.

In Athens, Epicurus (341-270 B.C.), became the leader of the popular hedonistic philosophy with its emphasis upon pleasure. Self-sacrifice and noble conduct in the social sense are foreign to Epicureanism. Friends should be sought, not for the sake of cultivating their friendship, but for the pleasure of the seeker. If you treat other persons unjustly, they will retaliate; therefore, treat others justly.

Stoicism, which was founded in Athens by Zeno, reached its culmination among the Romans and hence will be discussed in the following chapter. Polybius (203-121 B.C.), known as the last Hellenic social philosopher, developed a theory of social evolution, based on the belief that people associate because of the selfish benefits that accrue, and on the fact that group approval and disapproval play a leading part in the development of human attitudes.

Grecian social thought is noteworthy because of its intellectual foundations. It ignored many affective elements, and for that reason it became one-sided and unbalanced. It was rational rather than affective or supernatural. It was designed to meet the needs of this life. It moved away from authority and towards opportunism.

Economically, Hellenic social thought assumed or justified slavery. It postulated a democracy, but a democ-

racy builded on the backs of thousands of slaves. In practice, at the zenith of the Athenian democracy, there were only about 25,000 free Athenians as against 300,000 slaves. Women were not enfranchised. The governments put slaves into armies, and ultimately attempted to throw out a commercial net over the other Mediterranean states. As a result they lost the spirit of democracy. The whole system and concept of democracy was undermined by the debilitating influences of an industrial autocracy. The social thought of the Greek was limited in its actual application largely to the privileged few, who aristocratically ignored the needs of the helpless many.

Grecian social thought at the height of the Athenian democracy did achieve, however, for its day and epoch, a unique degree of expression among the free citizens. For example, in the matter of athletics and recreation, the Athenians worked together in furnishing themselves organized group activities. Their athletic contests were of a free community nature, untrammelled by commercialized motives. In furnishing recreation for themselves, they co-operated; they acted as community units. Moreover, in these community activities they generated in themselves the spirit of a genuine democratic consciousness.

The fundamentals of Grecian social thought were preserved by the Romans, without being augmented by them. Together with the Hebrew and early Christian social thought, Grecian social thought laid the foundations for the rise of modern social science, and even of sociology.

ARISTOTLE'S SOCIAL THOUGHT³⁵

THE STATE

The state is the highest form of community and aims at the highest good. How it differs from other communities will appear if we examine the parts of which it is composed. It consists of villages which consist of households. The household is founded upon the

³⁵ Reprinted by permission from Aristotle's *Politics*, translation by Jowett, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1905.

two relations of male and female, of master and slave; it exists to satisfy man's daily needs. The village, a wider community, satisfies a wider range of needs. The state aims at satisfying all the needs of men. Men form states to secure a bare subsistence; but the ultimate object of the state is the good life. The naturalness of the state is proved by the faculty of speech in man. In the order of Nature the state precedes the household and the individual. It is founded on a natural impulse, that towards political association. (p. 7)

To ascertain the nature of the ideal state we should start by examining both the best states of history and the best that theorists have imagined. Otherwise we might waste our time over problems which others have already solved.

Among theorists, Plato in the *Republic* raises the most fundamental questions. He desires to abolish private property and the family. But the end which he has in view is wrong. He wishes to make all his citizens absolutely alike; but the differentiation of functions is a law of nature. There can be too much unity in a state. And the means by which he would promote unity are wrong. The abolition of property would produce, not remove, dissension. Communism of wives and children will destroy natural affection. Other objections can be raised; but this is a fatal bone. To descend to details. The advantages to be expected from communism of property would be better secured if private property were used in a liberal spirit to relieve the wants of others. Private property makes men happier, and enables them to cultivate such virtues as generosity. The *Republic* makes unity the result of uniformity among the citizens, which is not the case. The good sense of mankind has always been against Plato, and experiment would show that his idea is impracticable.

Plato sketched another ideal state in the *Laws*; it was meant to be more practicable than the other. In the *Laws* he abandoned communism, but otherwise upheld the leading ideas of the earlier treatise, except that he made the new state larger and too large. He forgot to discuss foreign relations, and to fix a limit to private property, and to restrict the increase of population, and to distinguish between ruler and subject. The form of government which he proposed was bad. (pp. 8-9)

Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the

highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good. (p. 25)

Hence, it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either above humanity, or below; he is the

"Tribeless, lawless, heartless one,"

whom Homer denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war; he may be compared to an unprotected piece in the game of draughts.

Now the reason why man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animal is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain; and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere sound is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and in intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the unjust. And it is characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

Thus the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, so might we speak of a stone hand; for when destroyed the hand will be no better. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they are no longer the same, but only that they have the same name. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing; and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient to himself, must be either a beast or a god; he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, and the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society. (pp. 28-30)

THE SOCIAL MEAN

For if it has been truly said in the *Ethics* that the happy life is the life according to unimpeded virtue, and that virtue is a mean, then the life which is in a mean, and in a mean attainable by every one, must be the best. And the same criteria of virtue and vice apply both to cities and to constitutions; for the constitution is in a figure the life of the city.

Now in all states there are three elements: one class is very rich, another very poor, and a third is in a mean. It is admitted that moderation and the mean are best, and therefore it will clearly be best to possess the gifts of fortune in moderation; for in that condition of life men are most ready to listen to reason. But he who greatly excels in beauty, strength, birth or wealth, or on the other hand who is very poor, or very weak, or very much disgraced, finds it difficult to follow reason. Of these two the one sort grow into violent and great criminals, the others into rogues and petty rascals. And two sorts of offences correspond to them, the one committed from violence, the other from roguery. The petty rogues are disinclined to hold office, whether military or civil, and their aversion to these two duties is as great an injury to the state as their tendency to crime. Again, those who have too much of the goods of fortune, strength, wealth, friends, and the like, are neither willing nor able to submit to authority. The evil begins at home; for when they are boys, by reason of the luxury in which they are brought up, they never learn, even at school, the habit of obedience. On the other hand, the very poor, who are in the opposite extreme, are too degraded. So that the one class cannot obey, and can only rule despotically; the others know not how to command and must be ruled like slaves. Thus arises a city, not of free men, but of masters and slaves, the one despising, the other envying; and nothing can be more fatal to friendship and good fellowship in states than this; for good fellowship tends to friendship; when men are at enmity with one another, they would rather not even share the same path. But a city ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars; and these are generally the middle classes. Wherefore the city which is composed of middle-class citizens is necessarily best governed; they are, as we say, the natural elements of a state, for they do not, like the poor, covet their neighbors' goods; nor do others covet theirs, as the poor covet the goods of the rich; and as they neither plot against others, nor are themselves plotted against, they pass through life safely. Wisely then did Phocylides pray—

"Many things are best in the mean; I desire to be of a middle condition in my city."

Thus it is manifest that the best political community is formed by citizens of the middle class, and that those states are likely to be well administered, in which the middle class is large, and larger if possible than both the other classes, or at any rate than either singly; for the addition of the middle class turns the scale, and prevents either of the extremes from being dominant. Great then is the good fortune of a state in which the citizens have a moderate and sufficient property; for where some possess much, and the others nothing, there may arise an extreme democracy, or a pure oligarchy; or a tyranny may grow out of either extreme—either out of the most rampant democracy, or out of an oligarchy; but it is not so likely to arise out of middle and nearly equal conditions. I will explain the reason of this hereafter, when I speak of the revolutions of states. The mean condition of states is clearly best, for no other is free from faction; and where the middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and dissensions. For a similar reason large states are less liable to faction than small ones, because in them the middle class is large; whereas in small states it is easy to divide all the citizens into two classes who are either rich or poor, and to leave nothing in the middle. And democracies are safer and more permanent than oligarchies, because they have a middle class which is more numerous and has a greater share in the government; for when there is no middle class, and the poor greatly exceed in number, troubles arise, and the state soon comes to an end. (pp. 167-170)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. Aristotle's concept of virtue.
2. Aristotle's most famous dictum.
3. Aristotle's estimate of Plato's attitude toward communism.
4. Land equalization according to Aristotle.
5. Aristotle's theory of government.
6. The "social mean" as expressed by Aristotle.
7. Aristotle's "middle class" concept.
8. Aristotle's theory of crime.
9. Causes of social revolution.
10. The fundamental educational problem.
11. Aristotle's contribution to methods of making social science studies.
12. Comparisons of Aristotle's and Plato's social thought.
13. The chief contributions of Grecian social thought.

CHAPTER VII

ROMAN SOCIAL THOUGHT

ROMAN social thought is an outgrowth of Hellenic philosophic movements. It is represented in part by the codification of important phases of societary control—the product of the legalistic genius of the Romans. Stoicism, moreover, greatly affected and conditioned the meager social thinking of the Roman scholars.

Lucretius (99-55 B.C.) was the chief Roman exponent of Epicureanism. In his story of social evolution he began with the various phases of the biological struggle for existence, and proceeded to depict in a remarkably significant fashion the origins of social practices and customs.¹ Although his data are of questionable value, his descriptions of social origins often run strangely parallel to modern findings.

The ideal commonwealth of Cicero (106-43 B.C.) is founded on the belief that Rome has the possibility of becoming an ideal state.² The best ideas in this connection were selected by Cicero from the Aristotelian, Epicurean, and Stoic philosophies. Cicero was apparently an exponent of honest statesmanship and finally gave his life for civic efficiency. He argued that a child should not be punished by either a parent or a teacher in a fit of anger. Corporal punishment should be considered only when other methods fail to discipline.

The descriptive studies of Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.) are noteworthy. The *Commentaries* present social studies

¹ Lucretius, *De rerum natura*, translated by Munro, in Bohn's Libraries, V, 335 ff., 778 ff.

² *De officiis*, translated by Edmonds, Bohn's Libraries, I, XVII. XIV; *De re publica*, translated by Younge, Bohn's Libraries, I, XXV-XXVI, XIV.

of contemporary conditions; they possess modern value. In a large number of instances the accuracy of Caesar's social notes has been verified.

STOIC SOCIAL THOUGHT

The teachings of the Roman Stoics may be traced back to the Socratic formula: Virtue is knowledge. Virtue is knowledge which grows out of practical human conduct. Unlike Aristotle, the Stoics believed that sympathy is a disease. It is pathological and hence must be overcome. In helping other people the wise person does not allow the emotion of pity to appear.

Contrary to the theory of the Epicureans, the Stoics taught that pleasure is a tiresome and sickly goal. Seneca (4 B.C.-A.D. 65), a leading Roman Stoic, declared: "I am seeking to find what is good for a man, not for his belly."³ Virtue, according to Stoic philosophy, consists in living a free and undisturbed life. A line was drawn between the virtuous and non-virtuous, between a few virtuous and a multitude of fools. This doctrine tends to engender in the few virtuous a contemptuous regard for the pig-trough philosophy of the many.

This tendency, however, was offset by the Stoic belief that all persons originally possess the same nature and that all are children of the same universal Spirit. Social differences, hence, are external and superficial. Beneath the surface of human nature there is a cosmopolitanism which constitutes a passive brotherhood of man. Brotherly love should rule, according to the Stoics, but it should rule temperately, and not in such a way as to disturb the individual's self control. Brotherly love should be not a passionate but an intellectual element.

In his treatise on *Benefits*, Seneca makes benevolence the most social of all virtues and ingratitude the most ve-

³ *Dialogues*, VII, 9.

nal of all crimes. Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 121-180) gave the social injunction: Love mankind.⁴ Living should consist in passing from one social act to another.⁵ This is a social world; men exist for the sake of one another.⁶

The Stoic Emperor declared that God is social and that persons are part of God's universe. Each person is a component part of the social system, and hence every act of a person is an integral phase of social life.⁷ Inasmuch as the Intelligence of the universe is social, human society functions as a phase of the cosmic coordination. We are all colaborers and cooperators. Even the persons who find fault and who hinder what happens, are performing useful cooperative functions.⁸ That which is harmful to the swarm is likewise harmful to the individual. Man is a citizen of the world.⁹ The services of a good citizen are never lost. The good citizen does good chiefly by the example he sets.¹⁰

PASSIVE COSMOPOLITANISM

But the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics never extended beyond a passive interest in the world of affairs. It meant that a person should be agreeable with other persons, that he should be tolerant of the weaknesses of others, and that he should be aware constantly that others are watching him and likely to copy the example he sets.¹¹ Stoicism requires the suppression of anger and the exercising of clemency toward all human beings. While Stoicism does not extend so far in its profession as Christianity's doctrine of brotherhood of man, it represents a broader viewpoint of life than any code of conduct which previously had developed in the non-Christian world.

The purpose of punishment, according to Seneca, is twofold: either to reform the evil-doer, or to prevent the operation of his evil influence and to stop him from setting

⁴ *Thoughts*, translated by Long, VII, 31.

⁵ *Ibid.*, VI, 7.

⁶ *Ibid.*, VII, 59.

⁷ *Ibid.*, IX, 23.

⁸ *Ibid.*, VI, 42.

⁹ *Ibid.*, XII, 36.

¹⁰ Seneca, *Dialogues*, IX, 4.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, VII, 20.

harmful examples.¹² The social medicine must be determined, quantitatively and qualitatively, by the nature of the offender and the offense. Above all things else, he who administers punishment must not act in anger. Justice cannot be angry.¹³ Lynch procedure is entirely contrary to the teachings of Stoicism.

First of all, thieves and robbers should be instructed in the error of their ways. Obtain their point of view and administer punishment accordingly. Pity them. The person who understands why criminals commit offenses is prevented from becoming angry with them.¹⁴ Aurelius, like Jesus,¹⁵ gave the injunction: Love even those who do wrong. Aurelius, like Paul,¹⁶ urged an attitude of charity toward wrong-doers.¹⁷

The Stoics condemned luxurious living and fashion racing. True riches consists not in augmenting one's fortune, but in abating the desires for securing material wealth.¹⁸ The words of Emperor Aurelius regarding ostentatious living do not seem out of place when applied to the modern display of wealth. Seneca asserted that he would despise wealth as much when he has it as when he does not possess it.

Stoicism urged the Aristotelian social mean regarding property. Much property is a burden and a cause of worry and fear. It excites envy in others. The best society is that which is characterized by neither poverty nor plenty. The poor should not condemn riches, and the wealthy err in extolling the benefits of poverty—each is speaking of a situation which is objective to him and outside his sphere. Since it is objective to him, he is not qualified to speak concerning it. A person is great who is not corrupted by his wealth; but he is greater who is honestly poor in the

¹² *On Anger.*

¹³ *Loc. cit.*

¹⁴ Epictetus, *Discourses*, Book I, Ch. XVIII.

¹⁵ Matt. 5:44.

¹⁶ *Thoughts*, VII, 22.

¹⁷ Rom. 12:17.

¹⁸ *Thoughts*, VII, 26; III, 7.

midst of plenty.¹⁹ Riches constitute a power to do evil, hence mediocrity of fortune with a gentleness of mind represents the best status.²⁰

Stoicism enunciated excellent social ideals, which were, however, passively intellectual. They were not effectively dynamic. Despite their implications, they begat social inertia. The teachings of the Stoics removed rather than instilled a sense of public responsibility. The doctrines are available to the few rather than to the masses, although a Roman slave, Epictetus, as an exception, rose to a full interpretation of Stoic principles. The social ideals and concepts of the Stoics did not possess enough power to regenerate a degenerate society. They had sufficient strength, however, to maintain themselves in a voluptuous and pleasure-seeking world. They performed the exceedingly useful function of preparing the way for the invasion of the Roman Empire by the new and active Christian propaganda. The teachings of the Stoics made easier the conquest of Rome by Christianity. They softened a little an otherwise hard-hearted world.

As a class the Romans were men of action. They were soldiers and administrators. The name of Rome is still synonymous with power. On the whole it must be said that the Romans made little contribution to societary thought.

LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE THOUGHT

The constructive work of the Romans was legal and administrative. They built up a special social science—legal science. The legal genius of the Romans emphasized the rights of contract, of private property, of interest. Although this attention to the development of individualistic institutions was fatal to the rise of new social attitudes and to an increase in the sense of social responsibility, it never-

¹⁹ Seneca, *On a Happy Life*.

²⁰ *Loc. cit.*

theless was instrumental in constructing a stable framework for the evolution of the social process.

The Romans preserved a portion of Hellenic culture. The teachings of Plato and Aristotle were saved to modern civilization. Credit is due the Romans for receiving, keeping, working over, and handing on a part of the best Hellenic civilization.

Roman thought accentuated military principles of authority, even to the point of autocracy. It tended to crush the unprivileged populace. It tried to keep the masses contented by generous state aid. It denied to personality its complete individual and social expressions. In building an individualistic framework which would provide an orderly *milieu* for the rise of the institution of private property, it ignored the needs of the uneducated and poverty-enslaved masses for a full measure of liberty.

Rome developed the concept of organized power. The organizing ability of the Romans was marvelous, an organizing power that lives today in and through the Catholic Church.

The greatest gift of Rome was its Stoic concepts. Although these originated in Hellas, they attained their maturity in Rome. They opened the way for the reception of the Christian social concepts of love, service, brotherhood of man.

THOUGHTS OF MARCUS AURELIUS²¹

For we are all created to work together, as the members of one body—feet, hands, and eyelids, or the upper and nether teeth. Whence, to work against each other is contrary to nature;—but this is the very essence of anger and aversion. (pp. 8-9)

Wear not out what life may still be left thee in taking thought of others, save only when their goal be the common good. For why neglect thy proper duty in marvelling what this man is doing, and why; what he is saying, thinking, and devising; and in all the vain

²¹ Reprinted by permission from *The Thoughts of Marcus Aurelius Antonius*, translated by John Johnson, Henry Frowde, Oxford University Press, World's Classic Series, no date.

imaginings that divert us from the observation of the guiding principle within. Rather, thy duty is to shun all that is idle and vain in the series of thy thoughts, and, chief of all, curiosity and malignity, and to train thyself till every thought be such that, were a man suddenly to ask "What thinkest thou?" thou couldst answer, without delay and without concealment, "This or that," and make it sun-clear that all in thee is simplicity and kindliness, as befits a member of the community of living creatures—one who cares not for thought of pleasure or the life of enjoyment in general, who has no part in contentiousness, envy, or suspicion, or aught else that might raise a blush, wert thou to confess thou harboredst in thy soul. (p. 16)

We are all working together for one end; some of us consciously and purposely; others blindly in much the same way, presumably, as Heraclitus meant, when he said that even dreamers labour and cooperate in all that takes place in the universe. One man's task lies here; another's there. Even the grumbler, who is always trying to hinder or undo what happens, incidentally does his share. (p. 53)

As thy rôle is that of a part serving to complete a social system, so let thy every act serve to complete the life of a social being. Any act, then, which has no reference, either near or remote, to this end, tears thy life asunder, renders its unity impossible, and plays the part of a rebel, just as much as the citizen in a state who severs himself, as far as he is concerned, from the general harmony. (pp. 85-86)

If thy neighbor go astray, instruct him in kindliness and show him his error. If the task prove beyond thee, blame thyself,—or rather, blame not at all. (p. 92)

When thy neighbor's errors offend thee, straightway turn to thyself and consider what similar sin may be laid to thy charge,—classification, it may be, of wealth, pleasure, fame, and their like as goods. Attend to this and thy anger will soon be forgotten and give way to the reflection that the sinner acts under compulsion. And what is he to do?—Then bear with him or, if thou canst, release him from his bondage. (p. 99)

DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS²²

They are thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and evil. Ought we then to be angry with them, or to pity them? But show them their error, and you will see how they desist from their errors.

²² Reprinted by permission from *The Discourses of Epictetus*, Vol. I, translated by George Long, Scott-Thaw Company, New York, 1903.

If they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their present opinion.

Ought not then this robber and this adulterer to be destroyed? By no means say so, but speak rather in this way: This man who has been mistaken and deceived about the most important things, and blinded, not in the faculty of vision which distinguishes black and white, but in the faculty which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy him? If you speak thus, you will see how inhuman this is which you say, and that it is just as if you would say, Ought we not to destroy this blind and deaf man? But if the greatest harm is the privation of the greatest things, and the greatest thing in every man is the will or choice such as it ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you also angry with him? Man, you ought not to be affected contrary to nature by the bad things of another. Pity him rather; drop this readiness to be offended and to hate, and these words which the many utter: "these accursed and odious fellows." How have you been made so wise at once? And how are you so peevish? Why then are we angry? Is it because we value so much the things of which these men rob us? Do not admire your clothes, and then you will not be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer. Learn that a thief and an adulterer have no place in the things which are yours, but in those which belong to others and which are not in your power. If you dismiss these things and consider them as nothing, with whom are you still angry? But so long as you value these things, be angry with yourself rather than with the thief and the adulterer. Consider the matter thus: you have fine clothes; your neighbor has not: you have a window; you wish to air the clothes. The thief does not know wherein man's good consists, but he thinks that it consists in having fine clothes, the very thing which you also think. Must he not then come and take them away? When you show a cake to greedy persons, and swallow it all yourself, do you expect them not to snatch it from you? Do not provoke them: do not have a window: do not air your clothes. (pp. 72, 73, 74)

For that is not a principle of human nature which makes them bite one another, and abuse one another, and occupy deserted places or public places, as if they were mountains, and in the courts of justice display the acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes them intemperate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes them do whatever else men do against one another through this one opinion only, that of placing themselves and their interests in the things which are not within the power of their will. (p. 239)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The attitude of the Stoics toward the concept of brotherly love.
2. The purpose of punishment according to the Stoics.
3. The Stoic view of wealth.
4. The various Stoic concepts of virtue.
5. The values of Stoic social thought.
6. The general social thought contributions of the Romans.

CHAPTER VIII

EARLY CHRISTIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT

CHRISTIAN social thought is the direct outgrowth of Hebrew social concepts. Amos and Hosea and Isaiah paved the way for the social teachings of Jesus. The social commandments of the Old Testament were the progenitors of the modified social injunctions of the New Testament. Job, the social citizen, was not an unworthy precursor of Jesus, the lover of humanity. Out of the love and tender care for children which thrived in Hebrew homes there arose the concept of the brotherhood of man and the Fatherhood of God—the two cardinal principles of Christianity.

Jesus gave expression to no system of social thought, but uttered social principles and concepts which when put together, constituted the basis of a new social order. He dealt with personalities rather than with institutions. He looked to the individual rather than to the mass. He emphasized functions rather than structures. He proclaimed the need for socio-religious personalities. If he could get these, he was sure of the ultimate societal results. He foresaw a perfect society—the Kingdom of God.

Unlike Plato and Aristotle, Jesus was a continual student of everyday life. Like Socrates, Jesus was fond of people. He was a student of personal and social affairs. He mixed with all types of human beings. Like Socrates, he wrote practically nothing. Unlike Socrates, Jesus had a dynamic element in his nature which forbade him to remain content with people (after the Socratic manner), but which drove him to help and to heal. He went about doing good. The Gospel records are replete with instance after instance of his work in healing the sick of their in-

firmities. He was not, however, a physician but a teacher and a savior from sin and evil.

THE IDEAL SOCIETY

Behind all the teachings of Jesus, there is the concept of a perfect human order. This Kingdom begins in the hearts of individuals.¹ It is a spirit or an attitude of mind which leads the individual toward cooperative living. The Kingdom may come on earth as well as in heaven. Consider the picture of a harmonious community life which Jesus gave when lamenting over Jerusalem: "How often would I have gathered thy children together, as a hen doth gather her brood together under her wings, and ye would not!"²

Jesus extended the concept of brotherhood. Whoever shall do the will of God is a brother to me.³ The world, under God, is one family. The Kingdom, therefore, is to include all human beings who worship God in spirit and in truth and who at the same time love their fellow men in justice and cooperative living.

The ideal society is organic. It grows from good examples. Live so that other persons, seeing the helpfulness of your life, may live likewise. The Kingdom grows like a grain of mustard seed, which finally becomes a tree in whose branches the birds find homes.⁴ Love grows, and like leaven, permeates and transforms the whole mass,—the result is a perfect Kingdom.

God is the spiritual leader of the new society, to whom Jesus prayed in the social term, Our Father. God is the personification of love. God loved the sinful world so much that he gave his beloved son to the task of saving not simply the Jews or modern Europeans, but the whole world from all sins. The Star which guided the Magi was

¹ Luke 17:20, 21.

² Luke 13:34.

³ Matt. 12:48; Mark 3:34.

⁴ Matt. 13:31, 32; Mark 4:30;
Luke 13:18, 19.

God's service Star, announcing that he had given his beloved son in the war against sin.

THE SOCIAL PRINCIPLE OF LOVE

Love is the new note that is to reform the world.⁵ Love is the scientific principle from which all other true sociological concepts are derived. Love received the most perfect human expression in the personality and life of Jesus, who came not for self glory but to save people from hate and sin; who sought not the sheep to oppress and slay them for his own gratification, but to direct them, when lost, back to safe living; who sought not to weigh down the burdened with unjust taxes and harsh living conditions, but to relieve and give rest to the heavy-laden; who cared less for the upper Four Hundred than for the lower Four Million.

The principle of love compels the members of the Kingdom to show mercy. God is full of mercy, therefore, let his followers show mercy. Love forgives. The Christian citizen is instructed to become reconciled with his brother citizen before worshipping at the altar of God.⁶ If a person would be forgiven of his sins, he must acquire the habit of forgiving other persons. He must be careful not to judge harshly, lest other persons judge him harshly. He should forgive others seventy times seven, that is, without stint or measure.

St. Luke, the physician, recites the story of a loving father. The prodigal son impetuously demanded his share of the inheritance, and going into a far country, wasted his substance in riotous living. But upon showing true remorse for these exceedingly grave offenses, his father received him back with a loving, forgiving heart, a feast, the best robes, and music and dancing. One of the malefactors who was crucified with Christ showed a penitent heart

⁵ John 3:16.

⁶ Matt. 5:23; 18:15; Luke 6:41, 42.

at the last moment and received forgiveness from the loving, dying Christ. Since no one is without sin, no one has a right to be unforgiving. Even the woman taken in adultery came within the law of forgiving love.

The societary principle of love is the major chord of Christianity. It is Christianity's non-scientific but greatest gift to sociology. It has become the fundamental concept of sociology. To the Old Testament type of love which urged persons to love their neighbors and to love the alien and stranger, Jesus repeatedly insisted upon a love that is still greater, namely, a love which will include enemies. Love your enemies.⁷ Jesus himself exemplified this form of love. He made no idle interpretation of an impossible love, but demonstrated and lived a love which forgave his enemies, even those who mockingly, shamelessly nailed him to a cross. So great is the drawing power of this almost superhuman love which Jesus expressed in deeds that he himself predicted that if he were lifted up he would draw all people unto him.

Love fills people with compassion. The Gospels are replete with references to the fact that wherever Jesus saw sickness, poverty, sin, he was moved with compassion. The illustrations range from the blind men by the wayside to the bread-hungry multitudes, from the unclean leper in Galilee to murderous Jerusalem.

Love is cosmopolitan. All peoples are entitled to know the meaning of Christian love.⁸ Both Jew and Gentile shall feel its warming glow. The Samaritan lives it. Loving neighborliness includes more than priestly and Levitical acts; it involves Samaritan kindness. The love in the heart of Jesus reached first to a few close friends, then to sinners and outcasts, then to the Samaritans and the Gentiles, and finally to the whole world. It led ultimately to that most sacrificial of all human enterprises—the missionary movement.

⁷ Matt. 5:44, 46; Luke 6:20, 35.

⁸ Matt. 28:20; 24:14.

Love leads to humility and self-sacrifice. Almsgiving is done in private, not for social plaudits. A person prays, not to be seen of men and thereby to be accounted good.⁹ He who seeks to save his life shall lose it; whoever loses his life for the sake of the Kingdom shall save it. He who stores up for himself the wealth of the world shall lose himself. Salutations in the market places and chief seats in the synagogues in themselves are unworthy. The poor in spirit are blessed.

Love shuns positions of worldly power, lest they be secured at the loss of one's soul.¹⁰ The best positions in life are not to be seized; they are obtained through the exercise of love; they are bestowed in recognition of merit and worth. He who exalts himself will be abased; the humble will be exalted.

Love creates true greatness. The members of the society of perfect love are characterized by the sincerity, purity, humility of little children.¹¹ He who serves most is greatest. The Kingdom of God is an aristocracy, not of Might but of Service. The Son of God came to serve, not to be served. For the sake of those outside the Kingdom, Jesus sanctified himself, sacrificing even his life in that cause.

Love makes the Golden Rule the best sociological proposition in Hebrew and Christian literature. "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them." In reply to a lawyer of the Pharisees, Jesus enunciated a twofold commandment, the first part of which invoked complete love to God; the second part, to man. The love of a person for his fellow man as shown in both attitude and deeds is the test of the love of a person for God. Love means service. Love does not connote lip-service; neither does it mean divided service. No one can serve two masters, God and mammon.

⁹ John 12:43; Matt. 6:5.

¹⁰ Matt. 4:8.

¹¹ Luke 9:48; Mark 10:14; Matt.

18:1.

SOCIAL SERVICE

Christian love implies definite and continued personal service. Social service is the test of entrance to the Kingdom, and of the sincerity of a person's religious profession.¹² On the judgment day those on the right hand will be blessed and given life eternal, and to them the king of the judgment will say:

I was an hungered, and ye gave me meat;
I was thirsty, and ye gave me drink;
I was a stranger, and ye took me in;
Naked and ye clothed me;
I was in prison, and ye came unto me.

Then the righteous, with surprise, will inquire of the Lord of the judgment: When did we see you hungry and feed you; or thirsty, and give you drink? When did we see you a stranger and take you in? Then the Lord of the judgment will answer them that when they had served the weak and poor and the heavy-laden on earth, they had been serving him and thereby had proved their loyalty to God and earned the rewards of everlasting life. And those who failed to measure up to the social service test, whether professing Christians or not, will be turned away.

The importance and nature of religio-social service is indicated by Jesus when he symbolizes the giving of a cup of cold water in his name as a test for receiving eternal life.¹³ He who has two coats should give one to him who has none. The sharing of food with those who have no food is commanded. Give liberally; give all thou hast. It is blessed to give under all circumstances. Material riches are insignificant in value when compared with spiritual wealth. To give the things of this world is to receive the greater things of the spirit. He is richest who gives most, both of material and spiritual goods. As an expression of

¹² Matt. 25:31-46.

¹³ Mark 9:41; Matt. 10:42.

his love for God, Jesus lived a life of social and human service.

Whenever Jesus mentioned the ten commandments—all three synoptic writers agree on this point—he omitted the four commandments of individual import and repeated only the social rules, or principles, and revised one (the sixth below):

- (1) Thou shalt do no murder,
- (2) Thou shalt not commit adultery,
- (3) Thou shalt not steal,
- (4) Thou shalt not bear false witness,
- (5) Honor thy father and thy mother,
- (6) Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.¹⁴

After the fashion of the major social prophets, Jesus cried out vehemently against social injustice. He denounced the persons who devour widows' houses, or who lay unnecessary economic burdens upon their fellow men.

SOCIAL JUSTICE

Antisocial religion, above all things, angered Jesus. He wanted no followers who were practicing social or political injustice. Cursed are those persons who appear righteous, who make long prayers, or who go about in long robes, but who inwardly are hypocrites, are full of dead men's bones, of uncleanness, of extortion and excess.¹⁵ The shedding of innocent blood is condemned. The paying of money in order to expiate sin will avail nothing. Such money is tainted; it is blood money.¹⁶

Antisocial and commercialized religion so angered Jesus that, contrary to his customary attitudes toward sinners, he committed violence on one occasion against offenders. He overthrew the tables of the money changers in the temple, and, making a scourge of small cords, he

¹⁴ Matt. 19:18, 19.

¹⁵ Matt. 23:23-33.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

drove out the money changers. In so doing, he declared that the worship of God should not be commercialized.¹⁷ He would not have the house of worship turned into a cultured den of thieves.

So furious were the scribes and the chief priests because of the attack of Jesus upon antisocial religious practices that they planned how they might kill him.¹⁸ It appears that as a direct result of the antagonism of Jesus to the antisocial practices of the religious, or temple authorities, and of the other religious leaders the conspiracy against Jesus finally brought about his death. Jesus went about stirring up the common people in a democratic movement against the autocratic, hypocritical, antisocial religious leaders among the Jews. He met his death while championing the needs of the masses who were being exploited in the name of religion.

Jesus was the highest type of social democrat. The perfected social order which he foresaw is a democracy, ruled by the principles of love and service in the name of God. Furthermore, no one shall be compelled to come into the Kingdom. The good tidings shall be presented to all but the principle of voluntary assent, not compulsion or conscription, rules in recruiting for the Kingdom. Moreover, within the Kingdom, compulsion is unknown. Love sufficeth.

Jesus hated sin. To him, sin was anything which overcomes love and which causes a person or society to disintegrate. Sin is that which defeats or hinders the coming of the Kingdom of Love. Sin breaks up or holds back the social process. Sin, like love, is organic. Sin grows. An evil tree brings forth evil fruit; grapes and figs are not gathered from thorns or thistle-bearing plants.

Jesus forgave sinners; even social sinners. By means of imagination, he put himself in the place of the sinner and

¹⁷ John 2:13-17; Matt. 21:12, 13.

Mark 11:15-17; Luke 19:45, 46.

¹⁸ Mark 11:18; Luke 19:47.

sought to understand the causes of the sinning. As his mind filled with an understanding of sin, his heart overflowed with pity and forgiveness for the sinner. He sought primarily to reclaim; he thought secondarily of punishment. Even in the case of the adulterous woman, he sought to save what was left of the broken spirit rather than to punish. His cardinal penological principle was reformation.

THE FAMILY

It is significant that the social institution which Jesus supported above all others, even above the church and the state, was the family. Jesus spoke frequently for the family. He commanded that children should unwaveringly act loyally toward parents; he used not only the clear-cut terms of the writer of Exodus but added a curse of death upon those who abuse their parents.¹⁹

An even stronger command was given by Jesus concerning loyalty to the marriage relation. A man's genuine loyalty to his parents, undiminished in intensity, must be subordinated to faithfulness to his wife.²⁰ This social theory is opposite in character to that of Confucius concerning attitudes toward parents and wives. The conception which Jesus urged leads to social progress, while the teaching of Confucius leads to social stability.

A man and woman who have been spiritually joined together in wedlock are one flesh, above and beyond separation by civil authorities. Jesus uttered the stern and awe-inspiring sanction: What therefore God hath joined together, let not man put asunder. The family as an institution is accorded a sacredly fundamental place in the social order.

Jesus recognized woman as equal with man spiritually. His attitude toward his mother and the other

¹⁹ Matt. 15:4; 19:19.

²⁰ Mark 10:7, 8; Matt. 19:5.

women of his day was one of respect, chivalry, and gentleness. He laid the foundations of a social order in which women function on terms of equality with men.

Honor to parents and honor to wife must be supplemented by honor to children. Jesus revered little children. In them he saw the innocence and purity of God. When he wished to describe the attributes of the Kingdom, he selected a little child and held him up as typifying the simple, natural spirit of perfect living. Although without children himself, Jesus loved little children, choosing them for special honors, and declaring that of such is the Kingdom of God. It is not God's will that one of these little ones should perish; it is stupidity of man and the lack of social conscience that causes a high mortality rate of little children. He who harms the trustful child shall be cursed. It were better for such a miscreant that a millstone were tied about his neck and that he were thrown into the sea.²¹

PROPERTY AND POVERTY

In regard to the influence of private property Jesus was fearful. His zeal for and whole-hearted loyalty to spiritual values made him suspicious of vested interests. He repeatedly warned in vigorous language against the lure of gold and the baneful influences of material wealth upon the attitudes and acts of persons. He himself showed no interest in owning property. He lived without a home of his own and without private means. If he had possessed these, his life-work probably would have failed. He urged his disciples to remain free from the desire for money; he even commanded them to rely for means of material subsistence upon the people with whom they labored. Jesus believed that private property hindered the realization of the principle of brotherhood of man. He made a sharp distinction between the interests of God and mammon.

²¹ Mark 9:42.

He believed that these two sets of interests are diametrically opposed to each other. To the extent that a person relies upon property, he separates himself from God and the things of the Spirit. The disciples were instructed to scorn, not only the earning of wealth, but if they possessed earthly goods, they were to sell these and give the proceeds to the poor.²² The disciple of the spiritual life must divorce himself from the love of monetary gain.

Toward the poor, Jesus was sympathetic. The Gospel shall be preached chiefly to the poor, not because the poor, *per se*, need it more than the rich and not because the poor should be specially favored, but because they recognize their needs. They are in a receptive attitude whereas the attitude of the rich has been calloused by their wealth. The response to the Gospel is not likely to be wholehearted by persons who value riches highly.

Jesus taught a spiritual socialism. He thought in terms of spiritual love for all persons, not of material well-being for the proletariat. But he seemed to prefer the company of the poor. Blessed are the poor, was his attitude; for they are in a frame of mind which makes them fit subjects for the perfect Kingdom. The possession of property gives a person a feeling of self-exaltation; poverty gives rise to humility—a cardinal virtue of the Kingdom.

Jesus did not attack poverty with preventive measures. Poverty will continue to exist.²³ Perhaps it is well that it should continue, for a nation of economically satisfied people might not be religiously minded. It is harder for a camel to go through a needle's eye than for a rich man to get into the swing of an untrammelled social process. Woe unto the rich, because they are self-centered, materially inclined, and pleasure-loving. The man who pulled down his barns in order to build larger barns, saying to himself: "Take thine ease, eat, drink, and be merry," is

²² Matt. 19:21.

²³ John 12:8; Mark 14:7; Matt. 26:11.

scathingly condemned by Jesus.²⁴ He is ostracized from the ideal society. In the story of Lazarus and the rich man, the former is carried to Abraham's bosom, but the latter, in torments, begs for a cup of water and the company of Lazarus. He wanted Lazarus sent to him; he longed for the company of him whom he once ignored. The attention of Jesus was continually centered on the dangers of wealth, but rarely on the need of preventing poverty.

Zacchaeus, a rich man, was called as a disciple of Jesus. But before the discipleship began, the superintendent not only came down from the mulberry tree and declared his allegiance to God, but he volunteered evidence of being socially minded as well by stating that he gave one half of his wealth to the poor, and that he restored falsely acquired possessions fourfold.

Then there was the rich young man who came to Jesus, asking how he might obtain admittance to the Kingdom, declaring that he observed the commandments. One more thing, however, was required of him, namely, that he sell all his possessions and give the returns to the poor. Only by so giving might he have treasure in the social Kingdom.

The teaching of Jesus concerning the Sabbath throws light on the exceedingly human element in his thought. The Sabbath is a special day for doing good deeds.²⁵ The Sabbath is to be treated not primarily from the standpoint of religious rites but from the viewpoint of human welfare. Works of necessity, and deeds of mercy and kindness to man and beast are proper to the Sabbath.²⁶ Man was not made for the Sabbath, but the day of rest and good deeds was designed for the benefit of man.

²⁴ Luke 12:16-21.

²⁵ Luke 13:14; Matt. 12:2; 10:13.

²⁶ Mark 2:27; 3:4.

PEACE VERSUS WAR

The attitude of Jesus toward the problem of peace versus war has aroused considerable controversy. There are certain of his sayings which seem to contradict each other. But an analysis of all his teachings demonstrates that his emphasis was on peace. The exceptions to the rule will be stated first.²⁷ On one occasion he said: "I came not to send peace but a sword." The context shows that Jesus was speaking in an individual and not a national way. He had in mind the conflicts which arise between persons who are converted to the ideals of the Kingdom and those who are not. Jesus explained that those who love him must do so even at the expense of forsaking father and mother.²⁸ Loyalty to the Kingdom may mean that the son will oppose the practices of his father in business, the daughter will object to the time wasted in the un-Christian practices of her mother, the parents will protest the sowing of "wild oats" by son or daughter.

In the temple, on one occasion, Jesus displayed anger and used violence. He was dealing, however, with a group of criminals, cultured criminals, who apparently would respond to no treatment except violence. They would not cease their nefarious practices except through compulsion.

On the other hand, the illustrations are many where Jesus used love in order to change the ways of people. He never used force in his own behalf, even to save his life. He rebuked Simon Peter for drawing his sword and cutting off the right ear of the servant of the high priest who in company with others was seeking Jesus in order to bind him and kill him.²⁹ At another time Jesus specifically enjoined: "Resist not evil"; and instructed his followers when smitten upon the right cheek to turn the left also.³⁰ Those who take the sword shall perish by the sword; the

²⁷ Matt. 10:34-39.

²⁹ John 18:10; Matt. 26:50-56.

²⁸ Luke 12:49-53.

³⁰ Matt. 5:39.

nation that builds itself up by the sword shall be destroyed by it.

The birth of Jesus was accompanied by glad tidings and song, proclaiming peace on earth and good will toward men.³¹ Blessed are the peacemakers. In the perfect society, good will by all to all will be shown, perfect love will reign, and permanent peace will prevail.

Jesus may or may not have expressed himself on several important issues of his day. The incomplete records do not indicate his attitude upon many vital social problems. It appears that Jesus usually spoke in remedial rather than preventive social terms. However, beneath this remedial terminology there are fundamental social principles, which, if put into common practice, would solve social problems. Jesus proposed to build an ideal society by remaking and regenerating persons. He dared to promulgate the radical program of remaking human nature itself. He commanded that all self-centered impulses and tendencies be completely subordinated to the altruistic and socializing desires.

Jesus insisted throughout his life-work upon the principle that material factors must be subjected to spiritual values. In order to make this principle clear he often took particular pains to treat material goods with the utmost insignificance. He perceived that persons are made slaves by the worship of wealth, either on the part of themselves, of the privileged classes, or of society itself. He inaugurated a program of spiritualization which would free the world from the slavery which may come from the economic forces.

Although a religious teacher above all things else, Jesus insisted upon the necessity of something more than a saving faith alone. He required a social attitude of mind, a heart of social love, and a spirit of service. Give freely to others. Serve others. By giving himself for others, a person will

³¹ Luke 2:13, 14.

function in the Kingdom of perfect love, and win other persons to that Kingdom.

Jesus required that love be substituted for hate. Unkind deeds must be supplanted by kind deeds. According to this principle, employers and employees must learn to love one another; and business must be put upon the basis of love and service. Government must be a series of mutual services. Religion must harbor no narrowness. In all human relationships, Jesus reiterated the principle: Love, love, love. This is the spiritualizing and socializing principle by which Jesus proposed to make over the social order.

PAUL AS A SOCIAL THINKER

Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles, by virtue of unique experiences and many travels, possessed a cosmopolitan attitude of mind. He gave a practical application of the teaching of Jesus concerning the brotherhood of man. He urged the equal treatment of Jews and Gentiles, bond and free.³² He preached the essential unity of mankind. God is no respecter of persons; his Kingdom is a spiritual democracy. We are all—Jew and Gentile—children of the same Father, who gave his son in service for all.³³ To the call to come over into Macedonia for the purpose of rendering aid, Paul responded immediately and favorably. By so doing, he believed that he was carrying out the true implications of the love of God.

The greatest tribute that has ever been paid to love as a social force was given by Paul.³⁴ Although possessing the highest educational qualifications and being able to speak with the greatest eloquence, any person leads a practically useless life unless that life is motivated by love. Giving one's possessions to the poor and sacrificing one's body count little if one does these things in any other spirit than that of love. Love protects a person from envying his

³² Acts 15:9; 10:28; Galatians 3:28.

³³ Romans 8:16; 32.

³⁴ I Corinthians Ch. 13.

neighbors, from becoming proud and haughty and boastful. Love is the greatest principle of life.

The members of the Kingdom of God should love one another under all circumstances.³⁵ They should bear one another's burdens.³⁶ They should do good to all men, even to those who persecute. Above all, they should not recompense any man with evil for evil, or fail to feed their enemies if the latter hunger. Love is the law of God. Perfect love is more powerful than principalities and powers and even death.³⁷ Love conquers all evil. Love is more powerful than might. A practical, cosmopolitan brotherhood of man is one of the fundamental concepts of Paul's teachings.

Paul taught the organic unity of mankind. In the perfect Christian order each person has a specific function to perform which is a part of the whole process. Paul compares this situation to the human body in which there are many organs, each performing its individual but correlated function.³⁸ No one liveth to himself, no one dieth to himself.³⁹ Every person, even in dying, influences the social equilibrium and affects group progress. All individuals in the perfect Kingdom are colaborers and cooperators. Whatever weakens one individual weakens society; whatever strengthens the individual strengthens society, providing that strength is used societarily.

Another fundamental element in the social thought of Paul was his concept of sin. Sin is socially and individually destructive. The wages of sin—a generic term—is death. Paul made a long list of social sins, namely: covetousness, maliciousness, drunkenness, wantonness, dishonesty, fraud, stealing, fornication, murder. In nearly all his letters, Paul warned his followers against the evils which beset mankind. He urged people to beware of the

³⁵ Galatians 5:13; Romans 12:10.

³⁸ Romans 12:4-8; cf. I Cor. 12:12.

³⁶ Galatians 6:2; 6:10; Acts 20:35.

³⁹ Romans 14:7.

³⁷ Romans 8:35-39; 12:17; Ephesians 1:21; 2:4; 3:17, 18.

appearance of doing evil. Paul's rule of conduct was the Aristotelian mean: Be temperate in all things.

On the other hand, Paul cited long lists of virtues. Love is continually urged. Temperance, meekness, gentleness, honesty, purity, and justice are repeatedly stressed. Paul's description of a good man and bishop is the delineation of the nature of a social citizen who is temperate, a good husband, not mercenary nor covetous, who ruleth well his household, and possesses a good reputation and character.

In all Paul's thought, righteous living was uppermost. Cheerful giving was recommended. The strong must bear the infirmities of the weak, not only for the sake of the weak, but in order that the strong may not become self-centered.

Paul taught a gospel of peace. He deprecated strife between persons. He trusted in the operation of the law of love. Love will bring order out of confusion, and peace out of discord. The social Kingdom of God, motivated by love, moves orderly, harmoniously, and constructively.

Paul firmly supported the family as an essential institution of society. He admonished children to obey their parents, to honor their fathers and mothers. He commanded wives to obey their husbands, and husbands to love their wives even as Christ loved the church and as men love themselves.⁴⁰ He commanded men to remain true in the marriage relation, and to keep the single standard of morals inviolate.

The dangers of wealth were frequently pointed out by Paul. We brought no riches into this life; we can not take any riches out. Riches continually subject us to temptations, snares, and lusts. The love of money is the root of all evil.⁴¹ The greatest wealth which any person can acquire is the wealth of good deeds done to other persons.

⁴⁰ Ephesians 5:22-23; Colossians 3:18, 19; I Corinthians 11:9.

⁴¹ I Timothy 6:7-10; 17:18.

The thought of Paul concerning law is exceedingly modern. Law is not for the righteous; law is for the lawless and disobedient. The honest and righteous and just are above the law in the sense that a well-mated husband and wife are above the law of divorce. If there were none other than happily-mated husbands and wives, there would be no need for divorce laws. In a similar way, if perfect love prevailed among all people, law could be largely discarded. The teachings of Paul run the gamut of brotherly love. Paul thought in terms of concepts such as these: being well-grounded in love; abounding in love; let brotherly love continue; the love of Christ constraineth. Paul carried a message of love to all men, and established the church as a home for all who would accept Christ's message of love.

OTHER SOCIAL APOSTLES

The apostle James spoke in no uncertain terms of the democracy of God, the need of helping the weak, the dangers of riches, the evils of strife, and the social commandments. James made social service a fundamental test of religion.⁴²

Peter attacked the same social sins that Jesus and Paul had flayed, argued in behalf of the justice of God, and proclaimed with new vigor the law of love.

John is the chief exponent of the principle of love. God is love. The reign of God is a reign of love; the Kingdom of God is a kingdom of perfect love. In the Book of Revelation, the writer describes two cities: one wicked, and the other perfect. The first is elegantly clothed in purple and gold, bedecked with precious stones. But her heart is rotten. Lust and vice have ruined her. Her dominating sins are sex immorality and luxury. The perfect city is the new Jerusalem, a community of happy people, motivated in all things by love. Nothing that defileth is permitted in the New Jerusalem, nor anything that worketh abomination, or maketh a lie.⁴³

⁴² James 1:26, 27.

⁴³ Revelation, Ch. 21.

The fundamentals of early Christian social thought may now be summarized. The New Testament authorities offered no new system of sociology; they did not submit a scientific program for the social reorganization of the world, but made, however, substantial contributions.

(1) Early Christian social thought represented a system of changing the attitudes of persons. By making over persons the world can be improved. The person is exalted. The person must be re-educated. The right sort of persons will produce the right sort of social structure and the proper type of social process and society. Christianity indicated socialized principles of conduct which the disciples of Christianity must accept.⁴⁴

(2) The Fatherhood of God is made a cardinal principle of the Kingdom. When all persons recognize the Fatherhood of God, they will have a strong tie binding them together and impelling them to regenerated living.

(3) The universal brotherhood of man is a natural corollary of the principle of the Fatherhood of God. When everyone recognizes the underlying brotherhood of all persons, the prejudices of race which now so bitterly divide mankind will begin to dissolve.

(4) Marriage is a divine rite, and husbands and wives shall work together in behalf of their children. The family is the chief social institution which the New Testament writers supported.

(5) Little children set examples of simple faith and trust. They call for sacrifice and transform parents into altruistic beings.

(6) Early Christian thought was missionary. It was not self-centered. It said: Go. It drove out its adherents into all forms of sacrificial living. It required that

⁴⁴ An excellent summary of the "Social Gospel" is given by A. C. Knudson in the *Personalist*, V:102-114, under the title of "The Social Gospel and Theology." Four main aspects are mentioned: (1) Its dominant interest in the present earthly life; (2) its democratic tendency; (3) its ethical emphasis; and (4) its stress on social solidarity.

its followers help the sick, preach the gospel, travel into foreign lands. It was an activity religion. It defined in living terms the dynamic and driving principle of love.

THE ROLE OF SERVICE⁴⁵

Then the King will say to those on his right, "Come, you, whom my Father has blessed, enter into possession of the Kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world; for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you clothed me, I was sick and you cared for me, I was in prison and you came to me."

Then the upright will answer him, "Lord, when did we see you hungry and feed you? Or thirsty and give you drink? When did we see you a stranger and welcome you? Or naked and clothe you? Or when did we see you sick or in prison and come to you?" The King will answer them, "Truly, inasmuch as you have done it even to the least of these my brothers, you have done it to me." (Matthew, Mark, and Luke: p. 66)

THE ROYAL LAW OF LOVE

You have heard the saying, "You shall love your neighbor and hate your enemy." But I say unto you, love your enemies, ask blessings for those who curse you, do good to those who hate you, and pray for those who persecute you, that you may become sons of your Father in heaven; for he causes his sun to rise on the bad and good alike, and sends rain on both those who do right and those who do wrong. For if you love only those who love you, what reward have you earned? Do not even the tax-gatherers as much? And if you show courtesy only to your friends, what more are you doing than others? Do not even the heathen as much?

If you help only those who help you, what credit is that to you? Even sinners do that. And if you lend only in hope of repayment, what credit is that to you? Sinners lend to sinners to be repaid in full. But love your enemies and be helpful and lend, never losing faith, and your reward will be great. You shall be children of the Most High, for he himself is kind to the thankless and wicked.

Grow to be merciful, even as your Father is merciful. Give and gifts will come back to you in such generous measure that, pressed

⁴⁵ Reprinted by permission from Charles Foster Kent's *The Shorter Bible* (New Testament), Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923.

down, shaken together, running over, they shall pour into your lap. For the measure that you give is the measure you get. You must therefore become perfect, even as your heavenly Father is perfect.

Therefore, treat every man the same way that you would like him to treat you; this is the summing up of the law and the prophets. (Matthew, Mark, and Luke: pp. 92-93)

THE SUPREMACY OF LOVE

Yet I will show you a far better way. Though I speak the ecstatic language of men and of angels and have not love, I have become a resounding trumpet or a clanging cymbal. Even though I have the prophetic gift and can understand all mysteries and all knowledge and sufficient faith to remove mountains, and have not love, I am nothing. Though I give all I have to feed the poor and my body to be burned, and have not love, I gain nothing.

Love suffers long and is kind; love is not envious; love is not boastful, is not conceited, does not offend, is not self-seeking, is not enraged, does not resent wrong, does not delight in evil, but delights in the truth. Love forgives all things, believes all things, hopes for all things, endures all things.

Love never fails. As for prophecies they shall come to an end. As for ecstatic utterances they shall cease. As for knowledge it shall also come to an end; for our knowledge is limited, and we prophesy imperfectly. But when that which is perfect has come, that which is imperfect shall come to an end.

When I was a child, I spoke as a child, I thought as a child; but now that I am a man I have put aside childish ways. For now we see in a mirror indistinctly but then face to face. Now I know only in part, but then fully, even as I am fully known.

Faith, hope, and love—these three are eternal, but the greatest of these is love. (Paul's Letters: pp. 173-174)

LIVING IN LOVING FELLOWSHIP WITH GOD AND MAN

We know what love is by this, that Christ laid down his life for us; so we ought to lay down our lives for the brothers. But if any one possesses this world's wealth and looks on while a brother is in need and withholds his sympathy from him, how can the love of God remain in him? My dear children, let us show our love not with words nor with our lips only, but by deeds and sincerity.

Beloved, let us love one another, for love comes from God and every one who loves is a child of God and knows God. He who loves not man does not know God, for God is love. God revealed his love for us because he sent his only Son into the world that

through him we might have life. His love is shown in this, not that we loved God, but that he loved us and sent his Son to be the sacrifice that made possible the forgiveness of our sins.

Beloved, if God so loved us, then we ought also to love one another. No one has ever seen God; but if we love one another, then God dwells in us, and the love which is his is made perfect in us. By this we know that we shall dwell in him and he in us, because he has given us a portion of his own Spirit, and we have seen and bear witness that the Father has sent the Son to be the Savior of the world. Whoever acknowledges that Jesus is the Son of God, in him God abides, and he abides in God.

We ourselves know and believe in the love that God has for us. God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him. Love is perfect with us when we have full confidence regarding the day of judgment, for in this world we are living as Christ lived. In love there is no fear, but perfect love drives out all fear, for fear implies punishment, and he who fears has not attained perfect love. We love because he first loved us. If any one declares, "I love God," and yet hates his brother, he is a liar; for he who does not love his brother whom he has seen, cannot love God whom he has never seen. And we have this command from him, that he who loves God is to love his brother also. (John: pp. 268- 269)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The bases of early Christian social thought.
2. The major contributions of the teachings of Jesus to social thought.
3. Dynamic principles enunciated by Jesus.
4. Behavioristic rules according to Jesus.
5. The richest person in the world in Jesus' estimation.
6. Social causes of the successful attack upon the life of Jesus.
7. The nature of a social sinner.
8. The early Christian attitude toward wealth.
9. In what sense will there always be poor people?
10. The meaning of a spiritual socialism.
11. The Christian attitude regarding war and peace.
12. The apostle Paul's contribution to the brotherhood of man principle.
13. The best wealth according to Paul.
14. The Christian concept of the organic unity of mankind.
15. The most meaningful of the social thought teachings of Christianity.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL THOUGHT IN THE MIDDLE AGES

THE SOCIAL thought of the Middle Ages was in part a reflection of the unsettled social conditions, and in part an outgrowth of the thought and life of the five centuries which intervened between the beginning of the Christian Era and the Fall of Rome. During these centuries the Church Fathers modified somewhat the pristine Christian teachings. While they accepted the underlying social nature of mankind and believed that government and social organization were necessary in order to curb evil tendencies, they taught that the authority of all just government was derived from God. Government is a natural institution, necessary to the welfare of society, and therefore every subject owed obedience and loyalty to justly constituted government. The authoritative rather than the revolutionary element in government received support. The essential unity of mankind was proclaimed.

The strong Roman bias for organization and administration was builded into the church—the result was the powerful Church of Rome with its hierarchal structure. After the Fall of Rome, the Roman proclivity for centralization of government lived on and produced within the Church a center of power that has been the marvel of church history.

The Church Fathers directed the attention of the people to the next world and to preparation therefor. Sacramental and sacrificial methods of salvation were elaborated. The importance of a changing social order was underrated. In fact, the injustices in the current social order were considered as disciplinary measures for the soul in its preparation for the next world.

By the third century, loyalty to creed had become a dominant note in Christianity. The poor constituted a decreasing influence in church life; wealth was exerting un-Christian influences. The aristocratic elements in church organization began to transform the poor into a special class within the church. Poverty was not viewed preventively. By the time of the Fall of Rome the poor had become objects upon which to bestow alms as a means of expiating sin.

AUGUSTINE'S CONTRIBUTION

The greatest of the Latin Fathers was Saint Augustine (354-450). Among other works, he wrote an important document under the title of *The City of God*. In this gigantic undertaking social thought was submerged beneath theological discussions. A part of the argument is devoted to an explanation of the Fall of Rome. The leading causal elements are described as economic factors, such as the rise of luxury; and religious unbelief, such as the worship of pagan gods. Augustine describes two cities, one of this world, materialistic and debasing; and one of the next world—the City of God—which through the will of God will finally triumph.

During the first half of the Middle Ages the dominant tendencies are Roman and Christian. The Roman power of organization gains increasing strength in its new form—the Church. The Christian influences were expressed in high ideals, new duties, and asceticism. The church acted as a soothing and quieting force in the centuries of unrest. It built elaborate monasteries and gathered together under its protecting wing large numbers of people, chiefly the poor. Under the supervision of the church, these religious believers lived in communal and sympathetic fashion. Along with these developments the church also manifested grave abuses.

Out of the period of social disorder which characterized the early Middle Ages there developed educational move-

ments, such as that which Charlemagne sponsored, and the system of Feudalism, which gave to the Middle Ages its most distinctive set of characteristics. Feudalism made land the central institution of society. The ownership of land gave power; land constituted social and political power. Land was parcelled out upon the receipt of oaths of homage and fealty. Under this land system there were three classes of people: the nobles, the clergy, and the peasants. The nobles were the rulers and exercised military prerogatives. The clergy were either the privileged subjects of the nobles, or else through the institution which they represented they acquired land power. The peasants often despised the nobles, although they worked for and supported them.

As an outgrowth of feudal industry various forms of guilds or industrial organizations flourished from the tenth to the fifteenth centuries. Sometimes the masters and workmen jointly belonged to guilds, as in the case of the merchant guilds. Sometimes the guilds became local monopolies. Always they possessed the aim of improving the conditions of the membership.

The religious wars, or Crusades, of the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries inaugurated many changes. They gave the restless nobility major themes of attention and even removed many nobles through death in battle from the European arena. They created intellectual unrest. They enlarged the horizons of many persons and gave rise to skepticism. They led to the Reformation.

PERSONAL LIBERTY

Social thought in the Middle Ages received a considerable stimulus from Teutonic sources. The barbarous Teutons contributed ideas of freedom. They increased the emphasis upon the individual. They were rough, bold exponents of "personal liberty," and disregarded mere churchly procedure, social traditions, and some of the finer

ideals of life and character. On the other hand, chivalry and knighthood were perhaps of Teutonic origin.

The church utilized chivalry. It became the duty of the knight to defend the church and that which belonged to the church. Chivalry became a form of social discipline which ruled in the latter part of the Middle Ages. It softened manners and became the sponsor for virtue. It remained, however, a modified military structure with military traditions.

The rise of scholasticism manifested many traits opposite to those of monasticism. In the ninth century the leading thinkers had not advanced beyond the conception of a natural social state characterized by chaotic conditions, and organized by political machinery. By the twelfth century only the faintest glimmerings of a doctrine of popular sovereignty had begun to appear. The thought of the day was largely theological.

The church through its system of monasteries had maintained centers where religious and intellectual traditions had been preserved. These centers were undoubtedly important factors in conserving much that was valuable in an age when ruthless disregard for civilized values prevailed.

Because of the abuses which sprang up in connection with the monasteries, certain positive reactions against the monasteries arose. St. Francis of Assisi (1181-1226) turned from the monastery to actual life. He inaugurated a method for the regeneration of society. He and his followers lived and spent themselves among the actual poor, subjecting themselves to the economic conditions of the poor. They helped the poor, not by giving alms as an expiation for sin and to secure self-salvation, but by the first-hand giving of their lives. St. Francis ignored the regular ecclesiastical conception of charity and gave it all the reality of a new and genuine social force. By renouncing the possession of property and living as the poor live, he obtained what he could secure in no other way—the

poor man's point of view. In this way, also, he secured an entrance into the poor man's mind and heart that could not be had so well by any other method. By renouncing wealth and accepting literal poverty he reached the core of the problem of poverty. St. Francis was motivated by a desire to live a life of love. He spent not wealth but his life for the poor.

SCHOLASTICISM

According to scholasticism a person should look to reason for the attainment of truths of the natural order, and to faith under the guidance and infallible authority of the Church for the attainment of revealed truth or truths of the supernatural order. In all matters affecting faith and morals the teaching authority of the Church was supreme: "Philosophy is the handmaid of theology, and reason is the foundation of faith."

Scholasticism, developing during four centuries, reached its highest expression in the teachings of Thomas Aquinas (1226-1274). He pushed forward the Aristotelian premises as follows: Man is a social being; he unites with other persons in a social organization in order to gain his own purposes. A person looks to able rulers for wise political guidance; he accords the requisite power to these rulers. Aquinas taught that man was by nature a social being, that he was ordained by nature to live in association with other men. As men have diverse thoughts, desires, and impulses, government as a unifying principle is necessary. Man cannot live happily except in society; society is impossible without government; and therefore man must of necessity establish some form of government.

"To live a life of pleasure, or to think only of getting rich, appears as good only to a sensual and grasping man."¹ Men are obliged to live in society; it must be morally good to help our fellows. Social justice rests upon "a solemn

¹ M. De Wulf, *Mediaeval Philosophy*, Harvard University Press, 1924, p. 105.

affirmation of solidarity and mutual assistance."² If the people are careful guardians of the common weal then they have a right to choose their magistrates, but if they become so corrupt as to sell their votes then they forfeit their rights.³

Aquinas' thought is centered in his doctrine of law. First, there is eternal law which is divine reason in control of the universe. Second, there is natural law which is the increasing rationalization of eternal law by human beings. Third, there is human law which is eternal law expressed in the social order. Fourth, there is divine law, revealed in the Bible and supplementing the incompleteness of human law.⁴ "There is here outlined a logical and progressive order of social analysis. Under the gradual unfolding of the Divine purpose in Eternal law there is the natural history aspect of society in which social institutions have their natural origin, the organization of society into political form chiefly through conscious effort, and the final conformity of society and government to the will of God."⁵

In religion, scholasticism reduced religious mysticism to rational forms. It based religion on learning rather than on authority; it pursued the methods of reasoning rather than of contemplation.

Scholasticism furthered the advancement of learning; it aided and developed the life of the universities. It encouraged the growth of independent thinking, although its decline set in about the fourteenth century, before it had had a fair opportunity to inaugurate a movement which would lead to an inductive or a positivistic philosophy, or sociology.

Various other thought elements appeared in the closing centuries of the Middle Ages. As early as the ninth cen-

² *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³ M. De Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*, Princeton University Press, 1922, p. 256.

⁴ J. P. Lichtenberger, *Development of Social Theory*, Century, 1923, p. 110.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

ture a maritime code, a military code, and a rural code were formulated in the Byzantine Empire in order to meet new social needs. Until the fall of Constantinople the Byzantine influence was a deterrent against the forces from the East. Byzantium preserved and gave a new impetus to Grecian literature, art, architecture, and law.

Dante (1265-1321), the Italian literary genius, was interested in political and social life. He conceived a world society "ruled by one Supreme prince," not with reference to making trifling judgments for each particular town, but in those matters which are common to all men. In their peculiarities each town should be governed by special laws, but in commonalities the world should be governed by one person and by a rule common to them all, with a view to their peace.⁶ "The proper work of the human race, taken as a whole, is to set in action the whole capacity of that understanding which is capable of achievement. . . . The condition requisite for the accomplishment of this purpose is universal peace."⁷

In Arabia the celebrated historian and philosopher Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) made a detailed and surprisingly accurate description of the social life of the Arab. With the evolution of the life of the individual, he compared the development of the successive stages in social life. This distinguished historian urged that history should consider not simply rulers, dynasties, and wars, but also racial factors, climatic forces, the laws of association, and the stages of associative life. He wished to make history scientific, even a social science. He formulated an evolutionary doctrine of social progress. He evolved a spiral theory of social evolution, beginning with the crudest primitive life and ending with the most civilized urban life.

⁶ Dante's *De Monarchia*, translated by F. C. Church, Macmillan, 1878, Book I, ch. 12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Book I, ch. 4.

PIERS THE PLOWMAN

In the latter part of the fourteenth century, England's great popular poet, William Langland, wrote an allegorical poem entitled *Piers the Plowman*. In this work the oppressed laboring and peasant classes cry aloud their longings for improved conditions. They are personified in Piers the Plowman, who as a dignified laborer, plays for the first time the leading rôle in serious thought. He is the leader of a field of all types of people who are laboring together and longing for a better social order. Along with the agricultural laborers we see weavers and tailors, friars and minstrels, merchants and knights. Labor of every sort is dignified. All living laborers who work with their hands and minds, truly earning, living in love and according to the laws of social order and progress, will become the pure and perfected leaders of truth.

Langland depicted well the living and working conditions of the English laboring classes. Productive toil, he argued, will receive its crown of glory. But he did not indicate practical solutions. Langland was sure, however, that the service of labor to society is sacred. He pronounced patient poverty to be the prince of all virtues. He personified Jesus in the form of a working man. Langland's fourteenth-century social message was that the individual should renounce wealth, join the honest laboring poor, and follow Christ's example of living a life of labor and love.⁸

In one sense, social thought in the Middle Ages is fragmentary; but on the other hand, there is the extensive social teachings of the scholastics, dealing with the family, the state, charity, social organization, institutions, social obligations. The scholastics had a teleological view of society and taught concerning the improvement of society through the improvement of persons. The scholastics an-

⁸ B text, Passus VIII. The manuscripts of *Piers Plowman* number over forty and fall into three sets: A, B, and C.

anticipated Ward's "social telesis" although they would not have agreed with this modern sociologist on what constitutes social progress. While several centuries are included in the period known as the Middle Ages, new social ideas are few. The centuries of unrest and transition, and the prevalent illiteracy of the masses did not conduce to new types of social thinking. There were, however, outstanding thinkers, such as Augustus Abelard, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, not to mention leaders such as Charlemagne or Ibn Khaldun. The Middle Ages also has a number of enduring accomplishments which benefit mankind to its credit, such as the Gothic cathedrals, the hospitals, organized charity, and the Magna Charta. A portion of the social thinking of earlier epochs was preserved, constituting another foundation for the renaissance of social thought that followed the Middle Ages. "The struggle of kings with vassals, the communes, the establishment of citizenship, the freedom of the serfs"⁹—all these social changes indicate that the Middle Ages possessed elements of dynamic social thinking.

AGAINST EVIL¹⁰

An Exhortation to the Romans to renounce their Paganism. Let these rather be the objects of thy desires, thou courageous nation of the Romans, thou progeny of the Reguli, Scaevolae, Scipios, and Fabricii, long after these, disburn but the difference between these and that luxurious, filthy, shameless malevolence of the devils. If nature have given thee any laudable eminence, it must be true piety that must purge and perfect it; impiety contaminates and consumes it. Now then, choose which of these to follow, that thy praise may arise, not from thyself that may be misled, but from the true God, who is without all error. Long ago, wast thou great in popular glory; but as then (as it pleased the providence of the high God), was the true religion wanting, for thee to choose and embrace. But now, awake and rouse thyself, it is now day, thou art already awake

⁹ De Wulf, *Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages*, p. 60.

¹⁰ Reprinted by permission from St. Augustine, *The City of God*, Vol. I, translated by John Healey. J. M. Dent and Company, London.

in some of thy children, of whose full virtue and constant sufferings for the truth we do justly glory; they even these who fighting at all hands against the powers of iniquity, and conquering them all by dying undaunted, have purchased this possession for us with the price of their blood. To partake of which possession we do now invite and exhort thee, that thou wouldst become a citizen, with the rest, in that city wherein true remission of sins stands as a glorious sanctuary. Give no ear unto that degenerate brood of thine, which barks at the goodness of Christ and Christianity, accusing these times of badness, and yet desiring such as should be worse, by denying tranquillity to virtue, and giving security unto all iniquity; these times didst thou never approve, nor ever desirest to secure thy temporal estate by them. Now then reach up at the heavenly ones, for which, take but a little pains, and thou shalt reap the possession of them, unto all eternity. There shalt thou find no vestal fire, nor stone of the Capitol, but one true God, who will neither limit thee blessedness in quantity, nor time, but give thee an empire, both universal, perfect, and eternal. Be no longer led in blindness by these thy illuding and erroneous gods; reject them from thee, and taking up thy true liberty, shake off their damnable subjection. They are nought but wicked fiends; and all the empire they can give them is but possession of everlasting pain. Juno did never grieve so much that the Trojans (of whom thou descendest) should arise again to the state of Rome, as these damned devils (whom as yet thou holdest for gods) do envy and repine, that mortal men should ever enjoy the glories of eternity. And thou thyself hast censured them with no obscure note, in affording such plays, whose actors thou hast branded with express infamy. Suffer us then to plead thy freedom against all these impure devils that imposed the dedication and celebration of their own shame and filthiness upon thy neck and honour. Thou couldst remove and disenable the players of those uncleannesses, from all honours: pray likewise unto the true God, to quit thee from those vile spirits that delight in beholding their own spots, whether they be true (which is most ignominious), or feigned (which is most malicious). Thou didst well in clearing the state of thy city from all such scurrilous offscums as stage-players: look a little further into it: God's Majesty can never delight in that which polluteth man's dignity. How then canst thou hold these powers, that loved such unclean plays, as members of the heavenly society, when thou holdest the men that only acted them, as unworthy to be counted in the worst rank of the members of thy city? The heavenly city is far above thine, where truth is the victory; holiness the dignity, happiness the peace, and eternity the continuance. (I:101-103)

THE GREATEST GOOD¹¹

There remains the moral, in Greek, which inquires after the greatest good whereto all our actions have reference: and which is desired for itself only, for no other end, but to make us blessed in attaining it only; and therefore we call it the end: as referring all the rest unto it. But desiring it only for itself: this bliss-affording good some would derive from the body, some from the mind, some from both: for seeing that a man consists of but soul and body, they believe that this chief good must have original from one of the two, and therein subsist; as the final end standing as the shot-mark of all their actions, which being once attained, their labours were crowned with perfection. So that they added a third kind of good to these two, namely, consisting of honour, riches, and such goods of fortune, otherwise called extrinsical: did not propose it as a final good, that is, to be desired in respect of itself, but referred it to another: being of itself good to the good and bad to the bad. So this good then, that some derived from the body and some from the soul, and some from both, all derived from the man's self. But they that took the body's part had the worse side, the soul had the better: marry they that took both, expected this good from the whole man. So then, part or whole, it is from man, howsoever. These three differences made above three several sects of philosophers: each man construing diversely both of the body's good, and the soul's good, and both their goods. But let all those stand by and make them place that say that he is not happy that enjoys the body, nor he that enjoys a mind, but he that enjoys God: not as the soul enjoys the body, or itself, nor as one friend enjoys another, but as the eye enjoys the light. If the rest can say anything for the other similes, or against this last, what it is, God willing we shall in due season discover. (II:45, 46)

Let it suffice to remember that Plato did determine that the end of all good was the attaining a virtuous life, which none could but he that knew and followed God: nor is any man happy by any other means. And therefore, he affirms, that to be a philosopher is to love God, whose nature is incorporeal: and consequently that wisdom's student, the philosopher, is then blessed when he enjoys God. For though the enjoying of each thing a man loves does not forthwith make him happy: (for many by placing their love on hateful objects are wretched and more wretched in enjoying them) yet is no man happy that enjoys not that he loves. For even those that love what

¹¹ Reprinted by permission from St. Augustine, *The City of God*, Vol. II, translated by John Healey. J. M. Dent and Company, London.

they should not think not themselves happy in loving, but in enjoying. But he that enjoys what he loves and loves the true and greatest good, who (but a wretch) will deny him to be happy? This true and greatest good is God, says Plato, and therefore he will have a philosopher a lover of God, that because philosophy aims at beatitude, the lover of God might be blessed by enjoying God. (II:46-47)

SERVICE¹²

"And if thou find any one that fortune or any false men have injured, try to know such and comfort them with thy goods for Christ of Heaven's love. Love them and lend to them as God's law teacheth: *Alter alterius onera portate* (Let each bear the burdens of the other). And all men thou canst espy that are needy and have naught, help them with thy goods, love them and blame them not, let God take vengeance; those that do evil, let God be: *Michi vindicta, et ego retribuam* (Vengeance is mine, and I will repay). And if thou wilt be pleasing to God, do as the gospel teacheth, and make thyself beloved amongst lowly men; so shalt thou find grace. *Fa-cite vobis amicos de mamona iniquitatis* (Make to you friends of the mammon of unrighteousness)."

"I would not grieve God," said Piers, "for all the goods on earth; might I do as thou sayest and be sinless?" (pp. 117, 118)

"Peter!" quoth the priest then, "I can find no pardon, except 'Do well and have well, and God shall have thy soul; and do evil and have evil, and hope thou no other but that after thy death-day the devil shall have thy soul!' " (p. 128)

Therefore, I counsel you, ye men that are rich on this earth, and can have triennials on trust of your treasure, be ye never the bolder to break the ten commandments; and especially, ye masters, mayors, and judges, who are held for wise men, and have the wealth of this world to purchase pardon and the Pope's bulls. At the dreadful Doom, when the dead shall rise and all come before Christ to yield account, how thou didst lead thy life here and didst keep His laws, and how thou didst, day by day, the Doom will declare. A bagful of pardons there, or provincial letters, or though ye be found in the fraternity of all the four Orders, and have indulgences doublefold—except Do-well help you I set your patents and your pardons at the worth of a pea-shell! (pp. 131-132)

¹² Reprinted by permission from William Langland, *The Vision of Piers the Plowman*, arranged by Kate M. Warren, published by Edward Arnold, 1923.

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. Augustine's contributions to social thought.
2. The social meaning of "personal liberty."
3. The social keynote of "chivalry."
4. The proposals of St. Francis to regenerate society.
5. The main social concept of Thomas Aquinas.
6. Social thought in the writings of Ibn Khaldun.
7. The social thought implications of the poem, "Piers the Plowman."
8. A summary of social thought in the Middle Ages.

CHAPTER X

MORE AND UTOPIAN SOCIAL THOUGHT

OF THE MORE than two hundred social utopias or ideal societies that have been described, none equal, on the whole, the Utopia by Thomas More, unless Plato's *Republic* be included in this class. Shortly after the close of the Middle Ages, with its modicum of new social thinking, the idealism of Plato appeared in the new form of descriptive utopias. More's *Utopia* deserves a degree of attention which is not customarily accorded it. It was written by one of England's sane, shrewd, tolerant students of social conditions, at a time when it was dangerous to suggest social changes.

More mediated Plato to modern social philosophy; he moved in the field of Platonic ideas and ideals. He was also indebted to Plutarch's account of Spartan life. At the dawn of the Renaissance he presented the concept of a perfect commonwealth.

If one would understand the social thought of More, a contemporary of Columbus, he must put himself under the spell of fifteenth and sixteenth century conditions in England. He must remind himself of Henry VII and Henry VIII, two autocratic rulers whom it was difficult for any individually-minded person to please. The living conditions of the peasants were almost intolerable. Unemployment was common. Punishments were severe and brutalizing. Even thieves were subject to capital punishment. If an individual stole a loaf of bread, he might as well kill the person who saw him steal the bread. In fact, by so doing, he might be better off—the only witness to his theft would thus be unable to testify against him.

Sir Thomas More could not have openly criticized the unjust social conditions of his day, and long have escaped death. It was necessary for him to put his radical ideas into the mouth of a fictitious traveler, Raphael Hythloday, and thereby disown them. As it was, More became a martyr to his religious faith and to the cause of social freedom.

MORE'S UTOPIA

More wrote the *Utopia* in two parts. Part One was written as an explanation, or introduction, to Part Two. In Part One a conversation involving three persons is reported. A conservative Dutch citizen of Antwerp converses with Raphael Hythloday, an experienced traveler, and with More. Hythloday, however, is the chief speaker. He is well versed in Latin and especially in Greek culture. Moreover, he has traveled extensively, even with Amerigo Vespucci, the Florentine navigator. In this way he is given prestige in the mind of the reader. It is not impossible in Part One of *Utopia* to recognize a distinct resemblance to the dialogue form of Plato.

Part One describes certain factors in the political situation in England. The untoward phases of poverty and the vicious forms of punishment that prevailed are painted in gloomy colors. The reader is glad to turn from this unpleasant social picture to the description in Part Two of *Utopia*, where people are living under well-ordered conditions.

The ideal commonwealth is located on the mystical island of Amaurote, where Raphael Hythloday lived for five years. On this island the economic and social life is communistic, somewhat after the manner of Plato's *Republic*. It is a fundamental communism which More postulates. Complete communism of goods exists on Amaurote.¹ All possess equal portions of wealth. The

¹ *The Utopia of Sir Thomas More*, Bell and Sons, London, edited by George Simpson in Bohn's Classical Libraries, 1910, p. 75.

Utopian communistic state implies a radical change in human nature. More justifies communism on the grounds that it roots out that serious social evil, covetousness.² Likewise, the incentive for stealing and plundering is removed. If there is a scarcity of economic commodities in any part of Utopia, the surplus in any other part is immediately drawn upon to meet the need. Thus the whole land conducts itself as if it were one family or household.³ The guiding principle in regard to economic goods is that of human needs.

COOPERATION

In Utopia everyone finds his greatest pleasure in giving to others. The strongest league of peoples or of nations is not that which is united chiefly by covenants or treaties, but one which is knit together by love and a benevolent attitude.⁴ The strongest league in the world is that which is based on the fellowship of kindred natures—a genuine Christian brotherhood of nations.

In Utopia, agriculture is the most highly respected occupation. Agriculture is a science in which all Utopian men and women are expert. In the harvest days the urban people, both men and women (farmerettes), go out into the country and help gather in the crops.⁵ Urban and rural cooperation at harvest time solves the farmer's employment problems to the pleasure, good feeling, and advantage of all concerned. The food question is considered of paramount national importance. The agriculturist is equipped with the best tools and follows intensive methods.⁶

In addition to agricultural science, every citizen of Utopia learns at least one trade or craft.⁷ Even every woman learns a skilled trade. The advantages of learning a trade

² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 93.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 135, 84.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

by every citizen are obvious—they include a great increase in the potential industrial resources of a people. The question may be raised here, if it would not be a worthwhile asset for every citizen in our modern days to learn a trade. Such an accomplishment would give a sense of economic independence to every individual; it would afford to everyone the point of view of the skilled workman; it would add a gigantic potential force to production.

In Utopia, there is one leader, or syphogrant, to every thirty families. Although there are other officers, including a prince for each city and a king for the island, the syphogrants are in reality the leading officials. It is noteworthy that no public matters are to be decided until they have been considered and debated for at least three days. By this scientific procedure the necessity of rescinding hasty legislative action is reduced to a minimum.

EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS

An important duty of the syphogrants is to regulate employment. Not only is everyone in Utopia to have a trade, but all are to work. There are no idle poor or idle rich. All rich men, commonly called “gentlemen,” all women, priests, monks, and friars (except a few) engage in productive labor. Even the syphogrants, or officials, work spontaneously. All useless occupations are prohibited. In countries where the dollar rules, there are many vain occupations which serve only to augment riotous superfluities.⁸ Thus, since all persons work and since only needed occupations are permitted in Utopia, the working day is shortened to six hours.

In the case of a season of unemployment, the simple device is adopted of shortening temporarily the labor day. By cutting down the hours of labor to four a day during an unemployment period, work is provided for all. When an individual, it may be added, visits his friends, he works

⁸ *The Utopia of Sir Thomas More*, p. 97.

the same as if he were at home. He sets himself to the task in which his friends are engaged. No one in Utopia is encumbered with visitors who sit about doing nothing and who at the same time hinder their hosts from engaging in productive activities.

The syphogrants prevent idleness; they also prevent overwork. They permit no one to work at a task like a laboring and toiling beast; they allow no one to become a slave to his labor.

Laws in Utopia are few in number. Inasmuch as all the people are well instructed and socially minded, many laws are needless.⁹ Each citizen is above the law in the same way that an honest person is above the law against stealing. In the case of those disputes which must necessarily arise, the plaintiff and defendant go before the judge and plead for themselves. Utopia is noted for its scarcity of laws and the absence of attorneys. No crafty and subtle interpretation of laws by attorneys is permitted. Every man is his own attorney and simply states the facts in the given dispute; the judge knows the law and decides the case.¹⁰

The organization of the cities is interesting. In the middle of each quarter of each city there is a market place for the exchange of all manner of goods. Public *abattoirs* are in operation. Splendidly appointed hospitals are located outside the cities in a quiet environment. Contagious wards are provided. So excellent is the care which is afforded the patients in the public hospitals that any person who falls sick prefers to go to a hospital than to be cared for by the kindly ministrations of relatives at home. It may be noted that every city is provided with a hall of fame.

Every urban community is a garden city; every house has a garden plot. Furthermore, the people take much pride in their gardens; they compete with one another,

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

endeavoring to excel in the fruitage and in the beauty of the gardens.

City planning rules in Utopia.¹¹ Overcrowding is not permitted; whenever a city exceeds the norm, a new city is established. New urban communities are established by public action.

Social centers are common on the island of Amaurote. In the winter when the people cannot work in their gardens after the supper hour, they gather in their community halls, where they engage in music, wholesome conversation, and games. Dice-play and similar foolish and pernicious games are unknown.¹² Wine taverns, alehouses, "stewes," lurking corners, and places of wicked counsels are prohibited.¹³

Good health is a virtue in Amaurote; great pleasure is derived from possessing a well-ordered state of public health. Health is considered a sovereign pleasure in itself.¹⁴ Preventive measures are substituted for remedial medicines.

FASHION AND ORNAMENTATION

Fashions are regulated rigidly. Fashion imitation is prevented. The garments for men are all of one mode; and for women, of another mode.¹⁵ The married are distinguished from the unmarried by the style of wearing apparel. Thus, there are simply four sets of styles in Amaurote. Coats of uniform colors—the natural color of wool are worn. It is argued that coats of many colors are no warmer and hence no more practical than coats of the one natural color; they are more expensive and hence more wasteful.

¹¹ *The Utopia of Sir Thomas More* (Simpson, editor), p. 90.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 96.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 110; cf. Bacon, *The New Atlantis*, in "Ideal Commonwealths," Collier, 1901, p. 125.

¹⁴ *Utopia*, p. 131.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

In Utopia, gold and silver are held in reproach. They are not considered to be as useful as iron. Consequently, the Utopians load down their slaves with gold and silver ornaments and pearls.¹⁶ In this connection the description of the visit of a group of ambassadors to Amaurote is amusing. The ambassadors from an adjoining country were dressed in gorgeous apparel like the very gods. They came to Amaurote wearing chains of gold and displaying peacock feathers. The citizens of Amaurote, coming out to meet the guests, rushed past the ambassadors and saluted the plainly dressed slaves of the ambassadors. They mistook the ambassadors for fools and knaves. Even the little children of Amaurote, when they saw the jewelry of the ambassadors, looked at their mothers and said: "See, how great a lubber doth wear pearls and precious stones, as if he were still a little child."¹⁷ After being in Amaurote a short time, the ambassadors perceived how foolish it was to set emphasis on the doubtful glistenings of trifling stones. They recognized that it is foolish to consider oneself nobler than other selves because one can wear clothes that are spun from finer wool than the clothes of other persons. After all, whether the wool is coarse or fine, it may have come from the selfsame sheep.

A person does not become a god by wearing precious stones. The more a person burdens himself with heavy stones and gorgeous apparel, the more insignificant he is.

Although in Utopia no man is wealthy, yet in a sense, all men are wealthy. All live joyfully, without worrying, and without fearing that they or their children will fall into poverty. Amaurote is a gigantic household, wherein the more able take a personal interest in the less able and in the unfortunate. No one lives in idleness and no one lives by virtue of any form of unnecessary economic enterprise. Rich men are not permitted by either private fraud

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 115.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 117; cf. Campanella, *The City of the Sun*, in "Ideal Commonwealths," Collier, 1901, p. 157.

or common law to snatch away from the poor man some portion, great or small, of his daily earnings. There are no idle rich, conniving how they may keep their unearned wealth or how they may grind down the poor in order to get more wealth. Since the love of money is unknown in Amaurote, other passions are also absent. Since the people do not love money, they have lost the desire to perpetrate the money crimes, such as fraud, theft, murder, treason. Likewise, pride which measures its satisfaction, not in terms of its own merits, *per se*, but by comparison with the poverty of human beings, is destroyed. The Utopians have conquered materialism. They are not subject to the death grapples which are caused by the love of money. Luxuries have been suppressed and the leisure class has been eliminated. Social extremes are unknown.

People are honored, not for their wealth but for their serviceableness to the community.¹⁸ In the halls of fame, to which allusion has already been made, benefactors of the commonwealth are rewarded by having images of themselves set up in perpetual memory of their good deeds to their fellows.

The family is the fundamental social unit, but it is of the patriarchal type. Pure monogamic love is idealized. Especial care is taken that neither of the parties of a marriage vow possesses any hidden vices. Adultery is the chief justification for breaking the marriage bond. A single standard of morals for both husband and wife is set. Love may be won by beauty, but it can be kept and preserved only by virtue and obedience.

EDUCATION

Because of freedom from long hours of monotonous labor, nearly every one in Utopia is able to maintain his intellectual interests and to experience intellectual growth throughout life. It is the solemn custom to have daily lectures early every morning and it is the habit of multitudes

¹⁸ *The Utopia of Sir Thomas More* (Simpson, editor), p. 174.

of people of all types to attend.¹⁹ All of the time that it is possible to spare from the necessary occupations is devoted to the development and garnishing of the mind.²⁰ Nearly all the citizens devote their extra-occupational hours throughout their lives to the arts and sciences. The chief felicity of life is said to be found in learning. In training the mind, the Utopians never weary. As a matter of course, a common school education is provided for every individual. Classes for adults and adult education are made the outstanding features of the public school system in Amaurote. One must learn to live and must go on learning throughout life. Hence, the provisions of public education should be adequate for the adult as well as for the adolescent.

Religious education and practice are considered essential. More's tolerant attitude in an age of brutal intolerance is shown by the fact that the Utopians are permitted whatever religion they prefer. Superstitious beliefs are taboo. More makes a subtle thrust when he observes that the priests of Amaurote are possessed of great holiness and hence are few in number.²¹ It is no esoteric or monastic religion which More endorses. Future happiness may be secured best by busy labors and social efforts in this life.²² Public service, including the care of the sick, is religiously emphasized.

WAR

War is beastly. Contrary to the attitudes of the people in all other countries, the people of Amaurote count nothing so inglorious as the glory that is obtained in fighting and killing.²³ No imagination is necessary in order to understand the courage which More displayed in making a vigorous attack in the sixteenth century upon war.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 174.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 153 ff.

Under limited conditions, however, war is justifiable. More gives three worthy reasons for declaring war: (1) the defense of one's own country; (2) the defense of one's friendly neighbors; and (3) delivering oppressed peoples anywhere from the yoke and bondage of tyranny.²⁴

These reasons are all "defense" factors,—which is remarkable in view of the fact that they were enunciated in an age when "offensive" wars were common. The only reason for assuming the offensive in matters of war is the social one of taking land away from people who deliberately withhold land from cultivation and fail to produce food for the nourishment of mankind.²⁵ By this plan, More severely indicts the holders of large landed estates which are held chiefly for the personal gratification of the owners.

Hired or mercenary soldiers are employed in war. The people of Amaurote employ hideous, savage fighters from the wild woods and the high mountains to do their fighting for them. The larger the number of these impetuous barbarians who are killed in battle, the better off is the world.

More opposed conscription. Ordinarily, no one is forced to fight, because under such circumstances he will not fight well. In the case, however, of defending Amaurote, the cowards are distributed among the bold-hearted. In warfare, the people of Amaurote do not allow their warriors to lay waste or destroy the land of their enemies. Neither foraging nor the burning of food supplies is permitted. No one who is unarmed is to be hurt.

PUNISHMENT

More's penological ideas are modern. He points out the folly of making theft a capital offense the same as murder. The temptation will be to steal, or rob, and to kill also, whereas under a more reasonable law the temptation

²⁴ *The Utopia of Sir Thomas More* (Simpson, editor), p. 154.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

in many cases would be to steal only. A law which makes theft a capital offense is harsher than even the harsh Mosaic law of an eye for an eye, a life for a life, because the former justifies the government in taking the life of a person who is guilty of stealing money. In Utopia, the thief is compelled to restore the stolen goods to the person from whom he stole, and not to the king, as in many lands in More's time. The thief is put at common labor, not thrown into a city or county jail and left in idleness. Compulsory labor is the common method of punishment.²⁶

The fundamental penological principle which More developed was that crime should be prevented by taking away the occasion of offense.²⁷ He condemned the prevailing method in England of allowing wickedness to increase, and then of punishing the sinners after they had been permitted to grow up in an environment of sin. He objected to taking men from the trades for war service and then later irresponsibly discharging them, leaving many of them industrially stranded, unemployed, and subject to the temptation of stealing. More's dictum was: Show people how to live; do not let them steal and then take their lives away. Life in Utopia is more or less equally divided between five factors: industry, study, music, travel, and domesticity.

In the *Utopia*, Sir Thomas More made an indirect criticism of conditions in England; he showed himself an able student of social problems; and his ideas are noted for their "modernness." Altogether, the *Utopia* has made a remarkable impression, not simply upon social idealists but also upon practical thinkers. As a literary invention for shrewdly suggesting criticisms of vicious but entrenched social wrongs it has been followed by imitations, but remains unparalleled in quality.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 140, 141.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

OTHER UTOPIAS

In *The New Atlantis*, Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1628) wrote an unfinished description of a utopian island where there is a high degree of social welfare and where "social salvation by scientific education" obtains. An Order or Society of "Solomon's House" is established which sends out every twelve years merchants of light (intellectual) who travel for the following period of twelve years, gathering facts in all branches of science and art.²⁸ Upon being relieved by the next group of traveler scholars, they return home and contribute their knowledge to the acquired store, which in the meantime has been added unto by many trained experimenters and research scholars. Airplanes, horseless wagons, and submarines are not unknown in the *New Atlantis*. Superstition is banished. Social knowledge will lead to a nation of socialized persons,—this is the Baconian implication.

Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639), a monk, a philosopher, and an Italian contemporary of Francis Bacon, urged that human nature should be studied rather than books. Because of so-called heretical ideas, he was imprisoned for twenty-seven years. Shortly after his release he fled to Paris, where he died. In prison he wrote *The City of the Sun*, a crude but significant psychological analysis of society. It is a social order based on the balanced relations of the three principles of Power, Intelligence, and Love. These forces are equally expressed in the social process and produce a perfect society.

Oceana, "a Midsummer Night's Dream of Politics," is the title of a romance which was written by James Harrington (1611-1677). His social order rests on economic factors, chiefly landed estates. However, the author advocates the election of rulers by ballot every three years and the choosing of them from the intellectually élite.

²⁸ Bacon, *The New Atlantis*, in "Ideal Commonwealths," Collier, 1901, pp. 135 ff.

In this chapter it is impossible to note all the "utopias" that have been written. The utopian and communistic systems of socialists, such as Fourier, Saint Simon, and Owen will be referred to in Chapter XIV. There are other important utopian contributions, such as those by William Morris and Edward Bellamy. In *News from Nowhere*, William Morris (1834-1896), an English artist and socialist, describes his native England as a perfected society under a régime of socialism. Because of its American setting, Bellamy's *Looking Backward* will be presented in some detail in the following paragraphs.

"LOOKING BACKWARD"

In recent decades the utopian postulates of Edward Bellamy (1850-1898) in *Looking Backward* and *Equality* have had a wide reading. The author was the first American to command attention in the field of utopian thought. Bellamy presents a plan of industrial organization on a national scale with individuals sharing equally in the products of labor, or in public income, in the same way that "men share equally in the free gifts of nature." Bellamy protests against an economic order whose chief evil is summed up in the following question: How can men be free who must ask the right to labor and to live from their fellows, and seek their bread from the hand of others?

Society is likened to a gigantic coach to which the masses of humanity are harnessed, toiling along a very hilly and sandy road. The best seats are on top of the coach. The occupants of the elegant seats are constantly in fear of falling from their cushions of ease, splendor, and power,—and hence their interest in the toilers.

In *Looking Backward* the entire social process is made an expression of service. Service is a matter of course, not of compulsion. No business is so fundamentally the public's business as the industry and trade on which the livelihood of the public depends.²⁹ Therefore, to intrust indus-

²⁹ Bellamy, *Looking Backward*, Grosset and Dunlap, 1898, p. 57.

try and commerce to private persons to be managed for private profit is a folly "similar to that of surrendering the functions of political government to kings and nobles for their personal glorification."

Buying and selling are pronounced antisocial. They are an education in self-seeking at the expense of others.³⁰ Citizens who are so trained are unable to rise above a very low grade of civilization.³¹ They are sensitive chiefly to such motives as fear of want and love of luxury. For buying and selling, credit books are substituted which are good at any public warehouse. In place of higher wages, the chief motives to activity are honor, men's gratitude, the inspiration of duty, patriotism, the satisfaction of doing one's work well—in other words, the same motives that now influence, for example, the members of the teaching profession.

The arduousness of the trades is equalized, so that all shall be equally attractive, by making the hours of labor in different trades to differ inversely according to the arduousness.³² Everyone works as a common laborer for three years and then chooses an occupation—agriculture, mechanics, the professions, art. The working life is twenty-four years long, from the ages of twenty-one to forty-five, after which all may devote themselves to self-improvement and enjoyment, but subject to emergency calls along industrial and other social service lines.

Bellamy challenges an individualism which incapacitates people for cooperation. He builds his society upon solidarity of race and brotherhood of man. He does not fear corruption in a society "where there is neither poverty to be bribed nor wealth to bribe."³³

All cases of criminal atavism are treated in hospitals. There are no jails. Under capitalism nineteen-twentieths

³⁰ Bellamy, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 67.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

of misdemeanors are due to economic inequality. The remainder are the outcropping of ancestral traits. In Bellamy's society there are no private property disputes and no lawyers.

The educational system in *Looking Backward* does not educate some persons highly and leave others untrained.³⁴ It gives everyone "the completest education that the nation can give," in order that persons may enjoy themselves, in order that they may enjoy one another, and in order that the unborn may be guaranteed an intelligent and refined parentage.

Bellamy holds that human nature in its essential quality is good, not bad, and that men are naturally generous, not selfish; pitiful, not cruel; godlike in aspirations, moved by divine impulses of goodness, images of God and not the travesties upon Him which they have seemed.³⁵ It is our economic order which has fostered shameless self-assertion, mutual depreciation, a stunning clamor of conflicting boasts, and a stupendous system of brazen beggary.

In three utopias, H. G. Wells portrays societary conditions that are kinetic rather than static and world-wide rather than local in scope.³⁶ While the author provides a changed economic system, socialistic in nature, he urges that changed social attitudes are also needed. Works such as Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, Wells' *A Modern Utopia*, and similar modern treatises are not strictly utopian. They are less unreal than the earlier utopias; they utilize evolutionary and developmental principles in part; they deal with human nature more as it really is.

Utopias are to be viewed as "worlds of escape." We live in two worlds, the real world with all its imperfections; and an ideal world, where the imperfections are all corrected. Utopias are the results of compensatory effort.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 220 ff.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 287 ff.

³⁶ H. G. Wells, *Anticipation*, *Mankind in the Making*, and *A Modern Utopia*. See *A Modern Utopia*, Scribner, 1905, pp. 5, 11.

Our utopias make our real worlds tolerable to us.³⁷ The nature of our utopias is indicative of the shortcomings of our real worlds. Utopias are mirrors, often exaggerated, of the times in which they are written. Utopias, thus, are very real.

Important elements of reconstruction appear in all utopias. It is rather remarkable that nearly all take the form of cities; and that modern town-planning should be frequently anticipated. That a new economic order is developed in many utopias is quite natural. Important new inventions are found in nearly all utopias.

The underlying utopian spirit is "that society is capable of improvement and can be made over to realize a rational ideal."³⁸ Utopias are a laboratory wherein improvement through social ideals may be studied. Utopias "look ahead." The writers of utopias have been characterized by Hertzler³⁹ as persons who are filled with a divine discontent with things as they are; critics of their age who promulgate often "with sharp satire a happy ideal for the future"; individuals of constructive imagination and intellectual originality who have "a commendable faith," and who have been among our most important "carriers of social idealism."

The strength of utopian social thought is found (1) in its drastic criticism of current social evils, (2) in its relative harmlessness at the given time, (3) in the force of its indirect suggestion, (4) in the widespread hearing which it secures, and (5) in its social idealism. Utopias are always ahead of the times, and as such stimulate social prevision. They are not only states of perfect governmental, economic, and social life, but also states of mind—social states, not to be achieved but to stimulate achievement. Whether we think of religious utopias such as those of the

³⁷ *The Story of Utopias*, Lewis Mumford, Boni and Liveright, 1922, p. 11.

³⁸ J. O. Hertzler, *The History of Utopian Thought*, Macmillan, 1923, p. 3.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 259 ff.

Hebrew writers, or "the Kingdom of God"; of social utopias, such as Plato's ideal society, or More's important treatise; of socialistic utopias, such as those of Blanc or Fourier; or of neo-utopias, such as Bellamy's *Looking Backward* or Wells' *A Modern Utopia*—the social symbolism and the social hope remains strong.

In the utopian social thought that has been presented in this chapter and in the many utopias which are not mentioned here, there is generally displayed (1) a common weakness of impracticability under current circumstances, (2) an over-emphasis upon simply changing the economic order, and (3) static rather than dynamic principles.

As Hertzler has pointed out,⁴⁰ the Utopias failed in a number of important ways: namely, to see the necessity in a broad way of "a sound physical basis for social advance," to start with things as they are, to perceive that life is and probably always will be a constant struggle, to see that their ideal states were not necessarily "the final goal in social endeavor," to see that a state of social perfection is hardly possible.

SOCIAL IDEALS⁴¹

One rule observed in their Council, is never to debate a thing on the same day in which it is first proposed; for that is always referred to the next meeting, that so men may not rashly, and in the heat of discourse, engage themselves too soon, which might bias them so much, that instead of consulting the good of the public, they might rather study to support their first opinions, and by a perverse and preposterous sort of shame, hazard their country rather than endanger their own reputation, or venture the being suspected to have wanted foresight in the expedients that they at first proposed. And therefore to prevent this, they take care that they may rather be deliberate than sudden in their motions. (p. 40)

The chief, and almost the only business of the syphogrants, is to take care that no man may live idle, but that every one may follow

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Ch. X.

⁴¹ Reprinted by permission from Thomas More's *Utopia*, "The World's Great Classics," The Colonial Press, 1901.

his trade diligently: yet they do not wear themselves out with perpetual toil, from morning to night, as if they were beasts of burden, which, as it is indeed a heavy slavery, so it is everywhere the common course of life among all mechanics except the Utopians; but they, dividing the night and day into twenty-four hours, appoint six of these for work; three of which are before dinner, and three after. They then sup, and at eight o'clock, counting from noon, go to bed and sleep eight hours. The rest of their time besides that taken up in work, eating and sleeping, is left to every man's discretion; yet they are not to abuse that interval to luxury and idleness, but must employ it in some proper exercise according to their various inclinations, which is for the most part reading. It is ordinary to have public lectures every morning before daybreak; at which none are obliged to appear but those who are marked out, for literature; yet a great many, both men and women of all ranks, go to hear lectures of one sort or other, according to their inclinations. But if others, that are not made for contemplation, choose rather to employ themselves at that time in their trades, as many of them do, they are not hindered, but are rather commended, as men that take care to serve their country. After supper, they spend an hour in some diversion, in summer in their gardens, and in winter in the halls where they eat; where they entertain each other, either with music or discourse. (p. 41)

I never saw a clearer instance of the opposite impressions that different customs make on people, than I observed in the ambassadors of the Anemolians, who came to Amaurote while I was there. As they came to treat of affairs of great consequence, the deputies from several towns met together to wait for their coming. The ambassadors of the nations that lie near Utopia, knowing their customs, and that fine clothes are in no esteem among them, that silk is despised, and gold is a badge of infamy, used to come very modestly clothed; but the Anemolians, lying more remote, and having had little commerce with them, understanding that they were coarsely clothed, and all in the same manner, took it for granted that they had none of those fine things among them of which they made no use; and they being a vainglorious rather than a wise people, resolved to set themselves out with so much pomp, that they should look like gods, and strike the eyes of the poor Utopians with their splendor. Thus three ambassadors made their entry with one hundred attendants, all clad in garments of different colors, and the greater part in silk; the ambassadors themselves, who were of the nobility of their country, were in cloth-of-gold, and adorned with massive chains, earrings, and rings of gold; their caps were covered with bracelets set full of pearls

and other gems: in a word, they were set out with all those things that, among the Utopians, were the badges of slavery, the marks of infamy, or the playthings of children.

It was not unpleasant to see, on the one side, how they looked big, when they compared their rich habits with the plain clothes of the Utopians, who were come out in great numbers to see them make their entry: and, on the other, to observe how much they were mistaken in the impression which they hoped this pomp would have made on them. It appeared so ridiculous a show to all that had never stirred out of their country, and had not seen the customs of other nations, that though they paid some reverence to those that were the most meanly clad, as if they had been the ambassadors, yet when they saw the ambassadors themselves, so full of gold and chains, they looked upon them as slaves, and forbore to treat them with reverence. You might have seen the children, who were grown big enough to despise their playthings, and who had thrown away their jewels, call their mothers, push them gently, and cry out, "See that great fool that wears pearls and gems, as if he were yet a child." While their mothers very innocently replied, "Hold your peace; this, I believe, is one of the ambassador's fools." Others censured the fashion of their chains, and observed that they were of no use; for they were too slight to bind their slaves, who could easily break them; and besides hung so loose about them that they thought it easy to throw them away, and so get from them.

But after the ambassadors had stayed a day among them, and saw so vast a quantity of gold in their houses, which was as much despised by them as it was esteemed in other nations, and beheld more gold and silver in the chains and fetters of one slave than all their ornaments amounted to, their plumes fell and they were ashamed of all that glory for which they had formerly valued themselves, and accordingly laid it aside; a resolution that they immediately took, when on their engaging in some free discourse with the Utopians, they discovered their sense of some things and their other customs. The Utopians wonder how any man should be so much taken with the glaring doubtful lustre of a jewel or a stone, that can look up to a star or to the sun himself; or how any should value himself because his cloth is made of a finer thread: for how fine soever that thread may be, it was once no better than the fleece of a sheep, and that sheep was a sheep still for all its wearing it. They wonder much to hear that gold which in itself is so useless a thing, should be everywhere so much esteemed, that even men for whom it was made, and by whom it has its value, should yet be thought of less value than this metal. (pp. 52-54)

They have but few laws, and such is their constitution that they need not many. They very much condemn other nations, whose laws, together with the commentaries on them, swell up to so many volumes; for they think it an unreasonable thing to oblige men to obey a body of laws that are both of such a bulk and so dark as not to be read and understood by every one of the subjects.

They have no lawyers among them, for they consider them as a sort of people whose profession it is to disguise matters and to wrest the laws; and therefore they think it is much better that every man should plead his own cause and trust it to the judge, as in other places the client trusts it to a counsellor. (p. 72)

They detest war as a very brutal thing; and which, to the reproach of human nature, is more practiced by men than by any sort of beasts. They, in opposition to the sentiments of almost all other nations, think that there is nothing more inglorious than that glory that is gained by war. And therefore though they accustom themselves daily to military exercises and the discipline of war—in which not only their men but their women are trained up, that in cases of necessity they may not be quite useless—yet they do not rashly engage in war, unless it be either to defend themselves, or their friends, from any unjust aggressors; or out of good nature or in compassion assist any oppressed nation in shaking off the yoke of tyranny. They indeed help their friends, not only in defensive, but also in offensive wars; but they never do that unless they have been consulted before the breach was made, and being satisfied with the grounds on which they went, they have found that all demands of reparation were rejected, so that a war was unavoidable. This they think to be not only just, when one neighbor makes an inroad on another, by public order, and carry away the spoils; but when the merchants of one country are oppressed in another, either under pretense of some unjust laws, or by the perverse wresting of good ones. This they count a juster cause of war than the other, because those injuries are done under some color of laws. (pp. 75-76)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. Major reasons for writing *Utopias*.
2. Social conditions in England when More lived.
3. The technique, characters, and setting of More's *Utopia*.
4. Values in having every citizen learning a trade.
5. Safeguards against hasty legislation according to More.
6. More's solutions of unemployment.
7. The Utopians' attitudes toward laws and lawyers.

8. More's housing ideas.
9. The Utopians' practice regarding fashions.
10. Attitudes toward ornamentation.
11. Reactions toward wealth-seeking.
12. The intellectual attitudes of Utopians.
13. The conditions under which Utopians go to war.
14. The reasons for the use of hired soldiers by the Utopians.
15. More's basic penological idea.
16. The chief merit of More's Utopia.
17. The social thought dictum of Bacon's *New Atlantis*.
18. The organization of Campanella's *City of the Sun*.
19. The fundamental question of Bellamy's *Looking Backward*.
20. The resemblances of society to a gigantic coach.
21. Bellamy's division of labor plan.
22. Educational standards in *Looking Backward*.
23. The weaknesses of Utopias.
24. The strong points of Utopian social thought.

CHAPTER XI

INDIVIDUALISTIC SOCIAL THOUGHT

AT THE DAWN of the Renaissance, tradition and dogmatism were ruling mankind. Here and there, however, certain persons were perceiving the nature of the bondage. Occasionally a cry for individual freedom was uttered. Petrarch dared to say that the world was made for man's enjoyment. The early Teutons crudely developed the idea of personal liberty. In France a movement arose which culminated in the doctrines of natural rights and "Back to Nature." The stress upon individualism in England became so deeply ingrained that it exists today as a powerful form of traditionalism. The United States was founded, in part, upon a doctrine of natural rights.

MACHIAVELLI

Absolutely unlike Sir Thomas More in many ways, Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527), an Italian contemporary, broke with tradition and received the sobriquet, the Galileo of modern science. Unfortunately, many people think of the Italian writer in terms of the adjective which bears his name, Machiavellian, or political intrigue. While he deserves this reputation, he also should be considered in another light. He cut loose from the customary ways of thinking of his time and asserted that it is not necessary to take all things on fiat or alleged divine decree. Although this may be dangerous doctrine, it serves a useful and constructive purpose when people are ruled by political and ecclesiastical autocrats. Machiavelli was no idealist in the accepted sense of the term, but a man who mixed with people, traveled extensively, and studied ac-

tual conditions. He declared that people should be considered as they are, and not according to false teachings about them.

A century before the time of Sir Francis Bacon, the inaugurator of the so-called inductive or scientific method of study, Machiavelli was observing human conditions and upon the basis of these observations was drawing conclusions. He believed that it does not pay to be guided in one's conduct by abstract ethics or impracticable ideals—and said so, in an age when imprisonment, exile, or death awaited anyone who opposed the autocratic authorities. From abstract ethics, Machiavelli swung to the extreme of concrete expediency. He lived and thought in the exigencies of the moment. He is an example of one who reacts so strongly against the stress and strain of the hour that he cannot get the larger vision that is necessary for balanced thinking on fundamental issues.

Machiavelli wrote on the subject of leadership and government. He advocated either an autocratic or democratic form of government—according to the conditions of the time and place. In the *Prince* he described with noteworthy accuracy the traits and methods of a leader whose constituents must be treated with absolute authority. In the *Discourses* he dealt with a democratic-republican type of leadership and control.

The successful prince, or leader, in the egoistic sense, makes himself both beloved and feared by his people.¹ On occasion he uses force and even fraud. Sometimes he must either exterminate or be exterminated. He must repeal or suppress old laws and make new ones to fit the social situation. He seeks to be considered merciful rather than cruel. He exercises universal pity in order to prevent social disorders from occurring and producing rapine and murder.² He does not allow his mercy to be taken advantage of by ungrateful and hypocritical persons. He is

¹ Machiavelli, *The Prince*, Routledge, London, n.d., p. 53.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 105.

strong-minded; he is either a sincere friend or a generous foe. He is paternalistic, urging that his subjects be well-fed and have a good livelihood,³ thus gaining and maintaining the affection of the people. In international affairs he acts with a strong hand, fortifying well his city or nation, providing good laws for internal growth.⁴ Machiavelli errs grossly, however, in his fundamental philosophy that any plan or action that is for the welfare of the state, or nation, considered as a supreme unit of authority in itself, is socially sound. In many ways he is a forerunner of Mussolini.

After giving special attention to Machiavellism, J. P. Lichtenberger has made the noteworthy conclusion that Machiavelli "withdrew social and political interpretation from the domain of hypothetical speculation and started it upon a course of inductive observation. His chief contribution to social philosophy, therefore, lies in his method rather than in his material. His 'relentless empiricism' gave direction to the trend of social thinking which resulted in inductive researches in the fields of social analysis and social control."⁵ Machiavelli's philosophy of expediency has obscured his more worthy philosophy of idealism. It "deserves the censure it has received. It is the survival of a disappearing phase of the struggle from savagery to civilization which the race is undergoing; from a society based upon natural impulses to one which ultimately shall rest upon genuinely ethical foundations. . . . His ethical opportunism is that of a committee of public safety."⁶

FRANCIS BACON

Sir Francis Bacon, whose contributions to utopian social thought have been indicated in the foregoing chapter, placed all social thinkers under deep obligations by his

³ Machiavelli, p. 71.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁵ *Development of Social Theory*, Century, 1923, p. 148.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 148.

emphasis upon inductive reasoning. He helped to free persons from control by dogma and superstition. He provided them with a technique for securing a new sense of individual freedom. In freeing himself a person discards his irrational pre-judgments, whether socially inherited or individually developed. He protects himself from anthropomorphic judgments, i.e., from judgments which he makes because he looks upon life and the universe through human eyes. These pre-judgments are common to all mankind—they are “the idols of the tribe.” On the other hand, a person avoids purely individual preferences, which he is likely to hold because of his own peculiar experiences, and which thus place him outside the pale of common experience—these are “the idols of the cave.”

Then there are “the idols of the forum,” which cause a person to give undue dependence to words and language. “The idols of the theater” are traditional systems of thought. Bacon’s dictum has been stated as follows: Get as little of yourself and of other selves as possible in the way of the thing which you wish to see.

Having eliminated human predispositions, a person is ready to gather facts, arrange them in groups, draw conclusions from them, and act according to the resultant laws. Knowledge gives power. Social knowledge gives power to improve human conditions and makes possible wise social control. Thus, Bacon opened the road to personal growth.

Too much personal freedom, however, destroys government and the social order. If each person is a law unto himself, anarchy reigns and progress is prevented. Consequently, the question arises: How can individually free persons unite in a society without giving up their freedom? The answer to this question took the form of a controversy on the subject of the social contract, i. e., the contract or agreement of persons, as units, to form and maintain societies. This controversy arose in the seventeenth century and was waged vigorously in the eighteenth century.

HOBBS

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1678), the distinguished social philosopher of England, introduced his analysis of society with the idea that man was originally self-centered, egoistic, and pleasure-loving. He was an independent center. His interest in other people was based on their ability to cater to his own good. He and they desired the same things in life. His hand was thus raised, in competition, against every other man. This state of continual conflict became mutually destructive and unbearable.⁷ In consequence, each person agreed to give over some of his precious, inalienable rights to a central authority or sovereign, whose decrees should constitute law and serve as the guide for conduct. The war of each against all, with the concomitant state of fear, was thus supplanted by a mutual contract, conferring sovereignty by popular agreement upon the ruler. In this way Hobbes met the dilemma of supporting an absolute form of government in which he believed, and of denying the divine right of kings which he abhorred. Hobbes performed a useful service in intellectually destroying the idea of the divine right of kings, but urged after all an undemocratic political absolutism. Hobbes conferred humanly derived but irrevocable authority upon the king. He, however, traced sovereignty back to the people rather than to a divine right.

In getting away from the conditions "of Warre of every one against every one" in the natural state where "every man has a Right to everything," Hobbes swung to an undemocratic extreme. His Puritanic training gave an undue severity to his social thought. The Puritans, however, believed in the complete eradication of the savage human tendencies and also in the ultimate elimination of kings. Hobbes did not analyze deeply the instinctive bases of human nature. He built his *Leviathan* out of natural human qualities and tied its units together by means of a strong, central will—this was his perfect society.

⁷ Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Putnam, 1904, Ch. XIII.

SPINOZA

Baruch Spinoza (1631-1677), the Portuguese Jewish philosopher of Holland, improved the social contract idea. He believed that man was originally of an antisocial and a tooth-and-fang nature, possessing only incipient social impulses. Hence, man is not naturally bad, but naturally antisocial. Social organization was effected for purposes of "individual" gain and glory; it was promulgated and furthered by "individuals" in order that they might escape the miseries of unregulated conflict. Agreements were made whereby sovereignty was embodied in a ruler, but if the ruler abused the sovereignty entrusted to him, it reverted immediately to the people. This democratic conception was vastly superior to the idea of Hobbes, that sovereignty is delegated by the people to the king as an irresponsible monarch.

LOCKE

John Locke (1632-1704) strengthened the social contract theory, elaborating the idea that sovereignty reverts to the people whenever the king becomes a tyrant. He held that the natural state of "individuals" is a condition of perfect freedom to order their actions, not asking leave of any man.⁸ This state of liberty is not a state of license to "individuals" to destroy themselves or their neighbors.⁹ The state of liberty has the law of nature to govern it. Since all are equal, no one ought to harm another in his liberty or possessions.

Locke affirmed that men are in a state of nature until by their own consent they join in a political society.¹⁰ In order to meet their needs effectively, they join in societies. One of these important needs is the preservation of prop-

⁸ Locke, *Two Treatises on Government*, Routledge, n.d., p. 18.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

erty. Locke defended private property on the ground that it is a normal expression of, and necessary to "individuality."

Right and wrong are not determined by the ruler or the state; they existed before society developed. Here the Puritanism of Locke enters. He stressed moral values. He made the natural rights of "individuals" supreme; "individuals" may even overturn the government and still keep within their rights.

Locke's justification of revolution is his most startling doctrine. Imagine the heart-throb of the common people who heard Locke's contention that the end of government is the good of mankind, that people should not submit to tyranny, that whoever uses his force without right and law puts himself in a state of war with those against whom he uses it, and that in such a state the people have a right to resist and defend themselves.¹¹ Further, the people have a right to act as the supreme social force and to put legislation into new forms and into the hands of new executives. By these bold declarations Locke created a new public opinion, and aroused new moral power in the minds and hearts of the common people.

PHYSIOCRATS

By the middle of the eighteenth century the concept of "individual freedom" became crystallized in the doctrines of "the natural rights of the individual," the contractual societary relationships between independent "individuals," and the *laissez faire* principle in governmental science. The physiocrats, who took up the ideas of natural liberty and economic freedom, exercised a tremendous influence in France during the three decades following 1750. Their leaders were Quesnay, de Gournay, Condorcet, and Turgot. They believed that there was a natural law ruling human lives, just as there is a natural law ruling the physical

¹¹ Locke, *op. cit.*, p. 315.

world. They chafed under social restraints. Under the natural law, every "individual" has natural rights, chief of which is the right to the free exercise of all his faculties so long as he does not infringe on the similar right of other "individuals." Unlike John Locke and other English thinkers who accepted the idea of "individual liberty," the physiocrats argued that this natural liberty could not be abridged by a social contract.

According to the physiocrats the chief function of governmental control is to preserve the natural liberty of "individuals." Industry and commerce must not be governmentally regulated, for by such regulation the rights of some men, chiefly employers, will be infringed upon. Employees, on the other hand, who are being treated unjustly will freely quit a harsh employer and obtain employment with considerate masters. Thus, an unjust employer will be unable to secure workers and be forced to discontinue his unjust practices—without government regulation. Likewise, a dishonest merchant will lose his customers and be forced to become honest or to close his shop—and again without government regulation. The physiocrats became known by their famous phrase, *laissez faire, laissez passer*.

ROUSSEAU

Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), an able but baffling character, is the best known champion of the social contract idea. Although he advocated the family as a social institution and praised fatherhood, he reports that he carried his own children to a foundling asylum. He deprecated the disintegrating elements in civilization and urged a return to nature's simple ways. In his chief works, the *Contrat social*, and *Emile*, he attacked civilization vigorously. He asserted that civilization had almost destroyed the natural rights of man. His dictum was: Trust nature.

According to Rousseau the early life of mankind was nearly ideal in its simplicity and pleasantness. War and

conflict were relatively unknown. In his later writings, Rousseau modified his belief and asserted that primitive confusion made necessary some kind of social organization. On the other hand, it became the belief of Rousseau that civilization generates social evils and results sooner or later in social deterioration. Corruption in society has become notorious. Social inequality is rampant and unbearable. "Man is born free, and is everywhere in chains." People have become so engrossed in the artificialities of social life and so bewildered by its complexities that happiness has been lost.

Leave the "individual" free to carry out his own plans, untrammelled by complex social rules, restrictions, and duties. There is no social sanction at all; there is no authority except nature, which is necessity. In *Emile*, Rousseau takes his two leading characters to an island, where they live alone—happily! Liberty not authority reigns. But Emile, who has declared for liberty as opposed to authority, insists in his discussions of domestic relationships that "woman is made to please man." The "unselfish unsocial life" of Emile and Sophie turns out to be more than purely individualistic—it is anarchic and sensual. Emile fails to demonstrate the merit of Rousseau's own theories, such as "Man is good naturally but by institutions he is made bad," and "Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the Author of Nature; everything degenerates in the hands of man."¹²

Slavery is wrong, according to Rousseau.¹³ It is a contract or agreement, at the expense of the slave and for the profit of the slaveholder, in which the slaveholder asserts: I'll observe the agreement and you will observe it—as long as it pleases me.

Strength does not make right. Strength and moral force are not necessarily the same. Strength may often be iron-

¹² Rousseau, *Contrat social*, Garnier, Paris, p. 240.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

ically accepted in appearance and established in principle. By a social contract man loses his natural liberty and gains civil and moral liberty.¹⁴ In this connection Rousseau was simply the spokesman of a point of view which found frequent expression in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. For example, in 1635, John Winthrop, the first governor of the Massachusetts colony, made a clear-cut distinction between natural liberties, and civil and moral liberties. Natural liberty is liberty to do what one lists, to do evil as well as good. Civil, or moral liberty is liberty under the covenant between God and man, under the political covenants between men and men, and under the moral law. It is a liberty to do only that which is good, just, and honest.¹⁵

It was Rousseau who contended that life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness are man's inalienable rights. It was this doctrine which profoundly influenced Thomas Jefferson, as evidenced in the Declaration of Independence. Sovereignty rests not in a ruler or monarch but in the community of people—this was perhaps Rousseau's main contribution to social thought.

MONTESQUIEU

Before Rousseau wrote the *Contrat social*, however, the social contract theory had been overthrown. The writings of Montesquieu (1689-1755) offer an elaborate analysis of social and political processes. These analyses are similar, in some ways, to Aristotle's analyses of 158 constitutions. Montesquieu discussed the doctrine of natural rights, but did not believe that the natural state of mankind was one of conflict, in which social organization was forced as a means of meeting the needs of "individual" protection. He asserted that there was a natural, innate

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 249.

¹⁵ John Winthrop in *Selections from Early American Writers, 1607-1800*; edited by W. B. Cairns, Macmillan, New York, 1910, p. 52.

tendency in man toward association. In the support of this belief, Montesquieu drew facts from the lives of the individual members of the primitive tribes which were extant in his day. The influence of Montesquieu was clearly inimical to the social contract doctrine.

In the *Esprit des lois*, Montesquieu dissected the laws of many nations and tried to show the relations between these laws and social and political conditions. The general implication is that laws are a natural outgrowth of life conditions rather than of formal contractual agreements. Hence, society is a natural evolution rather than a contract.

HUME

Perhaps the chief antagonist in the eighteenth century of the social contract theory was David Hume (1711-1776), the father of social psychology. According to Hume, the origin of society was not in a contract arrived at by intellectual processes; it was instinctive. Man is a social animal. At the basis of this sociability lies the sex instinct, which resulted in the establishment of the family. The sex instinct is strongly supported by the sentiment of sympathy, which also is innate, and which may develop into intelligent cooperation. Man is not entirely self-centered; he takes pleasure in other people's pleasures and suffers when others are in pain, or the victims of disease, or are dying.

Sympathy, like the sex instinct, is a genuinely fundamental element in human nature and in society. However, the combination of sympathy and the sex instinct is not strong enough to support the family in either its simple or complex stages from the attacks upon it that are made by inherent human selfishness. Hence, social and political organizations are necessary to hold the selfish impulses and interests of mankind in check. Intellectual control of society thus becomes necessary and consciously recognized. Environment alone does not cause people in a

given community to act alike. It is imitation, primarily, which operates to bring about group conformity.¹⁶

Man in a large measure is governed by "interest." It is impossible for men to consult their interests "in so effective a manner as by a universal and inflexible observance of the rules of justice, by which alone they can preserve society, and keep themselves from falling into that wretched and savage condition, which is commonly represented as the state of nature."¹⁷

According to the contract theory, people expect protection and security. If they meet with tyranny and oppression, they are freed from their promises and return to that state of liberty which preceded the institution of government. But Hume maintained that if people entered into no contract and made no promises, government would still be necessary in all civilized societies. The obligation of submission to government is not derived from any promise of the subjects.¹⁸

Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) wrote an *Essay on the History of Civil Society* and *The History of the Progress and Termination of the Roman Republic*. He argued that social institutions and social convenience lead to inherent sociability, and pointed out that competition and conflict are vital to social development. Thomas Paine (1737-1809) asserted that man is inherently social and that social organization is a natural development.

MERCANTILISM

The natural rights theory and the resultant individualism not only repudiated their false derivative, the social contract concept, but also wrestled with considerable success with the socio-economic concept of mercantilism. Mercantilism was a system of regulating industrial enter-

¹⁶ *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1896, II:777, 114, 140, 150.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 534.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 546.

prise by governments in order to build up strong nation-states. Mercantilism reached its strictest form in France in the writings of Colbert (1619-1683). It prevailed in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the first four decades of the eighteenth century. It was a system which grew out of feudalism and the city-state type of society. It operated to bring together towns and cities into national unities. Under feudalism, the town had regulated industry for its own advancement and against the welfare, perchance, of neighboring towns. Mercantilism served to unite towns and to create in townspeople a national loyalty.

Under mercantilism, the nation entered upon the task of regulating industry and finance so as to build a strong state. A favorable balance of trade was sought in order to add to the bullion within the state. High tariffs were enacted, which sometimes defeated the intended purposes. A dense population was favored as a means of securing cheap labor, and hence of furthering manufacture, which in turn would develop foreign trade and bring in the coveted bullion—the heralded strength of a nation.

In the eighteenth century, mercantilism in France and England met defeat in the contest with the *laissez faire* theory, with which the names of the physiocrats and of Adam Smith are inseparably connected. It often fathered too stringent regulations. Instead of supporting national ends, mercantilistic measures frequently furthered private interests. Mercantilism, however, played a strong part in building up the concepts of national unity and loyalty.

In the German states and Austria, cameralism represented the ideas for which mercantilism stood in England, France, and elsewhere in Western and Southern Europe. Among the leading cameralists were Seckendorf, Horing, Justi, and Sonnenfels. Cameralism obtained a far deeper hold upon the German states than mercantilism did, for example, in England. The *laissez faire* philosophy was never able to make a deep inroad upon cameralism. In

fact, the *laissez faire* philosophy did not receive serious consideration in the German states before 1880, and did not strike deep. National self-sufficiency, paternalistic control, minute regulation of internal affairs, rearing of large families, and subordination to the welfare of the state—these are the concepts which ruled in Germany.

ADAM SMITH

Adam Smith (1723-1790), primarily an economist and often referred to as the father of political economy, exerted a profound influence upon social thought. He coupled a modified natural rights theory with a doctrine of sympathy; he spoke for the natural rights of the individual, of the poorer classes in society, and of the smaller nations. He vigorously attacked mercantilism with its system of minute regulation. He objected to promoting unduly the interests of one class of men in a country, for by so doing, the interests of all other classes in that country and of all persons in all other countries are harmed.¹⁹ He pointed out the fallacy of building a nation of shopkeepers, for in so doing the government of such a nation will be unduly influenced and controlled by the interests of shopkeepers. The interests of other classes will be more or less ignored. Adam Smith protested against Great Britain's methods of regulating the American colonies. To prohibit the American colonies from making all they could of every part of their own produce or from employing their stock and industry in the way that they judged most advantageous to themselves, was "a manifest violation of the most sacred rights of mankind."²⁰

Mercantilism made use of monopoly of one kind or another, and hence is objectionable, according to Smith. Mercantilism is regulation, and regulation is often carried on for the benefit of the rich and powerful, thus neglecting

¹⁹ Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations*, Putnam, 1904, II:114.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, II:83.

and oppressing the poor.²¹ Smith failed to note, however, that the *laissez faire* policy likewise favored the rich and powerful and neglected the poor. Mercantilism, according to Smith, considers production and not consumption as the end of industry and commerce, and thus favors one class at the expense of other classes.

"Wherever there is great property," said Smith, "there is great inequality." For every very rich man there must be at least 500 poor men, and the affluence of the few supposes the indigence of the many.²² But no society can be flourishing and happy wherein the greater part of the members are poor and miserable.²³ The laboring men should have "such a share of the produce of their own labor as to be themselves tolerably well fed, clothed, and lodged." Poverty does not prevent the procreation of children, but is on the other hand extremely unfavorable to the rearing of children."²⁴ Smith pointed out four causes of social inequality:²⁵ (1) Superiority in personal qualifications, such as strength, beauty, agility of body; or wisdom, virtue, prudence, justice, fortitude, moderation of mind. (2) Superiority of age and experience. (3) Superiority of fortune. Riches give social authority; riches possess power to buy. (4) Superiority of birth, based on family prestige.

Smith extolled the merits of division of labor in industry with the resultant increase in the quantity of work. There are three sets of causal circumstances:²⁶ (1) the increase of dexterity; (2) the saving of time in passing from one kind of work to another; and (3) the invention of a large number of machines. Smith, however, deplored the deadening effect upon the individual of repeating over and over a simple process, hundreds or thousands of times daily. In summary, Adam Smith (1) applied the concept of natural rights to industrial conditions; (2) developed

²¹ Smith, *op. cit.*, II:143.

²² *Ibid.*, II:203.

²³ *Ibid.*, I:80.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, I:81.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, II:203-207.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, I:11.

Hume's concept of sympathy into a theory of mutual aid between "individuals," classes, and nations; and (3) supported the necessity of division of labor.

The natural rights and social contract theories affected in one way or another the thinking not only of the men who have already been considered in this chapter, but also of many other individuals. Blackstone (1723-1780) held that man's weakness in isolation led to association. The primary group was the patriarchal family. Blackstone was not an advocate of social regulation. His exposition of English law in the *Commentaries* stood for law itself, and became the bulwark at once of the doctrines of individual rights and property rights in both England and the American colonies. In the United States, its influence remained dominant for more than a century after the founding of the republic.

Although Edmund Burke (1729-1797) believed in a corporate unity of society, he became in his century the chief spokesman of humanity for humanity's sake. He pleaded for justice for and conciliation with the American colonies; he spoke for the benighted Hindus who were being plundered by English stockholders; and he championed the rights of slaves. He failed, on the other hand, to appreciate the struggles of the French people which culminated in the French Revolution.

KANT

Immanuel Kant (1724-1817) declared man in a natural state is both social and unsocial and referred to the "unsocial sociableness" of man. "Man cannot get on with fellows and he cannot do without them." Man has an inclination to associate with others and also a great propensity to isolate himself from others. He wishes to direct things according to his own ideas and thus courts resistance and conflict. It is this conflict, however, which leads to "individual" advancement.

Kant laid great stress upon a good will.²⁷ The "individual" may have intelligence and sagacity, power and wealth, but he may still be a pernicious and hurtful member of society. He is not even worthy to be happy unless he possesses a good will. A man's will is good not because of the end he seeks nor because of the results of his activities but because he inherently wills the good. It is this "good will" of Kant which is in conflict with the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, and also with modern behavioristic psychology and objective sociology. To Kant, morality is subjective. Social laws may regulate and control man's conduct but they cannot control his motives.

Johann Fichte (1762-1814) joined with Kant in the interpretation of a good will. He held that property is essential to the development of freedom. However, he pushed the social contract idea to an extreme and developed a doctrine of an idealistic state socialism, including the superiority of Germany among the nations of the world.

Hegel (1770-1831) supported cameralism by developing the State idea, with the implication that Germany would become the supreme State in the world. Hegel even asserted that man has his existence and his ethical status "only in being a member of the State."²⁸ Morality is not a matter of striving independently to realize one's inner self, but of living in accord with the traditions of one's State.

Perhaps the individual rights theory never manifested a greater aberration than in the mind of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). Power is supreme. The "individual" or the nation with the greatest power has the greatest right to live. Against this idea or the expressions of this idea, weaker persons tend to combine and to extol their weaknesses as virtues, even building a religion out of these glorified weak-

²⁷ Kant, *Theory of Ethics*, translated by Abbott, p. 9.

²⁸ Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, translated by Dyde, Part III, p. 150.

nesses, for example, Christianity. Nietzsche's doctrine of the superman and the superstate will be discussed in Chapter XXI.

UTILITARIANISM

Closely related to the discussions concerning natural rights and the social contract is the doctrine of utilitarianism, a modified form of individualism with certain objective standards. Jeremy Bentham (1728-1832) made utilitarianism well known, and particularly the standard: The greatest good of the greatest number. In accordance with a formal idea of social change, Bentham urged that social improvements be made by legislation. He demanded objective standards as opposed to Kant's emphasis on the inner motive. Where Kant accented the "how" of conduct, Bentham insisted on the "what" of conduct. He pointed out the need for improved forms of government, apparently ignoring or at least greatly underestimating the fact that real progress comes chiefly through modifying organic processes. However, Bentham may be rated a virile social reformer, for he strongly advocated such measures as the secret ballot, woman suffrage, trained statesmanship. He made social welfare a main goal.

The doctrine of utilitarianism was carried forward by James Mill (1773-1836) and was brought to its highest fruition by the son, John Stuart Mill (1806-1873). The elder Mill contended that utility is morality. Like Bentham the elder Mill urged many social reforms.

John Stuart Mill adopted a modified form of the natural rights theory. He asserted that the "individual" should have all the rights that he can exercise without infringing upon the equal rights of other "individuals." Mill recognized a gradation in the pleasures which satisfy human beings. He declared that it is better to be a man dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; he objected to the prevailing classification of people on the basis of poverty and wealth, and urged the substitution of standards of personal worth, honor, and true leadership as bases for social classification.

Sir Henry Maine (1832-1888) invented the phrase: From status to contract. He applied this phrase to a program of social welfare. There are many illustrations, he pointed out, in business and industrial life, and even in political and fraternal activities where people make social contracts. The marriage contract also has many of the characteristics of a genuine social contract. Maine pushed the social contract idea to its furthest practical point; but deprecated the possibility that the masses might come into power. His individualism deprived him of a faith in the possible social development of the uneducated.

Herbert Spencer, whose ideas will be discussed more extensively in a subsequent chapter, became one of the chief exponents of the doctrine of *laissez faire* in governmental matters. He brought a vast reading knowledge and able arguments to the support of individualistic doctrines. He added very little that was new to individualistic and *laissez faire* theories although he was at one time perhaps their leading exponent. One of his chief contributions to social thought was indirect and unintentional, namely, the way in which his writings challenged the attention of an American paleontologist, Lester F. Ward, and led him to point out the psychical nature and hence telic possibilities of civilization. In consequence of this challenge Spencer fell, and Ward rose to the rank of dean of American sociologists. An entire chapter will be devoted to the sociology of Lester F. Ward.

SUMMARY

William G. Sumner (1840-1910) was one of the last noted champions of a governmental *laissez faire* doctrine.²⁹ He held that the State owes nothing to anybody except peace, order, and the guarantee of rights. It is not true that the poor ought to care for each other, and that the churches ought to collect capital and spend it for the poor; it is not true that if you get wealth you should support others; and that if you do not get wealth others ought to

²⁹ W. G. Sumner, *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other*, Harper, 1920, p. 12.

support you. In a society based on contract there is no place for sentiment in public or common affairs.³⁰ Everyone will develop the self-reliance of a free person, if he is not taught that others will care for him in case he fails to care for himself. Sumner spoke vigorously as well as harshly in support of liberty, contract, and private property. Although he took an extreme and untenable position his ideas will bear careful, unbiased study, for they contain a large amount of common sense.³¹ His ethnological work will be indicated at some length in another chapter.

A noteworthy statement which has come from a current American school of legal thinkers concerning individualistic social thought, is found in the writings of Professor Roscoe Pound of Harvard Law School. In *A Theory of Social Interests* he has summed up the new point of view.³² In the last century all interests were thought of in terms of individual interests, all were reduced to their purely individual elements and considered as rights.

In this century, Dean Pound indicates that law, for example, aims primarily to conserve some general social interest. It conserves the social interest in the general security, that is, in public health and in peace. It conserves the social interest in institutions,—domestic, religious, political. It conserves the social interest in natural resources, preventing the waste of oil and gas and protecting water rights. It conserves the social interest in general progress, in economic, political, cultural progress, although its main contributions in other fields, such as promoting the esthetic interests, are yet to be made. It conserves the social interests in individual life and in seeing that people live humanly and that the will of the individual is not trodden upon. Legal processes have thus become types of social engineering.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³¹ An excellent biography was published in 1926, entitled *William Graham Sumner*, by Harris E. Starr, Henry Holt and Company. "The volume portrays, in perspective and fine proportion, one of the big figures in American sociology."

³² Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol. XV.

The doctrine of natural rights reached its largest degree of acceptance in England, France, and the United States. It was not only reflected in the thought of Thomas Jefferson but in the fundamental principles upon which the United States was established. It suffered an aberration in the form of the social contract theory which in its extreme forms was later repudiated. Its greatest weakness was the exaggerated form which it assumed, especially in England and the United States. In the latter country it became greatly magnified through contact with the spirit of discovery, invention, and pioneering which prevailed for over a century. Consequently, it dominated the thought life of the United States throughout the nineteenth century. It permitted captains of industry to exploit the helpless masses, and encouraged politicians to pursue selfish practices until governments became honey-combed with graft. It nearly capsized the good Ship of State—Democracy.

Theories of natural rights have been supplanted by considerations of natural needs, both "individual" and social. Human needs are now considered the only imperatives, but even they are relative and changing. Dr. Frank Wilson Blackmar, distinguished pioneer in sociology, sums up the whole matter in his book entitled *Justifiable Individualism* as follows: "The only individualism that is justifiable is that which is built up in the service of others." If individualism is essential to progress, then socialization of human attitudes is essential to individualism.

A COMMONWEALTH³³

The finall Cause, End or Designe of men (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others), in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves (in which we see them live in Commonwealths), is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent (as hath been shewn), to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation

³³ Reprinted by permission from Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, edited by A. R. Miller, Cambridge University Press, 1904.

of those Lawes of Nature set down in the fourteenth and fifteenth Chapters.

For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to), of themselves without the terrour of some Power, to cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all. Therefore notwithstanding the Lawes of Nature (which every one hath then kept, when he has the will to keep them, when he can do it safely), if there be no Power erected, or not great enough for our security; every man will, and may lawfully rely on his own strength and art, for caution against all other men. And in all places, where men have lived by small Families, to robbe and spoyle one another, has been a Trade, and so farre from being reputed against the Law of Nature, that the greater spoyles they gained, the greater was their honour; and men observed no other Lawes therein, but the Lawes of Honour; that is, to abstain from cruelty, leaving to men their lives, and instruments of husbandry. And as small Families did then; so now do Cities and Kingdoms which are but greater Families (for their own security) enlarge their Dominions, upon all pretences of danger, and fear of Invasion, or assistance that may be given to Invaders, endeavour as much as they can, to subdue, or weaken their neighbors, by open force, and secret arts, for want of other Caution, justly; and are remembered for it in after ages with honour. (pp. 115-116)

It is true, that certain living creatures, as Bees, and Ants, live sociably one with another (which are therefore by Aristotle numbered amongst Politicall creatures), and yet have no other direction, than their particular judgments and appetites; nor speech, whereby one of them can signifie to another, what he thinks expedient for the common benefit; and therefore some man may perhaps desire to know, why Man-kind cannot do the same. To which I answer:

First, that men are continually in competition for Honour and Dignity, which these creatures are not; and consequently amongst men there ariseth on that ground, Envy and Hatred, and finally Warre; but amongst these not so.

Secondly, that amongst these creatures, the Common good differeth not from the Private; and being by nature enclined to their private, they procure thereby the common benefit. But man, whose Joy consisteth in comparing himselfe with other men, can relish nothing but what is eminent.

Thirdly, that these creatures, having not (as man) the use of reason, do not see, nor think they see any fault in the administration

of their common businesse: whereas amongst men, there are very many, that thinke themselves wiser, and abler to govern the Publique, better than the rest; and these strive to reform and innovate, one this way, another that way; and thereby bring it into Distraction and Civill Warre.

Fourthly, that these creatures, though they have some use of voice, in making knowne to one another their desires, and other affections; yet they want that art of words, by which some men can represent to others, that which is Good, in the likeness of Evill; and Evill, in the likeness of Good; and augment, or diminish the apparent greatness of Good and Evill; discontenting men, and troubling their Peace at their pleasure.

Fifthly, irrationall creatures cannot distinguish between Injury, and Damage; and therefore as long as they be at ease, they are not offended with their fellows: whereas Man is then most troublesome, when he is most at ease; for then it is that he loves to show his Wisdom, and controule the Actions of them that govern the Commonwealth.

Lastly, the agreement of these creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall: and therefore it is no wonder if there be somewhat else required (beside Covenant) to make their Agreement constant and lasting; which is a Common Power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the Common benefit.

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as that by their owne industrie, and by the fruites of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that they may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to beare their Person; and every one to owne, and acknowledge himselfe to be Author of whatsoever he that so beareth their Person, shall Act, or cause to be Acted, in those things which concerne the Common Peace and Safetie; and therein to submit their Wills, every one to his Will, and their Judgments, to his Judgment. This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, inn one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such manner, as if every man should say to every man, I Authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This

done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a *Common-Wealth*, in latine *Civitas*. This is the Generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather (to speake more reverently), of that Great Mortall God, to which wee own under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. For by this Authoritie, given him by every particular man in the Common-wealth, he hath the use of so much Power and Strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to forme the wills of them all, to Peace at home, and mutuall ayd against their enemies abroad. And in him consisteth the Essence of the Common-wealth; which (to define it) is one Person, of whose Acts a great Multitude, by mutuall Covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the Author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their Peace and Common Defence. (pp. 117-119)

BENEVOLENCE³⁴

It may be esteemed, perhaps, a superfluous task to prove, that the benevolent or softer affections are estimable; and wherever they appear, engage the approbation and good-will of mankind. The epithets *sociable, good-natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, generous, beneficent*, or their equivalents, are known in all languages, and universally express the highest merit, which *human nature* is capable of attaining. Where these amiable qualities are attended with birth and power and eminent abilities, and display themselves in the good government or useful instruction of mankind, they seem even to raise the possessors of them above the rank of human nature, and make them approach in some measure to the divine. Exalted capacity, undaunted courage, prosperous success; these may only expose a hero or politician to the envy and ill-will of the public: but as soon as the praises are added of humane and beneficent; when instances are displayed of lenity, tenderness or friendship, envy itself is silent, or joins the general voice of approbation and applause. (p. 176)

Suppose that, though the necessities of the human race continue the same as at present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity, that every man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his own interest than for that of his fellows; it seems evident that the use of justice would, in this case, be suspended by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the divisions and barriers of property and obligation have ever

³⁴ Reprinted by permission from David Hume, *Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals*, Clarendon Press.

been thought of. Why should I bind another, by a deed or promise, to do me any good office, when I know that he is already promoted, by the strongest inclination, to seek my happiness, and would of himself, perform the desired service; except the hurt he thereby receives, be greater than the benefit accruing to me? in which case, he knows, that, from my innate humanity and friendship, I should be the first to oppose myself to his imprudent generosity. Why raise land-marks between my neighbor's field and mine, when my heart has made no division between our interests; but shares all his joys and sorrows with the same force and vivacity as if originally my own? Every man, upon this supposition, being a second self to another, would trust all his interests to the discretion of every man; without jealousy, without partition, without distinction. And the whole human race would form only one family; where all would lie in common, and be used freely, without regard to property, but cautiously too, with as entire regard to the necessities of each individual as if our own interests were most intimately concerned.

In the present disposition of the human heart, it would, perhaps be difficult to find complete instances of such enlarged affections; but still we may observe, that the case of families approaches toward it; and the stronger the mutual benevolence is among the individuals, the nearer it approaches; till all distinction of property be, in a great measure, lost and confounded among them. Between married persons, the cement of friendship is by the laws supposed so strong as to abolish all division of possessions; and has often, in reality, the force ascribed to it. And it is observable that, during the ardour of new enthusiasms, when every principle is inflamed into extravagance, the community of goods has frequently been attempted; and nothing but experience of its inconveniences, from the returning or disguised selfishness of men, could make the imprudent fanatics adopt anew the ideas of justice and of separate property. So true is it, that this virtue derives its existence entirely from its necessary use to the intercourse and social state of mankind. (pp. 184-186)

The rage and violence of public war; what is it but a suspension of justice among warring parties, who perceive, that this virtue is now no longer of any use or advantage to them? The laws of war, which then succeed to those of equity and justice, are rules calculated for the advantage and utility of that particular state, in which men are now placed. And were a civilized nation engaged with barbarians, who observed no rules even of war, the former must also suspend their observance of them, where they no longer serve to any purpose; and must render every action or encounter as bloody and pernicious as possible to the first aggressors. (pp. 187-188)

THE SOCIAL PACT³⁵

I assume that men have reached a point at which the obstacles that endanger their preservation in the state of nature overcome by their resistance the forces which each individual can exert with a view to maintaining himself in that state. Thus this primitive condition can no longer subsist, and the human race would perish unless it changed its mode of existence.

Now, as men cannot create any new forces, but only combine and direct those that exist, they have no other means of self-preservation than to form by aggregation a sum of forces which may overcome the resistance, to put them in action by a single power, and to make them work in concert.

This sum of forces can be produced only by the combination of many; but the strength and freedom of each man being the chief instruments of his preservation, how can he pledge them without injuring himself, and without neglecting the cares which he owes to himself? This difficulty, applied to my subject, may be expressed in these terms:

"To find a form of association which may defend and protect with the whole force of the community the person and property of every associate, and by means of which each, coalescing with all, may nevertheless obey only himself, and remain as free as before." Such is the fundamental problem of which the social contract furnishes the solution.

The clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would render them vain and ineffectual; so that, although they have never perhaps been formally enunciated, they are everywhere the same, everywhere tacitly admitted and recognized, until the social pact being violated, each man regains his original rights and recovers his natural liberty, whilst losing the conventional liberty for which he renounced it.

These clauses, rightly understood, are reducible to the only, viz., the total alienation to the whole community of each associate with all his rights; for, in the first place, since each given himself up entirely, the conditions are equal for all; and, the conditions being equal for all, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others.

Further, the alienation being made without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be, and an individual associate can no longer claim anything; for, if any rights were left to individuals, since there would be no common superior who could judge between them and

³⁵ Reprinted by permission from J. J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, translated by H. J. Tozer, George Allen and Unwin, 1920.

the public, each, being on some point his own judge, would soon claim to be so on all; the state of nature would still subsist, and the association would necessarily become tyrannical or useless.

In short, each giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is not one associate over whom we do not acquire the same rights which we concede to him over ourselves, we gain the equivalent of all that we lose, and more power to preserve what we have.

If, then, we set aside what is not of the essence of the social contract, we shall find that it is reducible to the following terms: "Each of us puts in common his person and his whole power under the supreme direction of the general will; and in return we receive every member as an indivisible part of the whole."

Forthwith, instead of the individual personalities of all the contracting parties, this act of association produces a moral and collective body, which is composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, and which receives from this same act its unity, its common self (*moi*), its life, and its will. This public person, which is thus formed by the union of all the individual members, formerly took the name of city, and now takes that of republic or body politic, which is called by its members, State, when it is passive; sovereign, when it is active; power when it is compared to similar bodies. With regard to the associates, they take collectively the name of people, and are called individually citizens, as participating in the sovereign-power, and subjects, as subjected to the laws of the State. But these terms are often confused and mistaken one for another; it is sufficient to know how to distinguish them when they are used with complete precision. (pp. 109-111)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. Machiavelli's main contribution to social thought.
2. The characteristics of a prince, or leader.
3. The indebtedness of social thinking to Francis Bacon.
4. The idols of the tribe.
5. The idols of the cave.
6. The idols of the forum.
7. The idols of the theater.
8. The nature of the individual according to Thomas Hobbes.
9. Man's original nature according to Spinoza.
10. John Locke's justification of revolution.
11. The Physiocratic idea of *laissez faire*.
12. Inalienable rights according to Rousseau.

13. The evolutionary nature of society as developed by Montesquieu.
14. The justification for calling Hume the father of social psychology.
15. The causes of inequality as outlined by Adam Smith.
16. The meaning of Kant's phrase: "unsocial sociableness of man."
17. Social implications of Kant's "good will."
18. The social meaning of the phrase: "It is better to be a man dissatisfied than a pig satisfied."
19. W. G. Sumner as a representative of individualistic social thought.
20. Weaknesses of individualistic social thought.

CHAPTER XII

MALTHUS AND POPULATION CONCEPTS

A UNIQUE and distinctive trend in social thought with important sociological implications developed in the closing years of the eighteenth century, namely, Malthusian thought regarding population. Malthusianism, however, was preceded by the ideas of William Godwin and Adam Smith. In 1775, Adam Smith had stated that "every species of animals naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of their subsistence, and no species can ever multiply beyond it."¹ Scanty subsistence, however, destroys a large percentage of offspring. Inasmuch as men, like all other animals, multiply naturally in proportion to the means of their subsistence, food is always, more or less, in demand; and food, or the cost of living, regulates population.² City people must depend upon the country for their subsistence, whereas seaport towns can command food resources from all parts of the earth.

The population ideas of William Godwin (1756-1836) were the immediate stimuli which set Malthus at work. In 1793, Godwin's *Enquiry Concerning Justice* was published. Godwin elaborated several radical social ideas of the French Physiocratic philosophers. He declared that human misery is caused by coercive institutions. Government, he asserted, is an evil, and should be abolished. He urged also the abolition of strict marriage relations, although he personally acquiesced in the custom and in his last days he commended marriage. He thought that no social group should be larger than a parish, and that there should be an equal distribution of property. Godwin thus

¹ Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Putnam, 1901, I:81.

² *Ibid.*, p. 147.

carried the doctrine of natural rights to the verge of anarchy and licentiousness. His ideas furnished a basis for the nineteenth century experiments in communism. But what is more important, Godwin's ideas regarding the reconstruction of society stimulated Thomas Malthus, who developed what is commonly known as the Malthusian doctrine of population.

THE SOCIAL PROBLEM

In 1798, under an assumed name, Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) offered to the world the first carefully collected and elaborated body of data, dealing with what he called *the social problem*, namely: What is the underlying cause of human unhappiness? This study may be counted, in a sense, the beginning of modern sociological study. Early in life Malthus showed an interest in social questions. Godwin's ideas had centered Malthus' attention on population. Malthus' well-known treatise entitled *An Essay on the Principle of Population as it Affects the Future Improvement of Society*, undertook two important tasks: (1) To investigate the causes that have impeded the progress of mankind toward happiness, and (2) to examine probabilities of a total or partial removal of these causes.³

Among both plants and animals there is a constant tendency to reproduce numerically beyond the subsistence level. Wherever there is liberty, this power of increase blindly asserts itself. Afterwards, a lack of nourishment and of room represses the superabundant numbers.⁴ It appears, therefore, that the ultimate check to population is lack of food, due to the fact that population increases faster than food supply. Nature, in other words, sets a harsher law over the increase of subsistence than she does over the

³ *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, eighth edition, Reeves and Turner, 1878, p. 1; cf. W. S. Thompson, *Population: A Study in Malthusianism*, Columbia University, 1915, Ch. I.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

birth rate. Man fails to take cognizance of this law and brings untold misery upon himself. The lower economic classes are the chief victims, and the giants of poverty and pauperism rule over whole sections of human population. Malthus considers the question of population the fundamental social problem.

CHECKS ON POPULATION

Since population outruns food supply, dire human consequences naturally follow. Food supply, as a check upon population, operates harshly; it is but representative of an entire series of rigorous natural, or positive, checks upon population. In this list there are unwholesome occupations, forms of severe labor, extreme poverty, damp and wretched housing conditions, diseases, epidemics, plagues, poor nursing, intestine commotion, martial law, civil war, wars of all forms, excesses of all kinds.⁵ These positive checks upon population are the results of two main causes, namely, vice and misery. As a result of the operation of these factors, population is being continually cut down and kept near the mere subsistence plane.

Malthus pointed out another check upon population, the preventive. The fear of falling into poverty causes many young people to postpone marriage until they can safely marry—economically. This check so far as voluntary is peculiar to man and, to the extent that it is not followed by irregular sex gratification, is prudential. The actual pressure of population upon food supply, or the fear of this impingement, prevents people from marrying earlier than they do and from reproducing their kind faster than they would do otherwise. The pressure, or the fear of it, cuts down the marriage rate in times of economic depression. But let prosperity come and the marriage rate leaps upward, especially among the poorer classes.

⁵ Malthus, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

The positive and preventive checks upon population hold a definite relation to each other. "In every country where the whole of the procreative power cannot be called into action, the preventive and the positive checks must vary inversely as each other."⁶ That is to say, when positive checks, such as famine and war, slay large numbers of people, moral restraint is diminished and the population numbers rapidly increase. When the preventive check expresses itself strongly, the population is kept down numerically, and positive checks, such as famine or even war, are defeated.

Malthus attempted to establish three propositions:

(1) That population is limited by the restriction of the means of subsistence.

(2) That there is an invariable increase of population whenever the means of subsistence increase, unless prevented by powerful checks.

(3) That the factors which keep population on a level with the means of subsistence are all resolvable into three: moral restraint, vice, and misery.⁷

POPULATION PROBLEMS

No one can gainsay the importance or the seriousness of the problem of population. Plato wrestled with it, and urged that procreation when it goes on too fast or too slow should be regulated by the state—through a proper distribution of marks of ignominy or of honor. The number of marriages should be determined by the magistrates.

Aristotle suggested that the ages of marriages for both sexes should be regulated; he even advocated the regulation of the number of children for each marriage. Additional children should be aborted.

Malthus, however, was wiser than either Plato or Aristotle, for he observed that the cause which has the most

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

lasting effect in improving the condition of the poorer classes is the conduct and prudence of the individuals themselves.⁸ Malthus asserted that it is in the power of each individual to avoid all the evil consequences to himself and society which result from the principle of population, "by the practice of a virtue clearly dictated to him by the light of nature and expressly enjoined in revealed religion."⁹

Malthus demonstrated clearly the weakness of liberal poor-laws. Give more food to the poor, and they will produce more children, and suffer more misery. Poor-laws increase the numbers of children of the poor, and hence increase the amount of misery. Both private benevolence and poor-laws increase the number of marriages and of children.¹⁰

Education is the solution which Malthus demanded.¹¹ Educate the poor to postpone marriage, to keep the birth rate down, and to practice economic thrift. To a great extent education will secure the operation of the prudential check upon population. The science of moral and political philosophy should not be confined within such narrow limits that it is unable to overcome in practical ways the obstacles to human happiness which arise from the law of population.¹²

NEW POPULATION PROBLEMS

There are factors in the population situation which did not exist in the time of Malthus, or which he did not see. Today there are additional preventive checks upon population, for example, the rise of democracy in the family whereby the wife and mother no longer is dominated by the husband and father, but has a voice of her own regarding domestic matters, such as the number of children.

⁸ Malthus, *op. cit.*, p. 371.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 402.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 416.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 437.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 481.

Closely related to this tendency is the feminist movement, or woman's rights movement, whereby women are demanding that they not be confined to the sphere of bearing and rearing children. Increasing intelligence and foresight has served as a powerful preventive check upon population. The current emphasis upon luxury is inimical to the birth rate. A higher economic status almost uniformly cuts down the birth rate. Within the last score of years the new science of eugenics has attracted widespread attention. Eugenics stresses quality of population. It would effect a decrease in the numbers of children born among the lower classes, among the poorer stocks, and prevent procreation among the mentally deficient. It would increase the birth rate among the cultured and the high grade stocks.

Malthus appreciated the dependence of urban population upon rural districts, but he could not foresee the degree to which cities would grow in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The relative decrease of agricultural labor and the proportional increase in non-agricultural labor has thrown a burden upon the food supply which even Malthus could not forecast.

On the other hand, Malthus did not realize the extent to which new countries such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Argentina, would contribute to the world's means of subsistence. He could not predict the way in which invention would be applied in solving agricultural problems, and how today one man with improved machinery and intensive methods can produce a hundred ears of corn where one was produced a century ago. Nevertheless, the "new country" argument against Malthus' principle of population is ultimately fallacious, for new countries soon become old, the supply of new countries becomes exhausted, and there is even a limit to soil productiveness. The very pressure of population against means of subsistence is, however, a cause of inventiveness, so that unanticipated increases in food supply may occur at any time.

Socialism has criticized Malthus severely. Socialism holds that at a given time the food supply is sufficient to meet human needs but that it is poorly or unjustly distributed. With just distribution of the returns from industry, food supply would not impinge strongly on population. But socialism might greatly endanger the prudential check on population, and hence result in an increased birth rate; which in turn would more than balance any release from human misery that a just distribution of the returns from industry would effect.

Another point which Malthus did not observe is that the increase in technical skill which comes with vocational education is overcome by the tendency of the world's population to overtake the world's food productiveness. With increase in population, the price of land rises, the rent for land increases, the cost of living mounts upward, and the purchasing power of the dollar, or its equivalent, declines.

Some of the followers of Malthus have advocated birth control as an artificial means of regulating population. Birth control prevents by physical means the birth of children. It is a useful weapon against sexually brutal husbands. It does not provide for self control or moral control of the sexual impulses. It encourages rather than controls gratification of the sexual desires. By it a gain is made in protecting helpless women and in cutting down the birth rate among the lower classes, whether wealthy or poor, but the gain is more than lost by the opportunity which birth control gives to the irregular gratification of sexual impulses and by the resultant weakening of moral fibre.

Many writers have pointed out, however, what a tremendous injury mankind does itself by allowing the higher developed members of various races to practice voluntary parenthood, while the less developed reproduce at a more natural and far higher rate. The world must control its population rate or face famine, argues E. M. East. Soon there will be 3,000 million people on the earth and then

"a sudden drop of 25 per cent in the grain crop, just such a drop as has occurred time and again before, . . . will make what is left of them awaken to the folly of negligence."¹³ The world question, continues Professor East, is the question "of reducing a swiftly increasing population to fit a rapidly diminishing food reserve." This startling conclusion is a stimulus for thought, although the situation may not be quite so serious as implied.

Thomas N. Carver, whose work will be referred to again in subsequent chapters, has developed an interesting population theory which is partly Malthusian.¹⁴ The increase in population from both immigration sources and the birth rate should be cut down, thereby decreasing the percentage of unskilled labor. Further, persons should be trained out of the unskilled group into the skilled group and then into the *entrepreneur class*. Thus, by greatly decreasing the number of unskilled laborers and by increasing the number of entrepreneurs, wages will advance and profits will be increasingly subdivided. The poor will become well-to-do, and poverty as it is now known will tend to disappear. This theory underestimates the rôle of psychological motives and of social attitudes under a system where a marked degree of competition is encouraged—certain persons will still take advantage of their fellows.

In conclusion, it may be stated that the principle of population as given by Malthus is fundamental to an understanding of the problems of social progress.¹⁵ There is a positive relation between population and means of subsistence. Positive and preventive checks upon population are continually at work. Moral restraint and self control tend to create a better moral fibre than birth control. The quality of personality is far more important than mere num-

¹³ E. M. East, *Mankind at the Crossroads*, Scribners, 1923, p. 349.

¹⁴ T. N. Carver, *Essays in Social Justice*, Harvard University Press, 1915. Ch. XIV.

¹⁵ Cf. W. S. Thompson, *Population: A Study in Malthusianism*, Columbia University Studies, 1915.

bers of population. The struggle for equality in personal-ity must be supplanted by justice in industrial and social processes before the population problem can be solved.

THE PRINCIPLE OF POPULATION¹⁶

In an inquiry concerning the improvement of society, the mode of conducting the subject which naturally presents itself, is:

1. An investigation of the causes that have hitherto impeded the progress of mankind toward happiness; and,

2. An examination into the probability of the total or partial removal of these causes in the future.

To enter fully into this question, and to enumerate all the causes that have hitherto influenced human improvement, would be much beyond the power of an individual. The principal object of the present essay is to examine the effects of one great cause intimately united with the very nature of man, which though it has been constantly and powerfully operating since the commencement of society, has been little noticed by the writers who have treated this subject. The facts which establish the existence of this cause have, indeed, been repeatedly stated and acknowledged; but its natural and necessary effects have been almost totally overlooked; though probably among these effects may be reckoned a very considerable portion of that vice and misery, and of that unequal distribution of the bounties of nature, which it has been the unceasing object of the enlightened philanthropist in all ages to correct.

The cause to which I allude, is the constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment prepared for it. (p. 77-78)

The checks to population, which are constantly operating with more or less force in every society, and keep down the number to the level of the means of subsistence, may be classed under two general heads: the preventive and the positive checks.

The preventive check is peculiar to man, and arises from that distinctive superiority in his reasoning faculties which enables him to calculate distant consequences. Plants and animals have apparently no doubts about the future support of their offspring. The checks to their indefinite increase, therefore, are all positive. But man cannot look around him, and see the distress which frequently presses upon those who have large families; he cannot contemplate his pres-

¹⁶ Reprinted by permission from T. R. Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, Macmillan Company, 1914.

ent possessions or earnings, which he now clearly consumes himself, and calculate the amount of each share, when with very little addition they must be divided, perhaps, among seven or eight, without feeling a doubt, whether if he follow the bent of his inclinations, he may be able to support the offspring which he will probably bring into the world. In a state of equality, if such can exist, this would be the simple question. In the present state of society, other considerations occur. Will he not lower his rank in life, and be obliged to give up in great measure his former society? Does any mode of employment present itself by which he may reasonably hope to maintain a family? Will he not at any rate subject himself to greater difficulties, and more severe labour than in his single state? Will he not be unable to transmit to his children the same advantages of education and improvement that he had himself possessed? Does he even feel secure that, should he have a large family, his utmost exertions can save them from rags, and squalid poverty, and their consequent degradation in the community? And may he not be reduced to the grating necessity of forfeiting his independence, and of being obliged to the sparing hand of charity for support?

These considerations are calculated to prevent, and certainly do prevent, a great number of persons in all civilized nations from pursuing the dictate of nature in an early attachment to one woman.

If this restraint does not produce vice, as in many instances is the case, and very generally so among the middle and higher classes of men, it is undoubtedly the least evil that can arise from the principle of population. Considered as a restraint on an inclination, otherwise innocent, and always natural, it must be allowed to produce a certain degree of temporary unhappiness; but evidently slight, compared with the evils which result from any of the other checks to population. (pp. 87-88)

The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include every cause, whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree contribute to shorten the natural duration of human life. Under this head therefore may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, severe labour and exposure to the seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common diseases and epidemics, wars, pestilence, plague, and famine.

On examining these obstacles to the increase of population which are classed under the heads of preventive and positive checks, it will appear that they are all resolvable into moral restraint, vice, and misery.

Of the preventive checks, that which is not followed by irregular gratifications, may properly be termed moral restraint.

Promiscuous intercourse, unnatural passions, violations of the marriage bed, and improper arts to conceal the consequences of irregular connections, are preventive checks that clearly come under the head of vice.

Of the positive checks, those which appear to arise unavoidably from the laws of nature, may be called exclusively misery; and those which we obviously bring upon ourselves, such as wars, excesses, and many others which it would be in our power to avoid, are of a mixed nature. They are brought upon us by vice and their consequences are misery.

In every country, some of these checks are, with more or less force, in constant operation; yet, notwithstanding their general prevalence, there are few states in which there is not a constant effort in the population to increase beyond the means of subsistence. This constant effort as constantly tends to subject the lower classes of society to distress, and to prevent any great permanent amelioration of their condition.

These effects, in the present state of society, seem to be produced in the following manner. We will suppose the means of subsistence in any country just equal to the easy support of its inhabitants. The constant effort towards population, which is found to act even in the most vicious societies, increases the number of people before the means of subsistence are increased. The food therefore which before supported eleven millions, must now be divided among eleven millions and a half. The poor consequently must live much worse, and many of them be reduced to severe distress. The number of labourers also being above the proportion of work in the market, the price of labour must tend to fall; while the price of provisions would at the same time tend to rise. The labourer therefore must do more work to earn the same as he did before. During this season of distress, the discouragements to marriage, the difficulty of rearing a family are so great, that population is nearly at a stand. In the meantime, the cheapness of labour, the plenty of labourers, and the necessity of an increased industry among them, encourage cultivators to employ more labour upon the land; to turn up fresh soil, and to manure and improve more completely what is already in tillage; till ultimately the means of subsistence may become in the same proportion to the population as at the period from which we set out. The situation of the labourer being again tolerably comfortable, the restraints to population are in some degree loosened; and, after a short period, the same retrograde and progressive movements, with respect to happiness, are repeated. (pp. 89-92)

PROBLEMS OF POPULATION¹⁷

Problems of population fall into two main groups—those connected with the quantity and those connected with the quality of the population. Considerations of the population problem are commonly devoted to one of these chief aspects to the exclusion of the other with the result that the relation between them is seldom appreciated. It is one of the objects of this book to show that all problems of population have the same origin. The development of biological knowledge in the last century, and in particular the discussion of evolution, have made it clear that the whole population question and all the problems arising therefrom have their origin in the fact that mankind has a definite position in the animal kingdom. In the next two chapters an attempt is made to set out the basis of the whole question in the light of modern research, and in the fourth chapter are discussed the nature of the various problems and their relations to one another; first those which are connected with the quality of the population.

This was not, however, the manner in which the question was first approached. There was not, to begin with, an understanding of the zoological position of man leading to a growing comprehension of the problems to which it gave rise. From early days attention was particularly directed to the question of numbers. Between the fifth century B.C., and the eighteenth century A.D.—between, that is to say, the time of Plato and that of Malthus—opinions were often expressed regarding the desirability or otherwise of a dense population. The work of Malthus focused opinion upon this point. In a restricted sense this problem can be solved without an understanding of the biological origin of the whole question, and the discussion which followed the publication of the *Essay on Population* has resulted in the general acceptance of a solution by students of political economy. In a wider sense the solution of this problem depends upon a comprehension of its biological origin, and it was not therefore until after the middle of the last century that all the problems connected with quantity fell into their proper setting owing to the work of Darwin and Wallace, both of whom acknowledged their debt to Malthus. The latter, though he did not in any way realize the fact, was discussing the point which is intimately connected with evolution, and both Darwin and Wallace were influenced by their acquaintance with the work of Malthus in arriving at their explanation of the process of evolution. Thus from the time of Darwin and Wallace it has been possible to view the population problem as a

¹⁷ Reprinted by permission from A. M. Carr-Saunders, *The Population Problem*, Clarendon Press, 1922.

whole, though the discussions of the problems connected with quantity have been pursued independently not only before but also after the publication of the *Origin of Species*.

Problems of quality did not arouse the same early interest. It is, of course, well known that Plato was occupied with this aspect of the whole problem; Roman authors also commented upon the eugenic bearing of certain practices. In later days, in a remarkable book Campanella dwelt upon the importance of good breeding. But the interest in quality was not, as was the interest in quantity, widespread or long maintained; it was not until the origin of living species by evolution had been generally accepted and some knowledge of inheritance had been gained, that problems of quality came to occupy anything more than the passing attention of mankind. (pp. 17-18)

As we have seen among species in a state of nature, change is founded upon germinal change. So, too, among men there is germinal change, and so far as history (using the term in the widest sense to include what is often rather meaninglessly called 'prehistory') is connected with germinal change, so far it is of essentially the same nature as change among other species. But both the direction and intensity of germinal change among men have been greatly influenced by mental evolution. Certain causes of elimination have been removed wholly or in part, others have been introduced. The facts are familiar; there is not need to labour over the point. It is also worth noting that, should it be found that mutation frequently arises owing to alterations in the environment during the formation of the germ cells, such a discovery might have considerable bearing upon the position of man. Owing to human activity under the guidance of reason, the environment has been profoundly changed in many directions, and without question in consequence of such changes the germ cells of human beings are subject during their development to far more varied stimuli than are those of other species. This, however, is only a possibility. Nothing is known with certainty upon the subject. It may be that the great variety of goods, the absorption of alcohol and nicotine, the various occupations and customs, and many other factors, all ultimately traceable to reason, may, some of them in some way, tend to bring about mutation in man. (pp. 80-81)

Some calculations may be conveniently added to illustrate the strength of human fecundity, which, as we shall see, is constantly underestimated. Let us consider a population of a million born in the same year, half of whom are males and half females. Let us suppose that they all marry, each couple before the age of twenty

producing two children, half of whom are girls and half boys. For the sake of simplicity we may imagine that at the end of each twenty-year period the parents die simultaneously with the birth of their offspring. Then, if the children marry and produce offspring as did their parents, we shall have a standard population of 1,000,000, which will neither increase nor decrease so long as these conditions are fulfilled. If, however, the average number of children is two and one-half per couple, then in 100 years the population will be 3,000,000; if three, 7,954,000; if four, 32,000,000; if five, 97,650,000. (p. 105)

The quantitative problem presents itself to all races at all times. There is no escaping it. The common notion that it only presents itself at certain times and in certain places is based upon a failure to grasp the strength of fecundity. Almost without exception these factors, which incidentally restrict increase and produce elimination, are insufficient so to reduce fertility as to keep numbers down to the optimum level. There thus arises the need for factors which directly restrict fertility and cause elimination; among primitive races these factors take the form of abortion, infanticide, and prolonged abstention from intercourse. There is no correlation between these factors and the economic stage reached, and therefore we have no grounds for assuming any one factor to have been prevalent at any one stage in prehistory, though we must assume that one or more of these factors was always at work. (p. 475)

Turning now to the problem of quality, we found that change among species in a state of nature, and therefore among our pre-human ancestors, was due to germinal change alone. Just as man moved away from the position in which all species in a state of nature are situated as regards quantity, so he moved away from the position in which they are placed as regards quality. Human history, in other words, is not explicable as due to germinal change alone. Tradition becomes a factor of ever-increasing importance; the direct influence of the environment also assumes a greater importance than among species in a state of nature, though it remains relatively insignificant compared with changes in tradition and changes in the germinal constitution. Germinal change, however, retains almost its full importance so far as permanent changes in physical characters are concerned.

We have seen that physical characters as presented to us are the expression of the interaction between certain germinal predispositions and a certain environment, and that, disease apart, such variations as usually occur in the environment do not in any notable manner affect these characters. Tradition does not enter directly

into the expression of physical character; it alters the environment, it is true, but that is another matter. Nevertheless, when we come to investigate the smaller differences, such as those which are found as between members of different classes in a modern community, the greatest caution is necessary before the differences in the environment are ruled out as contributory factors in producing these differences. Broadly speaking, we may say that differences in stature, eye colour, eyesight, muscular power, and so on, are all, though in varying degrees, because different organs vary in their susceptibility to environmental differences, expressions of germinal differences. It follows that, so far at least as physical characters are concerned, the germinal constitution is of primary importance. Disease due to parasites is a question apart. The parasites might be eliminated, or conceivably preventive medicine might render susceptibility to disease of little account. Disease due to structural defects must be classed with other physical characters, and, whether it be that we are considering health (immunity from parasitic disease excepted), stature, eye colour, or any other physical character, it is to the germinal constitution that we must look as the factor of chief importance.

It is not, however, of changes in physical characters but of changes in mental characters of which we think when we ask what it is that has caused those events the recording of which is the province of historians. There are three factors to be considered, germinal change, traditional change, and the direct effect of the environment, which latter factor we may pass over, merely recalling that it can at times as in the case of chronic disease affecting at one time a large proportion of the inhabitants of a country—appreciably retard progress. It is never in the true sense a cause of progress. In thus relegating the direct effect of the environment to a very subsidiary place among the factors, we are not dismissing the environment as of little account in human history or in the lives of individual men and women. Though the direct effect of the environment on the germinal constitution is seldom clearly distinguished from its effect in moulding tradition, yet it is wholly distinct; and in fact, while attributing to the former little importance, we have found the latter to be of increasing importance until it comes altogether to dominate germinal change. (pp. 477-479)

Our conclusion therefore must be something after this kind. Those who base upon germinal change their hopes for the physical condition of the human race in the future are building upon sound foundations. However much our power to control and regulate vital processes may increase—and it is clearly upon the verge of a very great increase—in the end a satisfactory physical condition can

only be the product of a certain constitution. On the other hand, those who think that germinal change in mental characters will affect the evolution of society and mould the course of history are upon the whole mistaken. The course of history is in the main dependent upon changes in tradition which are for the most part independent of germinal change. Just as the outstanding happenings in the last century—the turning of thought and conduct in Germany, for example, along certain lines, which ended in so great a catastrophe—were due to changes in tradition and not to changes in the germinal constitution, so whether the problems now pressing upon European society are to be solved or whether some greater catastrophe, reaching a climax in a long course of years or bursting suddenly upon us, is to be the outcome, will depend upon changes in tradition and not upon germinal change. The reason for this lies in the fact that the vast accumulation of tradition overlays the outward expression of mental character, determines the direction of intellectual activity and moulds the expression of the instinctive faculties. But as far as tradition is equalized, so far do innate mental differences manifest themselves as between man and man, and since tradition is more or less equalized, if not within races, at least within classes in the same race, to that degree is mental endowment of pre-eminent importance to the individual. (pp. 481-482)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The two major tasks which Malthus set himself.
2. The basic Malthusian principle.
3. The positive checks upon population.
4. The preventive checks upon population.
5. The relation of the operation of these checks to each other.
6. The solution to the population problem as suggested by Malthus.
7. Socialism's criticism of Malthus.
8. Carver's population plan.
9. Your reactions to Malthusianism.
10. Population problems not foreseen by Malthus.
11. Significant ideas of Carr-Saunders.

CHAPTER XIII

COMTE AND POSITIVE SOCIAL THOUGHT

AN ORGANIZED foundation for the field of social thought was not laid until near the close of the first half of the nineteenth century. At that time Auguste Comte (1798-1857) gave at least an organized groundwork, if not a synthetic introduction to sociology. He was the first to stake out the territory of social thought, to show the relation of social thought to other fields of knowledge, and to separate social statics from social dynamics. He was the first important social philosopher, and his *Positive Philosophy* the first treatise roughly to outline the field of sociology.

Auguste Comte invented the term, sociology, by which he meant the science of human association. While he did not contribute much to the science itself, he laid important foundations. He reacted against all forms of loose thinking about man, rejected metaphysical and theological speculations, and insisted upon the observation and classification of social phenomena. He repudiated attempts to discover causes of social uniformities, and coined the name, *positivism*, for the philosophical system upon which he founded sociology. The bases of positivism may be discovered in the ideas of Bacon, Galileo, and Descartes. As each of these three men broke with tradition and sought observed facts in their respective fields, so Comte was likewise prompted to do in the field of social thought.

Auguste Comte was born at Montpellier, France, the son of humble and law-abiding Catholic parents. At the age of nine he displayed unusual mental ability, a strong character, and a tendency to defy authority. He is described as brilliant and recalcitrant. He possessed a wonderful memory and a remarkable avidity for reading. In

school he won many prizes, and took a position of leadership among his fellow students, who called him "the philosopher." At the age of sixteen he was devoting his energies and abilities to the study of mathematics.

As a youth Comte demanded the resignation of one of his instructors, criticized Napoleon, and disregarded both ecclesiastical and parental authority. He especially enjoyed pointing out the stupidity of his superiors and opposing tyranny.

At the age of nineteen Comte made the acquaintance of Saint Simon, the well-known socialist. The friendship lasted for only a few years, but long enough to exert a deep influence upon the youthful mathematician. Saint Simon (1760-1825) had indicated the need for a scientific classification of the sciences with political science at the head of the list, and had developed a new fraternalism under the name of *Le nouveau Christianisme*. This system was optimistic and humanitarian, but dreamy. Comte was dissatisfied with it, and undertook to work out a better scheme of social analysis and organization.

REORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY

In 1822, Comte's first important work was published. It contained an introduction by Saint Simon, and was entitled, *A Prospectus of the Scientific Works Required for the Reorganization of Society*. It represented an important beginning of the task on which Comte was to spend his life. Upon the problem Comte read and worked assiduously, save as he was interrupted by an unhappy married life and by mental aberrations due to overwork. He gave courses of public lectures, but insisted upon working gratuitously. He would not accept royalties from the sale of his books, despite the fact that he lived continually on the verge of starvation. His friends, however, made him gifts and established a subsidy. He insisted upon the rule that all his literary productions should be given to the public gratuitously.¹

¹ Auguste Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, translated by Martineau, Vol. I, pp. x, xi.

His method of composition has been commented upon by his biographers. As a result of his unusual memory and the high degree of mental concentration to which he attained, he was able to plan chapters and volumes in their smallest details, and then from memory to put them into written form. This method enabled him to secure "an extraordinary unity of conception and organic symmetry of plan."

Comte manifested an unusual regard for the truth. This attitude required him to modify and qualify statements of fundamental principles at great length. As a result his works are often tedious reading. He preferred, however, to write meticulously and thus to safeguard truth, rather than speak in epigrams and sacrifice truth.

Comte's two leading works are: the *Positive Philosophy* and the *Positive Polity*. The first appeared in six volumes during the years from 1830 to 1842. The second work, in four volumes, was published in the years from 1851 to 1854. It is not the equal of the *Positive Philosophy*, which was translated into English in 1853 by Harriet Martineau.

John Stuart Mill has referred to Comte as among the first of European thinkers; and, by his institution of a new social science, in some respects the first.² George Henry Lewes called Comte the greatest of modern thinkers. John Morley, the English statesman and author, says of Comte: "Neither Franklin, nor any man that has ever lived, could surpass him in the heroic tenacity with which, in the face of a thousand obstacles, he pursued his own ideal of a vocation." Harriet Martineau summarizes his methods as follows: "There can be no question but that his whole career was one of the most intense concentration of mind, gigantic industry, rigid economy, and singular punctuality and exactness in all his habits."³

² Comte, *op. cit.*, p. xi.

³ *Ibid.*, p. xv.

TYPES OF THINKING

In laying the foundations for a new social science, Comte began with an analysis of types of thinking. Primitive and untrained persons everywhere think in supernatural terms. They suppose that all physical phenomena are caused by the immediate action of capricious supernatural beings. The primitive man believes in all kinds of fetishes in which spirits or supernatural beings live. Fetishism admitted of no priesthood, because its gods are individual, each residing in fixed objects.⁴

As the mind of primitive man became better organized, fetishism became cumbersome. Too many fetishes produced mental confusion. A coalescence of gods resulted and polytheism arose. The polytheistic gods represented different phases of life. This state in human thought is well illustrated by the Homeric gods.

But a large number of capricious divinities are mentally unsatisfactory. They create mental contradictions. Consequently, the gods are arranged in a hierarchy. Finally, the idea of one God, or of monotheism, developed. The belief arose that every phenomenon is produced by the immediate action of the one God. As man's vision widened and his observations increased in scope and depth, the concept of a monotheistic universe became clarified. Monotheism is the climax of the theological stage of thinking.

But rationalism argues that God does not stand directly behind every phenomenon. Pure reason insists that God is a First Cause or an Abstract Being. Pure reason speaks in terms of inalienable rights; metaphysical explanations, however, are unsatisfactory to the mind.

Hence, Comte developed his concept of positivism, which is a purely intellectual way of looking at the world. Comte held that the mind should concentrate on the observation and classification of phenomena. He believed that both theological and metaphysical speculations, as

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 13.

he used the terms, were as likely to be fiction as truth, and that there is no way of determining which is the case. Thus it will be more profitable if a person would direct his thoughts to the lines of thinking which are most truly prolific, namely, to observation and classification of data. Comte even took the position that it is futile to try to determine causes. We can observe uniformities, or laws, but it is mere speculation to assign causes to these uniformities. Positivism deified observation and classification of data. Its weaknesses should not hinder the student, however, from seeing the importance of its emphasis upon the scientific procedure of observing and classifying data in an age when dogmatism and speculation were rife.

The three stages of thought which Comte described are not three levels of thought, as Comte contended, but, as Herbert Spencer indicated, they may represent the same plane of thinking. Each requires about the same degree of thinking ability. Moreover, as John Fiske argued, the three methods of approach to problems are often pursued simultaneously by a given person. Some phenomena are explained theologically; others, metaphysically; and others, positively.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

A second main contribution which Comte made to social thought is that each of the three modes of thinking determines and corresponds to a type of social organization. Speaking from the standpoint of his own religious contacts, he declared that theological thinking leads to a military and monarchical social organization, with God at the head of the hierarchy as King of kings and a mighty warrior, and with human beings arranged in a military organization. Divine sanction rules. As expressed through the human leaders, this divine sanction must not be questioned. Dogmatism must be meekly endured, or else its threatened punishments will be turned loose upon helpless offenders. Divine rights rule.

Metaphysical thinking produces a government dominated by doctrines of abstract rights. Natural rights are substituted for divine rights. A priesthood is furthered. Social organization becomes legalistic, formal, structural, without adequate content.

Positive thinking produces practical results in the form of industrial enterprises, and ushers in an industrial age. It inquires into the nature and utilization of natural forces. It transforms the material resources of the earth, and produces material inventions.

Comte failed to postulate a fourth mode of thinking, namely, socialized thinking, or a system of thought which would emphasize not simply the use of natural forces, but the use of natural forces for social ends, for the purpose of building constructive, just, and harmonious societies, and of developing persons who will evaluate life in terms of the welfare of other persons. Comte, however, should be credited with opening the way for the rise of socialized thinking.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES

A third phase of Comte's system was his classification of the sciences, with sociology as the latest and greatest of the group. The Greek thinkers, it will be recalled, undertook to classify all knowledge under three headings: physics, ethics, and politics. Bacon made the divisions correlative to the so-called mental faculties of memory, imagination, and reason, namely: history, poetry, and science.

Comte chose as his principle of classifying knowledge, the order of increasing dependence. He arranged the sciences so that each category may be grounded on the principal laws of the preceding category, and serve as a basis for the next ensuing category.⁵ The order, hence, is one of increasing complexity and decreasing generality. The

⁵ *Positive Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 26.

most simple phenomena must be the most general—general in the sense of being everywhere present.⁶

Comte began with mathematics, the tool of the mind. With mathematics as its chief tool, the mind of man can go anywhere in its thinking. Mathematics is the most powerful instrument which the mind may use in the investigation of natural laws.⁷

Mathematics is not a constituent member of the group of sciences. It is the basis of them all. It holds the first place in the hierarchy of the sciences, and is the best point of departure in all education, whether general or special.⁸ It is the oldest and most perfect of all the sciences.⁹

Mathematics is the science which measures precisely the relations between objects and ideas. It is *the* science.¹⁰ Its function is that of ascertaining relationships, a process which is basic to scientific thinking in all fields. Education that is based on any other method is faulty, inexact, and unreliable. It is only through mathematics that we can understand science.

The highest form of mathematics is calculus. There is no scientific inquiry in which calculus is not used. Even the physician in prescribing for the cure of disease, must provide for the mixing together of different quantities of different medicines, so that, when taken at determined intervals of time, they will possess the right qualities for bringing the human body back to its normal state. Calculus is the branch of science which has the highest intellectual dignity.¹¹ In it the proportion of reasoning to observation is greater than elsewhere.

With mathematics as the tool, the classification of knowledge may proceed. All natural phenomena fall into two grand divisions: inorganic and organic. The inorganic are more general and should be considered first. Inorganic phenomena are of two classes: astronomical and

⁶ Comte, *op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 27 ff.

terrestrial. Astronomical phenomena are the most general of all. The stars and planets appear under the least varied aspects.¹² Astronomy is the science by which the movements of the heavenly bodies, including the earth, are measured. How can we thoroughly understand any terrestrial phenomena without considering the nature of the earth and its relation to the other units of the solar system?¹³

Terrestrial physics includes two fields: physics proper and chemistry. Material bodies may be regarded in either their physical or chemical aspects. Physics is more general than chemistry; it deals with masses rather than elements. Chemical phenomena depend upon the laws of physics, without being influenced by them in turn. Chemical action is conditioned by the laws of weight, heat, electricity. The study of inorganic phenomena thus falls under three scientific heads: astronomy, physics, and chemistry.

Organic phenomena include two types: individual and group. The first refers to the function and structure of all individual forms in the plant and animal worlds. It is general physiology, or, in modern terms, biology. It involves the study of all life and the general laws pertaining to the individual units of life.

Biology rests upon chemistry, because it is in chemistry that all reliable knowledge about nutrition or secretion is found. Biology is indebted to physics for knowledge concerning the weight of, temperature of, and related facts about living organisms. Biological laws are partially determined by astronomical factors. If the earth were to rotate faster than it does, the course of physiological phenomena would be accelerated, and the length of life would be shortened.¹⁴ If the orbit of the earth were to become as eccentric as that of a comet, changes of a fatal nature

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 153, 154.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 30.

would occur to all life on earth. If there were no inclination of the earth's axis, the seasons would be unknown, and the geographical distribution of living species would be vastly different from the present situation. All accurate work in biological studies is mathematical in character. Thus biology, the science of organic phenomena, is dependent on all the preceding divisions on the scale of knowledge.

SOCIOLOGY

The study of gregarious or associative life is a special field. Comte called this science social physics, and for it invented the specific term, *sociology*. It rests in turn upon biological, chemical, physical, and astronomical knowledge and uses mathematics as its tool. Comte virtually defines six sciences: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology. He treats of transcendental biology, which is the basis of modern psychology. Comte urged that no science could be effectually studied without competent knowledge concerning the sciences on which it depends. It is necessary not only to have a general knowledge of all the sciences but to study each of them in order—this is Comte's dictum to the student of sociology. Comte insisted that one general science could not develop beyond a given point until the preceding science has passed a given stage.

Each of the six general sciences has passed through the three stages of thought. Mathematics, which has advanced furthest into the positive stage, is still connected with superstition, such as that which hovers round the number 13. The other general sciences are less further along. Sociology, the latest science to develop, Comte hoped by his works to push over into the positive stage.

Comte divided sociology, or social physics, into social statics and social dynamics. Social statics is the study of the laws of action and reaction of the different parts of the social order, aside for the time being from the general

social movements which are modifying them.¹⁵ Social dynamics considers the laws of progress. Social statics inquires into the laws of coexistence of social phenomena; social dynamics examines the laws of social succession. Sociology is the study of social organization and of social progress.

Society is in a state of anarchy. Individuals with the best of purposes are continually weakening the efforts of each other. Powerful persons are crushing the weak. The defeated are conniving against the strong. Why all this social anarchy? To Comte the answer is clear. Behind moral and social anarchy there is intellectual anarchy. People do not have a knowledge of the fundamental laws of social order and social progress.

Moreover, people fail to appreciate the necessity of knowledge of social laws. They are insensible to the value of sound social theory. They want nothing but the "practical," unmindful of the fact that the "practical" is as likely to be based on incorrect social theory as upon sound social conceptions.

The necessity of fundamental concepts concerning society underlies social organization. In the absence of these general ideas, there is "no other daily resource for the maintenance of even a rough and precarious social order than an appeal, more or less immediate, to personal interests."¹⁶ In the absence of a moral authority, the material order requires the use of either terror or corruption; the latter is less inconvenient and more in accordance with the nature of modern society.¹⁷ Moreover, politicians and other public men work against the elaboration of the social theory which is necessary for the salvation of society. They sneer at the development of social science. Many of those who occupy the chief political stations regard with antipathy the true reorganization of society. Social

¹⁵ *Positive Philosophy*, p. 219.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 176.

principles are not even sought. On the other hand, social charlatanism attracts by the magnificence of its promises and dazzles by its transient successes. Comte deplored attempts to remake society through institutionalism, regardless of social theory. He stressed the fundamental importance of social principles as the only means of guaranteeing a correct institutional procedure. As a practical principle of social adjustment, Comte endorsed the Catholic ideal: In necessary things, unity; in doubtful things, liberty; in all things, charity.

Comte protested vigorously against materialism. He pointed out that for three centuries the best minds had been devoted to material science and had neglected societary problems.¹⁸ Material institutions should be modified and made to harmonize with the underlying laws of social evolution. A moral reorganization of society must precede and direct the material and political reorganization.¹⁹

Social improvement is a result of mental development. This development favors the preponderance of the noblest human tendencies. Prevision and science when applied to society will bring out the best phases of human nature, and thus result in social improvement. Although the lower instincts will continue to manifest themselves in modified action, their less sustained exercise will debilitate them by degrees.²⁰

SOCIAL VARIATION

The three chief causes of social variation result from, first, race; second, climate; and third, political action in its whole scientific content. The first and second factors cannot be changed greatly, but the political influences are wide open to modification by social prevision. In this connection sociology finds its manifestation.

¹⁸ *Positive Philosophy*, p. 180.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 193.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

With the development of society, intellectual activity and gregariousness slowly overcome the preponderance of the affective over the intellectual phases of life. But even in the best natures the personally affective elements are more powerful than the social affections. Real intellectual development, however, will strengthen man's empire over his passions, refine his gregariousness, and release his energies for social activities.

Comte makes the family the social unit. Man cannot survive in isolation, but the family can survive by itself.²¹ The striking characteristic of domestic organization is its establishment of the elementary idea of social perpetuity, by directly and irresistibly connecting the future with the past.²² Family life will always be the school of social life, both for obedience and for command.²³ Comte failed to escape the logic of the patriarchal family life. He did credit women, however, with being superior to men in the spontaneous expansion of sympathy and sociality, although inferior in understanding and reason.

The direction of social evolution is toward further development of the noblest dispositions and the most generous feelings, and away from the expression of the animal appetites and the material desires.²⁴ The trend is from the satisfaction of the selfish impulses to the habitual exercise of the social impulses. Happiness depends on the presence of new stimuli in one's form of activity. A life of labor that is full of constructive stimuli is after all the fittest to develop personality.

Comte was the friend of popular education.²⁵ He based his contention on the invariable homogeneity of the human mind. The minds of people of all races are potentially similar. All members of the race are capable of development to a common plane.

In his *Positive Polity*, Comte made important changes in his thinking. This work was the product of his later

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 292.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 287.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 286.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 300.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 320.

years, and shows the effects of deprivation and struggle. It is inferior in quality to his earlier treatise on *Positive Philosophy*. It is a question, therefore, how far his later ideas should be permitted to supersede his thinking when he was in his prime. In his later thought-life he receded from his emphasis upon the intellectual nature and stressed the importance of the affections. He made affection the central point of life and developed the concept of love. We tire of thinking and even of acting, he asserted, but we never tire of loving.²⁶

The Comtean ideal became a disinterested love of mankind. Comte developed a religion of humanity. His contact with Christianity gave him the belief that it is chiefly ecclesiastical. He did not see in Christianity a social keynote. Hence, he attempted to create a purely social religion. He made mankind an end in itself; he failed to see that human society is possibly an outcropping of universal purpose.

If we judge Comte by his own time and age, we shall see the importance of his contributions to social thought, which were as follows: 1. There is need for accurate thinking about society. Mathematics is the best tool for obtaining social accuracy. 2. Comte developed positivism with its emphasis upon observation and classification of social data. 3. Knowledge has scientific divisions, according to the principles of increasing dependence and decreasing generality. This scale begins with mathematics and astronomy, includes physics, chemistry, biology, in order, and ends with the social sciences, particularly sociology. 4. Sociology deals with the static and dynamic phases of human association. 5. Comte developed a humanitarian philosophy. 6. Comte insisted on an intellectual understanding of social processes as the only true basis for overcoming social anarchy and for solving the problems of society.

²⁶ Comte, *Positive Polity*, London, 1871, I:1.

CLASSIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE²⁷

Now we must remember that we have to look for the principle of classification in the comparison of the different orders of phenomena through which science discovers the laws which are her object. What we have to determine is the real dependence of scientific studies. Now, this dependence can result only from that of the corresponding phenomena. All observable phenomena may be included within a very few natural categories, so arranged that the study of each category may be grounded on the principle laws of the preceding, and serve as the basis of the next ensuing. This order is determined by the degree of simplicity, or, what comes to the same thing, of generality of their phenomena. Hence results their successive dependence, and the greater or lesser facility for being studied.

It is clear, *a priori*, that the most simple phenomena must be the most general; for whatever is observed in the greatest number of cases is of course the most disengaged from the incidents of particular cases. We must begin then with the study of the most general or simple phenomena, going on successively to the more particular or complex. This must be the most methodical way, for this order of generality or simplicity fixes the degree of facility in the study of phenomena, while it determines the necessary connection of the sciences by the successive dependence of their phenomena. It is worthy of remark in this place that the most general and simple phenomena are the furthest removed from Man's ordinary sphere, and must thereby be studied in a calmer and more rational frame of mind than those in which he is more nearly implicated; and this constitutes a new ground for the corresponding sciences being developed more rapidly.

We have now obtained our rule. Next we proceed to our classification.

We are first struck by the clear division of all natural phenomena into two classes—of inorganic and of organic bodies. The organic are evidently, in fact, more complex and less general than the inorganic, and depend upon them, instead of being depended on by them. Therefore it is that physiological study should begin with inorganic phenomena; since the organic include all the qualities belonging to them, with a special order added, viz, the vital phenomena, which belong to organization. We have not to investigate the nature of either; for the positive philosophy does not inquire into natures. Whether their nature be supposed different or the same, it is evidently

²⁷ Reprinted by permission from Auguste Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, translated by Harriet Martineau, Bohn's Philosophical Library, G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., London, 1913, Vol. I.

necessary to separate the two studies of inorganic matter and of living bodies. Our classification will stand through any future decision as to the way in which living bodies are to be regarded; for, on any supposition, the general laws of inorganic physics must be established before we can proceed with success to the examination of a dependent class of phenomena.

Each of these great halves of natural philosophy has subdivisions. Inorganic physics, must, in accordance with our rule of generality and the order of dependence of phenomena, be divided into two sections—of celestial and terrestrial phenomena. Thus we have Astronomy, geometrical and mechanical, and Terrestrial Physics. The necessity of this division is exactly the same as in the former case.

Astronomical phenomena are the most general, simple, and abstract of all; and therefore the study of natural philosophy must clearly begin with them. They are themselves independent, while the laws to which they are subject influence all others whatsoever. The general effects of gravitation preponderate, in all terrestrial phenomena, over all effects which may be peculiar to them, and modify the original ones. It follows that the analysis of the simplest terrestrial phenomena, not only chemical, but even purely mechanical, presents a greater complication than the most compound astronomical phenomenon. The most difficult astronomical question involves less intricacy than the simple movement of even a solid body, when the determining circumstances are to be computed. Thus we see that we must separate these two studies and proceed to the second only through the first, from which it is derived.

In the same manner, we find a natural division of Terrestrial Physics into two, according as we regard bodies in their mechanical or their chemical character. Hence we have Physics, properly so called, and Chemistry. Again, the second class must be studied through the first. Chemical phenomena are more complicated than mechanical, and depend upon them, without influencing them in return. Every one knows that all chemical action is first submitted to the influence of weight, heat, electricity, etc., and presents moreover something which modifies all these. Thus, while it follows Physics, it presents itself as a distinct science.

ORGANIC SCIENCES

Such are the division of the sciences relating to inorganic matter. An analogous division arises in the other half of Natural Philosophy—the science of organized bodies.

Hence we find ourselves presented with two orders of phenomena: those which relate to the individual and those which relate to the species, especially when it is gregarious. With regard to Man, espe-

cially, this distinction is fundamental. The last order of phenomena is evidently dependent on the first, and is more complex. Hence we have two great sections in organic physics—Physiology, properly so called, and Social Physics, which is dependent upon it. In all Social phenomena we perceive the working of the physiological laws of the individual; and moreover, something which modifies their effects, and which belongs to the influence of individuals over each other—singularly complicated in the case of the human race by the influence of generations on their successors. Thus it is clear that our social science must issue from that which relates to the life of the individual. On the other hand, there is no occasion to suppose, as some eminent physiologists have done, that Social Physics is only an appendage to physiology. The phenomena of the two are not identical, though they are homogeneous; and it is of high importance to hold the two sciences apart. As social conditions modify the operation of physiological laws, Social Physics must have a set of observations of its own.

It would be easy to make the divisions of the Organic half of Science correspond with those of the Inorganic, by dividing physiology into vegetable and animal, according to popular custom. But this distinction, however important in Concrete Physics (in that secondary and special class of studies before declared to be inappropriate to this work) hardly extends into those Abstract Physics with which we have to do. Vegetables and animals come alike under our notice, when our object is to learn the general laws of life—that is, to study physiology. To say nothing of the fact that the distinction grows ever fainter and more dubious with new discoveries, it bears no relation that there is only one division in the science of organized bodies.

Thus we have before us Five fundamental Sciences in successive dependence,—Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Physiology, and finally, Social Physics. The first considers the most general, simple, abstract, and remote phenomena known to us, and those which affect all others without being affected by them. The last considers the most particular, compound, concrete phenomena, and those which are the most interesting to Man. Between these two, the degrees of speciality, of complexity, and individuality are in regular proportion to the place of the respective sciences in the scale exhibited.

FILIATION OF THE SCIENCES

This—casting out everything arbitrary—we must regard as the true filiation of the sciences; and in it we find the plan of this work.

As we proceed, we shall find that the same principle which gives this order to the whole body of science arranges the parts of each

science; and its soundness will therefore be freshly attested as often as it presents itself afresh. There is no refusing a principle which distributes the interior of each science after the same method with the aggregate sciences. But this is not the place in which to do more than indicate what we shall contemplate more closely hereafter. We must now rapidly review some of the leading properties of the hierarchy of science that has been disclosed.

This gradation is in essential conformity with the order which has spontaneously taken place among the branches of natural philosophy, when pursued separately, and without any purpose of establishing such order. Such an accordance is a strong presumption that the arrangement is natural. Again, it coincides with the actual development of natural philosophy. If no leading science can be effectually pursued otherwise than through those which precede it in the scale, it is evident that no vast development of any science could take place prior to the great astronomical discoveries to which we owe the impulse given to the whole. The progression may since have been simultaneous; but it has taken place in the order we have recognized.

This consideration is so important that it is difficult to understand without it the history of the human mind. The general law which governs this history, as we have already seen, cannot be verified, unless we combine it with the scientific gradation just laid down; for it is according to this gradation that the different human theories have attained in succession the theological state, the metaphysical, and finally the positive. If we do not bear in mind the law which governs progression, we shall encounter insurmountable difficulties: for it is clear that the theological or metaphysical state of some fundamental theories must have temporarily coincided with the positive state of others which precede them in our established gradation, and actually have at times coincided with them; and this must involve the law itself in an obscurity which can be cleared up only by the classification we have proposed. (pp. 27-30)

MAN'S SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT²⁸

Civilization develops, to an enormous degree, the action of Man upon his environment; and thus, it may seem, at first to concentrate our attention upon the cares of material existence, the support and improvement of which appear to be the chief object of most social occupations. A closer examination will show, however, that this de-

²⁸ Reprinted by permission from Auguste Comte, *Positive Philosophy*, translated by Harriet Martineau, Bohn's Philosophical Library, G. Bell and Sons, Ltd., London, 1913, Vol. III.

velopment gives the advantage to the highest human faculties, both by the security which sets free our attention from physical wants, and by direct and steady excitement which it administers to the intellectual functions, and even the social feelings. In man's social infancy, the instincts of subsistence are so preponderant, that the sexual instinct itself, notwithstanding its primitive strength, is at first controlled by them: the domestic affections are then much less pronounced; and the social affections are restricted to an almost imperceptible fraction of humanity, beyond which everything is foreign, and even hostile: and the malignant passions are certainly, next to the animal appetites, the mainspring of human existence. It is unquestionable that civilization leads us on to a further and further development of our noblest dispositions and our most generous feelings, which are the only possible basis of human association, and which received by means of that association, a more and more special culture. As for the intellectual faculties,—we see, by the habitual improvidence which characterizes savage life, how little influence reason has over men in that stage of existence. Those faculties are then undeveloped, or show some activity only in the lowest order, which relate to the exercise of the senses: the faculties of abstraction and combination are almost wholly inert, except under some transient stimulus: the rude curiosity which the spectacle of nature involuntarily inspires is quite satisfied with the weakest attempts at theological explanation; and amusements, chiefly distinguished by violent muscular activity, rising at best to a manifestation of merely physical address, are as little favorable to the development of intelligence as of social qualities. The influence of civilization in perpetually improving the intellectual faculties is even more unquestionable than its effect on moral relations. The development of the individual exhibits to us in little, both as to time and degree, the chief phases of social development. In both cases, the end is to subordinate the satisfaction of the personal instincts to the habitual exercise of the social faculties, subject, at the same time, all our passions to rules imposed by an ever-strengthening intelligence, with the view of identifying the individual more and more with the species. In the anatomical view, we should say that the process is to give an influence by exercise to the organs of the cerebral system, increasing in proportion to their distance from the vertebral column, and their nearness to the frontal region. Such is the ideal type which exhibits the course of human development, in the individual, and, in a higher degree, in the species. This view enables us to discriminate the natural from the artificial part of the process of development; that part being natural which raises the human to a superiority over the animal attributes; and that part being artificial by which any faculty

is made to preponderate in proportion to its original weakness: and here we find the scientific explanation of that eternal struggle between our humanity and our animality which has been recognized by all who have made Man their study, from the earliest days of civilization till now, and embodied in many forms before its true character was fixed by the positive philosophy.

RATE OF PROGRESS

This, then, is the direction of the human evolution. The next consideration is the rate at which it proceeds, apart from any differences which may result from climate, race, or other modifying causes. It is clear that the speed must be in proportion to the combined influence of the chief natural conditions relating to the human organism first, and next to its medium. The invariableness—the evident impossibility of suspending these fundamental conditions must ever prevent our estimating their respective importance, though we may have a general conviction that our spontaneous development must be hastened or retarded by any change in these elementary influences, organic or inorganic; supposing, for instance, our cerebral system to be slightly inferior, in the frontal region; or our planet to become larger or more habitable. Sociological analysis can, by its nature, reach only to accessory conditions, which are rendered susceptible of estimate by their variations.

Among these secondary but permanent influences, which affect the rate of human development, ennui is the first which presents itself. Man like other animals, cannot be happy without a sufficient exercise of all his faculties, intense and persistent in proportion to the intrinsic activity of each faculty. The greater difficulty experienced by man in obtaining a development compatible with the special superiority of his nature renders him more subject than the other animals to that remarkable state of irksome languor which indicates at once the existence of the faculties and their insufficient activity, and which would become equally irreconcilable with a radical debility incapable of any urgent tendency, and with an ideal vigour, spontaneously susceptible of indefatigable exercise. A disposition at once intellectual and moral, which we daily see at work in natures endowed with any energy, must have powerfully accelerated the human expansion, in the infancy of humanity, by the uneasy excitement it occasioned either in the eager search for new sources of emotion, or in the more intense development of direct human activity. This secondary influence is not very marked till the social state is sufficiently advanced to make men feel a growing need to exercise the highest faculties, which are, as we have seen,

the least energetic. The strongest faculties, which are the lowest, are so easily exercised that in ordinary circumstances they can hardly generate the ennui which would produce a favourable cerebral reaction. Savages, like children, are not subject to much ennui while their physical activity, which alone is of any importance to them, is not interfered with. An easy and protracted sleep prevents them, as if they were mere animals, from feeling their intellectual torpor in any irksome way. This brief notice of the influence of ennui was necessary, to show what its operation really amounts to in accelerating the speed of our social evolution. But perhaps the most important of all accelerating influences is the ordinary duration of human life, which I mention in the second place. There is no denying that our social progression rests upon death. I mean, the successive steps suppose the steady renewal of the agents of the general movement, which is almost imperceptible in the course of any single life, and becomes marked only on the succession of a new generation. Here again the social resembles the individual organism—being under the same necessity to throw off its constituent parts as they become, by the vital action itself, unfit for further use, and must be replaced by new elements. To illustrate this, we need not go so far as to suppose an indefinite duration of human life, which would presently put a stop to all progression whatever. It is enough to imagine it lengthened tenfold only, its respective periods preserving their present proportions. If the general constitution of the brain remained the same as now, there must be a retardation, though we know not how great, in our social development: for the perpetual conflict which goes on between the conservative instinct that belongs to age and the innovating instinct which distinguishes youth would be more favourable than now to the former. From the extreme imperfection of the higher parts of our nature, even those who, in their prime, have contributed most to human progress cannot preserve their due social eminence very long without becoming more or less hostile to the further progress which they cannot assist. But an ephemeral life would be quite as mischievous as a too protracted one, by giving too much power to the instinct of innovation. The resistance which this instinct now meets with from the conservatism of age compels it to accommodate its efforts to the whole of what has been already done. Without this check, our feeble nature, which has a strong repugnance to irksome and continual labor, would be forever proposing incomplete views and crude attempts, that could never ripen into mature projects and feasible acts: and this would be the inevitable state of things, if human life were reduced to a quarter, or even to half its present length. Such would be the consequences, in either

case, if we suppose the constitution of the human brain to be much what it is now: and to suppose it essentially changed, would be to carry us over into the region of hypothesis.

No justification is, however, afforded by these considerations to the optimism of the advocates of final causes: for if, in this as in every other case, the actual order is necessarily more or less accordant with the course of the phenomena, it is very far from being true that the arrangement of the natural economy is as good for its purposes as we can easily conceive. The slowness of our social development is no doubt partly owing to the extreme imperfection of our organism; but it is owing nearly as much to the brevity of human life: and there would be no risk to any other great arrangement if the duration of our life, while still limited by the conditions just specified, were doubled or trebled. We have hardly thirty years (and those beset with impediments) to devote to other purposes than preparation for life or for death; and this is a very insufficient balance between what Man can devise and what he can execute. Probably no one has ever nobly devoted himself to the direct advancement of the human mind without bitterly feeling how time, employed to the utmost, failed him for the working out of more than an insignificant part of his conceptions. It will not do to say that the rapid succession of coadjutors compensates for this restriction of individual activity. Important as this compensation is, it is very imperfect, both on account of the loss of time in preparing each successor, and because the precise continuance of the work by different persons, occupying different points of view, is impossible, and the more out of the question exactly in proportion to the value of the new coadjutors. In the simplest material operations, no man's work has ever been carried on by others precisely as he would have done it himself; and the more difficult and lofty labors, which require intellectual and moral forces to complete them, are much more in need of a persistent unity in their management. These intellectual and moral forces no more admit of partition and addition by successors than by contemporaries; and, whatever the advocates of the indefinite distribution of individual efforts may say, a certain degree of concentration is necessary to the accomplishment of human progress.

INCREASE OF POPULATION

Another cause which affects the rate of progress is the natural increase of population which contributes more than any other influence to accelerate the speed. This increase has always been regarded as the clearest symptom of the gradual amelioration of the human

condition; and nothing can be more unquestionable when we take the whole race into the account; or at least, all the nations which have any mutual interest: but this is not the view with which my argument is concerned. I have to consider only the progressive condensation of our species as a last general element concurring in the regulation of our rate of social progress. It is clear that by this condensation, and especially in its early stages, such a division of employments is favored as could not take place among smaller numbers: and again, that the faculties of individuals are stimulated to find subsistence by more refined methods; and again, that society is obliged to react with a firmer and better concerted energy against the expansion of individual divergences. In view of these considerations, I speak, not of the increase of the numbers of mankind, but of their concentration upon a given space, according to the special expression which I have made use of, and which is particularly applicable to the great centres of population, whence, in all ages, human progression has started. By creating new wants and new difficulties, this gradual concentration develops new means, not only of progress but of order, by neutralizing physical inequalities, and affording a growing ascendancy to those intellectual and moral forces which are suppressed among a scanty population. If we go on to inquire into the effect of a quicker or slower concentration, we shall perceive that the social movement is further accelerated by the disturbance given to the old antagonism between the conservative and the innovating instincts—the last being strongly reinforced. In this sense the sociological influence of a more rapid increase of population is in analogy with that which we have just been considering in regard to the duration of life; for it is of little consequence whether the more frequent renewal of individuals is caused by the short life of some, or the speedier multiplication of others; and what was said in the former case will suffice for the latter. It must be observed, however, that if the condensation and rapidity were to pass beyond a certain degree, they would not favor, but impede this acceleration. The condensation, if carried too far, would render the support of human life too difficult; and the rapidity, if extreme, would so affect the stability of social enterprises as to be equivalent to a considerable shortening of our life. As yet, however, the increase of population has never nearly reached the natural limits at which such inconveniences will begin; and we have really no experience of them, unless in a few exceptional cases of disturbance caused by migrations, ill-managed as to their extent of numbers and of time. In an extremely distant future, our posterity will have to consider the question, and with much anxiety; because from the smallness of the globe and the necessary limitation of human re-

sources, the tendency to increase will become extremely important, when the human race will be ten times as numerous as at present, and as much condensed everywhere as it now is in the west of Europe. Whenever that time comes, the more complete development of human nature, and the more exact knowledge of the laws of human evolution, will no doubt supply new means of resistance to the danger; means of which we can form no clear conception, and about which it is not for us to decide whether they will, on the whole, afford a sufficient compensation. (pp. 300-306)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The derivation of the term, sociology.
2. Significant personality traits of Auguste Comte.
3. The influence of socialism upon Comte.
4. The social significance of Comte's first book.
5. Three major types of human thinking.
6. Other types of thinking.
7. The culmination of the three types of thinking in types of social organization.
8. The nature of positivism.
9. Comte's principle of classifying knowledge.
10. Comte's classification of the sciences.
11. The relation of mathematics to social thought.
12. The differences between social statics and social dynamics.
13. The reasons for society being in a state of anarchy.
14. Comte's reactions concerning materialism.
15. The meaning of prevision.
16. The direction of social evolution.
17. Comte's outstanding contribution to social thought.

CHAPTER XIV

MARX AND SOCIALISTIC SOCIAL THOUGHT

SOCIALISM proper had its beginning in the second and third decades of the nineteenth century. It developed primarily in continental Europe and in England. Although Plato's communism and More's utopianism were forerunners of socialism, the social unrest in Europe in the early years of the nineteenth century was the direct causal factor. Socialism also represented a reaction against the prevailing *laissez faire* thought regarding the evils of society and the suffering of the poorer classes.

Socialism began with the concepts and experiments of Saint Simon and Fourier in France, of Robert Owen in England, and of Rodbertus, Lasalle, Marx, and Engels in Germany. In France the movement was carried forward by Proudhon and Blanc; and in England by the Christian socialists, chiefly Maurice and Kingsley. In Germany, Marx maintained the position of leadership for many decades, and finally became the best known exponent of socialist thought in the world.

In his *New Christianity*, Saint Simon, who was referred to in the preceding chapter, made a unique contribution to social thought. His thinking was not deep, or systematic, but characterized by ingenuity. Saint Simon advocated a society in which only useful things are produced. In this industrial order, men of science will be in control. Saint Simon was greatly interested in the welfare of the poorest classes. His *New Christianity* was essentially a plea that the whole world devote itself to the improvement of the living conditions of the very poor. The influence which Saint Simon had upon Comte has already been mentioned.

FOURIER

Another important socialistic ideal was developed by Fourier (1772-1837), who worked out a social system in which the *phalange* is the chief instrument in securing a perfect society. The phalange is composed of from twenty-four to thirty-two groups of people. Each group comprises from seven to nine persons. The unifying bond is natural attraction, or free elective love and sympathy. The members of each phalange live communistically in a large commodious structure called a *phalanstère*. The phalanges were to unite in one large world federation, with headquarters at Constantinople.

The people work according to their interests, frequently changing occupations. The products of labor are subdivided; a minimum goes equally to all, irrespective of any conditioning factors; of the remainder five-twelfths goes to labor, three-twelfths to special ability, and four-twelfths to capital. Difficult common labor is paid the most, on the assumption that he who does pleasant labor receives pay in mental ways. Every person should have an opportunity to become a capitalist; and every woman should be enabled to become independent economically. These utopian plans of Fourier called for a sudden and complete transformation of human nature.

BLANC

Socialistic thought was carried into politics by Louis Blanc (1811-1882). He declared that no genuine reformation of society could take place until political machinery was organized democratically. The democratic state would endow national workshops. These workshops would be operated by industrial associations composed of workingmen who would elect their own officers, regulate their own industries, and provide for the distribution of the returns from industry. Once started by the state these industrial associations will expand and increase in

number until the whole nation, and then the world, will be organized in this way.

Blanc participated in the French Revolution of 1848 and became a member of the provisional government. His national workshop idea failed in practice. His enemies were partly responsible for this defeat, because the essentials of productive work and guarantees of character which Blanc urged were disregarded. The fact, however, that these two essentials were considered necessary for the successful development of national workshops indicates that the system, under average conditions, might not be a success.

Nearly all the early socialists were evolutionists rather than revolutionists. They did not advocate class struggle theories. They developed bourgeois rather than proletarian ideas. An outstanding exception to these statements is found in the radical attitude of Babeuf (1760-1797), who was essentially a forerunner of Marxian socialism and also of the anarchistic philosophy of Proudhon and Bakunin. Babeuf vigorously proclaimed the sovereignty of the proletariat, and advocated the abolition of inheritance laws and of private property. He urged that the property of corporations be confiscated, and that a communistic state be established.

PROUDHON

The well-known principles of justice, liberty, and equality were utilized by Proudhon (1809-1865), a philosophic anarchist. He would have the same wages paid to an unskilled workman as to a successful business or professional man. He predicted that equalization of opportunity would bring about an equalization of ability.

Proudhon attacked property rights. He declared that property is theft. In itself property is lifeless, but it nevertheless demands rent, interest, or profits, or all three. It protects itself behind law, and in order to guarantee its

alleged rights, it calls out the militia, evicts families, and takes bread from the mouths of little children. It robs labor of its just returns.¹

By unsatisfactory reasoning Proudhon urged the free development of individuals in society, whereby each would learn to govern himself so well in society that government would no longer be needed. This theory is Proudhon's concept of anarchy. In this doctrine Proudhon neglects to provide an adequate dynamic or to foresee the ultimate complexity of human relations.

ROBERT OWEN

In England, Robert Owen (1771-1858) became a founder of socialism. As a factory manager, Owen developed social ideas. Living in an age of long hours, woman and child labor of the worst forms, and deplorable housing conditions, Owen deserves the credit of inaugurating a twentieth-century campaign of welfare work. It was Owen's theory that the workingman is so subject to his environment that even his character is determined for him. Owen attempted in theory and practice to prevent the impingement of the economic environment upon the workers. He believed in self-governing organizations of labor. He inaugurated the cooperative movement as a means of securing industrial justice and of giving the workingman a chance at the free development of his personality.

Owen objected to Malthus' doctrine of population on the ground that it failed to consider the marvelous increase in the means of subsistence which might come from the application of inventive genius to the sources of food supply. He also protested against the Malthusian argument for the restriction of population, because this argument did not give due weight to the unjust distribution of wealth and to the enslaving social organization to which labor is subject.

¹ Proudhon, *What Is Property?* Twentieth Century Press, 1908.

Owen's experiments, particularly at New Harmony, Indiana, indicated that a communistic organization in itself cannot save society. The strength of Owen's social thought lay in its accentuation of the need for providing labor with opportunities of industrial initiative and co-operation.

During the middle of the nineteenth century in England, the Christian socialists flourished. The founders of this movement were Frederick Maurice and Charles Kingsley. These men were clergymen who became greatly interested in the welfare of the working classes. They made clear the evils of the prevailing economic order, the formality of the Manchester school of economics, and proposed to apply the principles of Christianity to the economic system of the day. They opposed economic competition. For this method they urged the substitution of the ethical and spiritual principles of cooperation and love in industrial relationships—for both employer and employee in all their dealings with each other. Their socialism is essentially a vigorous application of Christian love to everyday relationships.

The influence of Christian socialism strengthened the experiment of the Rochdale weavers who in 1844 had organized a consumers' cooperative society. The concept of consumers' cooperation received its original impetus from the thought and practice of Robert Owen, achieved a measurable degree of concreteness under the efforts of the Rochdale weavers, and through Maurice and Kingsley won the assistance of Christianity.

RODBERTUS

In Germany, Rodbertus, Lassalle, Marx and Engels, molded the thinking of socialists about the nature of human society. Rodbertus (1805-1875), the son of a university professor, was a quiet, deep thinker about social processes. According to his analysis of social development, three stages may be pointed out. The first was marked by

slavery, or by private property in human beings. The second state is an indirect form of the first, namely, one of private property in land and capital. Through this type of ownership the economically fortunate or shrewd are able to exercise widespread power over the unfortunate and the uneducated. In the third state, toward which society is trending, the concept of service will rule, and private property as a dominant concept will be compelled to take a thoroughly subordinate place in human activities. The ultimate goal, according to Rodbertus, is a world communist society, with land and capital as national property, and with labor rewarded according to its productiveness.²

Rodbertus denied the validity of the wages fund theory and argued that wages are not paid by capital; it is that part of the productive earnings of labor which labor receives. His fundamental thesis is that labor is the source and measure of all value. He advocated an evolutionary procedure whereby the state should pass legislation that would guarantee just returns to labor. This form of state socialism is to be gradually developed, until a scientific socialism is reached with its emphasis upon a government of labor, for labor, and by labor.

LASSALLE

The founder of Social Democracy in Germany, Ferdinand Lassalle (1825-1864), wrote two significant treatises, the *Bastiat-Schulze* and the *Working Men's Programme*. Lassalle believed that natural conditions are productive of misery and vice, and that it is the chief business of the state to extricate men from this thralldom. The state should provide means for lifting the laboring man to a level of industrial freedom.

Lassalle objected to the theory known as the iron law of wages. He protested against the smallness of the share

² Rodbertus, *Overproduction and Crises*, Scribner, 1906.

of his earnings which the laborer really receives. He advocated the establishment of productive associations wherein labor might perform the double function of workman and capitalist. In order that these productive associations might be started, the state should advance funds. After the productive associations have secured momentum they will continue by virtue of their own strength. Ultimately, industry will be conducted exclusively through productive associations; both industrial and social democracy will finally rule in political life. Lassalle became the founder of the Social Democratic party in Germany. Lassalle boldly denounced the reactionary classes that were in political power in his time and led the workers in a movement to overthrow the existing social order.³

KARL MARX

The name of Karl Marx (1818-1883) is supreme on the list of socialists. Marx was born in Germany of Jewish parents, and educated at the universities of Bonn and Berlin. He became a journalist, but the paper which he edited was considered too liberal and was suppressed. Marx went to Paris in 1842, where he continued editorial work. At this time he was influenced by French socialism and its leader, Proudhon. In 1845, he was expelled from Paris at the request of the Prussian government. He went to Brussels. In the meantime a deep friendship with Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) had been established.

In 1847, Marx and Engels issued the Communist Manifesto.⁴ This radical document was circulated widely and became extensively accepted by social revolutionists. Its doctrines were:

1. Abolition of property in lands; rents to be used for public purposes.
2. Abolition of all rights of inheritance.
3. Progressive income tax.

³ Lassalle, *Science and the Workingman*, Kerr, 1903.

⁴ Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, Kerr, 1902.

4. Nationalization of the means of transportation and commerce.
5. Extension of productive enterprises by the state.
6. Compulsory labor.
7. Free education ; no child labor.
8. Elimination of the distrust between town and country.

Marx returned to Germany and established the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung* in Cologne in 1848. Engels served as editor. Because of revolutionary activity, Marx was forced to leave Germany in 1849. He went to Paris and then to London, where he became a newspaper correspondent, and where he lived until his death in 1883.

In 1859, the *Kritik der politischen Oekonomie* was published. It contains the essential principles of Marx's system of thought. In 1864, Marx found the opportunity for which he had long been seeking, namely, to organize the workers of the world into one large association. On September 28, in St. Martin's Hall, Marx, in the presence of a vast concourse of people, initiated the "International Workingmen's Association." The fundamental idea was to organize the societies of workingmen which have a common purpose, namely, the emancipation of the working classes, into a world or international union for cooperative purposes. The International proposes that governments shall put the interests of the working classes to the forefront of national concern, and subordinate the present attention they give to war, diplomacy, and national jealousies.

In 1869, Marx, aided by Karl Liebknecht (1826-1900), Engels, and others, organized in Germany the Social Democratic Labor party. The movement which Lassalle had started became united with the Marxian movement, and in 1875 the German Social Democracy presented a united front to capitalism. Marx, Engels, Liebknecht, and Bebel are its best-known leaders. Bismarck was forced to acknowledge its power, and condescended to inaugurate a

system of social insurance in order to appease its rank and file.

In 1867, 1885, and 1895, the three volumes of *Das Kapital* appeared, in chronological order.⁵ By this work, *Capital*, Marx is known throughout the world. The style is laborious; the analyses are minute and in places difficult to follow. The method is historical. Marx analyzes social evolution. He traces the rise of capitalism from its humble beginnings to its autocratic fruition. In this development the instruments of capital showed a tendency to congregate in a decreasing number of hands. By this token it will be seen that the number of the propertyless ever increases. In this way, the proletariat is developed, a product of capitalism.

THE CAPITALIST CLASS

A definite class, the capitalist, acquires increasing industrial, political, and social power. The proletariat suffer increasing misery. They own nothing except their ability to labor. They are forced to throw this human quality on the commercial market and sell it to the highest bidder. But capitalism increases the number of the proletariat. This tendency, together with the increase in population, creates a superabundance of labor. Laborers are forced to compete in the labor market. The laborers who will sell their labor for the least wages will be employed. Capitalism thus forces wages to a mere subsistence level, with the result that the misery and suffering of the proletariat are greatly augmented. In this way the laborer is crushed by the operation of the iron law of wages.

By the operation of the iron law, the capitalist is enabled to appropriate to himself an increasing amount of the earnings of labor. This appropriated amount is called the surplus value. Marx developed at length the concept of surplus value. Capitalism exploits the laborer by taking possession of as large a proportion of the earnings of labor as it can obtain—through its might and its shrewdness.

⁵ *Capital*, translated by Moore and Aveling, Kerr, 1909, I:673 ff., 834 ff.

CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS

The growth of capitalism also causes a class consciousness to develop among the members of the proletariat. This class consciousness is increasing. It produces labor organizations; these organizations are acquiring vast power. The struggles between them and the capitalistic classes go on. By force of numbers the proletariat are bound finally to win, and to overthrow the capitalistic classes which are now in power. They will seize the means of production and manage them for the good of all.

Marx did not outline a utopia. He described the historical evolution of society as he saw it, and he participated in plans for the organization of all laborers for their common good. Inasmuch as Marx advocated compulsory labor, the laboring class under Marxian socialism would include all people. Marx advocated an equal distribution of wealth, not in the sense of the popular misconception of that term, but in the sense that the earnings from the industry shall be distributed to the workers in proportion to their achievements.

REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM

In Russia, Marxian socialism in 1918 came into power. The Bolsheviki represent the radical wing of the Marxian followers. They established essentially a dictatorship of the proletariat, substituting it for the dictatorship of capitalists which existed under the reign of the czars. Bolshevism substitutes occupation for geographic area as a basis of representative government. This program is deficient and sociologically untenable, because occupational groups do not encompass all phases of human personality. A government based on occupational group needs is representative of only a portion of the elements of human life. When seventy-five per cent of the people are illiterate, as has been the case in Russia, no form of government whether democratic or not can be other than a dictatorship.

Revolutionary socialism coincides, in part, with syndicalism, a movement which developed in France and England. Syndicalism is a radical form of trade unionism. It declares that workingmen cannot hope for genuine betterment through politics. They must organize and inaugurate a general strike. This universal strike will paralyze the present régime and render it helpless. As a result the workers will come into power. In the meantime, the workers must keep up a running warfare with capitalists and the government which supports capitalism. Sabotage is a common concept among syndicalists. It implies a program of destroying machinery, hindering the production of economic goods, and creating inefficiency in capitalistic industry. In both England and the United States, syndicalism has appeared. In the United States, the Industrial Workers of the World, or I. W. W., confess to doctrines similar to those which have been espoused in Europe under the name of syndicalism. A leading philosophic exponent of syndicalism has been George Sorel.

Revolutionary socialism has been paralleled in certain ways by anarchism. These teachings first acquired force through the writings of Proudhon. Another leading anarchist was the Russian nobleman and military officer, Michael Bakunin (1814-1876). Although of aristocratic birth, Bakunin became furious when he observed the human misery among the masses which Russian autocracy was producing. He became an agitator. He was confined in dungeons and exiled to Siberia. He escaped from Siberia, and by way of California went to England and then to Switzerland. His chief work is *God and the State*. Vital, vigorous, magnetic, fearless—these are the adjectives which describe the personality of Bakunin.

Bakunin scorned rank, birth, and fortune. He attacked external authority of all kinds. He denied the validity of concepts such as "God" and the "state"; they are parts of systems which enslave the free will of man. Classes must be abolished and the masses of individuals freed from all

enslaving institutions, such as marriage, the church, the state.

In a related way Prince Kropotkin (1842-1921) developed anarchistic principles. Peter A. Kropotkin was of aristocratic Russian birth and a person of mild, courteous manners. His father was a serf owner; the son could not bear to see the sufferings which the serfs underwent. He threw away the privileges of rank and became a defender of the oppressed. He attempted to correlate the theories of anarchism with those of mutual aid, and fought socialism with the concept of centralized control on the ground that it would destroy individual liberty.⁶ In Chapter XXII, Kropotkin's theory of mutual aid will be analyzed.

Anarchism and socialism make similar attacks upon the evils of capitalism. Both are determined to overthrow capitalism. Both believe in revolt. They part ways when they advocate a constructive program for the new order which shall follow the violent overthrow of capitalism. Unlike socialism, anarchism holds that all government is an evil and that industry can go on without organization. It advocates a free communism.

HENRY GEORGE

One of the essentials in the Communist Manifesto was the appropriation of rents for public purposes. Starting from a viewpoint distinctly different from that of Karl Marx, Henry George (1839-1897) became the founder of a system of single tax thought. In early life Henry George came to San Francisco and established a struggling newspaper. At once he found himself practically overwhelmed by the brutal competition of the metropolitan press and telegraphic news service. George was crushed by monopoly. It was this defeat which gave him a new idea—an idea that was to command the attention of the world.

As George walked the streets of New York City he puzzled over the existence of indescribable destitution and

⁶ Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution*, Doubleday, Page, 1908.

suffering in the shadow of the princely rich with their ostentatious luxuries.⁷ Why in a land blessed with generous natural resources should there be such poverty? Although discovery has followed discovery and invention has followed invention, neither has lessened the toil of those who most need respite. With material progress poverty takes on a larger aspect. Material progress may be likened to an immense wedge which is being forced, not underneath society, but through society. "Those who are above the point of separation are elevated, but those who are below are crushed down."⁸ George set himself the task of finding out why poverty is associated with progress.

This cause George found in the land situation. As land increases in value, poverty increases. The price of land is an index of the disparity in the economic conditions of the people at the extremes of the social scale. Land is more valuable in New York City than in San Francisco, and there is more squalor and misery in New York City than in San Francisco. Land is more valuable in London than in New York City, and likewise there is more squalor and destitution in London than in New York City.

When increasing numbers of people live in a limited area under a system of private property in land, rents are raised and land values go up. The cost of living mounts, wages are kept to a minimum, overcongestion of population ensues; and again, rents and land values are increased.⁹

Upon what does title to land rest? Where did it originate? In force. But has the first comer at a banquet the right to turn back all the chairs, and claim that none of the other guests shall partake of the food that has been provided? Does the first passenger who enters a railroad car thereby possess the right to keep out all other persons, or admit them only upon payment to him of sums of

⁷ Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, Doubleday, Page, 1916, p. 9.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 286, 287.

money? "We arrive and we depart, guests at a banquet continually spread, spectators and participants in an entertainment where there is room for all who come."¹⁰ These illustrations are pertinent to the unjust elements in the present economic order.

As a result of private property in land, the owner possesses power over the tenant, a power which is tantamount to a system of slavery. There is nothing strange, therefore, in the poverty phenomena of the world. The Creator has not placed in the world the taint of injustice. The fact that amid our highest civilization men faint and die with want, is not because of the niggardliness of nature or the injustice of the Creator, but is due to the injustice of man.¹¹ Since the owner of land receives wealth without labor to an increasing degree, so there is an increasing robbery of earnings of those who labor.

George attacked Malthusianism, and pointed out the deficiencies in the proposed remedies for poverty, such as greater economy in government, diffusion of knowledge, and improved habits of industry. He then proceeded to give his own and well-known solution, namely, making land common property through a system of taxation of land values alone. Since land, not labor, is the source of all wealth, it is just and necessary to make land common property.

The weakness of Henry George's argument lies in his single panacea for securing justice. He overemphasized the importance of one line of procedure. He neglected other important factors, such as self-centered human nature. He rendered, however, a splendid service in showing the weaknesses in the system of private property in land. In this connection he has been unequalled in his contribution to social thought.

In this discussion of the contributions of socialism to social thought, many types or expressions of socialism have

¹⁰ George, *Progress and Poverty*, p. 342.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 339.

not been presented. The educational propaganda of the Fabian socialists in England should be mentioned as being very effective. Although small in number this group of intellectuals, the best known being Sidney and Beatrice Webb, have exerted a constructive and practical influence upon social thought.

SOCIALISM SUMMARIZED

Socialism has assumed various phases. (1) It originated in utopianism and in a loose, broad type of communism. (2) It then took the form of associationism, urging the organization of groups of associated individuals, such as phalanges. As utopianism was in part the expression of a poetic imagination, so associationism represented a bourgeois philosophy. (3) In the next place socialism assumed political aspirations, and advocated a governmental program whereby the existing governments shall gradually extend their power until they exercise control over rent-producing land and interest-producing capital. (4) State socialism, however, was supplanted in many minds by ideas of more radical procedure. Marxian socialism holds that a class conflict is inevitable and that the workers must overthrow the capitalists, together with the governments which they control. (5) To the other radical extreme is philosophic anarchism, with its emphasis upon the abolition of all existing governments, and the establishment of individual autonomy.

Socialism has made several contributions to social thought. (1) It has called the attention of civilized mankind, and particularly of the economically wealthy classes, to the needs of the weaker classes. It has introduced humanitarian concepts into the minds of the socially unthinking, educated classes. (2) It has jolted many economic autocrats from their thrones of power. It has thrown the spot light of publicity upon the pompous ostentation of the hereditary leisure classes. (3) It has held social theory to a more practical course and to developing more im-

mediate social solutions than it otherwise would have achieved. (4) It has developed a power equal to that held by "individualism." It has helped to demonstrate the dualistic nature of social evolution, that is, that there are two poles to human life rather than one.

LABOR¹²

Labor is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers, and compels them to act in obedience to his sway. We are not now dealing with those primitive instinctive forms of labor that remind us of the mere animal. An immeasurable interval of time separates the state of things in which a man brings his labor-power to market for sale as a commodity from that state in which human labor was still in its first instinctive stage. We presuppose labor in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labor-process we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the laborer at its commencement. He not only effects the change of form in the material on which he works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his *modus operandi*, and to which he must subordinate his will. And this subordination is no mere momentary act. Besides the exertion of the bodily organs, the process demands that, during the whole operation, the workmen's will be steadily in consonance with his purpose. This means close attention. The less he is attracted by the nature of the work, and the mode in which it is carried on, and the less, therefore, he enjoys it as something which gives play to his bodily and mental powers, the more close his attention is forced to be.

¹² Reprinted by permission from Karl Marx, *Capital*, The Humboldt Publishing Company, 1873.

The elementary factors of the labor process are: (1) the personal activity of man, i.e., work itself; (2) the subject of that work; and (3) its instruments.

In the labor-process, therefore, man's activity, with the help of the instruments of labor, effects an alteration, designed from the commencement, in the material worked upon. The process disappears in the product; the latter is a use-value, Nature's material adapted by a change of form to the wants of man. Labor has incorporated itself with its subject; the former is materialized, the latter transformed. That which in the laborer appeared as movement now appears in the product as a fixed quality without motion. The blacksmith forges, and the product is a forging. (pp. 98-99)

The labor-process, turned into the process by which the capitalist consumes labor-power, exhibits two characteristic phenomena. First, the laborer works under the control of the capitalist, to whom his labor belongs; the capitalist taking good care that the work is done in the proper manner, and that there is no unnecessary waste of raw material, and no wear and tear of the implements beyond what is necessarily caused by the work.

Secondly, the product is the property of the capitalist, and not that of the laborer, its immediate producer. Suppose that a capitalist pays for a day's labor-power at its value; then the right to use that power for a day belongs to him just as much as the right to use any other commodity, such as a horse that he has hired for the day. To the purchaser of a commodity belongs its use, and the seller of labor-power by giving his labor does no more in reality than part with the use-value that he has sold. From the instant he steps into the work-shop the use-value of his labor-power, and therefore also its use, which is labor, belongs to the capitalist. By the purchase of labor-power the capitalist incorporates labor as a living ferment with the lifeless constituents of the product. From his point of view, the labor-process is nothing more than the consumption of the commodity purchased, i. e., of labor-power; but this consumption cannot be effected except by supplying the labor-power with the means of production. The labor-process is a process between things that the capitalist has purchased, things that have become his property. The product of this process belongs, therefore, to him just as much as does the wine which is the product of a process of fermentation completed in his cellar. (pp. 102-103)

CAPITAL

In conflict with "public opinion," or even with the Officers of Health, capital makes no difficulty about "justifying" the conditions, partly dangerous, partly degrading, to which it confines the working

and domestic life of the laborer, on the ground that they are necessary for profit. It is the same thing when capital "abstains" from protective measures against dangerous machinery in the factory, from appliances for ventilation and for safety in mines, etc. It is the same here with the housing of the miners. Dr. Simon, medical officer of the Privy Council, in his official report says: "In apology for the wretched household accommodation . . . it is alleged that mines are commonly worked on lease; that the duration of the lessee's interest (which in collieries is commonly for 21 years), is not long enough that he should deem it worth his while to create good accommodation for his laborers, and for the tradespeople and others whom the work attracts; that even if he were disposed to act liberally in the matter this disposition would commonly be defeated by his landlord's tendency to fix him, on ground rent, an exorbitant additional charge for the privilege of having on the surface of the ground the decent and comfortable village which the laborers of the subterranean property ought to inhabit, and that the prohibitory price (if not actual prohibition) equally excludes others who might desire to build. (p. 421)

EVOLUTION AND REVOLUTION

The starting-point of the development that gave rise to the wage-laborer as well as to the capitalist was the servitude of the laborer. The advance consisted in a change of form of this servitude, in the transformation of feudal exploitation into capitalistic production as early as the fourteenth or fifteenth century, sporadically, in certain towns of the Mediterranean the capitalistic era dates from the sixteenth century. Wherever it appears, the abolition of serfdom has long been effected, and the highest development of the middle ages, the existence of sovereign towns, has been long on the wane.

In the history of primitive accumulation, all revolutions are epoch-making that act as levers for the capitalist class in course of formation; but, above all, those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurled as free and "unattached" proletarians on the labor market. (p. 457)

THE ENIGMA OF POVERTY¹³

This fact—the great fact that poverty and all its concomitants show themselves in communities just as they develop into the conditions toward which material progress tends—proves that the social

¹³ Reprinted with permission from Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, Doubleday, Page and Company, 1926, 25th anniversary edition.

difficulties existing whereas a certain stage of progress has been reached, do not arise from local circumstances, but are, in some way or another, engendered by progress itself.

And, unpleasant as it may be to admit it, it is at last becoming evident that the enormous increase in productive power which has marked the present century and is still going on with accelerating ratio, has no tendency to extirpate poverty or to lighten the burdens of those compelled to toil. It simply widens the gulf between Dives and Lazarus, and makes the struggle for existence more intense. The march of invention has clothed mankind with powers of which a century ago the boldest imagination could not have dreamed. But in factories where labor-saving machinery has reached its most wonderful development, little children are still at work; wherever the new forces are anything like fully utilized, large classes are maintained by charity or live on the verge of recourse to it; amid the greatest accumulation of wealth, men die of starvation, and puny infants suckle dry breasts; while everywhere the greed of gain, the worship of wealth, shows the force of the fear of want. The promised land flies before us like the mirage. The fruits of the tree of knowledge turn as we grasp them to apples of Sodom that crumble at the touch. (pp. 7-8)

The new forces, elevating in their nature though they be, do not act upon the social fabric from underneath, as was for a long time hoped and believed, but strike it at a point between top and bottom. It is as though an immense wedge were being forced, not underneath society, but through society. Those who are above the point of separation are elevated, but those who are below are crushed down. (p. 9)

In the United States it is clear that squalor and misery, and the vices and crimes that spring from them, everywhere increase as the village grows to the city, and the march of development brings the advantages of the improved methods of production and exchange. It is in the older and richer sections of the Union that pauperism and distress among the working classes are becoming more painfully apparent. If there is less poverty in San Francisco than in New York, is it not because San Francisco is yet behind New York in all that both cities are striving for? When San Francisco reaches the point where New York now is, who can doubt that there will also be ragged and barefooted children on her streets?

This association of poverty is the great enigma of our times. It is the central fact from which spring industrial, social, and political difficulties that perplex the world, and with which statesmanship and philanthropy and education grapple in vain. From it come the

clouds that overhang the future of the most progressive and self-reliant nations. It is the riddle which the Sphinx of Fate puts to our civilization, and which not to answer is to be destroyed. So long as the increased wealth which modern progress brings goes but to build up great fortunes, to increase luxury, and make sharper the contrast between the House of Have and the House of Want, progress is not real and cannot be permanent. The reaction must come. The tower leans from its foundations, and every new story but hastens the final catastrophe. To educate men who must be condemned to poverty, is but to make them restive; to base on a state of most glaring social inequality political institutions under which men are theoretically equal, is to stand a pyramid on its apex. (pp. 9-10)

I purpose to seek the law which associates poverty with progress, and increases want with advancing wealth; and I believe that in the explanation of this paradox we shall find the explanation of those recurring seasons of industrial and commercial paralysis which, viewed independently of their relations to more general phenomena, seem so inexplicable. (p. 12)

I propose to beg no question, to shirk from no conclusion, but to follow truth wherever it may lead. Upon us is the responsibility of seeking the law, for in the very heart of our civilization today women faint and little children moan. But what that law may prove to be is not our affair. If the conclusions that we reach run counter to our prejudices, let us not flinch; if they challenge institutions that have long been deemed wise and natural, let us not turn back. (p. 13)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. Fourier's plan for the distribution of wealth.
2. Blanc's idea of national workshops.
3. Proudhon's concept of property.
4. Reasons for the lack of success of Robert Owen's cooperative societies.
5. An evaluation of the ideas of the Christian socialists.
6. Rodbertus' analysis of social development.
7. The nature of the Communist Manifesto.
8. The world movement inaugurated by Marx.
9. The chief theme of Marx's volumes entitled, *Capital*.
10. Marx's meaning of "equal distribution of wealth."
11. The relation of bolshevism and sovietism to Marxianism.
12. The keynote of syndicalism.

13. Bakunin's major thought.
14. The underlying problem that Henry George attacked.
15. The cause of social injustice as seen by Henry George.
16. The weakness of George's proposed remedy.
17. The strongest point of socialistic social thought.
18. The greatest weakness of socialism.

CHAPTER XV

BUCKLE AND GEOGRAPHIC SOCIAL THOUGHT

IT HAS long been observed that climate, fertility of soil, rainfall, and similar factors have had a powerful influence upon human nature and upon the development of civilization. The chief founders of this line of thought were Buckle and Ratzel. In recent years Semple and Huntington have become well-known authorities. Many other thinkers have contributed to the present knowledge concerning the interactions between geographic factors and human development.

One of the first writers to elaborate a climatic theory of social evolution was Bodin (1530-1596). Hot climates, he observed, further the rise of all kinds of superstitious beliefs. Cold climates produce brute will-power. Temperate climates constitute an essential basis for the development of reason. In the ideal commonwealth which Bodin described, all three types of climate are represented.¹ The northern zone furnishes the fighters and the workers. The southern zone produces poets, priests, and artists. The temperate zone is the parent of legislative, judicial, and scholarly leaders.

Bodin's theory of physical and social causation was revolutionary, and while partly erroneous, due to the lack of development of basic scientific studies, stood for two centuries as the chief representative of geographic human thought. Latitude, longitude, elevation, location, fertility of the soil are all given a place in his social causation theories. The psychological results of these psychological factors are remarkable, considering the general lack of psy-

¹ Jean Bodin, *The Six Bookes of a Commonwealth*, translated by R. Knoles, London.

chological knowledge in Bodin's time. Family life, mental growth, temperamental variations, and particularly morals, have explanatory factors in climatic conditions.

In the *Spirit of Laws* to which reference was made in Chapter XI, Montesquieu accentuated the importance of environmental influences on social processes. He attempted to show the effects of climate upon social institutions. Montesquieu did important pioneer work in what is now known as the field of anthropo-geography.

Montesquieu sought to define cause and effect, and thus shifted the emphasis from social philosophy to social science. His mind was upon both observation and processes, and thus he improved upon Bodin. He attempted to explain the process by which people in cold climates are more vigorous than those in warm regions—"cold air constricts the extremities of the external fibres of the body; this increases their elasticity, and favors the return of blood from the extreme parts to the heart. On the contrary, warm air relaxes and lengthens the extremes of the fibres; of course it diminishes their force and elasticity. People are therefore more vigorous in cold climates."²

Climate plays a rôle in marriage forms. "Women in hot climates are marriageable at eight, nine, or ten years of age; thus, in those countries, infancy and marriage generally go together. They are old at twenty; their reason therefore never accompanies their beauty."³

"In temperate climates, where the charms of women are best preserved, where they arrive later at maturity, and have children at a more advanced season of life, the old age of their husband in some degree follows theirs; and as they have more reason and knowledge at the time of marriage, if it be only on account of their having continued longer in life, it must naturally introduce a kind of equality between the two sexes; and, in consequence of this, the law of having only one wife."⁴

² *Spirit of Laws*, Bell and Sons, 1894, I:7.

³ *Ibid.*, I:270.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I:271.

Great heat enervates the strength and courage of men while cold climate creates a certain strength of body and mind, "which renders them patient and intrepid, and qualifies them for arduous enterprises."⁵ Even religious attitudes are affected by climatic conditions. North Europe accepted Protestantism and South Europe kept Catholicism because "the people of the north have, and will forever have, a spirit of liberty and independence which the people of the south have not; and therefore a religion which has no visible head is more agreeable to the independence of the climate than that which has one."⁶

Even commerce is affected by climate. Climatic differences lead to different agricultural products, and thus exchange of goods comes about. People of the same climate have not this same need for trading.⁷

Sometimes the climate is more favorable than the soil; the people multiply, and are destroyed by famine; this is the case in China."⁸ Under these climatic conditions there is no need of legislation to increase propagation. In these samples of Montesquieu's thought, the virility, and at the same time, the error of particularization are evident.

By way of contrast, the attitude of Hume, whose contributions to social psychology have already been noted, stands out sharply. According to Hume, physical causes have no particular effect on the human mind. No geographic factors influence either the temperament, disposition, or ability of people. Hume was led to this extreme position by his staunch faith in the subjective and psychological factors of human nature.

The distinguished German scientist, Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), traveled extensively throughout the world, observing the physical geography of many lands in conjunction with the meteorological conditions of each.

⁵ *Spirit of Laws*, I:284.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I:114.

⁷ *Ibid.*, II:3.

⁸ *Ibid.*, II:90.

At the same time von Humboldt was a careful observer of the customs, manners, and standards of the various peoples with whom he came in contact. In these travels and studies, von Humboldt was careful to note relationships between soils and civilizations. His contributions to social thought were of this descriptive nature, based on first-hand observations in many parts of the world.

BUCKLE

The writings of Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-1862) contain an extensive and detailed explanation of the ways in which geographic and natural factors modify human life. Buckle starts with a decidedly dualistic universe—a dualism which is disjunctive. The dualism consists of nature and mind, each subject more or less to its own laws. Rejecting both the doctrine of free will and of predestination, Buckle concludes that the actions of men are determined solely by their antecedents and that they have a character of uniformity.⁹ Man modifies nature, and nature modifies man, but in the past in many parts of the world the thoughts and desires of men are more influenced by physical phenomena than they influence such phenomena. Because of this dominant activity of the physical forces, these should be studied as a basis for understanding the history of man.

FROM CLIMATIC FACTORS

The physical factors which have powerfully influenced men are four: climate, food, soil, and the general aspects of nature. By the fourth, Buckle refers to those appearances which are presented chiefly through the medium of sight and which produce their chief results by exciting the imagination and suggesting superstitions. The three first-mentioned factors do not operate on the mind directly.¹⁰

⁹ H. T. Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, Appleton, 1874, 2 vols., I:14.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

The first effect of climate, food, and soil upon man that may be noted is that they lead man to accumulate wealth. These accumulations permit that degree of leisure from "making a living" which enables some members of society to acquire knowledge. Upon these acquisitions of knowledge, particularly of socialized knowledge, civilization depends. This progress in the early stages of civilization rests on two circumstances: "First, on the energy and regularity with which labor is conducted, and second, on the returns made to that labor by the bounty of nature."¹¹ Both these causes are the results of physical antecedents. The returns which are made to labor are regulated by the fertility of the soil. Moreover, Buckle asserted, the energy and regularity with which labor is conducted will be entirely dependent on the influence of climate.¹² When heat is intense, men will be indisposed and partly unfitted for active industry. Climate also affects the regularity of the habits of laborers. In very cold climates, the weather interferes with regular habits and produces desultoriness. In southern countries regular labor is likewise prevented—this time by the heat. Thus, in the early stages of civilization the fundamental law may be stated: the soil regulates the returns made to any given amount of labor; the climate regulates the energy and constancy of labor itself.¹³

Of the two primary causes of primitive societary growth, the fertility of the soil is more important than the climatic influences. It is only where soil fertility exists that civilization can arise at all.¹⁴ But in Europe, climate has been more effective than soil fertility. In Europe a climate has existed which has stimulated human activities.

Since the mental powers of man are unlimited they are more important, once they get started, than the powers of

¹¹ Buckle, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

nature, which are limited and stationary. Man has endless capacity, through his dynamic mental tendencies to develop the physical resources of the earth.

The birth rate depends on food supply. In hot countries, where less food per capita is required than in cold countries, and where an abundance of food exists, the birth rate is very high. In cold countries highly carbonized food is necessary, but this food is largely animal in origin and great risk is involved in procuring it. Hence the people of cold countries become adventuresome.¹⁵

By the study of physical laws it is possible to determine what the national food of a country will be. In India, for example, the physical conditions are decidedly favorable to the growth of rice, which is the most nutritive of all cereals, and which, consequently, is a causal factor in a high birth rate.

Where there is a cheap national food, the increase in population becomes very great. As a result, there are multitudes of people who are able to keep just above the subsistence level. A few persons who understand the operation of these physical laws are able to manipulate the multitudes in such a way as to make themselves immensely wealthy. Since wealth, after intellect, is the most permanent source of power, a great inequality of wealth has been accompanied by a corresponding inequality of social and political power.¹⁶ It produces classes and even castes. Poverty provokes contempt. Class conflict results. The poor are ground low, murmur, and are again subjected to ignominy. Under such conditions democracy has a hard struggle. When physical conditions favor one class, that class will constitute itself the government and bitterly oppose the extension of government to all other classes. In Europe there was no cheap national food, no blind multiplication of population, and hence no such disparity be-

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 44 ff.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

tween classes as in India. In Europe it has been easier for democratic movements to spread.

Early civilization developed in the Euphrates valley, the Nile valley, and in the exceedingly fertile regions of Peru, Central America, and Mexico. Modern civilization is found largely in fertile river valleys, such as the Thames, Seine, Rhine, Po, Danube, Hudson, Mississippi. But in the Amazon valley, the fertility of soil has not invited the growth of a large population. The trade winds have brought in a superabundance of moisture, producing torrential rains, and a luxuriance of plant life and a complexity of virile animal life which thus far have defied the skill of man to overcome.

GENERAL ASPECTS OF NATURE

The fourth physical factor which Buckle presents is the general aspects of nature. Of these the first class excites the imagination and the second stimulates the rational operations of the intellect.¹⁷ In regard to natural phenomena it may be said that whatever inspires feelings of terror, of the vague and uncontrollable, and of great wonder tends to inflame the imagination and to cause it to dominate the intellectual processes. Where nature is continually exhibiting its power, man feels his inferiority. He assumes a helpless attitude. He ceases to inquire or to think. His imagination, rather than his reason, reigns. On the other hand, where nature works smoothly and quietly, man begins to assert himself. He even essays to dominate nature and other men.

All early civilizations were located in the tropics or sub-tropics. In these regions nature is dangerous to man. Earthquakes, tempests, hurricanes, pestilences prevail. Consequently, the imagination of man takes exaggerated forms. The judgment is overbalanced; thought is paralyzed. The mind is continually thrown into a frantic

¹⁷ Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, p. 85.

state. These reactions throw human life into feeling molds, into poetic rather than scientific forms. Religious feelings are promoted. The leading religions of the world originated in the subtropical and tropical regions of the earth.

East Indian literature and thought illustrate the effect of nature upon the feelings and the imagination. The works of the East Indians on grammar, law, history, medicine, even on mathematics, geography, and metaphysics are nearly all poems.¹⁸ Prose writing is despised. The Sanscrit language boasts of more numerous and more complicated metres than can any European tongue. The East Indian literature is even calculated to set the reason of man at defiance.¹⁹

The imagination, for example, in India has produced an exaggerated respect for the past; it is this situation which has led poets to describe a Golden Age in the remote past. In the literature of India is recorded the statement that in ancient times the average length of life of common men was 80,000 years. There are instances of poets who lived to be half a million years old.

In Greece, on the other hand, nature is more quiet and the mind of man functioned in a reasoning way. In the North Temperate zone science developed. "The climate was more healthy; earthquakes were less frequent; hurricanes were less disastrous; wild beasts and noxious animals less abundant."²⁰ Buckle, in other words, insists that everywhere the hand of nature is upon the mind of man.

The work of Buckle, the chief exponent of the influence of physical nature upon mental man, accentuates important phases of the growth of civilization. Buckle over-emphasized his anthro-po-geographic observations. However, they constitute a part of the whole picture of human progress, and when seen in the light of modern mental

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 96.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

growth and control of environment they shrink into proper proportions.

SEMPLÉ

The field which Buckle opened has been developed extensively by Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904). This German scholar, traveler, and geographer is generally credited with putting anthropo-geography on a scientific basis. Miss Ellen Semple attempted to translate his work on *Anthropo-Geographie* into English, but found the German constructions so difficult to handle accurately that it was necessary for her to put Ratzel's observations into her own words. She also points out in Buckle a lack of system and an undue tendency to follow one generalization after another. Her own *Influences of Geographic Environment* promptly became a standard work on the ways in which physical nature affects mankind.

Miss Semple, following but improving upon Ratzel, has shown in turn the influences of geographical location, area, and boundaries upon people. She indicates the various ways in which oceans, rivers, and coast lines have molded human minds; she distinguishes between mountain, steppe, and desert effects upon mankind. She describes man as a product of the earth's surface. She stresses unduly the physical influences; she considers nature the dominating force. Even where civilized man has developed inventive powers and spiritual prowess, nature is given the credit.²¹ Nevertheless, Miss Semple has marshalled facts in powerful array and increased their force by literary skill. No student or teacher can afford to neglect Miss Semple's extensive survey of the interaction between physical nature and human progress.

Among the many other writers upon the relation of geographic factors to civilization the investigations of Ellsworth Huntington are significant. He has described the climatic conditions that are most favorable to mental stimulation and growth, and then has classified all dis-

²¹ Ellen Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment*, Holt, 1911, p. 635.

tracts of the earth according to the degree in which they stimulate or arrest mental advance. Even the seasons have their measurable effects upon human activity. By a series of experiments upon different types of workers, Huntington concludes that "both physical and mental activity reach pronounced maxima in the spring and fall, with minima in midwinter and midsummer."²²

Activity varies according to temperature.²³ Lower types of life "seem to reach their optima at higher temperatures than do the more advanced types," but even mental effort has its optimum working temperature. "The law of optimum temperature apparently controls the phenomena of life from the lowest activities of protoplasm to the highest activities of the human intellect."²⁴ Changes in temperature are beneficial; likewise alternations in sunshine and cloudy weather are helpful. Humidity plays a leading rôle in effective human activity. In dry weather metabolism is more active. Huntington has attempted with some degree of success to determine what variations in mean temperature from month to month, what temperature variations from day to day, and what variations in humidity are most conducive to physical and mental productivity.

Huntington's most important hypotheses, however, relate to his findings, first, regarding the correlation of the distribution of climatic energy over the earth's surface and the distribution of civilization; and second, to his correlations between the shifting of climatic zones and the shifting centers of civilization.²⁵

In this same connection William Z. Ripley has investigated the relation of climate to races.²⁶ After analyzing races and distinguishing between them and the geographic influences upon pigmentation, head, form, stature, and

²² *Civilization and Climate*, Yale University Press, 1915, p. 82.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 110.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Chs. XI, XII.

²⁶ W. Z. Ripley, *Races in Europe*, Appleton, 1899, p. 571.

other traits, mainly structural, he classifies climatic elements in order of importance, as follows: humidity, heat, and monotony. A high humidity, excessive heat, and long series of sunshine or of cloudy weather produce mental enervation, stagnation, and retrogression.

Acclimatization of races is a very slow process, according to Ripley. It requires centuries. Perhaps the white race can never become truly acclimated in the tropics. Racial differences he shows are due to environmental factors far more than is ordinarily supposed.

The distinction made by U. G. Weatherly between habitation areas and interest areas illustrates an important trend of social life and of social thought.²⁷ The passing of the "neighborhood," the changing nature of primary groups, and the subordination of geographic factors to a rising tide of psycho-social forces are significant developments.

In conclusion, it may be said that physical forces have operated strongly on man. But when man has developed modern mental tools, he has been able to escape a part of the enslaving environmental influences. The history of the relation of geographic factors to human progress indicates a fundamental but a proportionate decrease in those influences. The limited influence of environment is well summarized by R. H. Lowie, who points out how the identical environment is consistent with distinct cultures, and how cultures disappear "when one would least expect it on geographic principles."²⁸

Within recent years anthropo-geographic thought has appeared in a new form with new tendencies. Human ecology is the new name. Borrowing its title from plant ecology and holding to certain plant life tendencies, it has laid a great deal of emphasis on the place of economic and physical resources in explaining the life and structure of

²⁷ "Habitation Areas and Interest Areas," *Jour. of Applied Sociology*, X:404-06.

²⁸ *Culture and Ethnology*, McMurtrie, 1917.

human communities.²⁹ On a strictly biologic and economic basis it is not sociology but a scientific refinement of old forms that gives a more substantial understanding of social processes than has been previously developed. Some carry human ecology to the extreme of making it synonymous with environmental studies of all types, with spiritual environment dominant. Time and space relations concepts are borrowed from philosophy but given new and exact meanings which are helpful. Human ecology links up with sociology at the point of community studies, and gives fine promise of making fundamental contributions to sociologic understanding.

FOUR CLIMATIC FACTORS³⁰

If we inquire what those physical agents are by which the human race is most powerfully influenced, we shall find that they may be classed under four heads: namely, Climate, Food, Soil, and the General Aspects of Nature; by which last, I mean those appearances which, though presented chiefly to the sight, have, through the medium of that or other senses, directed the association of ideas, and hence in different countries have given rise to different habits of national thought. To one of these four classes may be referred all the external phenomena by which Man has been permanently affected. The last of these classes, or what I call the General Aspects of Nature, produces its principal results by exciting the imagination, and by suggesting those innumerable superstitions which are the great obstacles to advancing knowledge. And as, in the infancy of a people, the power of such superstitions is supreme, it has happened that the various Aspects of Nature have caused corresponding varieties in the popular character, and have imparted to the national religion peculiarities which, under certain circumstances, it is impossible to efface. The other three agents, namely, Climate, Food, and Soil, have, so far as we are aware, had no direct influence of this sort; but they have, as I am about to prove, originated the most important consequences in regard to the general organization of society, and from them there have followed many of those large and conspic-

²⁹ The statement appended at the end of this chapter from the ecological studies made by R. D. McKenzie indicates the value of the new ecological trend of anthropo-geographic thought.

³⁰ Reprinted by permission from H. T. Buckle, *History of Civilization in England*, Vol. I, Hearst's International Library, New York, 1884. By permission of D. Appleton & Co., New York.

uous differences between nations, which are often ascribed to some fundamental difference in the various races into which mankind is divided. But while such original distinctions of race are altogether hypothetical, the discrepancies which are caused by difference of climate, food, and soil, are capable of a satisfactory explanation, and, when understood, will be found to clear up many of the difficulties which still obscure the study of history. I purpose, therefore, in the first place, to examine the laws of these three vast agents in so far as they are connected with Man in his social condition; and having traced the working of those laws with as much precision as the present state of physical knowledge will allow, I shall then examine the remaining agent, namely, the General Aspects of Nature, and shall endeavor to point out the most important divergencies to which its variations have, in different countries, naturally given rise.

Beginning then, with climate, food, and soil, it is evident that these three physical powers are in no small degree dependent upon each other; that is to say, there is a very close connection between the climate of a country and the food which will ordinarily be grown in that country; while at the same time the food is itself influenced by the soil which produces it, as also by the elevation or depression of the land, by the state of the atmosphere, and, in a word, by all those conditions to the assemblage of which the name of physical Geography is, in its largest sense, commonly given. (pp. 29, 30)

These are the great physical causes by which the creation of wealth is governed. There are, no doubt, other circumstances which operate with considerable force, and which, in a more advanced state of society, possess an equal, and sometimes a superior influence. But this is at a later period; and looking at the history of wealth in its earliest stage, it will be found to depend entirely on soil and climate: the soil regulating the returns made to any given amount of labor; the climate regulating the energy and constancy of the labor itself. It requires but a hasty glance at past events, to prove the immense power of these two great physical conditions. (p. 33)

These considerations clearly prove that of the two primary causes of civilization, the fertility of the soil is the one which in the ancient world exercised most influence. But in European civilization, the other great cause, that is to say, climate, has been the most powerful; and this, as we have seen, produces an effect partly on the capacity of the labourer for work, partly on the regularity or irregularity of his habits. The difference in the result has curiously corresponded with the difference in the cause. For although all civilization must have for its antecedent the accumulation of wealth, still what subsequently occurs will be in no small degree determined by the conditions under which the accumulation took place. In Asia,

and in Africa, the condition was a fertile soil, causing an abundant return: in Europe, it was a happier climate, causing more successful labour. In the former case, the effect depends on the relation between the soil and its produce, in other words, the mere operation of one part of external nature upon another. In the latter case, the effect depends on the relation between the climate and the labourer; that is, the operation of external nature not upon itself, but upon man. Of these two classes of relations, the first, being the less complicated, is the less liable to disturbance, and therefore came sooner into play. Hence it is, that, in the march of civilization, the priority is unquestionably due to the most fertile parts of Asia and Africa. But although their civilization was the earliest, it was very far, indeed, from being the best or most permanent. Owing to circumstances which I shall presently state, the only progress which is really effective depends, not upon the bounty of nature, but upon the energy of man. Therefore it is, that the civilization of Europe, which, in its earliest stage, was governed by climate, has shown a capacity of development unknown to those civilizations which were originated by soil. For the powers of nature, notwithstanding their apparent magnitude, are limited and stationary; at all events, we have not the slightest proof that they have ever increased, or that they will ever be able to increase. But the powers of man, so far as experience and analogy can guide us, are unlimited; nor are we possessed of any evidence which authorizes us to assign even an imaginary boundary at which the human intellect will, of necessity, be brought to a stand. And as this power which the mind possesses of increasing its own resources, is a peculiarity confined to man, and one eminently distinguishing him from what is commonly called external nature, it becomes evident that the agency of climate, which gives him wealth by stimulating his labour, is more favourable to his ultimate progress than the agency of soil, which likewise gives him wealth, but which does so, not by exciting his energies, but by virtue of a mere physical relation between the character of the soil and the quality or value of the produce that it almost spontaneously affords. (pp. 36, 37)

The Aspects of Nature, when considered from this point of view, are divisible into two classes: the first class being those which are most likely to excite the imagination; and the other class being those which address themselves to the understanding commonly so called, that is, to the mere logical operations of the intellect. For although it is true that, in a complete and well-balanced mind, the imagination and the understanding each play their respective parts, and are auxiliary to each other, it is also true that, in a majority of instances, the understanding is too weak to curb the imagination and restrain

its dangerous license. The tendency of advancing civilization is to remedy this disproportion, and invest the reasoning powers with that authority, which, in an early stage of society, the imagination exclusively possesses. Whether or not there is ground for fearing that the reaction will eventually proceed too far, and that the reasoning faculties will in their turn tyrannize over the imaginative ones, is a question of the deepest interest; but in the present condition of our knowledge, it is probably an insoluble one. At all events, it is certain that nothing like such a state has yet been seen; since, even in this age, when the imagination is more under control than in any preceding one, it has far too much power; as might be easily proved, not only from the superstitions which in every country still prevail among the vulgar, but also from that poetic reverence for antiquity, which, though it has been long diminishing, still hampers the independence, blinds the judgment, and circumscribes the originality of the educated classes. (pp. 85, 86)

Now, so far as natural phenomena are concerned, it is evident, that whatever inspires feelings of terror, or of great wonder, and whatever excites in the mind an idea of the vague and uncontrollable, has a special tendency to inflame the imagination, and being under its dominion, the slower and more deliberate operations of the understanding. In such cases, Man, contrasting himself with the force and majesty of Nature, becomes painfully conscious of his own insignificance. A sense of inferiority steals over him. From every quarter innumerable obstacles hem him in, and limit his individual will. His mind, appalled by the undefined and undefinable, hardly cares to scrutinize the details of which such imposing grandeur consists. On the other hand, where the works of Nature are small and feeble, Man regains confidence: he seems more able to rely on his own power; he can, as it were, pass through, and exercise authority in every direction. And as the phenomena are more accessible, it becomes easier for him to experiment on them, or to observe them in minuteness; an inquisitive and analytic spirit is encouraged, and he is tempted to generalize the appearances of Nature, and refer them to the laws by which they are governed.

Looking in this way at the human mind as affected by the Aspects of Nature, it is surely a remarkable fact, that all the great early civilizations were situated within and immediately adjoining the tropics, where those aspects are most sublime, most terrible, and where Nature is, in every respect, most dangerous to man. Indeed, generally, in Asia, Africa, and America, the external world is more formidable than in Europe. This holds good not only of the fixed and permanent phenomena, such as mountains, and other great natural barriers, but also of occasional phenomena, such as earth-

quakes, tempests, hurricanes, pestilences; all of which are in those regions very frequent, and very disastrous. These constant and serious dangers produce effects analogous to those caused by the sublimity of Nature, in so far, that in both cases there is a tendency to increase the activity of the imagination. For the peculiar province of the imagination being to deal with the unknown, every event which is unexplained, as well as important, is a direct stimulus to our imaginative faculties. In the tropics, events of this kind are more numerous than elsewhere; it therefore follows that in the tropics the imagination is most likely to triumph. A few illustrations of this principle will place it in a clearer light, and will prepare the reader for the arguments based upon it.

Of those physical events which increase the insecurity of Man, earthquakes are certainly among the most striking, in regard to the loss of life which they cause, as also in regard to their sudden and unexpected occurrence. There is reason to believe that they are always preceded by atmospheric changes which strike immediately at the nervous system, and thus have a direct physical tendency to impair the intellectual powers. However this may be, there can be no doubt as to the effect they produce in encouraging particular associations and habits of thought. The terror which they inspire excites the imagination even to a painful extent, and, overbalancing the judgment, predisposes men to superstitious fancies. And what is highly curious, is, that repetition, so far from blunting such feelings, strengthens them. In Peru, where earthquakes appear to be more common than in any other country, every succeeding visitation increases the general dismay; so that, in some cases, the fear becomes almost insupportable. The mind is thus constantly thrown into a timid and anxious state; and men witnessing the most serious dangers, which they can neither avoid nor understand, become impressed with a conviction of their own inability, and of the poverty of their own resources. In exactly the same proportion, the imagination is aroused, and a belief in supernatural interference actively encouraged. Human power failing, superhuman power is called in; the mysterious and the invisible are believed to be present; and there grow up among the people those feelings of awe, and of helplessness, on which all superstition is based, and without which no superstition can exist. (pp. 86, 87, 88)

The manner in which the Aspects of Nature, when they are very threatening, stimulate the imagination, and by encouraging superstition, discourage knowledge, may be made still more apparent by one or two additional facts. Among an ignorant people, there is a direct tendency to ascribe all serious dangers to supernatural intervention; and a strong religious sentiment being thus aroused, it

constantly happens, not only that the danger is submitted to, but that it is actually worshipped. This is the case with some of the Hindus in the forests of Malabar; and many similar instances will occur to whoever has studied the condition of barbarous tribes. Indeed, so far is this carried, that in some countries, the inhabitants, from feelings of reverential fear, refuse to destroy wild beasts and noxious reptiles; the mischief these animals inflict being the cause of the immunity they enjoy. (pp. 89, 90)

If, then, we look at the ancient literature of India, even during its best period, we shall find the most remarkable evidence of the uncontrolled ascendancy of the imagination. In the first place, we have the striking fact that scarcely any attention has been paid to prose composition; all the best writers having devoted themselves to poetry, as being most congenial to the national habits of thoughts. Their works on grammar, on law, on history, on medicine, on mathematics, on geography, and on metaphysics, are nearly all poems, and are put together according to a regular system of versification. The consequence is, that while prose writing is utterly despised, the art of poetry has been cultivated so assiduously, that the Sanscrit can boast of metres more numerous and more complicated than have ever been possessed by any of the European languages. (p. 95)

A belief in the longevity of the human race at an early period of the world was the natural product of those feelings which ascribed to the ancients a universal superiority over the moderns; and this we see exemplified in some of the Christian, and in many of the Hebrew writings. But the statements in these works are tame and insignificant when compared with what is preserved in the literature of India. On this, as on every subject, the imagination of the Hindus distanced all competition. Thus, among an immense number of similar facts, we find it recorded that in ancient times the duration of the life of common men was 80,000 years, and that holy men lived to be upwards of 100,000. Some died a little sooner, others a little later; but in the most flourishing period of antiquity, if we take all the classes together, 100,000 years was the average. Of one king, whose name was Yudhishtir, it is casually mentioned that he reigned 27,000 years; while another, called Alarka, reigned 66,000. They were cut off in their prime, since there are several instances of the early poets living to be about half a million. But the most remarkable case is that of a very shining character in Indian history, who united in his single person the functions of a king and a saint. This eminent man lived in a pure and virtuous age, and his days were, indeed, long in the land; since when he was made king, he was two million years old; he then reigned 6,300,000 years; having

done which, he resigned his empire, and lingered on for 100,000 years more. (pp. 97, 98)

Our view of this vast process may be made clearer by comparing it with the opposite conditions of Greece. In Greece, we see a country altogether the reverse of India. The works of nature, which in India, are of startling magnitude, are in Greece, far smaller, feebler, and in every way less threatening to man. In the great center of Asiatic civilization, the energies of the human race are confined, and as it were, intimidated, by the surrounding phenomena. Besides the dangers incidental to tropical climates, there are those noble mountains, which seem to touch the sky, and from whose sides are discharged mighty rivers, which no art can divert from their course, and which no bridge has ever been able to span. There, too, are impassable forests, whole countries lined with interminable jungle, and beyond them, again, dreary and boundless deserts; all teaching Man his own feebleness, and his inability to cope with natural forces. Without, and on either side, there are great seas, ravaged by tempests far more destructive than any known in Europe, and of such sudden violence, that it is impossible to guard against their effects. And as if in those regions every thing combined to cramp the activity of Man, the whole line of coast, from the mouth of the Ganges to the extreme south of the peninsula, does not contain a single safe and capacious harbour, not one port that affords a refuge, which is perhaps more necessary than in any other part of the world.

But in Greece, the aspects of nature are so entirely different, that the very conditions of existence are changed. Greece, like India, forms a peninsula; but while in the Asiatic country every thing is great and terrible, in the European country every thing is small and feeble. The whole of Greece occupies a space somewhat less than the kingdom of Portugal, that is, about a fortieth part of what is now called Hindoostan. Situated in the most accessible part of a narrow sea, it had easy contact on the east with Asia Minor, on the west with Italy, on the south with Egypt. Dangers of all kinds were far less numerous than in the tropical civilizations. The climate was more healthy; earthquakes were less frequent; hurricanes were less disastrous; wild beasts and noxious animals less abundant. In regard to the other great features the same law prevails. The highest mountains in Greece are less than one-third of the Himalayas, so that nowhere do they reach the limit of perpetual snow. As to rivers, not only is there nothing approaching those imposing volumes which are poured down from the mountains of Asia, but Nature is so singularly sluggish, that neither in Northern nor in Southern Greece do we find any thing beyond a few streams, which are easily forded, and which, indeed, in the summer season, are frequently dried up.

These striking differences in the material phenomena of the two countries gave rise to corresponding differences in their mental associations. For as all ideas must arise partly from what are called spontaneous operations in the mind, and partly from what is suggested to the mind by the external world, it was natural that so great an alteration in one of the causes should produce an alteration in the effects. The tendency of the surrounding phenomena was, in India, Man was intimidated; in Greece, he was encouraged. In India, obstacles of every sort were so numerous, so alarming, and apparently so inexplicable, that the difficulties of life could only be solved by constantly appealing to the direct agency of supernatural causes. Those causes being beyond the province of the understanding, the resources of the imagination were incessantly occupied in studying them; the imagination itself was overworked, its activity became dangerous, it encroached on the understanding, and the equilibrium of the whole was destroyed. In Greece, opposite circumstances were followed by opposite results. In Greece, Nature was less dangerous, less intrusive, and less mysterious than in India. In Greece, therefore, the human mind was less appalled, and less superstitious; natural causes began to be studied; physical science first became possible; and Man, gradually waking to a sense of his own power, sought to investigate events with a boldness not to be expected in those other countries, where the pressure of Nature troubled his independence, and suggested ideas with which knowledge is incompatible. (pp. 98, 99, 100)

MAN A PRODUCT OF THE EARTH'S SURFACE³¹

Man is a product of the earth's surface. This means not merely that he is a child of the earth, dust of her dust; but that the earth has mothered him, fed him, set him tasks, directed his thoughts, confronted him with difficulties that have strengthened his body and sharpened his wits, given him his problems of navigation or irrigation, and at the same time whispered hints for their solution. She has entered into his bone and tissue, into his mind and soul. On the mountains she has given him leg muscles of iron to climb the slope; along the coast she has left these weak and flabby, but given him instead vigorous development of chest and arm to handle his paddle or oar. In the river valley she attaches him to the fertile soil, circumscribes his ideas and ambitions by a dull round of calm, exacting duties, narrows his outlook to the cramped horizon of his farm. Up on the wind-swept plateaus, in the boundless stretch of the grass-

³¹ Reprinted with permission from E. C. Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment*, Henry Holt and Company, 1911.

lands and the waterless tracts of the desert, where he roams with his flocks from pasture to pasture and oasis to oasis, where life knows much hardship but escapes the grind of drudgery, where the watching of grazing herd gives him leisure for contemplation, and the wide-ranging life a big horizon, his ideas take on a certain gigantic simplicity; religion becomes monotheism, God becomes one, unrivalled like the sand of the desert and the grass of the steppe, stretching on and on without break or change. Chewing over and over the cud of his simple belief as the one food of his unfed mind, his faith becomes fanaticism; his big special ideas, born of that ceaseless regular wandering, outgrow the land that bred them and bear their legitimate fruit in wide imperial conquests.

Man can no more be scientifically studied apart from the ground which he tills, or the lands over which he travels, or the seas over which he trades, than polar bear or desert cactus can be understood apart from its habitat. Man's relations to his environment are infinitely more numerous and complex than those of the most highly organized plant or animal. So complex are they that they constitute a legitimate and necessary object of special study. The investigation which they receive in anthropology, ethnology, sociology, and history is piecemeal and partial, limited as to the race, cultural development, epoch, country, or variety of geographic conditions taken into account. Hence all these sciences, together with history so far as history undertakes to explain the causes of events, fail to reach a satisfactory solution of their problems largely because the geographic factor which enters into them all has not been thoroughly analyzed. Man has been so noisy about the way he has "conquered Nature," and Nature has been so silent in her persistent influence over man, that the geographic factor in the equation of human development has been overlooked.

In every problem of history there are two main factors, variously stated as heredity and environment, man and his geographic conditions, the internal forces of race and the external forces of habitat. Now the geographic element in the long history of human development has been operating strongly and operating persistently. Herein lies its importance. It is a stable force. It never sleeps. This natural environment, this physical basis of history, is for all intents and purposes immutable in comparison with the other factor in the problem—shifting, plastic, progressive, retrogressive man. (pp. 1, 2)

THE CRADLE OF CIVILIZATION

The North Temperate Zone is pre-eminently the culture zone of the earth. It is the seat of the most important, most steadily progressive civilizations, and the source of all the cultural stimuli which

have given an upward start to civilization in other zones during the past three centuries. It contains the Mediterranean basin, which was the pulsing heart of ancient history, and all the modern historically important regions of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. The temperate belt of the southern hemisphere also is following its lead, since European civilization has been transplanted to other parts of the world. This is the zone which least suffers from the drawbacks of climatic monotony or extremes, and best combines, especially in the northern hemisphere, the wide range of annual and seasonal variety so favorable to economic and cultural development, with the incalculable advantage of large land area.

Man grew in the temperate zone, was born in the Tropics. There, in his primitive, pre-civilized state, he lived in a moist, warm, uniform climate which supplied abundantly his simple wants, put no strain upon his feeble intellect and will. That first crude human product of Nature's Pliocene workshop turned out in the steaming lowland of Java, and now known to us as the *Pithecanthropus erectus*, found about him the climatic conditions generally conceded to have been necessary for man in his helpless, futile infancy. Where man has remained in the Tropics, with few exceptions he has suffered arrested development. His nursery has kept him a child. Though his initial progress depended upon the gifts which Nature put into his hands, his later evolution depended far more upon the powers which she developed within him. These have no limits, so far as our experience shows; but their growth is painful, reluctant. Therefore they develop only where Nature subjects man to compulsion, forces him to earn his daily bread, and thereby something more than bread. This compulsion is found in less luxurious but more salutary geographic conditions than the Tropics afford, in an environment that exacts a tribute of labor and invention in return for the boon of life, but offers a reward certain and generous enough to insure the accumulation of wealth which marks the beginning of civilization.

Most of the ancient civilizations originated just within the mild but drier margin of the Temperate Zone, where the cooler air of a short winter acted like a tonic upon the energies relaxed by the lethargic atmosphere of the hot and humid Tropics; where congenial warmth encouraged vegetation, but where the irrigation necessary to secure abundant and regular crops called forth inventiveness, co-operation, and social organization, and gave to the people their first baptism of redemption from savagery to barbarism. Native civilizations of limited development have arisen in the Tropics, but only where, as in Yemen, Mexico, and Peru, a high, cool, semi-arid plateau, a restricted area of fertile soil, and a protected location, alternately coddled and spurred the nascent people.

As the Tropics have been the cradle of humanity, the Temperate Zone has been the cradle and school of civilization. Here Nature has given much by withholding much. Here man found his birth-right, the privilege of the struggle. (pp. 634-635)

EFFECTS OF CLIMATE³²

For the production of good fruit the three factors of good stock, proper cultivation, and favorable climatic conditions are absolutely necessary. Are they equally essential to the fruit known as civilization? We all admit that race and the thing which for lack of a better name we call cultivation or training are of vital importance, but is it also true that man cannot rise to a high level except where the climate is propitious? From the days of Aristotle to those of Montesquieu and Buckle, there have been men who have believed that climate is the most important factor in determining the status of civilization. Others have held that wherever food is available for a moderately dense population and man can avoid diseases like tropical malaria, human culture can rise to the highest levels. The location of the world's great nations seems to them largely a matter of accident.

The majority of people reject both of these extreme views. Few doubt that climate has an important relation to civilization, but equally few consider it so important as racial inheritance, or as good institutions in the form of church, state, and home. We realize that a dense and progressive population cannot live in the far North or in deserts simply because the difficulty of getting a living grinds men down and keeps them isolated. We know that the denizens of the torrid zone are slow and backward, and we almost universally agree that this is connected with the damp, steady heat. We continually give concrete expression to our faith in climate. Not only do we talk about the weather more than about any other one topic, but we visit the seashore or the mountains for a change of air. We go South in winter, and to cool places in summer. We are depressed by a series of cloudy days, and feel exuberant on a clear, bracing morning after a storm. Yet, in spite of this universal recognition of the importance of climate, we rarely assign to it a foremost place as a condition of civilization. We point out that great nations have developed in such widely diverse climates as the hot plains of Mesopotamia and Yucatan and the cool hill country of Norway and Switzerland. Moreover, although Illinois and southern Mongolia

³² Reprinted with permission from *Civilization and Climate*, by Ellsworth Huntington, Yale University Press, 1915.

lie in the same latitude and have the same mean temperature, they differ enormously in civilization. To put the matter in another way, we recognize two great sets of facts which are apparently contradictory. We are conscious of being stimulated or depressed by climatic conditions, and we know that as one goes northward or southward, the distribution of civilization is closely in harmony with what we should expect on the basis of our own climatic experiences. Nevertheless, even in our own day, equally stimulating climates differ greatly in their degree of civilization. When we compare the past with the present, we find the same contradiction still more distinctly marked. Hence our confusion. From personal experience we know that climate is of tremendous importance. Yet many facts seem to indicate that its importance is less than our observation would lead us to anticipate. (pp. 2, 3)

The ideal way to determine the effect of climate would be to take a given group of people and measure their activity daily for a long period, first in one climate, and then in another. This, however, would not be practicable because of the great expense, and still more because the results would be open to question. If people were thus moved from place to place, it would be almost impossible to be sure that all conditions except climate remained uniform. If the climate differed markedly in the two places, the houses, food, and clothing would also have to be different. Social conditions would change. New interests would stimulate some people and depress others. Hence, no such experiment now seems practicable. The most available method is apparently to take a group of people who live in a variable climate, and test them at all seasons. The best test is a man's daily work, the thing to which he devotes most of his time and energy. Accordingly, I have taken the records of over five hundred factory operatives in the cities of New Haven, New Britain, and Bridgeport, in Connecticut, three or four thousand operatives in southern cities from Virginia to Florida, and over seventeen hundred students at the United States Naval Academy at Annapolis and the Military Academy at West Point. In most cases each person's record covers an entire year, or at least the academic year. All the records have been compared with the various conditions of the weather. The results are surprising. Changes in the barometer seem to have little effect. Humidity possesses a considerable degree of importance, but the most important element is clearly temperature. The people here considered are physically most active when the average temperature is from 60 to 65 degrees, that is, when the noon temperature rises to 70 degrees or even more. This is higher than many of us would expect. Mental activity reaches a maximum when the outside temperature averages about 38 degrees, that is,

when there are mild frosts at night. Another highly important climatic condition is the change of temperature from one day to the next. People do not work well when the temperature remains constant. Great changes are also unfavorable. The ideal conditions are moderate changes, especially a cooling of the air at frequent intervals.

The facts just stated are of great significance. From the data described in this book I shall construct a map showing how human energy would be distributed throughout the world if all the earth's inhabitants were influenced as are the people of the eastern United States. We shall find that this agrees to a remarkable extent with a map of civilization based on the opinions of about fifty geographers and other widely informed men in a dozen countries of America, Europe, and Asia. Moreover, by reconstructing the climate of the past, it will appear that when the various nations of antiquity were in their prime, they were probably blessed with climates which shared the stimulating qualities which now prevail where civilization is highest. (pp. 7, 8, 9)

The problem which confronts us is primarily to separate the effects of race from those of place, heredity from environment. It may be made concrete by comparing two of the world's most sharply contrasted races, Teutons and Negroes. Suppose that there were two uninhabited Egypts, exactly alike, and that one could be filled with Negroes and the other with Teutons. Suppose that these settlers were average members of their races, and were equipped with the same religion, education, government, social institutions, and inventions. This might easily happen if the Negroes came from the United States. Suppose, further, that neither race received new settlers from without. Which would succeed best? "The Teutons, of course," is the answer. "What a foolish question." But is it so foolish? You are thinking of the first few generations. I am thinking of the twentieth or thirtieth or later. Does anyone know what five hundred or a thousand years of life in Egypt would do for either Teutons or Negroes if no new blood were introduced? (p. 11)

HABITATION AREAS AND INTEREST AREAS³³

We may then designate the physical residence as a habitation area and the regions where the psycho-cultural concerns are located as interest areas. Interest areas are the countries of the mind. One may have many of them at the same time; and he may change or transpose them almost at will. Whereas in the family and tribal era

³³ Reprinted by permission from U. G. Weatherly, "Habitation Areas and Interest Areas," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. X.

of social evolution loyalty was tyrannically monistic, it is now possible for the individual to be devoted to several groups. Some of these are idealistic, and nearly all are free from rigid exclusiveness. Loyalty thus becomes pluralistic. Free migration is easier in the realm of the mind than in physical areas. We may even say that as to their psychic concerns men may be born many times by passing into entirely new regions of interest. Certainly this is true with reference to the transition from one age-period to another, for the individual lives several successive and largely dissociated lives in the journey from infancy to old age. The country of the mind which he inhabits at any time depends mainly upon his years. The child may be father to the man, but in passing from the age of dolls and toys to that of philosophies of life and conduct he becomes a different individual.

The railway and the automobile have so widened the boundaries of the habitation area that the neighborhood is no longer the narrow-shut-in district that it once was, nor are these boundaries so clearly defined. People visit and associate more widely and because distance has been almost annihilated they find their centers of amusement, culture, and economic life in ever-enlarging spheres. Two hours of driving over bad roads once took the remote countryman to the rural village which was the center of his world. Two hours of auto travel over good roads now takes him to one of several cities.

But it is especially the more plastic psychic interests that have expanded. The invention of printing was the pioneer factor in this change; then came the newspaper, the telegraph, the telephone, and finally the radio. The advent of the radio has brought about a revolution in social life which the sociological student must henceforth take into account. It has already begun to alter our conception of the meaning of the primary group, because it gives people a common experience without physical presence. As one listens to a radio concert he is conscious of an audience widely dispersed but real, and he has some of the same sense of contact and participation that he has in a concert hall. On election night, when we are listening to the broadcasting of returns, we catch again some of the crowd excitement that we used to feel while watching the bulletin boards in a crowded street.

What then are the boundaries of an interest area? Where group organization is rigid they may be almost as definite as geographical boundaries; but interests fluctuate and the individual belongs to many interest groups at the same time. Besides, he is, as already mentioned, constantly taking on new interests and dropping old ones.

In its larger meaning the interest group includes all who are loyal to a particular concern, wherever they are located. The real community in this case is made up of the group of persons enclosed within the bounds of loyalty to a common psycho-social concern, and this loyalty may have little relation to geographical regions.

When community organizations' work began to be developed, the pioneers assigned to the community concept an exclusiveness that it does not properly possess. Except for the very practical matters of eating, sleeping, health and making a living, modern people, and especially urban people, live in varied and often loosely defined areas. For a very large part of our cultural life we are dependent on agencies that are either national or cosmopolitan in scope. They are not and from their very nature cannot be wholly localized in content or management. The local phase is hitched on organically to a larger body. Our passion for efficiency has led to the organization and standardization of nearly every kind of cultural activity in district, national, and sometimes international organizations. (pp. 404-406)

THE SCOPE OF HUMAN ECOLOGY³⁴

Human ecology is the science which deals with the changing spatial distribution of all organisms, plant and animal as well as human, in which the individual units bear a sustenance or semi-organic relationship to one another. The relationship may be that of mutualism, parasitism, competition, or combination of these. The organic nature of plant and animal communities has been studied for some time in the special disciplines of plant and animal ecology. We are just beginning to study human spatial distribution from the same objective standpoint.

Human spatial relationships change with much greater rapidity than those of the plant or animal. The fact that man is a cultural animal makes his ecological organization more dynamic and unpredictable, but at the same time more interesting and important, than that of the precultural organisms. Social and political organization tend to become accommodated to the spatial distribution or ecological organization resulting from prevailing forms of transportation. The introduction of new forms of communication such as the railway, automobile, telegraph, radio, necessitates a re-accommodation of social organization to the new interpretation of spatial distance.

Prior to the advent of modern industry, and even in parts of the world today where machine industry has not yet penetrated, human

³⁴ Reprinted by permission from R. D. McKenzie, "The Scope of Human Ecology," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. X. — *Done*

spatial distribution and social organization are effected on a primary scale of distance. Communities are small, compact, and largely self-sustaining units. But wherever mechanical has replaced human energy in the production and transportation of commodities great transformations have taken place in both ecological and social organization. A new order of spatial distribution, characterized by mobility, centralization, segregation, and regional economic interdependence, has supplanted the old order of stability, decentralization and local economic autonomy. History reveals the gradual expansion of the human community as distance becomes shortened by swifter modes of transportation and communication and as mechanical replaces human energy in the production of material commodities. The ecologist is concerned with the processes of human distribution as they operate under different conditions of culture and mobility. There are at least five major ecological processes which invite careful study on the part of human ecologists, namely: concentration, centralization, segregation, invasion, succession. Some of these processes have obverse or negative aspects as, for instance, the obverse of concentration is dispersion, of centralization, decentralization.

✕ *Concentration.* This is the tendency of an increasing number of human beings or human utilities to congregate within a definite area. Density represents the degree of concentration at a given time. Concentration results from either natural increase or accretion by migration or from both. Prior to the utilization of mechanical energy in production and transportation regional human concentration was largely a matter of natural increase. To be sure, human migrations have existed from time immemorial but as a rule they have resulted in group displacement rather than in accretion. Modern mobility which is expressed in individual rather than in group migration occasions territorial concentrations which are predominantly the result of accretion rather than natural increase.

The limits of regional concentration vary with the changing conditions of mobility and economic organization. In the relatively static regions of the Orient concentration is regulated by the conditions of local food supply based upon a subsistence standard of living. Population density in these regions varies directly with the fertility of the soil for the production of the staple food commodity. Fertile valleys are always densely populated, the less fertile uplands sparsely inhabited and the arid regions devoid of population. Modern industrialism, however, is rapidly changing these conditions just as it has changed the population density of the food producing regions of Europe and America. New concentrations of population are rapidly emerging in the Orient in response to the wider economic

organization of industry and commerce. The townward tendency is commencing, draining, as in the western world, the young men and women from the food producing areas.

The limits of population concentration in the new focal points of industry and commerce are determined by the relative competitive strength of each specific region in the production and distribution of manufactured commodities. Many of the old centers of commerce have declined in importance as new avenues of world trade have supplanted the older routes, and many regions previously uninhabited have suddenly become areas of population concentration in response to the new organization of industry.

Centralization. The process of centralization must be distinguished from that of concentration. Centralization implies the integration of human beings or human interests around certain pivotal locations. The inhabitants of a given area tend to come together at definite places for the satisfaction of specific common interests such as work, education, religion, sociability. Centralization is thus the process of community formation; it creates the "mainstreet" of the country village and the "city" of the metropolitan area. Centralization is a function of mobility; the size, shape, and ecological organization of a community are determined by the conditions of transportation and communication. This relation of centralization to different forms of mobility is well illustrated in the cities of Japan. The old communities which grew up with human energy as the dominant form of transportation were merely aggregations of houses separated by narrow winding paths. There was no mainstreet, no amusement or industrial center, no residence, financial or wholesale district. These centers of interest and segregation which are so common in all American cities are just beginning to emerge in the large population centers of Japan in response to the introduction of the street car and other forms of rapid transportation.

The process of centralization operating in a world economy of great mobility makes for specialization of communal function. Large cities tend to become specialized centers with reference to interests which transcend local and national boundaries. The modern city is characterized by the rôle it plays as a specialized center of a dominant interest such as industry, commerce, finance, recreation, education, art.

Decentralization and recentralization are resulting from modern mobility and standardization. Some interests are becoming decentralized while others are becoming still more highly centralized. As commodities and services become standardized in quality and price their retail distribution becomes more widely dispersed. The degree of centralization of any specific activity or interest seems to vary

directly with the extent of choice involved; the more specialized or select the service or utility the greater the distance traveled to acquire it. Thus the city center of the metropolitan community is gradually becoming a focal point of highly specialized commodities and services while the village is losing its specialized functions and is becoming merely the unit of distribution of the more standardized services and utilities. As life becomes more and more of the canned and card index type decentralization is likely to follow in the production as well as in the distribution of utilities and services. The present day decentralization, however, is different from the decentralization of the village community of the past; it is of the chain store variety and involves economic interdependence as well as greater centralization of control and administration.

Segregation. Segregation is the tendency of like units to concentrate within a specific area. The term is here used with reference to the distribution of population within a community. The attribute of segregation may be income, language, race, culture, or combinations of these. The degree of homogeneity of the segregation varies with the time the process has been at work, with the significance of the attributes of selection and with the conditions of mobility. Every area of segregation is the result of the operation of a combination of forces of selection. There is usually, however, one attribute of selection that is more dominant than the others and which becomes the determining factor of the particular segregation. Economic segregation is the most primary and general form. It results from economic competition and determines the basic units of the ecological organization. Other attributes of segregation function within the spheres of appropriate economic levels.

Economic segregation decreases in degree of homogeneity as we ascend the economic scale: the lower the economic level of an area the more uniform the economic status of the inhabitants, because the narrower the range of choice. But as we ascend the economic scale each level affords wider choice and therefore more cultural but less economic homogeneity.

The slum is the area of minimum choice. The slum therefore represents a homogeneous collection as far as economic competency is concerned but a most heterogeneous aggregation in all other particulars. Being an area of minimum choice the slum becomes the reservoir for the nuisances and economic wastes of the city. It also serves as the hiding place for many services which are forbidden by the mores but which cater to the wishes of residents scattered throughout the community.

Invasion. Invasion is a process of *group* displacement; it implies the encroachment of one area of segregation upon another, usually

an adjoining area. The term invasion in the historic sense implies the displacement of a higher by a lower cultural group. While this is perhaps the more common process in the local community, it is not, however, the only form of invasion. Frequently a higher economic group drives out the lower income inhabitants, thus enacting a new cycle of the succession. Invasion should be distinguished from atomization, which is individual displacement without consciousness of displacement or change in cultural level.

Succession. In human and plant communities change seems to occur in cyclic fashion. Regions within a city pass through different stages of use and occupancy in a regularity of manner which eventually may be predictable and expressible in mathematical terms. The process of obsolescence and physical deterioration of buildings makes for a change in type of occupancy which operates in a downward tendency in rentals, selecting lower and lower income levels of population until a new cycle is commenced. This may imply a complete change in use of land as when a residence section is usurped by business, or a new development of the old use as when apartments or hotels supplant private dwellings.

The thing that characterizes a succession is a complete change in population type between the first and last stages or a complete change in use of land. While there is not the organic connection between the different stages of a human succession that is found between the stages of a plant succession, nevertheless there is an economic continuity which makes the cycles of a human succession quite as pronounced and inevitable as those of the plant succession. Real estate investigators are beginning to plot the stages in use succession by mathematical formulae.

The entire community may pass through a series of successions due to mutations of its economic base affecting its relative importance in the larger ecological order. The population type usually changes with the introduction of a new economic base as, for instance, when an agricultural community changes to a mining or a manufacturing community.

Structure. Ecological processes always operate within a more or less rigid structural base. The relative spatial fixity of the road and the establishment furnishes the base in which the ecological processes function. The fact that the movements of men and commodities follow narrow channels of rather fixed spatial significance gives a structural foundation to human spatial relations which is absent in the case of plant and animal communities.

The history of civilization shows a gradually increasing flexibility in the channels of travel and traffic, which implies an increasing flexibility in the structural skeleton in which ecological processes take

place. Prior to the advent of the railroad the movements of people and commodities were largely determined by the course of the water systems, rivers, lakes, and seas. This rigid system of communication supplied the basis of human distribution. The construction of canals made for increasing flexibility, thereby creating new areas of concentration.

The coming of the railroads in the early part of the nineteenth century marked the first great release with regard to population distribution. New regions of concentration immediately arose while old regions either declined or commenced a new cycle of growth. The railroad, however, with its steel track and fixed right-of-way afforded a very rigid base for the inland movements of commodities and people. It forced human distribution and centralization within the limits of its inflexible structure. The advent of motor transportation and the good roads movement affords a release to the forces of human distribution which is unique in history, making for a redistribution of people and institutions on a much more flexible base than was ever known before. (pp. 316-323)

ENVIRONMENT VERSUS CULTURE³⁵

To sum up: Environment cannot explain culture because the identical environment is consistent with distinct cultures; because cultural traits persist from inertia in an unfavorable environment; because they do not develop where they would be of distinct advantage to a people; and because they may even disappear where one would least expect it on geographical principles.

Shall we then cavalierly banish geography from cultural considerations? This would be manifestly going beyond the mark. Geographical phenomena can no more be discarded than can psychological phenomena. They represent in the first place a limiting condition. As cultures cannot contravene psychological principles so they cannot, except in limited measure, override geographical factors. To use some drastically clear if somewhat hackneyed examples, the Eskimo do not eat coconuts nor do the Oceanians build snow-houses; where the horse does not occur it cannot be domesticated; in the Hopi country where water courses are lacking, navigation naturally did not develop. As Jochelson points out, the Koryak of northeastern Siberia cannot cultivate cereals because of the low temperature and they cannot succeed as cattle-breeders because of the low quality of the grasses. This minimum recognition of environment as a purely negative factor, however, does not do full justice to it. Take

³⁵ Reprinted by permission from Robert H. Lowie, *Culture and Ethnology*, D. C. McMurtrie, 1917, pp. 62-65.

the bison out of the plains Indian's life and his cultural atmosphere certainly changes. Nevertheless, we have seen that the presence of the bison by no means fully determined the cultural employment possible. Instead of hunting it as the Solutrean Europeans did the wild horse, the Indian might have domesticated it as his namesake by misnomer in Asia domesticated the buffalo. The environment, then, enters into culture, not as a formative but rather as an inert element ready to be selected from and molded. It is, of course, a matter of biological necessity for a people to establish some sort of adaptation to surrounding conditions, but such adaptation is no more spontaneously generated by the environment than are strictly biological adaptations. There are alternatives to adaptation — migration and destruction.

It is true, as Dr. Wissler has forcibly pointed out, that when some kind of adjustment has once been established it will tend to persist in the region of its origin. This, however, illustrates not so much the active influence of environment as rather the tremendous force of cultural inertia which tends to perpetuate an old muddling-along adjustment, however imperfect, provided only it has bare survival value.

Altogether we may illustrate the relations of culture to environment by an analogy used by Dr. Wissler in another connection, which also brings us back to my initial analogy of the environmental theory with the associationist system in psychology. The environment furnishes the builders of cultural structures with brick and mortar but it does not furnish the architect's plan. As the illustrations cited clearly prove, there is a variety of ways in which the same material can be put together, nay, there is always a range of choice as regards the materials themselves. The development of a particular architectural style and the selection of a special material from among an indefinite number of possible styles and materials are what characterize a given culture. Since geography permits more than a single adjustment to the same conditions, it cannot give the interpretation sought by the student of culture. Culture can no more be built up of environmental blocks than can consciousness out of isolated ideas; and as the association of ideas already implies the synthesizing faculty of consciousness, so the assemblage and use of environmental factors after a definite plan already implies the selective and synthetic agency of a preexisting or nascent culture.

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The meaning of geographic social thought.
2. Bodin's idea of the influence on man of climatic factors.
3. Hume's reaction to the alleged influence of geographic elements.

4. The four main geographic factors according to Buckle.
5. The relation of food supply to birth rate.
6. The major contributions of E. C. Semple to geographic social thought.
7. Ellsworth Huntington's analysis of climatic influence on man.
8. The meaning of human ecology.
9. The relation of human ecology to sociologic thought.
10. The trend of current human ecologic studies.
11. The significance of "interest areas."
12. The validity of Lowie's argument against geographic influence.

CHAPTER XVI

SPENCER AND ORGANIC SOCIAL THOUGHT

IN THE SECOND half of the last century social thought passed under biological influence. Society was discussed in terms of biological analogies, that is, it was compared in its structure and functions to organic life. Herbert Spencer was the leader among those writers who attempted to analyze society in terms of biological figures of speech. He also stressed the structural nature of society and in his *Principles of Sociology* he went into great detail in giving a historical description of social institutions.

The Greek writers, the Hebrews before them, the Founder of Christianity, made references to the likeness between human society and plant and animal life. Mankind has often been compared to a tree or a plant with its manifold, evolving branches and fruit.

Spencer's famous organic analogies were preceded by the studies of biologists, such as Lamarck and Darwin. Lamarck (1744-1820) argued that by activity and use man could develop traits which would be transmitted by inheritance. Although this theory has been undermined by Weismann, it served as a basis for the further study of the biological laws of human evolution.

DARWIN

The thought of Charles Darwin (1809-1882) upon the nature of evolution was stimulated in part by Malthus' doctrine of surplus population and the consequent struggle for existence. He also based his ideas on the principle of natural selection. He developed the concepts of the prodigality of nature and the struggle for existence, which led to the resultant concept of natural selection and sur-

vival of the fittest. The process of natural selection accounts for the instincts, imitation, imagination, reason, as well as for self-consciousness, and the esthetic and religious impulses. In this way man, according to the Darwinian formula, has ascended by stages from the lower orders of life.

The fittest to survive, concluded Darwin, are those individuals who are best fitted to meet the conditions of their environment. If the environment be competitive, savage, brutal, then the fittest will be the strongest physically and the most vicious. If the environment be cooperative, then the fittest will be the persons who cooperate best. With the development of intelligence and sagacity in early human society, individuals otherwise cruel learned to cooperate. A tribe of cooperating individuals would be victorious in a conflict with a tribe of non-cooperating members. Thus cooperation and a cooperating environment themselves are the result of natural selection.

Unfortunately, Darwin's concept of natural selection has been grossly distorted. Upon this misapprehension, a doctrine of "social Darwinism" has gained recognition. According to this false interpretation of Darwinism, the tooth and fang struggle for existence among animals is the normal procedure among human beings. The most brutal, cruel, and shrewd men are "fitted" to survive in an environment of physical and mental competition. Likewise, the nations which can marshal together the most powerful armies and navies are the "fittest" to survive in a world where each nation is accountable unto itself alone. Thus, it is seen that human society is simply an extension of the animal society and that the fundamental law of social progress is the law of force and might, first physical, and then physical and psychical.

But this interpretation is false to Darwin's own principles. While Darwin did describe and lay great emphasis upon the tooth and fang struggle for existence, he noted and stressed the fact that even among animals, modifying

influences were at work. He made clear that cooperation exists among many species of animal life, and that this cooperative tendency is an important survival factor. He also saw that among the highest types of animals there were new and complex expressions of cooperation, and that the higher mental activity of these animal types seemed to be a correlate in some way of the greater cooperative spirit. The application of this principle to human progress implies that cooperative attitudes may ultimately become the chief survival force, and that some day the "fittest" to survive will be those persons or groups of persons who cooperate most wisely. This theory will be developed further in the chapter upon "Cooperation Theories in Sociology." The chief contributors have been Kropotkin and Novicow.

Darwin made another important contribution to social thought in his theory of sexual selection. This idea is a phase of natural selection. Among the higher animals the females choose their mates. The males, for example, with the singing voice and beautiful plumage, are the most likely to be chosen. These males thus become the progenitors of the next generation of the given species; the less attractive males mate if at all with the inferior types of females. Thus signs of male attractiveness come to possess survival value.¹

Among human beings the principle of sexual selection operates, but in a reversed sexual form. During the earlier centuries of human history the custom developed whereby the males took the initiative in choosing mates. As a result, the females resorted to all sorts of devices to make themselves "attractive" and to get themselves "selected."

HERBERT SPENCER

The social theories of Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) have caused more controversy than those of any other writer in the sociological field. The fact that in these con-

¹ Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man*, Appleton, 1904, pp. 229 ff.

troversies the ideas of Spencer have usually been worsted will not obscure the important rôle which Spencer took in the field of social thought.

Spencer early developed the habit of causal thinking, that is, he believed in causes, and hence searched everywhere for causes. Because of the acrimonious discussions which took place between his father and mother, and because of his own independent nature, he repudiated the orthodox explanations of the universe. He was trained for the profession of civil engineering. His studies in mathematics and mechanics accentuated his precise and somewhat materialistic interpretation of the universe. His social theories are an outgrowth in part of his emphasis upon the laws of coexistences and sequences in the physical world.

LAW OF EVOLUTION

In order to understand Spencer's social laws it is necessary first to consider his general law of evolution. He traced everything in the world back through causal chains to two fundamental factors, namely, matter and motion—two aspects of force. As a result of the operation of some First Cause, an integration of matter began to take place, accompanied by a concomitant dissipation of motion. As a result, matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity. During this process the unexpended motion undergoes a similar change.²

The best explanation of this law of evolution can be found in its application to societary phenomena. Suppose that a modern city neighborhood undertakes to organize itself. It possesses physical resources and mental abilities. The "neighbors" are all more or less untrained in community organization activities. In this sense they are homogeneous. At first they are unable to work together; in fact they do not know what to do; thus, they form "an

² Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, Appleton, 1900, Section III:145.

indefinite, incoherent homogeneity." But with experience in community organization activities, the individuals of the neighborhood learn to work together. Each finds the type of work which he can do best. All work toward a definite goal. Thus, a definite, coherent heterogeneity arises. Further, the unexpended energies of the people are influenced and transformed by the pattern ideas which experience in community organization measures has taught.³

This application of Spencer's law of evolution to human progress has weak as well as strong points. There is not always an original homogeneity. Upon close examination this homogeneity disappears before a variegated conglomeration of heterogeneous experiences and potentialities of all the individuals who are concerned. It is not necessary to point out additional errors. Spencer deserves credit, however, for developing the concept of social evolution as a phase of natural evolution and for stressing the idea of natural sequences in societary matters.

Spencer began his *Principles of Sociology* with a very elaborate description of primitive man—the original societary unit corresponding to the biological cell. The physical, emotional, and intellectual life of primitive man is given prominence. An analysis is made of the behavior of man, the original social unit, when he is exposed to the various environing conditions—inorganic, organic, and superorganic. The emphasis upon "man" as the primary unit neglects the importance of the "group" in the social evolutionary process. Moreover, Spencer underrated the intellectual nature of primitive man; he denied to early man the qualities involving excursiveness of thought, imagination, and original ideas.⁴

Spencer's discussion of primitive ideas shows widespread reading of volumes of source materials. The "inductions"

³ *Principles of Sociology*, Appleton, 1914, I:596, 597.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 84.

are often influenced by preconceived notions of human life, despite Spencer's sincere desire and effort to be scientific. While the horde, the family, and other groups are described, the influences which are the result of the interaction of individual minds and the interactions between a person and his group are scarcely recognized.

In regard to the state, Spencer carried forward the theories which have already been noted, namely, of individual rights. He repudiated the state which is the product of military organization of society. Such a régime is primordial and uncivilized. It is an organization of homogeneous units in which the units, or the individuals, are slaves to the organization.

INDUSTRIAL ORDER

Spencer believed in a new industrial development whereby "individuals" would become differentiated and developed, and whereby they would be shifted from an autocratic maximum to a democratic maximum. To Spencer, man is vastly superior to the state. In the coming industrial order Spencer foresaw an era in which the main business of society will be to defend the rights of "individuals." Spencer forecasted an epoch of industrial states which have abolished war. In such a day the only conflicts that will take place between states will be natural. These will be only the competitions that arise naturally between states that are building up the best "individuals," that is, those persons who develop their "individuality" most freely and harmoniously.

The rise of industrial states with a minimum emphasis upon government and a maximum emphasis upon "individuality" will produce a world order in which national barriers will slowly melt away and a planetary unity will develop. Spencer's industrialism, however, has fundamental weaknesses. It implies that social organization is more important than social process. It neglects to pro-

vide sufficiently for inherent psychological changes. It assumes that an industrial society, *per se*, will be peaceful. It underestimates the importance of socializing motives.

In the changes from a military to an industrial organization of society, the six main sets of social institutions undergo deep-seated changes. Spencer describes at length these six institutional structures, namely, the domestic, ceremonial, political, ecclesiastical, professional, and industrial. Two, the political and industrial, have been mentioned on the preceding page. Spencer's treatment of the other four is accurate to a degree but at fundamental points is unreliable—judged by current conceptions and data.

ORGANIC ANALOGY

Perhaps Spencer is best known for his treatment of the organic analogy. He set up the hypothesis that society is like a biological organism and then proceeded to defend his thesis against all objections with great logical force. But logic was his sociological downfall, for it overcame his scientific insight.

Spencer found four main ways in which society resembles an organism.⁵ (1) In both cases growth is attended by augmentation of mass. (2) In each instance growth is accomplished by increasing complexity of structure. (3) In the organism and in society there is an interdependence of parts. (4) The life of society, like the life of an organism, is far longer than the life of any of the units or parts.

But there are ways in which society and an organism are unlike.⁶ These were analyzed by Spencer and determined to be merely superficial differences. There are four of these main differences. (1) Unlike organisms, societies have no specific extensive form, such as a physical body with limbs or a face. (2) The elements of society do not

⁵ *Principles of Sociology*, Part II, Ch. II.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 457 ff.

form a continuous whole as in the case of an animal. The living units composing society are free, and not in contact, being more or less dispersed. (3) The parts of society are not stationary and fixed in their positions relative to the whole. (4) In an organism consciousness is concentrated in a small part of the aggregate, while in society consciousness is diffused. The alleged superficiality in this difference between society and an organism was difficult for Spencer to maintain.

In discussing the organic analogy further, Spencer compared the alimentary system of an organism to the productive industries, or the sustaining system in the body politic.⁷ Furthermore, there is a strong parallelism between the circulatory system of an organism and the distributing system in society with its transportation lines; but more particularly, its commercial classes and media of exchange. Then, in both cases there have developed regulating systems. In an organism there are dominant center and subordinate centers, the senses, and a neural apparatus. A similar structure appears in society in the form of an adjustive apparatus, or government, for the purpose of adjudicating the differences between the producers and the consumers. These parallelisms throw only a small measure of light upon the nature of society. They appear ridiculous when carried to an extreme, for example, to the extreme to which Spencer himself went when he compared the King's Council to the medulla oblongata, the House of Lords to the cerebellum, and the House of Commons to the cerebrum.

Spencer uses his analogies very extensively and vigorously, and later refers to them as merely a scaffolding for building a structure of deductions. This conclusion contains contradictory elements. When the scaffolding is removed, society is left standing as a more or less intangible affair. If a society is like an organism, it experiences a

⁷ Spencer, *op. cit.*, Part II, Ch. VI-IX.

natural cycle of birth, maturity, old age, and death. But according to the telic concept of progress that was advanced by Lester F. Ward and developed by later writers, the death of society does not come with organic inevitableness, but depends on the vision, plans, courage, and activities of that society's members. A society need never die.

For many years it has been popular to criticise Spencer. Nearly all the criticisms are justified. Moreover, they have been so numerous that little of worth seems to be left in Spencer's writings. However, Spencer's contributions to social thought are not negligible for several reasons. (1) He emphasized the laws of evolution and natural causation. (2) He described social evolution as a phase of natural evolution. (3) He pointed out the likenesses between biological organisms and human society. (4) He made the rôle of social structures, or institutions, to stand out distinctly. (5) He stressed the importance of "individuality." (6) He undermined the idea that the State is a master machine to which all the individual citizens must submit automatically.

JOHN FISKE

In the United States, Spencer possessed an able and loyal friend in John Fiske (1842-1901). Fiske built his social thought upon the evolutionary formulae of Darwin and Spencer. In his *Cosmic Philosophy*, or philosophy of the universe, Fiske contended that the evolution of man produced fundamental changes in the nature of cosmic evolution. With the development of man there appears a new force in the universe, the human spirit, or soul. The advent of this psychical entity has produced a subordination of the purely bodily, physical, material forces and established a control by spiritual forces. Moreover, in human evolution there has been a slowly increasing subordination of the egoistic phases of spiritual life to the altruistic. With the apparent cessation in important bodily changes there have come unheralded and unantici-

pated psychical inventions, which have released man from the passive adaptation to environment which animals manifest, and given to him an increasingly positive control over the processes of adaptation. Humanity as the highest product of the evolutionary processes has the power to change the whole course of cosmic development.⁸ Fiske distinctly emphasized the psychical forces in evolution and the part which they play in making mankind purposeful and in organizing groups on social principles. Humanity is not a mere incident in evolution; it is the supreme factor.⁹ The main purpose of man is not the perpetuation of the species, but the development of increasingly more social purposes.

Following the ideas of Maine, Tylor, McLennan, and Lubbock, Fiske concluded that social evolution originated when families, "temporarily organized among all the higher gregarious mammals, became in the case of the highest mammal permanently organized."¹⁰ Gregariousness developed into definite family relationships and responsibilities. Social evolution produced an increased complexity and specialty in intelligence, which in turn required a lengthening of the period "during which the nervous connections involved in ordinary adjustments are becoming organized." Such a transformation requires time, and hence the need for a period of infancy which is not common to the lower animals. Accompanying this period of infancy, there is the expression of strong affection of relatively short duration among higher animals. Among mankind parental love takes on the characteristics not only of intensity but of duration and forgiveness. In this phase of evolution there is a correlative development of three factors, namely, the prolongation of infancy, the rise of parental affection, and increasing intelligence. The

⁸ John Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, Houghton Mifflin, 1904, III:280 ff.

⁹ John Fiske, *Destiny of Man*, Houghton Mifflin, 1904, p. 12.

¹⁰ Fiske, *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy*, IV:127.

gradual prolongation of the period of infancy is partly a consequence of increasing intelligence, and in turn the prolongation of infancy affords the circumstances for the establishment of permanent relationships, of reciprocal behavior, of sociality.¹¹

Fiske was one of the first social philosophers to point out the significance of foresight as a phase of evolutionary development. Perhaps the chief way in which civilized man is distinguished from the barbarian is in his ability "to adapt his conduct to future events, whether contingent or certain to occur." Civilized man has the power to forego present enjoyment in order to safeguard himself against future disaster.¹² This quality is the essence of prudence and is due in large part to civilized man's superior power of self-restraint, one of the chief elements in moral progress. It is equally important as "an indispensable prerequisite to the accumulation of wealth in any community." It is the basic factor in civilized man's elaborate scientific provisions and in his numerous far-reaching philosophic and religious systems.

LILIENFELD

Paul von Lilienfeld (1829-1903) made the organic analogy a definite part of his theory of society. He compared the individual to the cells in an organism; the governmental and industrial organizations, to the neural system; and the cultural products of society, to the intercellular parts of an organism.¹³

Lilienfeld compared the stages of growth of the individual to the stages of racial development, namely, savage, barbarian, and civilized. This analogy was made use of by Fiske. Although somewhat true in a very general sense, this recapitulation theory cannot be carried into minute details.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 360 ff.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 303 ff.

¹³ Paul von Lilienfeld, *Gedanken über die Socialwissenschaft der Zukunft*, II, pp. viii ff.

The concept of social capitalization was originated by Lilienfeld. By it he meant the ability of society to store up useful ideas and methods and transmit them from generation to generation. In this way each generation becomes the inheritor of all the human experiences that have gone before.

Lilienfeld was one of the first sociological writers to develop the definite concept of social pathology.¹⁴ His treatment of this theme, however, was exceedingly weak. He distinguished between a normal and diseased organism and then, by analogy, between a normal and diseased society. Social pathology, according to Lilienfeld, deals with three sets of diseases, namely, of industry, of justice, and of politics. Lilienfeld carried the organic analogy to a ridiculous and puerile extreme when he compared the diseases of industry to insanity; of justice, to delirium; of politics, to paralysis. He also elaborated a system of social therapeutics to correspond to the diseases.

SCHAEFFLE

In Albert Schaeffle (1831-1903), the organic analogy found another disciple, but a more worthy one than either Spencer or Lilienfeld. In the thought of Schaeffle, society is not primarily a large organism but a gigantic mind. Schaeffle presented a functional analogy rather than a biological analogy. Whereas Spencer was especially interested in social structures, Schaeffle set his attention upon social functions.

In his functional analogies Schaeffle compared the reason with the legislature in society; the will, with the executive officers, and the esthetic judgment, with the judiciary. Schaeffle's psychology is inaccurate and on the whole unscientific; his analogies add little to an understanding of society. Nevertheless, his thought on these subjects represents an advance over the ideas of Spencer.

¹⁴ Lilienfeld, *Pathologie Sociale*, 1904.

In the *Bau und Leben des Socialen Körpers*, Schaeffle undertook to develop a complete sociological system. His teachings follow the principle that "function leads structure and structure limits function." Activities produce developments in bodily structure, and also cause the formation of new social institutions. Bodily structures and social institutions alike limit activities and usefulness. These propositions are a reversal of the emphasis which Spencer maintained. They are fundamentally correct.

Although Schaeffle referred frequently to the "social body," he did not give the concept a specific meaning. He introduced the term "social process," but did not analyze its nature. He repudiated the idea that the individual is the social unit; he considered the group to be the all-important unit in society. Natural selection in social evolution manifests itself in conflicts between the ideals of different groups. René Worms, it may be added, has assumed the existence of a social consciousness apart from the consciousness of "individuals," and argued that the chief difference between biological organisms and social organisms is one of degree.

Schaeffle considered that government justifies itself in protecting the weaker members of society, and in maintaining the highest welfare of all. He pointed out the social responsibility which rests upon the best educated and most fortunate members of society. Schaeffle wisely emphasized the development of purposeful activity on the part of both persons and groups.

MACKENZIE

The ideas of John Stuart Mackenzie differ from those of Spencer, Lilienfeld, and Schaeffle. Mackenzie does not use the figure of an organic analogy; he speaks in terms of homologies. According to Mackenzie, society is not like an organism; it is organic.

The organic nature of society is threefold. (1) There is an intrinsic relation between the parts of society and the

whole. The individual reflects the culture of the group in which he has been trained. (2) The development of a group is by virtue of intrinsic processes. A group builds on ideas derived from both the past and from other groups, but it does not genuinely grow unless it takes these ideas and makes them over into a part of its own nature. (3) Society develops towards ends which are discoverable in society itself. By analysis of the ideals and motive forces of a group, it is possible to determine in what direction the group is moving.

Mackenzie argues for the inner principle of things and particularly for society. He believes, however, that knowledge concerning this inner principle and the essential unity of mankind cannot be reduced to a science, but will constitute the basis of a social philosophy. Social philosophy does not supply facts, but seeks to interpret the significance of the special aspects of human life with reference to the social unity of mankind.¹⁵

The family and the state are the two forms of association in which the most intimate bonds of union are nurtured. Language, if it can be called a social institution, is perhaps the most fundamental institution of all, because it produces that community spirit whereby social intimacy can take place and whereby the realization of a common good can be achieved.¹⁶

According to Mackenzie, there are three main lines of social progress, and hence three main types of social control to be encouraged.¹⁷ (1) The control of natural forces by human agencies. (2) The control of individuals by the communal spirit. (3) Self control.

The road of social advance is beset with obstacles. The chief are these: (1) The dominance of vegetative needs. These economic factors are so universal and insistent that they are likely at any time to override all other human

¹⁵ J. S. Mackenzie, *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, Macmillan, 1918, p. 14.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 243 ff.

needs. (2) The insistence of animal impulses, chiefly love and strife. While love promotes unity, it generally produces a limited unity. Moreover, one mode of unity is apt to conflict with other types of unity, and thus lead to intense strife. (3) The mastery of mechanism. Life is easily crushed under the weight of organization; thought, by scholastic pedantry; industry, by economic systems; nationality, by soulless bureaucracy. (4) Anarchism. The remedy for over-organization is not anarchy, for life and society are composed of numbers of conflicting tendencies, which must be controlled by the power of thought. But the exercise of merely individual thought¹⁸ will not suffice. Individual thought is likely to be egocentric, to evade the problems of group life, or to solve them narrowly. (5) Conservatism. An established and successful civilization is in danger of relying too much on its past. It often carries within itself the canker of decay, and frequently lacks any clear vision of higher development.

Mackenzie is committed to internationalism. It is no longer fitting for anyone to think of his own country as an exclusive object of devotion. "The earth is our country, and all its inhabitants are our fellow citizens; and it is only the recognition of this that entitles us to look for any lasting security."

Mackenzie advances beyond the organic analogists when he describes the ways in which society is organic. As a social philosopher he has contributed important pattern-ideas. He has escaped from the foibles of the organic analogy and at the same time indicated the values that lie beneath that concept.

This chapter deals with a significant period in the history of social thought. The biology of the time was very faulty and the sociological applications of biological knowledge were consequently of little merit. The early years of the present century were characterized by noteworthy

¹⁸ That is, thought about "individuals."

improvements in biological thinking. The facts about the laws of heredity and variation increased in number; a science of heredity was established. The first decade of the present century also marks the rise of the science of eugenics. In a later chapter the contributions of recent scientific biology, and particularly of eugenics, to social thought will be presented.

ORGANIC EVOLUTION¹⁹

Of the three broadly-distinguished kinds of Evolution outlined in *First Principles*, we come now to the third. The first kind, Inorganic Evolution, which, had it been dealt with, would have occupied two volumes, one dealing with Astrogeny and the other with Geogeny, was passed over because it seemed undesirable to postpone the more important applications of the doctrine for the purpose of elaborating those less important applications which logically precede them. The four volumes succeeding *First Principles*, have dealt with Organic Evolution: two of them with those physical phenomena presented by living aggregates, vegetal and animal, of all classes; and the other two with those more special phenomena distinguished as psychical, which the most evolved organic aggregates display. We now enter on the remaining division—Superorganic Evolution.

Although this word is descriptive, and although in *First Principles*, Part III, I used it with an explanatory sentence, it will be well here to exhibit its meaning more fully.

While we are occupied with the facts displayed by an individual organism during its growth, maturity, and decay, we are studying Organic Evolution. If we take into account, as we must, the actions and reactions going on between this organism and organisms of other kinds which its life puts it in relations with, we still do not go beyond the limits of Organic Evolution. Nor need we consider that we exceed these limits on passing to the phenomena that accompany the rearing of offspring; though here, we see the germ of a new order of phenomena. While recognizing the fact that some of the products of parental cooperation foreshadow processes of a class beyond the simply organic; and while recognizing the fact that some of the products of parental cooperation such as nests, foreshadow products of superorganic class; we may fitly regard Superorganic Evolution

¹⁹ Reprinted by permission from Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, D. Appleton and Company, 1914, Vol. I.

as commencing only when there arises something more than the combined efforts of parents. Of course no absolute separation exists. If there has been Evolution, that form of it here distinguished as superorganic must have come by insensible steps out of the organic. But we may conveniently mark it off as including all those processes and products which imply the coordinated actions of many individuals. (pp. 3, 4)

Let us now return and sum up the reasons for regarding a society as an organism.

It undergoes continuous growth. As it grows, its parts become unlike: it exhibits increase of structure. The unlike parts simultaneously assume activities of unlike kinds. These activities are not simply different, but their differences are so related as to make one another possible. The reciprocal aid thus given causes mutual dependence of the parts. And the mutually dependent parts, living by and for one another, form an aggregate constituted on the same general principle as is an individual organism. The analogy of a society to an organism becomes still clearer on learning that every organism of appreciable size is a society; and on further learning that in both, the lives of the units continue for some time if the life of the aggregate is suddenly arrested, while if the aggregate is not destroyed by violence, its life greatly exceeds in duration the life of its units. Though the two are contrasted as respectively discrete and concrete and though there results a difference in the ends subserved by the organization, there does not result a difference in the laws of the organization; the required mutual influences of the parts, not transmissible in a direct way, being, in a society, transmitted in an indirect way. (p. 462)

But now let us drop this alleged parallelism between individual organizations and social organizations. I have used the analogies elaborated, but as a scaffolding to help in building up a coherent body of sociological inductions. Let us take away the scaffolding: the inductions will stand by themselves.

We saw that societies are aggregates which grow; that in the various types of them there are great varieties in the growths reached; that types of successively larger sizes result from the aggregation and re-aggregation of those of smaller sizes; and that this increase by coalescence, joined with interstitial increase, is the process through which have been formed the vast civilized nations.

Along with increase of size in societies goes increase of structure. Primitive hordes are without established distinctions of parts. With growth of them into tribes habitually come some unlikenesses; both in the powers and occupations of their members. Unions of tribes are followed by more unlikenesses, governmental and industrial—

social grades running through the whole mass, and contrasts between the differently-occupied parts in different localities. Such differentiations multiply as the compounding progresses. They proceed from the general to the special. First the broad division between ruling and ruled; then within the ruling part divisions into political, religious, military, and within the ruled part divisions into food producing classes and handicraftsmen; then within each of these divisions minor ones, and so on.

Passing from the structural aspect to the functional aspect, we note that so long as all parts of a society have like natures and activities, there is hardly any mutual dependence, and the aggregate scarcely forms a vital whole. As its parts assume different functions they become dependent on one another, so that injury to one hurts others; until, in highly evolved societies, general perturbation is caused by derangement of any portion. This contrast between undeveloped and developed societies, arises from the fact that with increasing specification of functions comes increasing inability in each part to perform the functions of other parts.

The organization of every society begins with a contrast between the division which carries on relations, habitually hostile, with environing societies, and the division which is devoted to procuring necessities of life; and during the earlier stages of development these two divisions constitute the whole. Eventually there arises an intermediate division serving to transfer products and influences from part to part. And in all subsequent stages, evolution of the two earlier systems of structures depends on evolution of this additional system.

While the society as a whole has the character of its sustaining system determined by the character of its environment, inorganic and organic, the respective parts of this system differentiate in adaptation to local circumstances; and, after primary industries have been thus localized and specialized, secondary industries dependent on them arise in conformity with the same principle. Further, as fast as societies become compounded and re-compounded, and the distributing system develops, the parts devoted to each kind of industry, originally scattered, aggregate in the most favorable localities; and the localized industrial structures, unlike the governmental structures, grow regardless of the original lines of division.

Increase of size, resulting from the massing of groups, necessitates means of communication; both for achieving combined offensive and defensive actions, and for exchange of products. Faint tracks, then paths, rude roads, finished roads, successively arise; and as fast as intercourse is thus facilitated, there is a transition from direct barter to trading carried on by a separate class; out of which evolves a

complex mercantile agency of wholesale and retail distributors. The movement of commodities effected by this agency, beginning as a slow flux to and reflux from certain places at long intervals, passes into rhythmical, regular, rapid currents; and materials for sustentation distributed hither and thither, from being few and crude become numerous and elaborated. Growing efficiency of transfer with greater variety of transferred products increases the mutual dependence of parts at the same time that it enables each part to fulfil its function better.

Unlike the sustaining system, evolved by converse with the organic and inorganic environments, the regulating system is evolved by converse, offensive and defensive, with envioning societies. In primitive headless groups temporary chieftainship results from temporary war; chronic hostilities generate permanent chieftainship; and gradually from the military control results the civil control. Habitual war, requiring prompt combination in the actions of parts, necessitates subordination. Societies in which there is little subordination disappear, and leave outstanding those in which subordination is great; and so there are produced, societies in which the habit fostered by war and surviving in peace, brings about permanent submission to a government. The centralized regulating system thus evolved, is in early stages the sole regulating system. But in large societies which have become predominantly industrial, there is added a decentralized regulating system for the industrial structures; and this, at first subject in every way to the original system, acquires at length substantial independence. Finally there arises for the distributing structures also, an independent controlling agency.

Societies fall firstly into the classes of simple, compound, doubly-compound, trebly-compound; and from the lowest the transition to the highest is through these stages. Otherwise, though less definitely, societies may be grouped as militant and industrial; of which the one type in its developed form is organized on the principle of compulsory cooperation, while the other in its developed form is organized on the principle of voluntary cooperation. The one is characterized not only by a despotic central power, but also by unlimited political control of personal conduct; while the other is characterized not only by a democratic or representative central power, but also by limitation of political control over personal conduct.

Lastly, we noted the corollary that change in the predominant social activities brings metamorphosis. If, where the militant type has not elaborated into so rigid a form as to prevent change, a considerable industrial system arises, there come mitigations of the coercive restraints characterizing the militant type, and weakening of its structures. Conversely, where an industrial system largely devel-

oped has established freer social forms, resumption of offensive and defensive activities causes reversion towards the militant type.

And now, summing up the results of this general survey, let us observe the extent to which we are prepared by it for further inquiries.

The many facts contemplated unite in proving that social evolution forms a part of evolution at large. Like evolving aggregates in general, societies show integration, both by simple increase of mass and by coalescence and re-coalescence of masses. The change from homogeneity to heterogeneity is multitudinously exemplified; up from the simple tribe, alike in all its parts, to the civilized nation, full of structural and functional unlikenesses. With progressing integration and heterogeneity goes increasing coherence. We see the wandering group dispersing, dividing, held together by no bonds, the tribe with parts made more coherent by subordination to a dominant man; the cluster of tribes united in a political plexus under a chief with sub-chiefs; and so on up to the civilized nation, consolidated enough to hold together for a thousands years or more. Simultaneously comes increasing definiteness. Social organization is at first vague; advance brings settled arrangements which grow slowly more precise; customs pass into laws which, while gaining fixity, also become more specific in their applications to varieties of actions; and all institutions, at first confusedly intermingled, slowly separate, at the same time that each within itself marks off more distinctly its component structures. Thus in all respects is fulfilled the formula of evolution. There is progress towards greater size, coherence, multiformity, and definiteness.

Besides these general truths, a number of special truths have been disclosed by our survey. Comparisons of societies in their ascending grades have made manifest certain cardinal facts respecting their growths, structures, and functions—facts respecting the system of structures, sustaining, distributing, regulating, of which they are composed; respecting the relations of these structures to the surrounding conditions and the dominant forms of social activities entailed; and respecting the metamorphoses of types caused by changes in the activities. The inductions arrived at, thus constituting the rude outline in Empirical Sociology, show that in social phenomena there is a general order of coexistence and sequence; and that therefore social phenomena form the subject-matter of a science reducible, in some measure at least, to the deductive form.

Guided, then, by the law of evolution in general, and, in subordination to it, guided by the foregoing inductions, we are now prepared for following out the synthesis of social phenomena. We must begin with those simplest ones presented by the evolution of the family. (pp. 592-597)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. Darwin's meaning of the "fittest to survive."
2. Darwin's "social cooperation" theory.
3. The chief phases of Spencer's law of evolution.
4. The most valid of the four "likenesses" in Spencer's organic analogy.
5. The chief "unlikenesses" in the organic analogy.
6. The meaning of the prolongation of infancy concept.
7. The significance of "foresight" as a social value.
8. An evaluation of Lilienfeld's "social capitalization" theory.
9. The strength and weakness of Lilienfeld's "social pathology" concept.
10. The leading difference between Schaeffle's and Spencer's thought about organic analogies.
11. The most important of Mackenzie's three "lines of progress."
12. The chief of Mackenzie's "hindrances to progress."
13. The outstanding contribution of biology in the nineteenth century to social thought.

CHAPTER XVII

THE SOCIOLOGY OF LESTER F. WARD

THE NAME of Lester F. Ward (1841-1913) stands forth between the old and new eras of social thought. Ward belongs to both the old and new. He adopted Comtean positivism and built in part upon Spencer's evolutionary principles, but opposed Spencer's *laissez faire* ideas and his evolutionary determinism, especially in regard to education. Perhaps his most notable work was the way in which he shocked a Spencerian-tinged world of social thought into a new method of thinking.

Ward became the ardent advocate of social telesis. Man can modify, defeat, or hasten the processes of nature. Ward brought the concept of dynamic sociology to the attention of the world. Although he was interested in social statics, his primary concern was in the fact that man through the use of his intelligence can transform not only the natural world but the social world, and that he can harness not only the natural forces to social ends, but even the social forces to social purposes. Hence it is that Ward holds rank today, despite his monistic philosophy and his false psychological premises, as one of the world's leading sociologists.

Lester F. Ward was born in Joliet, Illinois. He received a limited schooling, and early went to work, first on a farm and then as a wheelwright. He manifested an unusual liking for books and to a great extent was self-educated. He entered the employment of the United States Government, where he remained for more than forty years, after he was honorably discharged from service in the Civil War. In the Government service he held the positions of

geologist and paleontologist. Despite his strenuous and efficient work for the Government, he found time to think through and write out an elaborate sociological system of thought.

Ward's published works in sociology began with his *Dynamic Sociology* (1883) and ended with the *Glimpses of the Cosmos* (1913) in several volumes, which, with the exception of Volume I, have been published posthumously. The intermediate books of importance in order were: *Pure Sociology*, *Applied Sociology*, and *Psychic Factors in Civilization*.

Ward was characterized by an impressive command of his subject and "a terrific mental drive." In 1906, he began the unique experiment of teaching sociology at the age of sixty-five. As a professor of sociology he served Brown University until his death—for a period of seven years. He was supported by the indefatigable assistance of his wife, as shown by the many files which she kept of "Reviews and Press Notices," "Autograph Letters," and "Biography."

DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY

Ward was led to produce *Dynamic Sociology* because of his observation that preceding 1875 there was an essential sterility in social science thinking. Ward observed that the prevalent teachings of Herbert Spencer were static, and that the ideas of Spencer's American disciples were only passively dynamic. Ward believed that before the science of society could be truly established the active dynamic factors must be described. A science which fails to benefit mankind is lifeless. To save sociology from the lifelessness which it was manifesting, Ward wrote *Dynamic Sociology*. He contemplated social phenomena "as capable of intelligent control by society itself in its own interest."¹ His main thesis in *Dynamic Sociology* is "the necessity for universal education as the one clear, overshadowing, and

¹ Lester F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Appleton, 1911, Vol. I, pp. xxv ff.

immediate social duty to which all others are subordinate." He argued for a truly progressive system of popular scientific education.² He declared that not one-hundredth of the facts which original research has already brought forth are today obtainable by a one-hundredth of the members of society, and hence not one truth in ten thousand is fully apprehended.³

The prevailing doctrine in social thought, that of *laissez faire*, as championed by Spencer, drew forth Ward's best intellectual efforts as a challenger. Ward protested against the teaching that natural forces are operating only as elements in the all-powerful evolutionary process. He pointed out that man is distinguished from the animals by the development of his psychical nature, i. e., of his foresight and reason. He demonstrated that by this development man is able to master and regulate the operation of the blind evolutionary forces. Hence, the doctrine of *laissez faire* is not only false but pernicious. It defeats social progress. The truth is, said Ward, society is able to improve itself, and it should set itself scientifically at once to the opportunity.

Passive, or negative, progress is represented by the social forces operating in their natural freedom, subject only to general evolutionary laws.⁴ Active, or positive, progress is represented by the social forces guided by conscious human purposes. Social statics deals with the nature of social order; social dynamics treats of the laws of social progress. Social dynamics concerns itself with two types of studies. One line analyzes and describes what is going on in society under the influence of natural laws—this is pure sociology. It is pure diagnosis; it has nothing to do with what society ought to be. It describes the phenomena and laws of society as they are.⁵ The other procedure dis-

² Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 22, 23.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 56, 57.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 60; Ward, *Pure Sociology*, Macmillan, 1914, p. 4.

cusses the application of human purpose to the natural social forces—this is applied sociology. It studies the art of applying the active, or positive, forces to the natural evolution of society. This method is distinctly a human process and “depends wholly on the action of man himself.” Applied sociology treats of social ends and purposes.

Pure sociology describes the spontaneous development of society; applied sociology deals with the artificial means of accelerating the spontaneous processes in society.⁶ Pure sociology treats of achievement; applied sociology, of improvement. But applied sociology is not social reform; “it does not itself apply sociological principles, it seeks only to show how they may be applied.” It lays down principles as guides to social action. The carrying of these principles into social and political practice is social reform.

The distinction is now clear between natural and artificial progress.⁷ The former is a blind growth; the latter, a purposeful manufacture. One is a genetic process; the other, a teleological process. One is characterized by increasing differentiation; the other, by a process of calculation. Artificial progress is considered superior to natural progress.

Ward was a monist. He believed in the absolute unity of nature, from the revolutions of celestial orbs to the vicissitudes of social customs and laws.⁸ He held that “life is a property of matter,” and naïvely declared that “it is simply the result of the movements going on among the molecules composing a mass of protoplasm.”⁹ Psychic phenomena are “the relations which subsist among the material molecules of the brain and nervous system and between these and the material objects of the outside world. . . .” Since mind is relational, it is immaterial,

⁶ Lester F. Ward, *Applied Sociology*, Ginn, 1906, pp. 5 ff.

⁷ *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 72.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

but it has matter for its basis. Relations, however, constitute the properties of matter, and hence mind, as well as life, is a property of matter.¹⁰ The logical length to which Ward goes in supporting his monistic doctrine is in itself a proof of his error.

HUMAN ORIGINS

Unlike Comte, Ward believed that man originally was antisocial and completely egoistic. In the earliest stage of human existence, man lived a life almost solitary, or at least in small groups.¹¹ He was surrounded by destructive forces both inorganic and organic. Against the wild and ferocious beasts he found himself almost physically helpless. Some of his number overcame their physical defenselessness by using their "wits." Through sagacity and cunning they were able to withstand the attacks of the wild beasts, to survive, and to propagate their young. Along with increased cunning there went an increased brain size in proportion to size of body, and also an improved brain structure qualitatively.

This brain development is the essential prerequisite for perceiving the advantages of association.¹² Man early recognized the merits of association, and moved up from the solitary, or autarchic, stage of social life to the second, or constrained aggregate stage. This second stage does not contain the elements of permanency because of its forced nature. The tendencies toward association are often counteracted and at times destroyed by fierce contests for the limited natural foods. In contending that man's early ancestors were very irascible and quarrelsome beings, Ward went beyond the limits of scientific induction. In believing that altruism is an outgrowth of egoism, Ward again violates the best scientific thought. The probabil-

¹⁰ *Dynamic Sociology*, pp. 408, 409.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 464.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 452.

ities are that both egoism and altruism have developed *pari passu*, and in part from different causes. During the second stage human speech became an art. It was a natural outgrowth of the associational life.

The use of the rudiments of an established government marks the beginning of the third period in human society. For protection, tribes unified themselves under central controls. Through compulsion or interest, and for protective reasons, tribes united; the spheres of social organization thus were enlarged. But government, which was established for the purpose of securing peace, became one of the chief causes of external wars. Governments, autocratic control, and territory hunger led peoples into destructive war. The world is still in this third stage.

But some day, according to Ward, wars between nations will cease, national prejudices will soften, diversity of language will be overcome, and all governments probably will be consolidated into one. This picture represents the fourth, or ideal, level of societary life, and may never be attained. Ward cherishes the strong belief that the present national stage will be succeeded by the cosmopolitan, or pantarchic, age. Ward perceives an ultimate triumph of humanitarian sentiments, which will be also "a triumph of practical interests, that shall sweep away the present barriers of language, national pride, and natural uncongeniality, and unite all nations in one vast social aggregate with a single political organization."¹³

SOCIAL FORCES

Ward's analysis of social evolution rests on his conception of the social forces. The primary social force is desire. Desire is the expression of any of the native impulses which, at the given moment, have not been gratified. This striving for gratification constitutes desire and the moving force in the societary world. "Desire is the essential basis of all actions."

¹³ *Dynamic Sociology*, p. 467.

The desires are numerous and complex, but upon examination lend themselves to classification. There are two fundamental and primary sets of desires, the nutritive and the reproductive. The end of the first is to preserve the individual; and of the second, to preserve and maintain the race.

"The first desire of all creatures is for nourishment." This desire remains dominant throughout life. The human race, Ward summarizes, spent its infancy—thousands of years—in the single pursuit of subsistence.¹⁴ When the natural food supply failed, man was forced to be inventive and to labor or die. Too many individuals in one place meant either the migration of some individuals or that others must compel nature through labor to increase her normal yield of subsistence.¹⁵

The nutritive desire has led man to labor. Labor, however, is not the natural condition of man.¹⁶ Work, according to Ward, is unnatural and irksome. The constant spur of hunger transformed man into a working man. To be useful, however, work must be continuous and applied steadily to a given object until that object is attained. This process is the essence of invention, the highest and most useful form of labor. Without wings, claws for digging, or valuable weapons of offense and defense, man has had but one line of advance open to him, namely, invention, whereby he could overcome his limitations and master nature.

Ward overlooked what Veblen has called the instinct of workmanship.¹⁷ Man has a desire to do, to achieve, to be active—only so can he escape the terrors of *ennui*. He secures illimitable enjoyment from seeing the crude

¹⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 474.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 486.

¹⁶ *Pure Sociology*, p. 270; also *Dynamic Sociology*, II:541.

¹⁷ *The Instinct of Workmanship*, Macmillan, 1914.

materials of nature change under the manipulations of his hand and mind into works of art.

Nevertheless, the need of nutrition was probably the chief factor in the invention of tools and in the storing of food against the hungry day. These tools and stores constituted property. Property at once represented power. The law of acquisition soon exerted a great force. Intense rivalries in acquiring property developed. "The grand rivalry was for the object, not the method; for the end regardless of the means."¹⁸ Through the centuries and until the present hour, the morality of obtaining wealth has rarely risen to the morality of many other phases of life.

SOCIAL DECEPTION

Deception early came into prominence. We deceive an animal in order to catch and domesticate or kill him. We deceive a fellow human being and take his hard earned property away from him. Society, blindly, has praised deception even when used by one individual against the welfare of his fellows. Society has honored him who could "drive a bargain."

Ward declared that the desire to acquire property regardless of the method is as strong as ever.¹⁹ The only changes that have come are a mitigation of the harshness of the method and the rise of compulsory laws and codes which force individuals to "drive their bargains" and to practice their deceptions within prescribed limits. The acquisitive impulses have created major social evils, as evidenced by "the exceeding indigence of the poor and the exceeding opulence of the rich," and by a relatively large proportion of non-producing rich people to the entire number of wealthy."²⁰ On the other hand, those who are poor because they are indolent are only a small proportion of those who are poor and industrious.

¹⁸ *Pure Sociology*, p. 497.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 516.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 518 ff.

The evils of acquisitiveness cannot be overcome by softening the human heart. Ward would make it impossible for persons to take away the property of others by making it to the interest of all persons not to act in that way. And then he would teach them, through the social sciences, that such conduct is against their own highest development.

Ward pronounced the money-making tendency one of the most useful and at the same time "one of the coarsest and cheapest of all mental attributes."²¹ It is useful because it is "the spur of all industry and commerce"; it provides the leisure which makes intellectual pursuits possible; it encourages exploration, discovery, and invention; it is the basis of all large business undertakings; and it has been an essential force in the development of civilization. Since civilization is so exclusively artificial, money can buy a vast variety of objects of human desire; hence, the possession of money is strenuously sought.²²

On the other hand, money-making confers a pleasure which after all is sordid.²³ It often leads to avarice. It has produced a pecuniary inequality of mankind which socially admits of little justification. From a moral viewpoint the great struggle for pecuniary possession has been man's greatest curse.²⁴ Because of it, many infants have opened their eyes as millionaires in a world of boundless plenty; others (equally worthy) have opened their eyes as beggars in a world of abject poverty.

SOCIAL PARASITES

Society becomes divided into two main classes: the industrials and the non-industrials, or parasites. The non-industrials use their cunning in various ways.²⁵ The leading non-industrial modes of acquisition are these: robbery, theft, war, statecraft, priestcraft, and monopoly.

²¹ *Pure Sociology*, p. 520.

²² *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 341.

²³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 520.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 522.

²⁵ Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 579.

This list represents the chronological order and history of non-industrial types of acquisition.

Robbery is the coarsest manner of acquisition. Theft represents the lowest order of cunning. Wars of conquest are robbery on so large a scale that they arouse group patriotism. Cunning and treachery in war have given way to strategy. Statecraft has often been characterized by the egoistic attempts of a few shrewd persons, who have devised means for supplying the wants of the many, and appropriated rich rewards for themselves from "the befriended and grateful community." Priestcraft as represented by many of the priests of Brahma, Buddha, Osiris, Ormuzd, Mahomet, and even Jesus have developed successful modes of acquisition. They have often stood at the gates of death, and for pay guaranteed to the stricken and fearful friends of a departed loved one a safe journey through the perils following death. Monopoly takes cunning advantage of a scarcity of the means of subsistence, or creates an artificial and false scarcity. Monopoly has organized the fields of transportation, exchange, finance, labor, manufacture.

The non-industrials cooperate better than the industrials. The latter, unfortunately, do not understand the principles of cooperation very well and do not have the intelligence to carry them into practical operation. They receive less education than the non-industrials; the years of their industrial apprenticeship are taken from their school days. After their apprenticeship begins, the fatigue of their labor gives them little time or energy for intellectual improvement.²⁶ In pronouncing cooperation the product of superior intelligence Ward neglects the rôle played by the gregarious, parental, and related social impulses. Ward sees only part of the truth when he calls competition a natural law, and cooperation artificial. He wisely observes, however, that those who cooperate thrive

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 579.

at the expense of those who compete.²⁷ In the same way that individuals cooperate in order to secure their own gain, society must organize to secure the progress of all.

The second primary set of fundamental forces is the reproductive. These operate for the future and for the species. In animals they operate without arousing shame or modesty. Among human beings they are manipulated through the agencies of the reason and the imagination and give rise to the sentiments of shame and modesty.²⁸ They are so clouded in secrecy that they arouse dangerous forms of curiosity.

Among animals the choice of mates is largely determined by the females. In fact, among the lowest types of animals there are no males. Among certain higher forms of animal life the male appears as a mere adjunct. But among human beings, male sexual selection is developed. This change in sexual selection is one of the differences between the brute and the human worlds. This transition is explained by the fact that the higher a being rises in the scale of development the more sensitive its organism becomes, and by the correlated fact that the male human being through his reason is able to arouse and satisfy a thousand desires of the female, and thus cause her to look to him for "that protection and those favors which he alone can confer."²⁹

FORMS OF LOVE

In the human world the reproductive forces have first produced a crude sexual love, animal in its nature, but far-reaching in its basic implications. Sexual love is an unconscious but dominant factor in courtship. In its refined form, and modified by the addition of genuine but often short-lived affective elements, it becomes romantic love.

²⁷ *Pure Sociology*, p. 594.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 606 ff.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 615.

Romantic love, according to Ward, unfits lovers for the normal pursuits of life. While under its spell they are unable to enjoy anything but each other's presence. "The man is unfitted for business, the woman for social life, and both for intellectual pursuits. The only spur that can make either party pursue other things is the sense of doing something that the other desires."³⁰

In the sense that natural, or sexual, love becomes the basis of romantic love, so romantic love in turn represents the genesis of a still higher form of love, namely, conjugal love. The love of a man for his wife or of a woman for her husband is, however, fundamentally different from romantic love. It is more stable, less disturbing to the normal processes of life, and makes the home and the family socially productive institutions. It often reaches a high state of refinement and develops its beauty of content from the sharing together by husband and wife of great joys and sorrows.

Maternal love, an outgrowth of maternity, manifests startling degrees of courage even among animals. Under the spur of the need for defending her young, a mother will often perform miraculous deeds. In its highest form maternal love manifests a remarkable strength throughout life and an extra-human power of forgiveness.

Then there is consanguineal love, which according to Ward, includes paternal and fraternal affections. It becomes the blood bond or feeling of attachment that exists among the members of a primitive kinship group, and it leads to feelings of race and world solidarity and attachment.

Ward also pointed out that for each of these forms of love there is a correlative hate. This force of repulsion is often greater than the correlative love. Jealousy often leads to violent and destructive actions. Race hatred frequently becomes a vicious, brutal, and widespread sentiment that paralyzes all tendencies toward world progress.

³⁰ *Pure Sociology*, p. 403.

Marriage institutions have developed from the operation of the reproductive forces. Polygamy, polyandry, and a score of other types of marriage have arisen, although monogamy has demonstrated itself to be the superior type of marriage institution.

SEX DIFFERENCES

The reproductive forces have led to numerous sexuo-social inequalities. Men and women have come to occupy separate spheres of activity, and to represent distinct social conditions.³¹ Although the two sexes live together and appear to be companions, they are in fact dwelling in separate worlds and on different planes. There are several principal inequalities. (1) There is an inequality of dress, which has loaded woman with ornaments and caused her an enormous amount of disease and suffering. (2) There is an inequality of duties, which has kept woman confined to the house, and made a slave or a pampered pet of her. (3) There is an inequality of education. Society has shut woman, in the past, from all opportunities for gaining knowledge by experience. Moreover, society has seen fit to debar women from the knowledge that is acquired by instruction. (4) There is an inequality of rights which has meant that women have been discriminated against before the law. Without direct representation in legislatures, women have suffered in proprietary matters. (5) There is a general sex inequality which has at times made woman the property or the slave of man. In short, women have been denied, until within recent years, entrance to the higher intellectual forms of activity and at the same time have been denied social and political opportunities.

Reverting to Ward's classification of desires, we may now proceed to a discussion of the third set of forces, the sociogenetic. In contradistinction to the nutritive and the reproductive desires, or to the ontogenetic and the phylogenetic forces, respectively, the sociogenetic forces lead di-

³¹ *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, p. 641.

rectly to race, or social, improvement. The ontogenetic forces guarantee individual preservation; the phylogenetic, race preservation; and the sociogenetic, race and social progress. Ward classified the sociogenetic forces as moral, esthetic, and intellectual.³²

Morality is either racial or individual. Race morality is largely an outgrowth of custom. Duty, according to Ward, is conduct favorable to race safety, while virtue is "an attitude of life and character consistent with the preservation and continuance of man on earth."³³ Individual morality on the other hand, is based on altruism. Altruism is the expenditure of energy by one person in behalf of other persons, and involves the power of representing the psychic states of others to one's self. Morality leads to humanitarianism, whose aim is meliorism. Meliorism aims to reorganize society so that the minimum pain and the maximum enjoyment may be insured. Meliorism is a non-sentimental improvement or amelioration of the human or social state.³⁴

Ward holds that the esthetic forces consist of a desire for open or deep-seated symmetrical forms. Behind a landscape which at first appears irregular and jagged, there is a fundamental symmetry and balance. Sculpture, painting, and landscape-gardening are largely imitations of nature. Architecture, however, emphasizes straight lines, regular curves, and other symmetrical and geometrical figures.³⁵ Because of the invention of popular musical instruments, music is open to and enjoyed by the common people. No such invention, unfortunately, has taken place in the fields of painting and sculpture. These realms are limited to the highest geniuses and "their choicest productions appropriated by the few who combine wealth with taste."³⁶

³² *Pure Sociology*, Ch. XV.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 420.

³⁴ Lester F. Ward, *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, Ginn, 1906, Ch. XXXIV.

³⁵ *Dynamic Sociology*, Vol. I, pp. 669, 670.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 473, 474.

INTELLECTUAL FORCES

The intellectual forces are chiefly the desires to know. These desires are threefold: (1) to acquire knowledge, (2) to discover truth, and (3) to impart information.³⁷ The desire to acquire knowledge is perhaps strongest in the young. Youth will often learn anything, without exercising any powers of discrimination. The gratification of the desire to discover new truth yields almost divine thrills of satisfaction. There are four methods of imparting information to others, viz., (1) by conversing, (2) by teaching, (3) by lecturing, and (4) by writing.

In addition to the dynamic forces there is the directive agent in society, namely, the intellect. Ward makes a precarious distinction between the feelings and thought, or between intellect as a seat of emotion, appetite and motive power, and intellect as the organ or source of thought and ideas.³⁸ Ward's psychology is admittedly unscientific. The thought or ideational phase of the intellect Ward divorced almost absolutely from the affective aspects of consciousness. He failed to perceive the dynamic character of thought and ideas. He made thought simply the directive agent in society.

In thought, Ward found the hope of the race. Thought can restrain and control social energy. It can produce telic methods of progress which are immeasurably superior to the blind, ruthless methods of nature. The procedure of nature with unlimited resources is "to produce an enormously redundant supply, and to trust the environment to select the best."³⁹ Nature secures success through "the indefinite multiplication of chances." Hence the survival of the fittest results in a sacrifice of a great majority—a highly wasteful method. The method of mind is the reverse. Through prevision, mind utilizes all the dynamic

³⁷ *Pure Sociology*, p. 438.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 457 ff.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 469.

forces of society, that is, the human desires, in constructive, orderly ways. Social waste may be reduced, by telic methods, to a minimum. Mind can perceive the best social ends and pursue them, whereas nature works blindly. Thought has in its power the possibility of subjugating natural forces and turning them into contributors to human needs.

SOCIAL DYNAMICS

Ward developed essentially four leading principles of social dynamics and hence of societal progress. (1) The first law he called "difference of potential."⁴⁰ This term, which he borrowed from physics, refers to the difference in potential possibilities of individuals. This difference is manifested, for example, in the crossing of cultures. It disturbs social stability, and creates social liability. Sex is a device whereby a difference of potential is maintained. While asexual reproduction is characterized chiefly by repetition of forms, sexual reproduction creates changes in the stock in countless directions. The difference of potential which is caused by a crossing of strains is highly dynamic, resulting in unnumbered variations, and hence in providing endless opportunities for progress. In a similar way a cross fertilization of cultures opens many opportunities for social advancement. "Progress results from the fusion of unlike elements."⁴¹ Difference of potential, again, is illustrated in the friction of mind upon mind. Thoughts conflict, and the result is likely to be an invention.

Difference of potential may lead to creative synthesis.⁴² When two elements are joined, the result is usually more than the sum of the parts. The combining of hydrogen and oxygen in given proportions produces water, which manifests characteristics that are not possessed by either of the constituents. Likewise, the combining of two ideas

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 231 ff.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 79 ff.

by the human mind may result in a new idea, and thus in progress.

(2) A second dynamic principle is innovation, which has its biological homologue in the sport, or mutant. Throughout nature and society, fortuitous variations occur. Life at times breaks over the bounds of pure heredity—the result is innovation. Variation, in the sense of mutation or innovation, appears to be due to the exuberance of life. At times nature appears to react against being bound by rigid laws of heredity, to defy her own rules, and to become rampant.

Social innovation is invention. New ideas often appear accidentally. The mind in its exuberance coins new phrases, catches new glimpses of reality, and creates ideas which are contrary to all that is established and supposedly true.

(3) Ward's third law of progress is called conation. This concept refers to social effort which is carried on naturally to satisfy desire, to preserve or continue life, to modify surroundings. In satisfying normally the gregarious desires a person advances the cause of social progress. In preserving the life of the child, the mother presumably contributes to the welfare of the race. The sacrifices which parents make in behalf of children are efforts which further the welfare of society. Every constructive modification of either the physical or spiritual environment benefits mankind. Conation is thus a term which covers a multitude of activities that are performed in the ordinary course of daily life, and which unconsciously to the doers are adding to the sum total of human welfare.

SOCIAL TELESIS

(4) The fourth dynamic principle which Ward described has already been discussed, namely, the principle of social telesis. The possibilities in social telesis are illimitable. Social telesis can turn the passions and desires of men into socially useful channels. These passions are

bad only when directed to wrong ends. They are like fire—they can destroy or they can refine. If individuals as members of society could develop prevision and work together for societary ends, they would be able to transform the world.

Ward believed that greatness does not rest so much in intellectual power as in emotional force. He had great faith in persons of average intellectual ability who have initiative. It thus becomes the part of wisdom for society to educate wisely the average intelligence. Ward challenged the idea that only a very few persons are geniuses and that these individuals, by virtue of their superior abilities, will uniformly overcome their environments. He held that genius is largely a matter of focalization of psychic energy, and that by this process all persons may have the honor of contributing something valuable to civilization.

Ward pointed out that geniuses are as likely to appear in one social stratum as in another, among the poor as among the wealthy, in the hovel as in the palace. He also demonstrated how society allows genius and talent to be ruthlessly destroyed among the lower classes through denial of opportunity. As a solution for this problem, Ward advocated social distribution, that is, the distribution of all useful knowledge to all humanity everywhere. A scientific system needs to be perfected in order to secure a better distribution of the great volume of valuable knowledge which has already been discovered. Ward was a strong advocate of the socialization of education.

In an article which appeared in the month following his death, Ward discussed his idea of social progress under the terms, *eugenics*, *euthenics*, and *eudemics*.⁴³ He supplemented a theory of sound birth with a theory of sound environment. The practical result in society would be a state of eudemics, or a society of sound people.

⁴³ Lester F. Ward, "Eugenics, Euthenics, and Eudemics." *American Journal of Sociology*, 18:737-54.

Ward was an advocate of sociocracy. By sociocracy he did not mean a democracy or a rulership that is likely to be conducted selfishly by the individuals who exercise sovereign power. Sociocracy connotes a rulership of the people in which each person is governed primarily not by his own interests but by the interests of society.

Achievement was a large concept in Ward's mind. He made "achievement" one of the chief goals of human life. By achievement in behalf of human progress a person may gain social immortality. The masses of humanity are achieving little or nothing in behalf of society.

In this treatment of Ward's sociological thought it has not been the aim of the writer to enter upon a dissertation regarding the abstract and philosophical implications that are involved in the subject matter. Neither has he attempted a polemic against the weaknesses in Ward's thinking except to note the defective monistic philosophy and the erroneous "faculty," psychology. It has been his purpose to let the strong, constructive elements in Ward's system of sociology speak clearly and effectively for themselves.

SOCIOLOGY⁴⁴

The science of Sociology, in so far as it can be said to have had a definite origin, was founded by Auguste Comte, who first made use of the term in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, Vol. IV, p. 185, third edition, written in 1838. The conceptions on which it rests, however, are much older, and Comte himself ascribes their first distinct enunciation to Montesquieu and Condorcet.

The essential element in the idea of a social science is, of course, the recognition of the regularity and uniformity of social phenomena. Statistics had proved this with respect to certain classes of these phenomena, and there had been many before Comte who had not shrunk from declaring that the apparent irregularity and arbitrary nature of human actions and social movements were due to the greater complexity of this class of facts, and the consequent inability of man to reduce them to general laws. (pp. 1-2)

⁴⁴ Reprinted with permission from L. F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, D. Appleton and Company, 1915, Vol. I.

The leading scientists and philosophers now realize and announce that all possible observable phenomena have real antecedents, and that therefore the work of investigating them is no longer a hopeless task, as it certainly would be if the possibility of the absolute independence of any phenomena were admitted.

The leading thinkers of our time also now concede and declare that the only ultimate object which can be successfully maintained for human effort is the improvement of the human race upon this planet.

Under the healthy stimulus of these two cardinal principles, the work of organizing human knowledge is now progressing with great promise of soon reaching a high state of completeness. Not until the work of classifying the sciences could be undertaken with the clear recognition that they may be arranged in some sort of connected and ascending series, whereby an acquaintance with subordinate stages becomes essential to a complete appreciation of the higher ones, could any satisfactory arrangement of the groups of phenomena be made or expected.

Not until such a clew was discovered and laid hold of, as the purpose of elevating humanity furnishes, could sufficient energy or perseverance be infused into the effort to insure for it a successful issue. The conception of a universal causal dependence of phenomena when transformed into an active working principle takes the shape of a universal theory of development or evolution. The high utilitarian motive, focalizing all considerations in the good of man, can have no other effect than to establish as the ultimate science, for the perfection of which all other sciences exist, the science of human life, which takes the form and name of sociology.

Thus, with the principle of evolution as a law and guide, and with the doctrine of "meliorism" (Comte, Vol. II, p. 468) as an incentive and motive-power the organization of all facts, forces and phenomena into an orderly and connected system is today progressing with certain and rapid steps. (pp. 8-9)

SOCIAL FORCES

The motive of all action is feeling. All great movements in history are preceded and accompanied by strong feelings. And it is those persons whose feelings have been most violent that have exerted the greatest influence upon the tone and character of society. Purely intellectual feeling is never sufficient directly to sway the multitude. The historical example which furnishes the nearest approach to this is that of ancient Greece. But even of this we have, in the surviving literature of that age, a very inadequate and superficial criterion.

The fact alone that feeling so far prevailed over intellect as to require the sacrifice of Socrates to its demands gives us a faint glimpse of the other unrecorded exactions which it must have made. Throughout all time past, the mass of mankind has been carried along by the power of sentiment. It has never been deeply moved, at least directly, by that of intellect. Hence we see that the psychical agencies that have stirred up mankind have been chiefly of a religious nature. Religion is the embodied and organized state of the emotions. It represents the combined forces of human feeling. The immense success with which religious reformers have met has been due to the almost irresistible power of their emotional nature, and never to their intellectual supremacy. That this is the normal state of the public mind I shall endeavor to establish in another place (Vol. II, pp. 111, 113, 123). What I desire to draw especial attention to here, is the remarkable fact that not only has the world been thus far ruled by passion and not by intellect, but that the true rulers of the world have had to be, in order to win that distinction, not merely enthusiasts and fanatics, but, in the majority of cases, insane persons, in a certain legitimate acceptance of that term. It is no longer a question among modern medical men that the remarkable actions of those men who have laid claims to divine inspiration and founded religious systems must be referred not only to a pathological but to an actually deranged condition of their minds.

The strange truth thus comes up for our contemplation that, instead of having been guided and impelled by intellect and reason throughout all the years of history, we have been ruled and swayed by the magnetic passions of epileptics and monomaniacs.

But this startling fact only shows us the more forcibly that it is feeling and not intellect which is required to influence human action. Indeed, this proposition is capable not only of a logical and a psychological, but of a truly physical, demonstration. Still, as it is somewhat obscure, it needs the aid of such an illustration as the above to bring it home to the mind. Those persons (and there are some very enlightened ones) who hope one day to see this state of society reversed, and who are looking forward to the time when intellect and reason shall assume control of society, dethroning passion and emotion, are doomed to disappointment, not only in their own time, but forever. Intellect is not an impelling but a directing force. Feeling alone can drive on the social train, whether for weal or woe. (pp. 11-12)

REFORM

All reform, which it is hoped to bring about by argument, persuasion, or any of the means available to the philosophers, must hold forth moral rather than intellectual inducements. To succeed, it

must follow in the path of all previous efforts of the kind, of the religious systems and the moral schemes of Menu, Zoroaster, Confucius, Jesus, and Mohammed. But like these great and successful systems it must be in accord with the state of society upon which it is expected to exert an influence. Any one of those systems, if attempted to be put into effect in Europe or America today, would fail at its inception. Every such scheme must bear upon it the stamp of reasonableness, proportioned to the capacities of the people. (p. 13)

EGOISM AND ALTRUISM

Egoism is the feeling which demands for self an increase of enjoyment and diminution of discomfort. Altruism is that which demands these results for others. Of course it can, and at the proper time will, be shown (Vol. II, pp. 146, 368) that, in the last analysis, egoism and altruism are one, that altruism is only an indirect or mediate form of egoism in which the motive is sympathy, i.e., a kind of feeling which results from the contemplation of suffering in others, and which is strong in proportion as the organization is delicate and refined. For this reason, and not because it is of a distinct nature, is altruism a far higher and nobler, though thus far a much less powerful, sentiment than egoism. (p. 14)

SOCIAL IMPROVEMENT

Notwithstanding the failure of all systematic attempts thus far made to secure artificially the improvement of society, still, cheerless as the prospect may seem, the only hope of success in this direction is in other systematic attempts made in the same manner, and according to the same methods by which these have been established and carried on; that is, placed in the power of the feelings which alone are capable of propelling any social operations. If this is hopeless, then must the race be left to drift on under purely natural influences, and reach any stage to which the conditions found on the planet may be capable of carrying it. Let no one, however, be deluded by the thought that this cosmical progress, even in its own slow way, can continue for ever. It will hereafter be shown (Vol. I, pp. 704, 706; II, pp. 15, 210, 272) that this swarming planet will soon see the conditions of human advancement exhausted, and the right of reaction and degeneracy ushered in, never to be again succeeded by the daylight of progress, unless something swifter and more certain than natural selection can be brought to bear upon the development of the psychic faculty, by which alone man is distinguished from the rest of the fauna of the earth and enabled to

people all parts of its surface. The resources of the globe are not inexhaustible unless zealously husbanded by the deliberative foresight of enlightened intellect. (p. 16)

The problem is to apply the vast emotional forces which are ever striving to improve society, but failing for want of the proper intellectual guidance, to some truly progressive system of machinery that shall succeed in accomplishing the desired end. As above remarked, the intellect alone can not do this. It must be joined to facts. In short, what is really required is knowledge. Knowledge is simply truth apprehended by the intellect. Intelligent mind, fortified with knowledge, is the only reliable form of the directive force. The only proper knowledge for this purpose is that which can be acquired of the materials and the forces of nature. As it is the utilizing of these which alone can secure the end sought, so the knowledge of these is the prime necessity in the exercise of a directive control over human zeal for the improvement of mankind. Hence the diffusion of knowledge among the masses of mankind is the only hope we have of securing any greater social progress than that which nature vouchsafes through its own process of selection. But the knowledge referred to is just that which is embraced in the word science, and the diffusion of it is the process which goes by the name of education. Therefore, the first element of a truly progressive system is popular scientific education. (pp. 21-22)

It is customary in our day to recommend in the strongest terms the extension to all our higher institutions of the facilities for increasing knowledge, for independent original research (Vol. II, p. 565). This is well, but the fact is that not one-hundredth part of the facts which original research has already brought forth are today obtainable by the one-hundredth part of the members of society, so that not one truth in ten thousand is fully utilized. Why go on bringing forth new truth, when in the existing state of society it is impossible to make proper use of what we already have? It would not be difficult to demonstrate that this constant accumulation of materials for progress so far beyond the capacity of society to utilize them, or even to become conscious of their existence, exerts along with some direct benefits a large amount of indirect evil to society itself. It is like gorging the stomach to repletion in the hope that thereby nutrition may be increased. (pp. 22-23)

SOCIAL TELESIS

Now, the kind of social progress which is needed is teleological progress. The slow and imperceptible genetic progress which society has thus far made is barely sufficient to keep apace with the increase

of population. Its entire increment toward improving the condition of society is neutralized by the rapid multiplication of individuals which in itself enables the race to carry on (Vol. I, p. 703; II, p. 209). There is very little perceptible amelioration of the condition of society at large. The world does, indeed, enjoy thousands of material blessings which this unorganized progress has scattered over it; but when we consider the proletariat, when we look into great cities or out on large plantations, or visit those immense centers of production the factories, we realize that, while the intellectual and material condition of society has reached almost giddy heights, the moral or emotional condition of man has scarcely advanced at all. There still remain the overworked millions on the one hand, and the unemployed millions on the other. There are still all the depths of ignorance, poverty, drudgery, and nameless misery that have ever been the baneful concomitants of human civilization. I am aware that it will be said that all this is a necessary evil, that it arises out of the inherent depravity, the idleness, or the perversity of human nature in some of its phases, and that it is incurable. This, however, is precisely the issue. There are some who think it quite unnecessary and the result of the wholly unorganized state of society itself—that these wretched ones are simply the unfortunates who, in the great soulless struggle for existence and scramble for gain, are crowded to the wall. There are those who believe that the organization of society on such a basis as shall put these evils in the way of immediate migration and ultimate removal is not a chimera. In fact, almost every one, without admitting it, entertains notions more or less definite of this kind. Such conceptions were far more prevalent in past ages than they are in our own. The failure of all the attempts in this direction has led to much skepticism in these later times. All the moral and religious systems of which mention has been made have been nothing more or less than so many attempts to realize a teleological progress. Even if the hope of securing any improvement in this world were renounced, and all efforts concentrated on obtaining the same results in a future life, the labors of missionaries and propagandists would still be simply teleological attempts to secure artificially this great good for man. (pp. 29-31)

Why cry "Laissez faire!" as if society would ever work out its own progress? As well say to all inventors: Cease trying to control nature, let it alone and it will control itself; it will, if left undisturbed, work out, in its own good time, all the cotton-gins, reaping machines, printing-presses, and sand-blasts that are needed. Why not, because the first telegraph line and the first ocean cable failed, cry down the Wheatstones and the Fields, and say, Let these matters alone, they

will regulate themselves? In point of fact, there were many who did so exclaim, as my personal recollection of the last-named event attests; and, although they did not claim that nature would ever do these things itself, they insisted that they could never be done. But even this last is not an uncommon position on the sociological question. In the domain of physics and mechanics, of industry and commerce, we are accustomed to call such people "croakers" and "retardataires." What shall we say of them in the field of social science? If society is to be benefited by the establishment of a social science, pray, how is it to be done, except by the same means that have rendered other sciences so useful? What would be thought of a successful experimenter in physics, should he constantly maintain that, while all the phenomena with which he dealt were uniform and governed by fixed laws, it was nevertheless useless to hope that they could ever be made more beneficial to man than nature, unaided, renders them, and should perpetually characterize all who attempted this as mere meddlers with the unchangeable laws of nature? Such a position would be pronounced highly inconsistent, in view of the actual benefits which man has derived from just such artificial and meddlesome control of physical forces, and of the fact that every successful experiment, whether useful to man or not, implies and involves such extra-natural modification.

The only way in which any science has ever done any practical service has been in enabling man, by the aid of the insight and foresight it has furnished him, to control the laws and forces which that science explains, and to bring them into harmony with his own wants. The social science can form no exception to this rule; it must come strictly within its scope and purview. But how shall the social forces be controlled but by society itself, and through its own chosen agents? (pp. 53-54)

CONTROL

The practical work which sociology demands is, when reduced to its lowest terms, the organization of feeling. The human body is a reservoir of feeling which, when wholly unobstructed, is all pleasurable. There are wide degrees of difference both in the quantity and the quality of this feeling. It has its volume, pitch, and timbre. The height to which enjoyment might be carried is very great, and cannot yet be reduced to any standard of measurement. Like everything else in nature, feeling is the constant play of external forces which are perpetually buffeting against it. Checked in its natural flow it becomes pain, and this negative class of feeling, too, has all the degrees which belong to the positive or pleasurable class. The

special problem of sociology is to control these forces, to remove throughout its vast domain all those which obstruct the natural course of the feelings, to increase and intensify those which are favorable to that course, and to guard against any form of stimulation whose reaction will count more strongly against the general sum of human happiness than the stimulus itself counts in its favor.

Such is the barest outline of the real problem with which the social science must expect to grapple, so soon as it shall have secured the means by which it can successfully commence operations. (pp. 68-69)

REMUNERATION

Among other means by which progress defeats itself is the circumstance that all the labor performed in the interest of progress is unremunerative. Most of the labor incident to scientific discovery has to be done gratuitously, as it commands no price. In fact, most of it has to encounter strong opposition, so that there have been even martyrs to science. The utterance of progressive ideas is not welcomed, much less paid for. The lucrative employments are all non-progressive. Those receive most who labor solely for the maintenance of the existing status, such as lawyers, judges, officers of government; and, in civil life, merchants and various non-producing professions. In the literary world the only writers that are paid are those who describe things as they are, and the more superficial and trivial the subject written upon the greater the compensation. Those who are able to tell us how things were in the remote past, how they are to be in the remote future, or how they should be in the present—these must work for nothing, and meet with perpetual opposition besides. (p. 78)

Modern society is in such a state that not only is it the worthless that commands the pay, but the truly valuable is systematically kept out of view. Those having the least merits have the most love of applause. It is sufficient to make one believe in the alleged degeneracy of the times to see the zeal for "cheap notoriety" evinced by persons having no merits, and the willingness of society at large, through the press and in other ways, to cooperate in the work. The really meritorious person shrinks from notoriety, and scorns applause not rendered to merit alone. Yet merit is rarely sufficiently appreciated to secure its own public mention. (p. 79)

IGNORANCE AND KNOWLEDGE

Human progress is further defeated by man's ignorance of his own interests. Those who most strenuously oppose measures of reform are usually the ones who would be most benefited by their

adoption. Just as the slave often declares his preference for slavery and helps his master to rivet his chains, so the ignorant generally denounce intelligence, and do all in their power to prevent the light from reaching them. It is a paradox in matters of education that those who vote against it thus really prove their need of it. (p. 80)

The truth is, that, if they could find a parallel in biology or any other science for such a state of inequality, this would be no bar whatever to the attempt to ameliorate that state. The only practical use to which we put science is to improve upon its nature, to control all classes of forces, social forces included, to the end of bettering the conditions under which we inhabit the earth. This is true civilization, and all of it. It is rather a disgrace to civilization—which has thus redeemed almost everything else from the rude, wasteful, and heartless dominion of Nature—that it has left the relations of the sexes untouched, or has even aggravated in the human race those existing in the brute. But it is positively shameful, in such a state of things, for scientific men, Bourbon-like, to go back to the brute creation for standards of human excellence and models of social institutions.

We should congratulate ourselves that we are neither lions nor spiders nor yet cave-dwellers, but civilized men, and should seek so to shape the social policy that honor, justice, and equity should prevail, rather than the instincts of brutes or the caprices of savages. (pp. 662-663)

EDUCATION⁴⁵

The problem of education is, therefore, reduced to this: whether the members of society shall continue to pass through life surrounded only by the natural and unorganized influences which everywhere exist, by which they are indeed constantly acquiring knowledge, such as it is, and many conceptions which are not knowledge because they consist of erroneous inferences; whether they shall thus be left to form all kinds of undigested and unsystematized ideas, half of which are objectively unreal, and most of the remainder too narrow to be of any value, yet to which their conduct will rigidly correspond, producing its legitimate effect upon themselves and upon society; or, whether they shall be required to pass a portion of their early lives under a system of artificial circumstances, so regulated that the bulk of the influences which appeal to the senses and produce ideas will be both reliable and important, and from which, under no other than the normal operations of the

⁴⁵ Reprinted by permission from L. F. Ward, *Dynamic Sociology*, D. Appleton and Company, 1915, Vol. II.

mind, reliable and valuable knowledge must necessarily result, solid characters be formed, and the highest ethical and dynamic actions be induced, exerting rigidly corresponding effects upon themselves and upon society. It is, in short, the question whether the social system shall always be allowed to drift listlessly on, intrusted to the by no means always progressive influences which have developed it and brought it to its present condition or whether it shall be regarded as a proper subject of art, treated as other natural products have been treated by human intelligence, and made as much superior to nature, in this only proper sense of the word, as other artificial productions are superior to natural ones. (pp. 632-633)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The uniqueness of L. F. Ward.
2. Ward's chief sociological works.
3. The dominant social thought contributed by Ward.
4. Ward's attitude toward the laissez faire doctrine.
5. Ward's concept of "pure sociology."
6. Ward's distinctions between applied sociology and social reform.
7. Work as an "acquired characteristic."
8. Ward's estimate of money-making as a life occupation.
9. The chief characteristic of romantic love.
10. The source of the highest values of conjugal love.
11. The unique characteristic of maternal love.
12. The distinguishing phase of consanguineal love.
13. The major inequalities suffered by women.
14. The nature of duty and virtue.
15. The meaning of meliorism.
16. The leading intellectual desires.
17. The essence of creative synthesis.
18. Conation as a social thought concept.
19. Ward's concept of "social telesis."
20. The main source of "greatness."
21. The relation of eugenics and euthenics to eudemics.
22. The difference between democracy and sociocracy.

CHAPTER XVIII

ANTHROPOLOGIC SOCIOLOGY

ADDITIONAL light upon the nature of sociological thought may be secured by consulting the anthropologists, and particularly, the students of social origins. The last mentioned group of scholars have been unusually successful in making valuable contributions to sociological thought, because they have used the psychological approach.

For more than a century the anthropologists have been searching for materials and advancing theories concerning the origin of man, of conflict and cooperative tendencies, and of the early ideas and institutions of the human race. They have been aided by the investigations of the geologists and especially of the paleontologists. The ethnographers and ethnologists have also discovered important data. The findings of all these groups of investigators, as far as they relate to the main thread of this book, will be here treated essentially as a unitary contribution. There is not space to deal specifically with the work of anthropologists, such as Tylor, Morgan, Pitt-Rivers, Haddon, Frazer, Keane, and a number of other prominent authorities.

Anthropological social thought will be indicated here under several headings. As far as possible the controversial and technical theories in anthropology will be avoided. Certain of the ideas that have been advanced by Sumner, Westermarck, Hobhouse, Wundt, Boas, Lowie, Kroeber, Wissler, Goldenweiser, and Thomas will receive special attention, because they are unusually pertinent to the main theme of this volume.

SOCIAL ORIGINS

1. There is common agreement among anthropologists that man is the descendant of a branch of higher animal

life, and that the creation of man took place by a slow, evolutionary process. The slowness of this development process does not necessarily lessen the mysterious or miraculous character of it. It places the origin of the human race at a much earlier date than was once supposed—perhaps from 200,000 to 500,000 years ago. The animal inheritance of man does not deny the correlative fact that man possesses spiritual qualities not common to the highest developed animals.¹

Even the psychic equipment of man can be traced in its origin to the primates with their individual and social behavior traits. The instinctive bases of human conduct are hundreds of thousands of years old. They are so intrinsically a part of human nature that no discussion of current social problems will neglect the imperiousness of the ancient instinct heritage of the human race.

2. There is extensive anthropologic evidence that mankind had a common origin. Many authorities hold to the polygenetic origin of man. Be that as it may, the remains of the earliest human beings are found in regions extending from Java, through India, to England. The Gobi Desert to the northeast and the Nile valley to the southwest have been claimed as the original centers of the race. From the earliest centers man seems to have migrated in various directions, and finally to the Western Hemisphere. Different climatic and environmental conditions affected the migrating groups in different ways. Those who migrated into the tropical regions were retarded because of the enervating climatic factors. Those who reached the frigid zone were also retarded, or subjected to recidivism for a different reason—a harshness of living conditions and an excess of environmental obstacles. The north temperate zone with its fertile lands and its invigorating climate afforded the proper *milieu* for the development of the race.

¹ H. F. Osborn, *Men of the Old Stone Age*, Scribner, 1918, Ch. I.

3. An important question relates to the alleged potential equality of all races. If common origin of races is accepted, the question remains open whether, for example, the African races possess the same innate mental abilities as the Caucasian races. The controversy here is sharply drawn between the environmentalists and the eugenicists. Each side of the debate has collected a large body of evidence. In reality, the question apparently boils down to this: Have the many centuries of living under the enervating torrid zone conditions affected the African races so deeply that under favorable cultural circumstances they have become incapable of developing beyond a certain mental level which is lower than that attained by the Caucasian races? In the past the answer to this question has been a strong affirmative. The bulk of the evidence that has been collected in recent years indicates that the affirmative answer is incorrect.

4. It is becoming clear that every race is a composite of several races. Ethnological data show that the three grand divisions of the human race² may be subdivided into racial stocks, and into races and subraces, until more than 600 races may be described; and furthermore, that each of the 600 or more races represents an amalgamation of other races. It is evident that no clear line of racial demarcation can be drawn, and that purity of race may be a fictitious term.

RACIAL INTERMARRIAGE

5. Intermarriage of the representatives of races belonging to similar racial stocks seems advisable—according to the ethnologist. Pure bloods apparently die out. The strongest races today are those in which amalgamation has taken place recently—that is, within one thousand or two thousand years, for example, the English, or the Scotch-Irish.

² Caucasian, Mongoloid, and Negroid.

A mooted question of world importance relates to the intermarriage of the representatives of races widely different, such as the white and the yellow races, or the white and the black races. No race has yet developed out of such combinations. Race prejudices and social distinctions have produced conflicts which thus far have prevented the formation of such a race. Very few scientific data are available regarding miscegenation.

Apparently, the interbreeding of whites and blacks leads ultimately to the elimination of the racial characteristics of the blacks and to the complete dominance of the whites. There are some writers who assert that this process takes place to the gain of the lower race and to the loss of the higher race, but the last-mentioned point has not yet been proved. Miscegenation between whites and blacks occurs under such abnormal and vicious social conditions that the racial tendencies are definitely obscured.

At this point the problem of "disharmonic" types may be mentioned. The Cro-Magnon type is illustrative, for in this connection a dolichocephalic skull is combined with very broad cheek-bones.³ Mental traits may also be crossed in a similar disharmonic fashion. Intermarriage of widely different racial types may produce not only disharmonic physiques but also disharmonic mental types—the latter in particular may mean race inferiority. At any rate the problem is one still subject to research.

6. Conflict between races is primordial; conflict between races today is illustrated in national wars and race persecutions. Weaker races have often combined against a stronger race; from these experiences there has come a growing sense of the value of cooperation. Nations with high moral principles have united against a powerful neighbor nation with bullying tendencies. Out of these temporary combinations there has arisen a sense of need for permanent forms of national cooperation. This common need will ultimately lead, undoubtedly, to a permanent association of nations.

³ R. Vernean, "La race de Cro-Magnon," *Rev. Anthropologie*, I:10 ff., 1886.

The conflict between the grand divisions of the human race will probably continue for a long time to come. Sometimes it is concentrated in an antagonism between the white and yellow races; and again, it is expressed in the more fundamental struggle between Occidentalism and Orientalism.

7. The origin and development of primitive ways of doing constitute a well-cultivated field of study. Anthropologists have published an endless amount of materials on the origins of languages, religions, occupations, sex distinctions. A portion of this work has been done without an accurate understanding of the psychological principles that are involved, and hence has to be viewed with caution or neglected entirely.

FOLKWAYS

W. G. Sumner, whose argument in favor of individualism and of a *laissez faire* governmental policy, was given in Chapter XI, published in his *Folkways* a minute and extended account of primitive institutions. In the development of his theories, Sumner began with the needs of primitive peoples and with the attempts to meet these needs. Repetition of these acts leads to established ways of doing, that is, to folkways. Folkways are "the widest, most fundamental, and most important operation by which the interests of men in groups are served."⁴

Societal life consists chiefly in making folkways and applying them. Even the science of society might be defined as the study of folkways. Folkways are the product of the trial and failure method of meeting needs. They tend to become firmly established and to be passed on from generation to generation. They become traditional. They acquire all the authority which is attached to the memory of respected ancestors. Even the ghosts of ancestors stalk the earth keeping guard over the folkways. The folkways carry with them the conviction that they are essential to

⁴ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, Ginn, 1907, p. 43.

human welfare. It is this conviction which gives them the force of *mores*. Thus the folkways are not purposeful methods of securing progress but unconscious ways of meeting current exigencies; they are blindly and rigorously forced upon successive generations.

8. Races are guilty of ethnocentrism.⁵ Each race considers itself the center of mankind. It judges all other races by its own standards, and not by a higher standard that is determined by data that are representative of the best interests of all races. Ethnocentrism compels each race to exaggerate the importance of its own folkways and to depreciate the folkways of other races. For example, the Romans and Greeks called all outsiders "barbarians." The Jews considered themselves "the chosen people," and the Romans and Greeks as "pagans."

9. Sumner divided the chief motives of human action into four classes: hunger, sex passion, vanity, and fear (of ghosts and spirits). Behind each of these motives there is a set of interests. (1) Hunger led primitive man to invent simple weapons and tools, such as arrows and hoes, and then to produce and hoard more complex forms of wealth. A strange peculiarity of wealth is its effect on its creator; it seems to be stronger than its creator. It often bears him down to a slavish, materialistic, and even selfish existence. Labor in the struggle for existence is irksome and painful. Wealth and labor, however, are both commendatory when they are used to increase human welfare. In this statement Sumner overlooked the fact that wealth in order to be commendable must also be produced under constructively social conditions, and that labor in order to be praiseworthy must in its exercise be individually helpful. In other words, Sumner's test of the use to which wealth and labor are put is incomplete.

Sumner gave a new meaning to the term *slavery*. He held that "men of talent are constantly forced to serve the

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

rest. They make the discoveries and inventions, order the battles, write the books, and produce the art.”⁶ Sumner deplored the tendency to call whatever one does not like by the name of slavery. He felt that marriage slavery, rent slavery, sin slavery, are terms which are coined by a too easily disgruntled people.

(2) The sex passion leads to sex *mores* which cover the relations of men and women to each other before marriage and in marriage, and the obligations of married persons to society. The sex *mores* determine the nature of marriage and of divorce. Sumner derided sex equality. Man has a more stable nervous system than woman, is more self-absorbed, more egoistic, less tactful. Since man has greater physical strength than woman, woman was educated by circumstances in primitive days to adapt herself to the stronger sex, and to win by developing charms where her lack of comparative strength rendered her helpless. Resignation and endurance thus became acquired traits of women.

Neither renunciation nor license is the proper method of control of the sex passions. Both produce unnecessary agony. License, for example, “stimulates desire without limit, and ends in impotent agony.” Sumner advocated temperance and regulation—a regulation which comes from knowledge and judgment.

Women by necessity must bear an unequal share in the responsibilities of sex and reproduction. Likewise, men must bear an unequal share of the responsibilities of property, war, and politics. For the latter types of duties women are hampered by a delicately adjusted and combersome generative system which men do not possess.⁷

Formerly women yielded to the will of men. Today, the marital state is one of endless discussion, a defeat for one party or the other, with unpleasant effects upon life

⁶ *Folkways*, p. 266.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 343, 362.

and character. In ancient times women took pride in the supervision which their husbands exercised over them and valued themselves as hidden treasures.⁸ This protected position was considered aristocratic. Under polygamy, women looked with pity and disgust upon the man who cannot, or is unwilling to, support more than one wife.

At this point it is interesting to note that W. I. Thomas has distinguished between the sexes on the basis of differences in metabolism—men being katabolic and women anabolic. Man consumes more energy than woman.⁹ He is better fitted for bursts of energy, while woman possesses more endurance. Man's structural variability is toward motion; woman's toward reproduction. Hence, man seems to have been assigned in primitive society to tasks requiring violence and exertion, whereas to women fell the work requiring constant attention.

Civilization thus far has largely profited by the intelligence of man. If to this situation it will develop and add the intelligence of woman, it will be supplanted by a higher type of civilization. Under these conditions a large percentage of marriages will represent "the true comradeship of like minds," instead of being frequently, as now, an arrangement in which woman is treated as a pet.

(3) The motive of vanity is all-powerful. "One likes to be separated from the crowd by what is admired, and dislikes to be distinguished for what is not admired."¹⁰ To satisfy vanity, barbarian mothers "deform their babies toward an adopted type of bodily perfection." Aristocracies grow up out of appeals to vanity. An aristocracy is a group of persons closely united who define the possession of things for which they are admired and which the masses do not possess. Vanity leads to all types of absurdities and indecencies in dress. Teeth are knocked out for the sake of appeasing vanity. An Indian woman puts a board

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 378.

⁹ W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, p. 51.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

on the forehead of her baby to make the forehead recede.

(4) Fear as a motive rules the lives of primitives. Fear of ghosts and spirits is peculiarly enslaving. Pestilence, defeat in war, bodily pain, were all considered the result of the wrath of the gods.

The mass phenomena of fear are especially pitiful. Manias of various types rule whole masses. Witchcraft thrived for centuries on the strength of fear. Pilgrimages and crusades were partly due to fear; demonism was a product of fear. When fear became firmly established in the folkways, it acted as an ever-ruling tyrant. In the *mores* it became firmly entrenched and was a leading factor in moulding character. Through religious practices and dogmas it defined a "hell" and ruled with a fearful hand.

10. Upon simplest analyses, according to Sumner, four societal values stand out with clearness: intellectual, moral, economic, and physical.¹¹ Each of these, however, is composite. The highest societal value seems to result from a harmonious combination of the four values enumerated. The best member of society is he in whom the intellectual, moral, economic, and physical values are more or less equally and harmoniously represented.

SOCIAL CLASSES

11. Sumner divided society into five main classes.¹² (1) The masses represent social mediocrity. They are of average social usefulness. (2) Then there are the dependent and defective classes—a drag upon society but not harmful or vicious. (3) The delinquent classes are grossly harmful. They are antisocial and a grievous burden. (4) Above the masses there are the people of talent, and (5) above the talented are the geniuses. "A man of talent, practical sense, industry, perseverance, and moral prin-

¹¹ *Folkways*, p. 41.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 40.

ciple is worth more to society than a genius who is not morally responsible, or not industrious."¹³

It is a mistake to think of the masses as being at the base of society; they are located at the core. They are traditional, conservative, and the bearers of the *mores*. The lowest sections of the masses are a dead weight of ignorance, disease, and crime.

12. A social institution is composed of an idea, notion, or interest, and a resultant structure. The primary institutions are property, marriage, and religion.¹⁴ These began as folkways; they became customs. Social institutions can be modified only when the *mores* are changed; they develop rituals which are ceremonious, solemn, and strongest when perfunctory and when exciting no thought.¹⁵

Sumner boldly asserted that nothing but might has ever made right, and that nothing but might makes right now.¹⁶ The fact that property began in force is not proof that property is an unjust institution. Marriage and religion also began in force, but the element of justice in the existence of these institutions is not seriously questioned today. Sumner, however, did not discriminate between force as an agent or a tool, and force as a primary cause. He did not distinguish clearly between hate and love as the dynamic factors behind action that is decisive. He did not set forth the distinction between harsh, material, immutable force, and a kindly, spiritual, attracting love.

MORES

13. The persistency of folkways and *mores* is illustrated in a thousand ways by Sumner. He described (1) their slow variability under changed life conditions, (2) their sudden variability under revolutionary conditions, (3) the possibility of changing them by intelligent action, (4) the problems involved in adjusting one's self to the *mores* of

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

another group, (5) the conflicts between the *mores* of different groups.¹⁷

The *mores* are powerful engines of societal selection. The most important fact about the *mores* is the power which they exert over the individual. He does not know their source. He is born into them. He accepts them in his early years uncritically. His habits and character are moulded by them. If in adult life he challenges them, he is ostracized by his group, labeled unpatriotic, and even trodden under foot.¹⁸ The *mores* develop powerful watchwords, slogans, and even epithets of contempt and disapproval which only the most independent and courageous individuals dare to face.

14. Ideals are entirely unscientific, declared Sumner.¹⁹ They are phantasies little connected with fact. They are often formed to pacify the restless, or to escape settling a question justly in the present. The "poor" are told to look to the next life for their rewards. The radicals are urged to accept the Christian virtues of meekness and lowliness. Ideals are useful, chiefly, in homiletics, in self-education *via* auto-suggestion, in satisfying vanity, in marriage. In these observations, Sumner undoubtedly pointed out genuine weaknesses in ideals. He underestimated the psychological fact that they spring from the very real affective phases of consciousness, and that they can be projected rationally. He was right, however, in deploring the chasm which exists between ideals and practices, and in showing how ideals may become encysted in literature although not in the *mores*. "The Greeks proved that people could sink very low while talking very nobly."

Immorality is conduct contrary to the *mores* of the time and place.²⁰ Chastity is conformity to the current taboo

¹⁷ Sumner, *op. cit.*, Ch. II.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 418; cf. W. I. Thomas, *Sex and Society*, University of Chicago Press, 1907, pp. 201-220.

on the sex relation. "Modesty is reserve of behavior and sentiment." Even "nakedness is never shameful when it is unconscious," that is, when there is no consciousness of a difference between fact and the rule set by the *mores*.

Sumner deduced an important principle when he asserted that the "*mores* can make anything right." The *mores* give usages a certain order and form, and cover them with a protecting mantle of propriety. The sanction of the *mores* is utilized by the class in power in order to maintain the established régime, even though it be one of injustice.

Sumner decried the importance which is ordinarily attached to book learning,²¹ because it is addressed to the intellect rather than to the feelings which are the springs of action. The real education is that which comes through personal influence and example. It is derived from "the habits and atmosphere of a school, not from the school textbooks."

15. Despite Sumner's failure to appreciate the significance of a thoroughgoing psychological approach to an analysis of folkways, his description of these societal phenomena constitutes a unique and valuable contribution to social thought. Sumner's rigorous attitude toward social life did not permit him to enter into an extensive interpretation of the folkways in the light of folk ideals. He dealt with what *is* to the exclusion of what *ought to be*. He saw the past so clearly, and the present so much as a reflection of the past, that no enheartening forward look was possible. He rested his theories on the inexorable work of the laws of biological evolution, modified chiefly by his belief in a strong individualism.

Sumner's fundamental theses have been developed and modified by A. G. Keller, who has projected the Darwinian principles of variation, selection, transmission, and adaptation into societal concepts. In fact, he has done this

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 629.

so well that he has given the Darwinian principles full sway, not allowing sufficiently for the rise and operation of complex psychic principles. He has made the folkways the connecting link between organic and societal evolution, but has not noted fully the new, countless, and often intangible but powerful factors by which societal evolution is characterized.²²

16. The rôle that concepts of conduct have played in the evolution of society, has been analyzed by E. A. Westermarck and L. T. Hobhouse. The former is usually known as an anthropologist, and the latter as a sociologist. Professor Westermarck has shown that, strictly speaking, a custom is not merely the habit of a certain group of people; it also involves a rule of conduct.²³ It possesses two characteristics—habitualness and obligatoriness.

Not every public habit, however, is a custom involving an obligation.²⁴ There may be certain practices which are more or less common in society, but which at the same time are generally condemned. The disapproval of these is as a rule not very deep or genuine.

Dr. Westermarck has indicated that there is a close similarity between the conscience of a community and that of a person.²⁵ If a group commits a sin twice, it is likely to be considered allowable. In order to get at the real nature of societal life, the "bad habits" as well as the professed opinions of groups must be examined.

"Society," says Dr. Westermarck, "is the birthplace of the moral consciousness."²⁶ Emotions which are felt by the community at large tend to take the form of conduct standards. The moral emotions lead to a variety of moral concepts. These fall into two main classes: concepts of

²² A. G. Keller, *Societal Evolution*, Macmillan, 1915.

²³ Edward Westermarck, *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, Macmillan, 1906, I:159.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 740.

disapproval, such as the concepts, bad, vice, wrong; and concepts of approval, such as good, virtue, and merit.

Professor Westermarck is convinced of the tremendous influence that religious beliefs have exerted upon the moral ideas of mankind.²⁷ This influence has been exceedingly varied. Religion has taught the principles of love and yet has indulged in cruel persecutions. It has condemned murder and yet been a party to child sacrifice. "It has emphasized the duty of truth-speaking, and has itself been a cause of pious fraud." Professor Westermarck has contributed to social thought not only in his valuable descriptions of the rise and evolution of moral ideas, but also in his *History of Human Marriage*, to which reference will be made in Chapter XXIV.

The writings of L. T. Hobhouse reveal a thorough, comparative study of the conduct rules of mankind. Professor Hobhouse has described the evolution of ethical consciousness as displayed in the habits, customs, and principles that have arisen in human history for the regulation of human conduct.²⁸ He has shown how, in the lowest forms of the organic world, behavior is regulated, and directed to some purpose.²⁹ This behavior is somewhat definitely determined by the structure of the organism itself.³⁰

There are three forces which may be called social, or which tend to keep society together. These social bonds are: (1) the principle of kinship, (2) the principle of authority, and (3) the principle of citizenship.³¹ Kinship is the moving force in primitive society. The principle of authority becomes prominent when one tribe captures and enslaves a weaker group. This principle is also invoked in order to secure an integration of openly diverse attitudes within the group, even of modern national groups. It is

²⁷ *Ibid.*, II:745.

²⁸ L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*, Holt, 1919, p. 1.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 43; cf. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, Lemcke, 1911, pp. 128 ff.

exemplified in the various forms of absolutism in government. The principle of citizenship finds expression when certain individuals within the group are delegated to perform as servants and ministers of the public as a whole.³² Personal rights and the common good are the two reigning ideals. Every person is recognized as having a right to the conditions requisite for the full development of his social personality. The good in life consists "in bringing out into full bloom of those capacities of each individual which help to maintain the common life."³³ The third principle, that of citizenship, when carried to its conclusion reveals the possibility of a world state.³⁴

It is the contention of Professor Hobhouse that there is a close connection between the growth of law and justice and the prevalent forms of social organization. Organized law has developed out of a sense of community responsibility, which, however, has expressed itself as a rule in crude ways, and without distinguishing between accident and design. This sense of community responsibility in primitive groups tends to hold in check the spirit of anarchy and of self-redress. Sooner or later, the method of community self-redress yields to the authority of a chief or of a council representing the whole community.³⁵ Ultimately the community develops a special social organ for adjusting disputes and preventing crime. It is then that the ethical idea becomes separated from the conflicting passions of the collectivity. Thus, the foundations are laid for true judicial inquiry by evidence and genuine proof, and for a system of scientific public justice.

FOLK PSYCHOLOGY

17. In applying the principles of folk psychology to the anthropologic field, William Wundt has developed a new method and new theories. Folk psychology is the study

³² *Op. cit.*, p. 60.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

³⁴ *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, p. 148.

³⁵ *Morals in Evolution*, pp. 130, 71.

of "the relations which the intellectual, moral, and other mental characteristics of peoples sustain to one another."³⁶ The term was originated by Lazarus and Steinthal, whose works will be referred to again in Chapter XXII. In the masterpiece on the *Elements of Folk Psychology*, Wundt has given a psychological description of the main processes and institutions in society, tracing them from their beginnings in the processes of nature; he has made a survey of human progress. His study opens with a discussion of the processes which produced the digging stick, the club, and the hammer; it ends with an analysis of world empire, world culture, world religions, and world history. The intervening ages are the totemic and the age of heroes and gods.³⁷

World empire affected primarily the material aspects of the life of peoples. It led to world intercourse, which in turn multiplied the needs of peoples. These multiplied needs were followed by exchanges of the means of satisfying the needs. The external and material phases of culture are survived by the spiritual phases—thus world culture is a sequence of world empire. It may be said that the vicissitudes of peoples under the rule of the world empire idea brings forth a unified history. World culture in turn creates a common mental heritage for mankind.³⁸

In the establishment of a world culture, world religions are the leading forces. They have been foremost in creating the idea of a universal human community. In particular, Christianity is based on a belief in a God who makes no distinction between race or class or occupation. Consequently, "it has regarded missionary activity among heathen peoples as a task whose purpose it is finally to unite the whole of mankind beneath the cross of Christ."³⁹

³⁶ William Wundt, *Elements of Folk Psychology*, translated by Schaub, Macmillan, 1916, p. 1.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 478.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 514.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 515.

For a long time in human history, religious development was considered to be the main connecting link—such was the contention of St. Augustine. In 1725, Vico argued that the development of language and jurisprudence is of universal import.⁴⁰ Finally, world history has become an account of the mental life of peoples—"a psychological account of the development of mankind."

ORIGINAL ABILITY

18. The work of Professor Wundt is similar in many ways, though characterized by a distinctive starting point and by many differences, to the contributions of Franz Boas and W. I. Thomas. Professor Boas has declared his belief in man's ability to dominate the laws of organic evolution as expressed in human life. He has brought forward a large amount of evidence in support of the theory that environment has caused differences between races. He has pointed out that race prejudice is largely a product of social environment, and that under changed conditions of life it has little place in the world. Boas is a strong advocate of the theory, already advanced in this chapter, that all races are potentially equal in ability, and that they would demonstrate the truth of this statement, if given a common cultural background and social opportunities. He has advanced the idea that "the organization of mind is practically identical among all races of men."⁴¹

Professor Boas has amassed considerable evidence to show that in the matter of inhibition of impulses, of power of attention, of ability to do original thinking, primitive man compares favorably with civilized man. Inasmuch as the social environment is powerful and education is effective in making over social environments, education can raise all races to the same high level, and at the same time unify them upon the same knowledge bases. This contention is similar to the position that Professor Hobhouse has made clear, namely: "While race has been relatively

⁴⁰ Wundt, *op. cit.*, p. 516.

⁴¹ Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man*, Macmillan, 1911, p. 102.

stagnant, society has rapidly developed." Moreover, social progress is determined not by alterations of racial type, but by modifications of social cultures.⁴² These modifications are caused primarily by the interactions of social factors.

19. The growth of culture concepts has been rapid. Clark Wissler has done as much as anyone to clarify and standardize meanings.⁴³ With "culture" as a general term referring to all the ways of doing and thinking of a social group, the term *culture trait* is used to denote a given set of group ways, such as raising maize. A culture complex, it follows, includes all the sets of group ways that are tied up with any particular culture trait. The raising of maize, for instance, involves ways of soil tillage, of harvesting, of exchange, of food preparation—the whole thing is a culture complex. Culture traits move; they are diffused. Culture diffusion takes place in both undirected and purposeful ways. In the first instance, persons who migrate carry culture traits into new parts of the earth. In the second case, proselytism, colonization, and conquest account for directed culture diffusion.⁴⁴

There is a universal culture pattern, common to mankind.⁴⁵ Wissler finds nine heads or phases to this universal culture pattern, namely, speech, art, religion, property, government, war, mythology and scientific knowledge, social systems, and material traits (food, clothing, shelter, and occupation habits). All tribes and races possess speech patterns, art patterns, and so forth.

20. Noteworthy pioneering in the field of social anthropology and social origins has been done by W. I. Thomas

⁴² Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, Lemcke, 1911, p. 39.

⁴³ In *Man and Culture*, T. N. Crowell and Company, 1923; *The American Indian*, Oxford University Press, 1922; and other writings.

⁴⁴ Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 129. Culture and culture diffusion are receiving increasing attention from sociologists. See the article on "Diffusion of Culture" in the *Journal of Applied Sociology*, XI:503-509, by Prof. Frank W. Blackmar, whose summary is: "In any case, the diffusion of cultures which occurs naturally and by contact on a living basis of good will and opportunity will be more influential for human progress than that imposed by organized effort, especially if it partake of dominant force."

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, Ch. V.

in terms of "crises," "attention," and "control." He has developed the theory that progress results from "crises."⁴⁶ As long as life runs along smoothly, a lack of interest is likely to ensue. The result is *ennui*. But a crisis in any of the life processes arouses the attention, that is, produces a concentration of psychic energy. A disturbance of any habit is a crisis. When the exigences of the crisis are solved through a focalization of consciousness, the situation is said to be controlled by the person, who again lapses into a state of disinterestedness until another disturbance of habit occurs. The new method of control will be imitated. If imitated widely, it will mark a rise in the level of civilization.

It will be observed at once that the power of attention to meet crises is largely an individual matter and that the rôle of the person is very important. The group level of culture limits the power of the mind to meet crises and to make adjustments.⁴⁷ The mind is limited by the psychic fund which the group already possesses. If there is no knowledge of mathematics in the group, then a large banking system is impossible. Crises, attention, control—these are the three leading concepts in Thomas' theory of social origins.

Control is the object of all purposeful activity.⁴⁸ It is the end, and attention is the means. An animal differs from a plant in that it has a superior control over a larger environment than does the plant. "It does not wait for food, but goes after it." Man differs from an animal partly in the fact that his fore limbs are free to secure new and varied forms of control. Moreover, man through his mind has a superior instrument of control. By the use of knowledge, mind is effective in controlling factors that are present in neither time nor space. Through its inventions,

⁴⁶ W. I. Thomas, *Source Book for Social Origins*, University of Chicago Press, 1909, p. 18.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

such as language, religious creeds, mechanical appliances, forms of government, man has risen to a high level of civilization.

"Civilization" is a living, tangible thing—a psychical phenomenon that dominates. When an individual arrives at self-consciousness, he finds himself fitted with complete culture paraphernalia. By invention, he may add to civilization, but the new that he may contribute "is never more than a slight ripple on the deep foundation of the old and established."⁴⁹

"Pre-literate" is a term suggested by Ellsworth Faris that has been coming into use in referring to early peoples. "It is neutral, connoting no reflection of inferiority."⁵⁰ It is also objective and descriptive. It is far better than "savages," and possibly superior to primitive.

At several points in the preceding paragraphs, anthropologic social thought merged into social psychology. Until twenty-five years ago, anthropology interpreted societary origins largely in terms of the "individual." With the rise of a social psychology such as Cooley represents, "anthropology has given more accurate explanations and has become essentially a social anthropology."

Before we discuss the different phases of psycho-sociologic thought, it will be well to make clear the recent advances that have been made in the biologic phases of social thought. The center of attention in this field is the relation of the laws of heredity to human progress, which constitutes the problem in eugenics. A discussion of eugenic social thought will bring forward in a scientific way the chief elements of an intellectual situation that was left, in Chapter XVI, in the unsatisfactory Spencerian formulae. A presentation of eugenic social thought will give a valuable background to the discussion which follows concerning psycho-sociologic thought.

⁴⁹ Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, Knopf, 1913, p. 18 ff.

⁵⁰ "Pre-Literate Peoples: Proposing a New Term," *American Journal of Sociology*, XXX:710-712.

ORIGIN OF FOLKWAYS⁵¹

If we put together all that we have learned from anthropology and ethnography about primitive men and primitive society, we perceive that the first task of life is to live. Men begin with acts, not with thoughts. Every moment brings necessities which must be satisfied at once. Need was the first experience, and it was followed at once by a blundering effort to satisfy it. It is generally taken for granted that men inherited some guiding instincts from their beast ancestry, and it may be true, although it has never been proved. If there were such an inheritance, they controlled and aided the first efforts to satisfy needs. Analogy makes it easy to assume that the ways of beasts had produced channels of habit and predisposition along which dexterities and other psychophysical activities would run easily. Experiments with newborn animals show that in the absence of any experience of the relation of means to ends, efforts to satisfy needs are clumsy and blundering. The method is that of trial and failure, which produces repeated pain, loss, and disappointments. Nevertheless, it is a method of rude experiment and selection. The earliest efforts of men were of this kind. Need was the impelling force. Pleasure and pain, on the one side and the other, were the rude constraints which defined the line on which efforts must proceed. The ability to distinguish between pleasure and pain is the only psychical power which is to be assumed. Thus ways of doing things were selected which were expedient. They answered the purpose better than other ways, or with less toil and pain. Along the course on which efforts were compelled to go, habit, routine, and skill were developed. The struggle to maintain existence was carried on individually but in groups. Each profited by the other's experience; hence there was concurrence towards that which proved to be most expedient. All at last adopted the same way for the same purpose; hence the ways turned into customs and became mass phenomena. Instincts were developed in connection with them. In this way folkways arise. The young learn them by tradition, imitation, and authority. The folkways, at a time, provide for all the needs of life then and there. They are uniform, universal in the group, imperative, and invariable. As time goes on, the folkways become more and more arbitrary, positive, and imperative. If asked why they act in a certain way in certain cases, primitive people always answer that it is because they and their ancestors always have done so. A sanction also arises from ghost fear. The ghosts of ancestors would be angry if the living should change the ancient folkways. (pp. 2, 3)

⁵¹ Reprinted with permission from W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, Ginn and Co., 1906

THE FOLKWAYS ARE A SOCIETAL FORCE

The operation by which folkways are produced consists in the frequent repetition of petty acts, often by great numbers acting in concert or, at least, acting in the same way when face to face with the same need. The immediate motive is interest. It produces habit in the individual and custom in the group. It is therefore, in the highest degree original and primitive. By habit and custom it exerts a strain on every individual within its range; therefore it rises to a societal force to which great classes of societal phenomena are due. Its earliest stages, its course, and laws may be studied; also its influence on individuals and their reaction to it. It is our present purpose so to study it. We have to recognize it as one of the chief forces by which a society is made to be what it is. Out of the unconscious experiment which every repetition of the ways includes, there issues pleasure or pain, and then, so far as the men are capable of reflection, convictions that the ways are conducive to societal welfare. These two experiences are not the same. The most uncivilized men, both in the food quest, and in war, do things which are painful, but which have been found to be expedient. Perhaps these cases teach the sense of social welfare better than those which are pleasurable and favorable to welfare. The former cases call for some intelligent reflection on experience. When this conviction as to the relation to welfare is added to the folkways they are converted into mores; and by virtue of the philosophical and ethical element added to them, they win utility and importance and become the course of the science and the art of living.

FOLKWAYS ARE MADE UNCONSCIOUSLY

It is of the first importance to notice that, from the first acts by which men try to satisfy needs, each act stands by itself, and looks no further than the immediate satisfaction. From recurrent needs arise habits for the individual and customs for the group, but these results are consequences which were never conscious, and never foreseen or intended. They are not noticed until they have long existed, and it is still longer before they are appreciated. Another long time must pass, and a higher stage of mental development must be reached, before they can be used as a basis from which to deduce rules for meeting, in the future, problems whose pressure can be foreseen. The folkways, therefore, are not creations of human purpose and wit. They are like products of natural forces which men unconsciously set in operation, or they are like the instinctive ways of animals, which are developed out of experience, which reach a final form of maximum adaptation to an interest, which are handed down by tradition and admit of no excep-

tion or variation, yet change to meet new conditions, still within the same limited methods, and without rational reflection or purpose. From this it results that all the life of human beings, in all ages and stages of culture, is primarily controlled by a vast mass of folkways handed down from the earliest existence of the race, having the nature of the ways of other animals, only the topmost layers of which are subject to change and control, and have been somewhat modified by human philosophy, ethics, and religion, or by other acts of intelligent reflection. We are told of savages that "it is difficult to exhaust the customs and small ceremonial usages of a savage people. Custom regulates the whole of a man's actions—his bathing, washing, cutting his hair, eating, drinking, and fasting. From his cradle to his grave he is the slave of ancient usage. In his life there is nothing free, nothing original, nothing spontaneous, no progress towards a higher and better life, and no attempt to improve his condition, mentally, morally, or spiritually." All men act in this way with only a little wider margin of voluntary variation. (pp. 2, 3)

HUNGER, LOVE, VANITY, AND FEAR

There are four great motives of human action, which come into play when some number of human beings are in juxtaposition under the same life conditions. These are hunger, sex passion, vanity, and fear (of ghosts and spirits). Under each of these motives there are interests. Life consists in satisfying interests, for "life," in a society, is a career of action and effort expended on both the material and social environment. However great the errors and misconceptions may be which are included in the efforts, the purpose always is advantage and expediency. The efforts fall into parallel lines, because the conditions and the interests are the same. It is now the accepted opinion, and it may be correct, that men inherited from their beast ancestors psychophysical traits, instincts, and dexterities, or at least predispositions, which give them aid in solving the problems of food supply, sex commerce, and vanity. The result is mass phenomena; currents of similarity, concurrence, and mutual contribution; and these produce folkways. The folkways are unconscious, spontaneous, uncoordinated. It is never known who led in devising them, although we must believe that talent exerted its leadership at all times. Folkways come into existence now all the time. There were folkways in stage coach times, which were fitted to that mode of travel. Street cars have produced ways which are suited to that mode of transportation in cities. The telephone has produced ways which have not been invented and imposed by anybody, but which are devised to satisfy conveniently the interests which are at stake in the use of that instrument.

PROCESS OF MAKING FOLKWAYS

Although we may see the process of making folkways going on all the time, the analysis of the process is very difficult. It appears as if there were a "mind" in the crowd which was different from the minds of the individuals which compose it. Indeed, some have adopted such a doctrine. By auto-suggestion the stronger minds produce ideas which when set afloat pass by suggestion from mind to mind. Acts which are consonant with the ideas are imitated. There is a give and take between man and man. This process is one of development. New suggestions come in at point after point. They are carried out. They combine with what existed already. Every new step increases the number of points upon which other minds may seize. It seems to be by this process that great inventions are produced. Knowledge has been won and extended by it. It seems as if the crowd had a mystic power in it greater than the sum of the powers of its members. It is sufficient, however, to explain this, to notice that there is a cooperation and constant suggestion which is highly productive when it operates in a crowd, because it draws out latent power, concentrates what would otherwise be scattered, verifies and corrects what has been taken up, eliminates error, and constructs by combination. (pp. 18-20)

THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF THE MORES

In the present work the proposition to be maintained is that the folkways are the widest, most fundamental, and most important operation by which the interests of men in groups are served, and that the process by which folkways are made is the chief one to which elementary societal or group phenomena are due. The life of society consists in making folkways and applying them. The science of society might be construed as the study of them. The relations of men to each other, when they are carrying on the struggle for existence near each other, consist in mutual reactions (antagonisms, rivalries, alliances, coercions, and cooperations), from which results societal concatenations and concretions, that is, more or less fixed positions of individuals and subgroups towards each other, and more or less established sequences and methods of interaction between them, by which the interests of all members of the group are served. The same might be said of all animals. The societal insects especially show us highly developed results of the adjustment of adjacent interests and life-acts into concatenations and concretions. The societal concretions are due to the folkways in this way,—that the men, each struggling to carry on existence, unconsciously cooperate to build up associations, organizations, customs and institutions,

which, after a time, appear full grown and actual, although no one intended, or planned, or understood them in advance. They stand there as produced by "ancestors." These concretions of relation and act in war, labor, religion, amusement, family life, and civil institutions are attended by faiths, doctrines of philosophy (myths, folklore), and by precepts of right conduct and duty (taboos). The making of folkways is not trivial, although the acts are minute. Every act of each man fixes an atom in a structure, both fulfilling a duty derived from what preceded and conditioning what is to come afterwards by the authority of traditional custom. The structure thus built up is not physical, but societal and institutional, that is to say, it belongs to a category which must be defined and studied by itself. It is a category in which custom produces continuity, coherence, and consistency, so that the word "structure" may properly be applied to the fabric of relations and prescribed positions with which societal functions are permanently connected. The process of making folkways is never superseded or changed. It goes on now just as it did at the beginning of civilization. "Use and wont" exert their force on all men always. They produce familiarity, and mass acts become unconscious. The same effect is produced by customary acts repeated at all recurring occasions. The range of societal activity may be greatly enlarged, interests may be extended and multiplied, the materials by which needs can be supplied may become far more numerous, the processes of societal cooperation may become more complicated, and contract or artifice may take the place of custom for many interests; but, if the case is one which touches the ways of interests of the masses, folkways will develop on and around it by the same process as that which has been described as taking place from the beginning of civilization. The ways of carrying on war have changed with all new inventions of weapons or armor, and have grown into folkways of commanding range and importance. The factory system of handicrafts has produced a body of folkways in which artisans live, and which distinguish factory towns from commercial cities or agricultural villages. The use of cotton instead of linen has greatly affected modern folkways. The applications of power and machinery have changed the standards of comfort of all classes. The folkways, however, have kept their character and authority through all the changes of form which they have undergone. (pp. 34-35)

MORE EXACT DEFINITION OF THE MORES

We may now formulate a more complete definition of the mores. They are the ways of doing things which are current in a society to satisfy human needs and desires, together with the faiths, notions,

codes, and standards of well living which inhere in those ways, having a genetic connection with them. By virtue of the latter element the mores are traits in the specific character (*ethos*) of a society or a period. They pervade and control the ways of thinking in all the exigencies of life, returning from the world of abstractions to the world of action, to give guidance and to win revivification. (p.59)

STATUS IN THE FOLKWAYS

If now we form a conception of the folkways as a great mass of usages, of all degrees of importance, covering all the interests of life, constituting an outfit of instruction for the young, embodying a life policy, forming character, containing a world philosophy, albeit most vague and unformulated, and sanctioned by ghost fear so that variation is impossible, we see with what coercive and inhibitive force the folkways have always grasped the members of society. The folkways create status. Membership in the group, kin, family, neighborhood, rank, or class are cases of status. The rights and duties of every man and woman were defined by status. No one could choose whether he would enter into the status or not. For instance, at puberty every one was married. What marriage meant, and what a husband or wife was (the rights and duties of each), were fixed by status. No one could alter the customary relations. Status, as distinguished from institutions and contract, is a direct product of the mores. Each case of status is a nucleus of leading interest with the folkways which cluster around it.

Status is determined by birth. Therefore it is a help and a hindrance, but it is not a liberty. In modern times status has become unpopular and our mores have grown into the forms of contract under liberty. The conception of status has been lost by the masses in modern civilized states. Nevertheless, we live under status which has been defined and guaranteed by law and institutions, and it would be a great gain to recognize and appreciate the element of status which historically underlies the positive institutions and which is still subject to the action of the mores. Marriage (matrimony or wedlock) is a status. It is really controlled by the mores. The law defines it and gives sanctions to it, but the law always expresses the mores. A man and a woman make a contract to enter into it. The mode of entering into it (wedding) is fixed by custom. The law only ratifies it. No man and woman can by contract make wedlock different for themselves from the status defined by law, so far as social rights and duties are concerned. The same conception of marriage as a status in the mores is injured by the intervention of the ecclesiastical and civil formalities connected with it. An indi-

vidual is born into a kin group, a tribe, a nation, or a state, and he has a status accordingly which determines rights and duties for him. Civil liberty must be defined in accordance with this fact; not outside of it, or according to vague metaphysical abstractions above it. The body of the folkways constitutes a societal environment. Every one born into it must enter into relations of give and take with it. He is subjected to influences from it, and it is one of the life conditions under which he must work out his career of self-realization. Whatever liberty may be taken to mean, it is certain that liberty never can mean emancipation from the influence of the societal environment, or of the mores into which one was born. (pp. 67, 68)

CULTURE⁵²

The field-worker in anthropology begins his study of tribal culture by concentrating upon one or two points. Thus, he may set out to see how fire is kindled, observing that it is made by boring one stick into another, but that these simple looking implements are fashioned according to a specific pattern and that the procedure is likewise fixed as in any handicraft. Yet, it is not enough to say that fire is kindled by wood friction; the individuality of the implements and the accompanying procedures must be recorded and representative objects collected. Thus, the re-making implement, accompanied by photographs and field notes, becomes the objective record of a unit of observation. Such is, for practical purposes at least, a unit of the tribal culture and is spoken of as a *trait*. This term is also applied to mannerisms and to concepts of whatever kind. Thus the custom of a man marrying his wife's sisters may be observed and, if so, is set down as a trait of the tribal culture. It follows then that a tribal culture is characterized by the enumeration of its observable traits and that the culture of one tribe is distinguished from that of another by differences in these traits. (p. 50)

THE CULTURE COMPLEX

We are now confronted by a more serious problem. If we mean by *trait* a unit in the tribal culture, then we must discover the nature and characteristics of this unit. When potatoes are shoveled into a bushel measure, we may correctly speak of them as a bushel of potatoes, by which we imply that each potato is a complete and independent unit in itself. Some students of culture seem to have regarded traits as similar independent units, to be scooped up in the

⁵² Reprinted with permission from Clark Wissler, *Man and Culture*, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923.

tribal measure and dealt with as a mere collection. Yet when one carefully scrutinizes a trait, he finds, not a clear-cut unit, but a kind of complex. For example, the Ojibway Indians in the vicinity of Lake Superior were observed to use wild rice for food and this was correctly set down as a trait of their culture. Yet, each member of the tribe did not snatch his rice food directly from the plant as do the birds, but received it as the end of a cycle of activities in which he, as an individual, played a varying part. Thus, though the plant is wild, some care was given the plots where it grew; later, the plants were tied in bunches to discourage rice-eating birds, then the rice was gathered, cured, hulled, winnowed, stored, cooked, and eaten. Incidentally, some of it was exchanged and some given away. The many processes involved required techniques of various complexities and special appliances. But that is not all, for intimately bound up in the whole are property rights, labor obligations, etiquette, methods of keeping time, and a number of special religious observances, prohibitions, and taboos. It is thus plain that if we arrive at an adequate notion of the wild rice trait, we must see it as a complex of many processes, all of which bear a functional relation to the end to be achieved. The name usually given to such a chain of activities is the *trait-complex*, or in this instance, the *wild rice complex*. (pp. 51-52)

THE UNIVERSAL CULTURE PATTERN

In the opening chapters we met with good reasons for suspecting that cultures are very much alike in their structure and behavior, and after our discovery of the units, or elements, of the phenomenon, found at least one fundamental form common to all these elements. We found, further, that trait-complexes tend to adhere, suggesting that they are linked in some way, though we found such linking to be for the most part independent of factors inherent in the traits themselves. If we shift our point of regard from the several trait-complexes to the tribal cultures as wholes, we note that notwithstanding these cultures fall into types, a certain similarity holds throughout. We have just seen that all trait-complexes have much in common as well as a common fundamental structure. So as one might say, the aggregates of similar things will themselves be similar; but since trait-complexes vary in kind, and, as we have seen, cultures are distinguishable by the trait-complexes they have or have not, it follows that cultures differ in their content. Yet, familiarity with cultures soon reveals something we have so far ignored, viz., that after all a tribal culture has a plan or pattern. If we should liken trait-complexes to building materials, then the plan of the house to be built of them would correspond to the pattern of a culture.

Such recognition of culture patterns is not contradictory to what we have observed to be true of the materials that make up these cultures. We are already aware that trait-complexes travel, or spread, and that they often do this in the company of others, so it was necessary to examine into this relation. What we found is again comparable to what we find in building materials; if bricks are chosen for the walls, then mortar and other elements of the complex follow, but we may choose the same kind of roof our neighbor puts upon a cement house, or any other kind of roof. No doubt this is obvious when we think of houses, but many good people forget it when they set out to deal with matters of culture. But to return to our subject, the plans for houses all call for walls, roofs, floors, and numerous other things, so what about patterns for culture?

In the first place, students of culture find that the same general outline will fit all of them; thus, we say the facts of culture may be comprehended under nine heads, ^{Science} the accompanying table, viz., Speech, Material Traits, Art, Mythology, Religion, Social Systems, Property, Government, and War. This outline can be greatly elaborated, if the reader gives his constructive imagination full play. It is, however, full enough for our purposes. (pp. 73, 75)

Now we have, as it were, set up a few categories which, taken together, seem to cover the entire range of culture content. Thus, under speech we may include language, sign-talk, gesture, and all other forms of writing, and so far as we now see, something under this category will be found in every culture. Yet, the several tribal cultures will differ in the kinds and number of trait-complexes falling under this head. If we turn to art, the facts are similar, and so on through the series. Nor need we trouble ourselves with the question as to whether culture was always laid out in this way, for that would lead us off into a search for other patterns, a problem to come later. Moreover, the pattern we have sketched here is the human pattern, the justification for that term resting upon usage, for by man is usually meant a mammal that possesses a culture conforming to this pattern. (pp. 77, 78)

We must now inquire into the objective limitations to the spread of culture. With the concrete facts for such spreading of trait-complexes over the world before us, there arise many specific questions as to why these movements of culture have followed certain routes instead of others. The objective approach to such a problem lies in the correlations between traits of culture on the one hand and the facts of geography on the other. This will be no light task, for the fauna, flora, topography, climate and all that go to make up the extra-human world, are even more complex than culture itself.

Taking the facts of diffusion as they stand, they reveal two types of phenomena, a kind of diffusion that is undirected by the groups of men involved, naïve, unconscious, or natural, as we say; the other projected deliberately and according to a well-developed plan. These concepts, however, define the extremes between which any given case of diffusion will fall, for it is doubtful if any event in diffusion is wholly rationalistic. Natural diffusion is seen at its best among the primitive, and directed diffusion among the enlightened. Natural diffusion we have commented upon in detail under the appropriate headings, but so far we have not considered the factors that facilitate such a spread of culture. Among these are the geographical settings and random migration, particularly infiltration. On the other hand, purposeful diffusion usually takes either of the following forms: colonization, proselytism, or conquest. It is to the nature of natural diffusion that we shall direct our attention in this chapter. (pp. 128-129)

THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATION⁵³

What, then, is civilization?

Our attitudes, beliefs and ideas, our judgments and values; our institutions, political and legal, religious and economic; our ethical code and our code of etiquette; our books and machines, our sciences, and beings, both in themselves and in their multiform interrelations, philosophies and philosophers—all of these and many other things constitute our civilization. In many of these things it differs from the civilizations of antiquity and from those other remoter ones of pre-history.

It is characteristic of civilization that it persists; a large part of it, most of it, in fact, is passed on from generation to generation. But also, it changes: at no two points in time is it quite the same, and the differences in the civilization of two succeeding generations are often perceptible and at times striking.

It takes but little thought to realize that the changes in civilization are each and all due to the emergence of new things, inventions, ideas, which, in the last analysis, are always emanations of the minds of individuals. Whether the change is in a mechanical device, or a detail of social organization; in a new scientific idea or ethical value; in a method of simplifying or improving economic production or distribution; in a new play or a novel form of stage art; in an article of use, comfort or luxury, a new word, a witticism, a proverb—all of these things originate in individual minds and there is no other

⁵³ Reprinted with permission from A. A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1923.

place where they can originate. Nor is this generalization in the least affected by whatever view one may hold as to the relative importance of the individual and society in the production of civilization. Even though the individual were wholly determined by the social setting, all of the civilizational changes just referred to, including those in material things, would remain psychological in their derivation and, as such, they could only originate in individual minds, for there are no other minds but those of individuals. Thus the whole of civilization, if followed backward step by step, would ultimately be found resolvable, without residue, into bits of ideas in the minds of individuals.

But civilization also persists and accumulates. Some elements carry over from generation to generation through the sheer objective continuity of material existence. Most of the paraphernalia of our complicated mechanical equipment, the roads, vehicles and houses, the books in our libraries, the specimens in the museums, persist in as crass and material a way as does man's physical environment. The institutions, those crystallized depositories of attitudes, ideas, and actions, persist in a less objectified form, for they are only in part represented by material or mechanical arrangements, such as fixed organizations, recorded codes and archives, in whose prolonged existence the change of generation appears as but an incident. But there is still another and more important mechanism through which civilization is passed on from fathers to sons. This mechanism, more dynamic and plastic than the others, is education. Through education, in the home, at school, in society, the past molds the present and sets a pattern for the future.

Here it is important to remember that civilization, psychological and individual though it may be when resolved into a chronological series, is not at all the outgrowth of the minds of individuals of any particular generation. On the contrary. It comes to them from without, it molds them, it forces itself upon them through the material persistence of its objective elements, through its codes and institutions, and through the deep cutting tools of education. A large part of the educational process strikes the mind of the individual during the years of highest receptivity and plasticity. Without accepting the extreme verdict of psychoanalysis on this matter, it suffices to realize that what is deposited in the mind during the early years of childhood, persists throughout later life with often but slight modification.

Not only is man at the mercy of civilization, but he generally remains either partly or wholly unaware of what he is thus forced to accept.

While we regard the language in which we think and express our ideas as very particularly our own, the grammatical structure of that language rests in the unconscious. The complicated system of classifications, categories and nuances, which make up grammar, are used by the individual without the least realization of their presence. In primitive communities, where writing is unknown, individuals are totally unaware of the very existence of a grammar underlying the language they daily use. The situation is not so very different today, for the fact that grammar is taught does not prevent us from absorbing the structure of our mother tongue without the least reference to whatever conscious knowledge we may acquire of its grammatical principles. Only at the cost of a deliberate and persistent effort can the mind be brought to deal analytically with the elements of the grammar it constantly employs in thinking.

The same is almost equally true of art, particularly of music. The theoretical structure of our musical system is known to but few. Many of those who appreciate music or even produce it by singing or playing an instrument, may remain almost wholly unconscious of the basic principles with which they operate. And, again, in primitive society or among the peasant populations of Europe or among the singing and banjo-playing masses of our cities, the theoretical foundations of the music they enjoy, use and abuse, remain altogether unknown. What applies so drastically to language and art is only to a slighter degree true of other elements of civilization. Rules of etiquette, religious dogma, political convictions, and to a great extent the specialized outlook of a social or professional class, become fixed in the mind of the individual before he is quite aware of what is taking place.

Then, when self-consciousness comes—and to many of us it never comes—we discover ourselves fitted out with all the paraphernalia of a world view, with a code of morality, behavior and belief. Then we may indulge in a deliberate effort to change these ideas and attitudes or, more commonly, to provide for them an exculpating background of explanations and justifications. Many of our theories of education, of criminology, or of etiquette, for example, consist of nothing but such accumulated afterthoughts, invented with greater or less ingenuity to render our unconsciously acquired habits, attitudes, and convictions more congenial to ourselves and better prepared to hold their own in the face of criticism or attack.

It appears from the above that the individual and the group have their share both in the persistence and the originality of civilization. The individual is responsible for the creation of the new, society provides it with a background and the occasion. For the new is never

more than a slight ripple on the deep foundation of the old and established. The conservative dead-weight of society opposes the new, but should it appear, molds it to its pattern by prescribing the direction it is to take as well as by limiting the range of its departure from the old. This is most clearly seen in inventions and artistic creations. The talent of an Edison is a congenital gift. Even though born in early pre-history, he would have been Edison, but could not have invented the incandescent lamp. Instead, he might have originated one of the early methods of making fire. Raphael, if brought to life in a Bushman family, would have drawn curiously realistic cattle on the walls of caves as well as steatopygous Bushman women. Had Beethoven been a Chinaman, he would have composed some of those delightfully cacophonous melodies which the seeker for the quaint and unusual pretends to enjoy in Chinatown.

Stability and persistence, on the other hand, are mainly brought about by social factors. Apart from the historic persistence of the material substratum of the group, the institutional norms and the directing pressure of public opinion, custom and law, are functions of the social setting. But these factors alone would be powerless to achieve stability in the absence of the inertia of the individual mind, with its readiness to adhere to once established conceptions and its predilection for the beaten path.

A civilization in its unique individuality is fascinating to behold and to study. The charm of specific cultural values eluded the eye of the evolutionist of a generation ago, whose interest centered in the task of reconstructing the antecedents of modern society. To him the civilizations of antiquity and to an ever greater degree those of pre-history, were but stepping-stones on the road to modern civilization, but stages in an ascending series of development. The modern student, whether historian, sociologist, or anthropologist, having freed himself from the dogmatic preconceptions of the evolutionary approach, is seized with renewed zeal toward a better understanding and deeper penetration of the total range of human civilization. But the data for his study are limited. Beneath manifold differences, a level of great uniformity underlies all modern civilizations. A comparison of the latter with those of antiquity contributes a wider range of contrasting colors, but the number of such ancient civilizations is small, and on analysis, they also display many common elements with our own. Pre-history, as it stands revealed by the researches of the ethnographer, belongs to a totally different plane. Each one of its civilizations is individual and unique, is carried by relatively few individuals and covers but slight territory. Of such highly individualized civilization, pre-history reveals a great variety, even though the list be made to include only those tribes whose cul-

tural possessions have been studied with care and in detail. Primitive North America alone comprises a greater number of well authenticated civilizations than can be found in the whole range of modern and ancient history.

The early world, then, presents an ideal field for the study of the achievements of man, for the extension of our understanding of cultural problems and our appreciation of the great range of civilization. (pp. 15-20)

CIVILIZATION, RACE, AND THE FUTURE⁵⁴

Culture may be independent of race; possibly is wholly so. But culture must be carried by races of some sort; and it may be of interest to consider whether the sweep of culture history reveals certain races as the most favorable carriers or as inherently constituted to be producers and dispensers of civilization.

On the whole, the greatest share of culture production has fallen to Caucasians. The art of Upper Paleolithic Europe, the laying of the foundations of modern civilization along the Nile and Euphrates six or seven thousand years ago, the more special ancient efflorescences like that of Crete, not to mention most of the advances of the last twenty-five hundred years, all fall to the account of the white race.

The part of the Mongoloids must not be underestimated. Even if the foundation of Chinese civilization prove to be largely western, its main structure is native, and the alien elements that flowed in during the last three thousand years have been most thoroughly adapted to this structure. The fact that derivative civilizations like the Japanese have succeeded in reaching a high degree of organization and refinement, argues still further for the vigor of Chinese culture. Then, the East Indians, another Mongoloid branch, have shown a fair power of assimilation. In the past two thousand years they may be said to have accepted and digested at least as much of Hindu and Mohammedan civilization as the North Europeans took over from Mediterranean sources between 1500 B.C. and 500 A.D. Finally, the achievements of the American Mongoloids in Mexico and Peru must be given weight because they appear to have been made in utter isolation, without the stimulus of contact or import, and on the basis of nothing more than a late Paleolithic or earliest Neolithic culture.

The share of the Negroids in the higher advances has been small. Africa, to be sure, lies off to one side from the great Euro-Asian

⁵⁴ Reprinted with permission from A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1923.

axis, and like southern India and Arabia has suffered from constituting almost a blind alley. Yet central Africa is no farther from the Mediterranean than is northern Europe. East Africa lies open to Egypt which six and five and four thousand years ago represented the apex of civilization. Yet Negro Africa today possesses scarcely more culture elements of Egypto-Babylonian origin than remote Scandinavia had absorbed by 500 B.C., and far fewer than Scandinavia had in 1000 A.D. It is hard to believe that this difference is due wholly to desert and jungle and tropical heat.

There is a parallel in the Oceanic Negroes. The Australians may be regarded in this connection, both on account of the isolation of their continent and the doubt whether they are to be reckoned as a branch of the Negroid stem. But the Papuans and Melanesians are undisputedly Negroid and far less touched by influences of higher culture than the adjacent East-Indians. It may be only geographic accident that writing and iron and kingship and Hindu and Arab religion traversed the Oceanian islands as far as the brown Mongoloids inhabited them, but stopped dead on the threshold of the blacks. Even the brown Polynesians, much more remote in the central Pacific than the Melanesians, possess more elements that are presumably traceable to Asia—such as their cosmogony, genealogies, kingship.

It is of course not fair to argue from cultural accomplishment to racial faculty unless all times and parts of the world are considered equally, and not safe to interpret the evidence too rigorously then. But the consistent failure of the Negro race to accept the whole or even the main substance of the fairly near-by Mediterranean civilization, or to work out any notable sub-centers of cultural productivity would appear to be one of the strongest of the arguments that can be advanced for an inferiority of cultural potentiality on their part.

Yet the weakness of correlation of race faculty and civilization, except in the most general way, can be driven home to North Europeans and North Americans as soon as the relative parts played in culture history by the several Caucasian divisions are examined. On the ground of long continued lead in productivity, of having reared the largest portion of the structure of existing civilization, the Mediterranean branch of the Caucasian race would have to be awarded the palm over all others. To it belonged the Egyptians; the Cretans and other Aegeans; the Semitic strain in the Babylonians; the Phoenicians and Hebrews; and a large element in the population of classic Greece and Italy, as well as the originators of Mohammedanism. With the Hindus added as probably nearly related, the dark whites have a clear lead.

The next largest share civilization would owe to the Alpine-Armenoid broad-headed Caucasian branch. This may have included the Sumerians, if they were not Mediterranean; comprised the Hittites; and contributed important strains to the other peoples of Western Asia and Greece and Italy.

By comparison, the Nordic branch looms insignificant. Up to a thousand years ago the Nordic peoples had indeed contributed ferment and unsettling, but scarcely a single new culture element, certainly not a new element of importance and permanence. For centuries after that, the center of European civilization remained in Mediterranean Italy or Alpine France. It is only after 1500 A.D. that any claim for a shift of this center to the Nordic populations could be alleged. In fact, most of the national and cultural supremacy of the Nordic peoples, so far as it is real, falls within the last two hundred years. Against this, the Mediterraneans and Alpines have a record of leading in civilizational creativeness for at least six thousand years.

It is clear, therefore, that any fears of the arrest and decay of human progress if a particular race should lose in fertility or become absorbed in others, are unfounded. Such alarms may be attributed to egocentric imagination. They resemble the regrets of an individual at the loss which the world will suffer when he dies; what he really fears is his own death. When we loosen the hold of such narrow and essentially personal emotions, and allow our minds to range over the whole of the labors and gradual achievements of humanity, irrespective of millenium or continent, the result is an unperturbed equanimity as to the slight and temporary predominance of this or that racial strain and as to the stability or future of culture. To contribute to this larger tolerance and balance of mind is one of the functions of anthropology. (pp. 504-506)

ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH⁵⁵

The evidence shows that the primitive mind is very similar to our own; that it enjoys many lucid intervals during which it is far from being oppressed by a great weight of supernatural powers and perils; and that the heathen savage is often, perhaps usually, just as individually and selfishly calculating in his behavior as the average civilized Christian! . . .

The older anthropology was more naïve and uncritical in its approach to tribal phenomena, and accepted facts and explanations at

⁵⁵ Reprinted by permission from Clarence Marsh Case, "A Crisis in Anthropological Research," *Sociology and Social Research*, XII:26 ff.

their face value. The distinction, only recently made by sociologists, between attitudes and opinions, would have been of service in ethnological field-work no less than it is in present-day social research in civilized societies. An understanding of the human tendency to explain and justify, by logic, behavior that rests upon instinctive and emotional drives would also have helped the ethnologist to be less gullible in his converse with primitive folk. Without using our sociological term "rationalization," Malinowski gives a fine account of it when he says:

"When the native is asked what he would do in such and such a case, he answers what he should do; he lays down the pattern of best possible conduct. When he acts as informant to a field-anthropologist, it costs him nothing to retail the Ideal of the law. His sentiments, his propensities, his biases, his self-indulgences, as well as tolerance of others' lapses, he reserves for his behavior in real life."⁵⁶

The crisis to which I here refer seems therefore to present three important aspects. The first suggests that the only really valuable anthropological field-work will have to be done by persons completely in command of the language of the group studied, and situated so as to be able and permitted to participate in the actual innermost life of the tribe, as Malinowski seems to have done. So long as anthropological research was mainly archaeological, and consisted in making collections of material culture-objects or of language structure, no psycho-social technique was required. But now that we are trying to learn just how the native feels and thinks, particularly with respect to such intangible complexes as domestic affairs and religious values, a radically new technique is called for.

So, in the second place, it seems that the new ethnologist must add to his knowledge of the language the concepts and methods of psychoanalysis and of social research.

In the third place, these linguistically proficient and sociologically instructed field investigators will have to add to their knowledge considerable despatch, because "primitive" or "nature" groups are rapidly vanishing from the earth. The crisis is therefore not only important but very acute. . . . A slight effort to look into primitive religion, through the accounts of ethnologists, voluminous and interesting as they are, quickly revealed to the present writer the woful dearth of materials that reveal any considerable insight into the sociology of religion. Is it possible to understand these simpler human communities before they vanish forever from our ken?

⁵⁶ *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*, New York, 1927, p. 125.

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The nature of anthropology.
2. The relation of anthropology to ethnology.
3. Anthropological attitudes toward the unigenetic and the poly-genetic origins of man.
4. The relative potential ability of African and Caucasian races.
5. The ethnologist's attitudes toward intermarriage of members of widely different races.
6. The meaning of ethnocentrism.
7. Sumner's basic sociological theories.
8. Thomas' theory of the intelligence of women.
9. Vanity as a powerful social factor.
10. Sumner's concept of the "masses."
11. The origin of folkways.
12. The difference between folkways and mores.
13. Sumner's belief in the weakness of ideals.
14. The source of genuine education.
15. The three forces that tend to keep society together.
16. The scope of folk psychology.
17. The leading force in establishing world culture.
18. The "crisis" theory of personality growth.
19. The difference between folk psychology and social anthropology.
20. Special reasons for using the term, pre-literate.
21. Dr. C. M. Case's threefold ethnological suggestions.

CHAPTER XIX

EUGENIC SOCIOLOGY

EUGENIC social thought is the child of biological discoveries. Eugenics, the science of good breeding, which did not achieve scientific standing until the closing years of the last century, may be traced back in its incipient forms to Plato, who advocated that strength should mate only with strength, and that imperfect children should be eliminated from society. In its scientific origins eugenics dates from 1859, when Darwin's *Origin of Species* was first published. Its beginning as a distinct field of human thinking is found in the articles by Francis Galton on "Hereditary Talent and Genius," which appeared in 1865; and in 1869, in book form under the title, *Hereditary Genius*.¹

Eugenic social thought deals with the operation of the laws of heredity among human beings. It was a part of this field which Francis Galton made world-known by his treatises on *Hereditary Genius* and *Inquiries into the Human Faculty*.² In 1904, Galton wrote a paper entitled, "Eugenics: Its Definition, Scope and Aims." In this dissertation the new science of eugenics was formally introduced to the world. Galton's analysis of eugenics became its leading interpretation.³

The mantle of the founder fell upon Professor Karl Pearson, whose work at times has assumed a distinctly statistical nature. Professor Pearson's leaning toward biometry has brought severe criticism upon him. The statistical approach, while exact and thought-provoking, is

¹ Francis Galton, *Hereditary Genius*, Macmillan, 1914.

² *Inquiries into the Human Faculty*, Dutton, 1908.

³ See C. W. Saleeby, *The Progress of Eugenics*, Funk and Wagnalls, 1914, pp. 1 ff.

subject to various errors in interpretation of data. The viewpoint from which Professor Pearson writes, however, is not one-sided. For example, he states that "it may require years to replace a great leader of men, but a stable and efficient society can only be the outcome of centuries of development."⁴ He holds that group conscience ought for the sake of social welfare to be stronger than private interest, and that the ideal citizen should be able to form a judgment free from personal bias.⁵

C. W. Saleeby, another English writer, has developed an independent reputation as a eugenicist.⁶ In the United States, such men as C. B. Davenport,⁷ and Paul Popenoe have made important eugenic contributions. The recent tendency has been to be wary of purely statistical studies of heredity and to rely more definitely upon case studies. However, since eugenics is directly indebted to the studies of heredity and since heredity must be investigated for several generations, eugenic social thought has not yet developed far.

EUGENICS

Galton defined eugenics as the science of good breeding. Its aim as a pure science is to study the agencies under social control "that may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or mentally." Galton's program, as outlined by the founder shortly before his death, insisted upon (1) a study of the laws of heredity, (2) a dissemination of knowledge about heredity, (3) a study of the factors underlying marriage, (4) a study of birth rates, and (5) a case study of individual families.

Eugenic social thought holds that heredity among human beings operates according to the same laws that govern heredity among animals. The theory of Mendelian

⁴ Karl Pearson, *The Grammar of Science*, Black, 1911, p. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶ See Saleeby, *The Progress of Eugenics*, Ch. II.

⁷ See C. B. Davenport, *Heredity in Relation to Eugenics*, Holt, 1911.

units becomes in practice the theory of multiple factors. The unit characters, upon analysis, appear to be complex and to be inherited in complex ways. Multiple factors are inherited from generation to generation directly when pure factors are united with pure factors. But when the pure is united with the hybrid, then the laws of dominance and recessiveness operate. In such combinations certain factors tend to express themselves in greater proportion than do other elements. This failure to secure expression in a given generation, however, means that the specific factor is recessive for the time being. Later, it will likely appear.

Galton stated another important eugenic law, the law of regression. Each peculiarity is inherited by the offspring on the average in a slightly less degree than it is found in the parent. Hence, according to Galton, good traits and poor traits alike are inherited in a degree nearer mediocrity by the offspring than by the parents. This law partially explains why gifted men rarely have sons who are equally gifted. The law seems to hold good for large numbers, but not when considered in relation to single families. It serves as a check upon variation and mutation.

Galton and Pearson advanced another statistical law, the law of ancestral inheritance. Galton supposed that the parents contribute to the child one-half of his inherited factors, the grandparents one-fourth, and so on. Pearson has secured statistical evidence which shows that Galton's geometric series is incorrect, and that on the average in a large number of cases the parents together contribute to the child .624 of his traits; the four grandparents, .198; the eight great grandparents, .063; and so on.

The law of mutation, described by De Vries and other geneticists, refers to the appearance of mutants, or individuals who do not reproduce to form but represent a new line of heredity. In this way the appearance of genius may often be accounted for. However, the factors which explain the appearance of mutants have not yet been analyzed.

Another fundamental genetic consideration is the law of selection. If individuals with worthy traits mate only with individuals who possess worthy traits, a superior stock will be produced. This tendency is very important, since it points the way to a potent method of securing social progress.

Eugenic social thought has been developed in part on the basis of the Weismann theory of no or slight transmission of acquired traits. The germ plasm is transmitted from individual to offspring in a direct line of descent. Injuries to the parent rarely change the nature of the germ plasm. Only extreme malnutrition or excessive use of alcohol apparently exerts a definite influence on the germ cells. Nature has thus made provision for the protection of germ plasm, whether strong or defective. Society, then, may encourage the mating of individuals who possess strong physical and mental traits, and discourage the mating of individuals who are defective—thus securing its own positive improvement.

APPLIED EUGENICS

Eugenic social thought follows two courses. Restrictive eugenics advocates the segregation of the so-called dysgenic classes, such as the feeble-minded, the insane, and the grossly defective criminal. Public opinion reacts against sterilization; injustice that cannot be remedied may be done through the use of sterilization. Segregation by sexes, while involving expense, is a satisfactory eugenic method of safeguarding society against the reproduction of dysgenic persons.

The other trend of eugenic thought supports the raising of the standards of choice in mating. Constructive eugenics, as distinguished from restrictive eugenics, urges a program of education whereby young people will habitually rate one another by physical and mental standards rather than by wealth and class standards.⁸

⁸ See Popenoe and Johnson, *Applied Eugenics*, Macmillan, 1918.

Eugenics disapproves of random mating. It favors assortative mating, because, for example, the "marriage of representatives of two long-lived strains ensures that the offspring will inherit more longevity than does the ordinary man."⁹ Eugenics thus stresses the importance of teaching young people eugenic ideas, and of training them to be guided by these ideals rather than by caprice and passion.¹⁰ Eugenic ideals include health, paternity and maternity, and pleasing disposition. Education and character are secondary eugenic ideals of importance.

A study of the birth rate shows that the inferior stocks and classes of individuals produce many more children than do the superior groups. Many cultured people do not marry, or if they marry they keep the birth rate very low. As a result, the racial character of a whole people may change within a few generations. The superior strains may be lost and the inferior furnish the entire population.

The low birth rate of the superior stocks is due to several factors: (1) The lengthening period of education and of professional training calls for the postponement of marriage. (2) The desire to give children the best advantages limits the birth rate. (3) The increasing spirit of independence on the part of women causes a postponement of marriage and a limitation of the number of children. These and other causes have produced a differential birth rate in favor of the inferior strains. Eugenic thought urges that the differential be reversed in favor of the superior strains. This conclusion implies that the dysgenic classes must be prevented from producing children, that the poor must be raised to higher educational and economic levels and taught to limit the birth rate, and that the eugenically superior be taught to increase the birth rate.

⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 213.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 218, 231.

WAR AND EUGENICS

Eugenics pronounces war to be both dysgenic and eugenic.¹¹ (1) It is dysgenic in that the bravest and the physically best are killed first. In the case of a long war only the weakest men physically and mentally are left alive to propagate the race. (2) War is dysgenic in that it produces a large number of hurried marriages. Rational choices of mates are supplanted by sudden emotional reactions. (3) War is dysgenic in that sex immorality greatly increases. Prostitution flourishes in the neighborhood of military encampments, unless rigid means of control are established. (4) Again, the dysgenic effect of war is seen in the period of socio-mental unrest which always follows war, and which among other things undermines rational sexual selection.

The chief eugenic effect of war is manifested during the period of training. This preparation period accents the importance of a strong physique and health measures. An insipid, stoop-shouldered population of city young men may be transformed into an army of fit soldiers. However, the conclusions are obvious that the dysgenic effects of war are far more potent than the eugenic gains, and that the eugenic advantages may be acquired in other ways than by promulgating war.

FEMINISM AND EUGENICS

Eugenics looks askance at the feminism movement. Feminism once meant the development of the womanly traits of the sex. It now refers to the elimination as far as possible of sex differences. It would make women as nearly as possible like men. Eugenics objects to this trend, since it underestimates the importance of the fact that women physically are built to be mothers. To the extent that women enter into all the occupations, they will become men-like; and their efficiency as mothers of the race will decrease, and the race will suffer.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Ch. XVI.

The economic equality of the sexes is a satisfactory doctrine to the eugenicist if the doctrine be extended to make motherhood a salaried occupation, like mill work or stenography.¹² "Child-bearing should be recognized as being as worthy of remuneration as any occupation which men enter, and should be paid for (by the state) on the same basis."¹³

Eugenics would throw every possible safeguard around motherhood, especially in the period immediately before and after the birth of the child. The mother, even the expectant mother, "is doing our business, indispensable and exacting business, and we must take care of her accordingly. She is not only a worker but the foremost of all workers."¹⁴

RACIAL POISONS

Eugenic thought as represented in the writings of C. W. Saleeby has denominated alcohol, venereal disease, and tuberculosis as "racial poisons." While there is some doubt regarding the eugenic effects of taking small amounts of alcohol into the human body, eugenicists are agreed that alcohol, when taken in excessive quantities, affects the germ plasm and produces a neurotic taint. It appears that alcoholism may be a cause in producing defective children. The verdicts of hygiene and economics that alcoholism is injurious to the race is supported by eugenics.

Venereal disease, another so-called race poison, produces toxins which apparently affect the germ plasm indirectly if not directly. It lowers the physical and moral tone and causes unfavorable racial tendencies. Venereal disease tends to destroy the generative organs and to cut off the birth rate entirely. It is a result of sex immorality which in itself tends to produce children under such abnormal conditions of vice that it becomes antisocial, if not a

¹² Popenoe and Johnson, *Applied Eugenics*, p. 381.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 380.

¹⁴ Saleeby, *The Progress of Eugenics*, p. 65.

dysgenic factor, in society. To the extent of course, that venereal disease kills off the racially useless, it may be considered eugenic.¹⁵ Such a point of view, however, fails to rate properly the invasions which venereal disease is continually making upon normal and superior types of germ plasm.

Tuberculosis weakens the membranous tissues and probably leads in a few generations to an unusual degree of susceptibility to the invasion of tubercle bacilli. It is still a question, however, to what extent tuberculosis may be counted a racial poison. Professor Hobhouse has argued that, by the development of scientific hygiene, it will be possible to center attention not upon eliminating tubercular stock, but upon eliminating the tubercle bacilli.¹⁶

RACES AND EUGENICS

In regard to race questions the social anthropologist and the eugenicist represent different poles of thought. As was indicated in the preceding chapter, the social anthropologists, such as Boas and Thomas, support the theory of potential race equality. The eugenicist, on the other hand, contends that there are inherently superior and inferior racial stocks, and that the marriages of representatives of inferior stocks with representatives of superior stocks will produce children of a stock distinctly lower than that of the superior stocks. The eugenicists in the United States hold that the immigration of the southern and eastern peoples of Europe will not only supplant through a higher birth rate the native stock of Nordic origin but, where marriages between natives and southern and eastern European immigrants occur, it will lower the racial quality of the population. While eugenic thought in this matter deserves a complete and respectful hearing, it must be considered along with the findings of social anthropology.

¹⁵ Popenoe and Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

¹⁶ Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, Lemcke, 1911, p. 45.

Eugenic thought opposes the miscegenation of the Caucasian and African. The Negro, it is contended, is not only different from the Caucasian but as a rule is eugenically inferior, judged by the achievements of the Negro. Moreover, the eugenicist interprets the anthropological tests to show that the innate ability of a colored man "is proportionate to the amount of white blood he has." The conclusion of eugenics is that "in general the white race loses and the Negro gains from miscegenation,"¹⁷—as far as the germinal natures of the two races are concerned. The eugenicist would forbid all intermarriage between the races, and urge that the taboo against sexual intercourse between the races be extended.

In the light of eugenic thought genealogy may become scientific, in fact, it may become a valuable source of scientific materials for eugenics. Heretofore genealogy has been the concern of a few leisure-class people, who have taken pleasure and pride in recounting the fact that some one of a possible thousand or more ancestors several generations back was distinguished in some way or other, and who would have friends or the public believe that they inherited from this ancestor of note the characteristics which made him great. Eugenics points out a nobler purpose to which genealogy may be put. It urges that mental and physical traits of every individual in all families be carefully analyzed and accurately and systematically recorded. In this way it will be possible in a generation to have available a large amount of eugenic materials, and in a few generations a reliable body of data for studying racial heredity.

The debate regarding the comparative influences of nature and nurture has been long and bitter. It may be said here that both heredity and environment are more or less equally essential in the development of human personality.¹⁸ Without inherited factors in the individual the en-

¹⁷ Popenoe and Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 292.

¹⁸ A scientific and sane outlook is maintained on this and questions of similar importance by J. S. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race*, Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1921.

vironment has nothing upon which to work. Without a stimulating environment the inherited traits will remain dormant. Each human being has inherited factors which, if played upon by certain environmental factors, may lead the individual to try to wreck society or himself or both. Every person, also, has traits which, if stimulated by the proper environmental elements may cause him to develop into a useful member of society. While the environment cannot change the inherited potentialities very much, if any, it is a prime factor of vast importance in determining which inherited tendencies will never find expression, which will be expressed in modified ways, and which will reach full fruition.

The eugenic goal, like the intelligence test standards, is often thought of in terms of ability to meet social life conditions. But social standards in an individualistic-capitalistic society may ultimately prove disastrous from the standpoint of securing the "highest" human types. As G. R. Davies has said: "The eugenicist who regards commercial success as the standard toward which society should breed apparently has in mind a nation composed only of cultured bondholders."¹⁹

Eugenics insists with increasing force that educational programs shall provide that every child be not only well reared but also well born. A weakness in eugenic thought is that it implies that sound racial stock is sufficient to guarantee progress; it tends at times to overstress an aristocracy of racial stock. It sometimes detracts from the importance of character and personal discipline as essential elements in social progress.

THE TREND OF THE RACE²⁰

The biological situation of our race is at present in many respects unique. In the earlier stages of man's evolution development was mainly along divergent lines. The spread of mankind over the con-

¹⁹ *Social Environment*, A. C. McClurg, 1917, p. 120.

²⁰ Reprinted by permission from S. J. Holmes, *The Trend of the Race*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1921.

tinents and islands of the globe brought about the formation of more or less completely isolated stocks, subjected to different conditions of environment. This resulted in breaking up the human species into a great multitude of divergent groups, in a manner which closely parallels the diversification of species of plants and animals subjected to the combined influence of isolation and varied surroundings. Few species of organisms present so great a variety of hereditarily diverse strains as our own. And even if we divide *Homo sapiens* into several distinct species, the same statement would apply to each of the component groups.

But now the trend of racial development has changed. Barriers that formerly kept peoples apart have become broken down. Races are meeting and amalgamating at a rate which becomes more rapid as time goes on and facilities for travel and intercommunication increase. The diversities which were the product of the long period of man's earlier evolution are becoming rapidly submerged. The period of divergence is now superseded by a period of convergence which, if it does not involve the ultimate obliteration of our present distinctions of race, will certainly greatly diminish the number of separate ethnic stocks. Perhaps the final result, if we can speak of any results as final, will be the formation of a few races which occupy those climatic zones to which they are peculiarly adapted and which will form a permanent barrier against successful invasion by their enemies. But, however the process of racial fusion may work out, it is evident that the growing amalgamation of races and peoples and the extension of civilization over the earth will leave no room for the replacement of decadent products of civilization by superior stocks which have not yet been overtaken by culture. If civilization is really an enemy of racial development, it will ultimately check the course of man's biological evolution unless some effective means can be instituted for counteracting its insidious effects. That it has a profound effect upon our biological development is a conclusion that cannot be escaped. But to discover just how it acts involves an attack upon a number of problems many of which are of great difficulty and many incapable of solution with the data at present available. Civilization influences human heredity in very diverse ways, some favorable and some the reverse. For a long time it may be impossible to estimate, with any degree of accuracy, the potency of the factors which are responsible for evolutionary changes in man. In an attack upon a complex and many-sided problem such as this, one has to be continually on guard against making hasty generalizations and falling into statistical fallacies. (pp. 5-6)

A person with our present knowledge of human heredity and endowed with the authority which the Great Master in Campanella's

City of the Sun exercised over the matings of men and women, could produce, in a few generations, a remarkable array of diverse types. He could, for instance, breed an albino race, a deaf race, a feeble-minded race, an insane race, a race of dwarfs, a race with hook-like extremities instead of hands, a race of superior intellectual ability, or a race of high artistic talent. It may be said that such changes as may occur in a few generations affect merely the prevalence of characteristics already present, or the making of different combinations of existing hereditary factors. But from the standpoint of human welfare the importance even of such changes is tremendous. They may make all the difference between a breed of wretched degenerates and a race of physical vigor and superior mentality. The human species possessing so great a diversity of hereditary traits and subjected to the influences of so many changing forces both physical and social can scarcely fail to undergo more or less rapid modification. If our race would avoid the danger of deterioration and realize the best of its hereditary possibilities we should know first of all what is the present trend of our development and what are some of the more important forces by which our development is guided. (pp. 8-9)

The elimination of our worst defectives would not meet the most serious difficulty which consists in the loss of these stocks which carry our best inheritance. It is doubtful if the pecuniary rewards which have sometimes been advocated for increasing the birth rate of desirable parents would prove very effective. There is much to be said in favor of making parenthood voluntary in all classes so as to restrict the birth rate among the people who occupy the rather broad belt between the obviously defective and ordinary mediocrity. This of itself would lead to a greater relative fecundity among those of superior inheritance, and so long as restriction is not carried far enough to prevent all increase of the population, the result would doubtless be eugenically and socially desirable. Through reducing the death rate the natural increase of several countries has become more rapid, despite the diminishing numbers of births. For most civilized countries, therefore, the necessity for further restriction of the birth rate must sooner or later become imperative. If this should occur mainly in people of better endowments who already have a low birth rate the deterioration of our racial inheritance will go on at an accelerated pace.

The birth rate of different stocks would become more nearly equalized by economic reforms which would effect a more equitable distribution of wealth and by the greater diffusion of education which would be favored by such reforms. An ignorant and poverty-ridden

proletariat will multiply rapidly through sheer lack of restraint. It is a most fortunate circumstance that the third estate continues to include many people of excellent hereditary qualities; in course of time, however, they tend to rise and become sterile, and thus the great breeding ground from which they emerged is impoverished. It is the very inadequacy and incompleteness of this sifting process which has thus far tended to keep racial deterioration in check. A social system in which human beings are rewarded by education and position according to their inborn capacity has often been held up as a desideratum. But lest the racial effect of such a régime should prove to be more destructive than our present system, some means must be instituted for encouraging race suicide among those to whom Nature has been grudging in her distribution of desirable endowments.

It is doubtless feasible to do much more through education toward the accomplishment of this purpose, but the advantages conferred by elimination, however extensively it may be carried out, are of less value than those resulting from an increase in the highest types of inheritance. The best blood of a nation is its most priceless possession. It cannot be increased by any artificial or arbitrary methods as these would not commend themselves to modern ethical standards. Education to whose influence many dysgenic effects may now be justly charged is, after all, the essential basis for the realization of any project of racial improvement. To be effective it must include the inculcation of a sense of responsibility for the hereditary qualities of future generations. Education is eugenically of value as making possible the development of a "eugenic conscience" which is now sadly lacking in most people of culture. It is a hopeful sign that here and there among people who have inherited a generous measure of desirable traits eugenic considerations have led to the rearing of larger families. On the other hand, many who are aware that they carry a hereditary taint refrain from transmitting a possible affliction to their posterity. With a higher standard of education and a diffusion of the sense of obligation to transmit socially valuable qualities conditions might conceivably be changed so that a greater relative fecundity would come to characterize the more vigorous, intelligent, and public-spirited members of the community. Those who have been most fortunate in the possession of hereditary gifts should feel that upon them rests an unusual obligation to see that their qualities are not allowed to perish from the earth. The race has its fate in its own hands to make or to mar. Will it ever take itself in hand and shape its own destiny? (pp. 381-383)

THE EUGENIC GOAL²¹

Sociology, then, does not attack eugenics, but only insists on the erection of social standards in connection with the definition of the fittest. And in so doing, it merely continues the demand that the social spirit has asserted from the first; namely, that a person shall be regarded as good not in accordance with his ability to further his own interests, but in accordance with his willingness and ability to cooperate in group life. Measured by social standards many of the world's successful must give place to the humble, and the last may again be first. In the rush of militarism and commercialism social standards have been submerged, and the worldly-minded revert to the natural standards of success. This tendency is often reflected among the eugenicists, as, for example, when a recent writer in a popular magazine calmly classified the unsuccessful as feeble-minded on the ground that life is the most comprehensive test of mentality. Such an attitude shows an utter blindness to the unsocial spirit of commercialized society, where success so often means simply the monopolization of property by which revenues may be wrung from the unsuccessful. Capitalistic property is not essentially different from feudal property, and its ownership by no means guarantees service. The eugenicist who regards commercial success as the standard toward which society should breed apparently has in mind as an ideal a nation composed only of cultured bondholders. What an admirable solution of the labor problem!

One cannot but commend the efforts of the eugenicists to discourage the propagation of the seriously defective classes. Such a policy is both humane and enlightened. But in the opposition they so commonly evince toward social legislation they pervert their reasoning and prostitute their science to exploiting interests. Laws to protect the toiler against destructive competition are merely the modern correlative of primitive customs expressive of the blood bond, by which the individually weak were welded into the socially strong group. And such measures are in reality the most practicable eugenic measures. If society is to continue it must devise means to perpetuate the lives and homes of the productive and the socially minded against those who are examples of the natural standard of success in their ability to take. The natural standard readily asserts itself in the *laissez faire* of the market and the battlefield; social standards can be maintained only by the persistent effort of the social mind.

²¹ Reprinted with permission from G. R. Davies, *Social Environment*, A. C. McClurg and Company, 1917.

Evolution has always been sympodial; each succeeding age has been a judgment day that pulled down the mighty and exalted them of low degree. The giant ferns, the dinosaurs, and the mastodons have their day at the pinnacle of creation, then disappear in favor of some insignificant competitor. So when the present-day lust of greed and blood shall have spent itself, it may be found that the kingdom of the future belongs to some of the despised and the rejected. Who are the fittest? Is the standard of the jungle or the standard of the gospels to be applied? (pp. 119-121)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The leading founders of eugenics.
2. The chief elements in Galton's program of eugenics.
3. The reasons why gifted men rarely have sons equally gifted.
4. The distinction between the law of recessiveness and the law of regression.
5. The law of ancestral inheritance.
6. The program of assortative mating.
7. The nature of "constructive eugenics."
8. The main dysgenic classes.
9. Causes of the low birth rate of the superior classes.
10. War as a dysgenic agency.
11. War as a eugenic agency.
12. The attitude of eugenic thought toward feminism.
13. The meaning of "racial poisons."
14. The distinction between the eugenic and the social anthropological attitude toward the racial equality theory.
15. The leisure-class attitude contrasted with the eugenic attitude toward genealogy.
16. The strong and weak points of eugenic thought.

CHAPTER XX

CONFLICT THEORIES IN SOCIOLOGY

THE CONCEPT of social conflict has already been introduced to the reader. In the chapter on "Individualistic Social Thought" the prolonged struggle between individual rights and genuine social control was analyzed. Malthus described the conflict between population and the means of subsistence. Comte insisted that man is not naturally a social being. Hence this unsocial nature of mankind is a fruitful source of human conflict. Marx pictured the class struggle; and Darwin elaborated the doctrine of the survival of the fittest.

The slightest grasp of social thought reveals the fact that human association is characterized at times by deep-seated and subtle conflicts; and at other times by a fundamental cooperative spirit. Some sociological writers have seen only or chiefly the conflicts of life; others have sought out the cooperative activities; still other have tried to discover the relationships between conflict and cooperation in societal development. This chapter will deal with the concept of social conflict, while the next chapter will be centered on the ideal of social cooperation and upon the relationship of conflict to cooperation in group processes.

GUMFLOWICZ

One of the outstanding believers in the theory that conflict dominates societal life was Ludwig Gumplowicz (1838-1910). His system of thought begins with the assertion that primitive hordes were the original units of society. Gumplowicz dissented from Herbert Spencer's belief in the individual as the original societary unit, although he accepted the determinism that is inherent in Spencer's

theory of evolution. Gumplowicz also repudiated Comte's belief in social amelioration through prevision, but subscribed to Comte's positivism.

According to Gumplowicz, society began with a large number of primitive groups, which were self-sustaining and self-conscious units. Each one of these hordes was a warring group, possessing an instinctive hatred of all other hordes.¹ As these hordes increased in size, the general food supply failed to meet the needs. Consequently, inter-group struggle resulted and the members of the weaker hordes were either destroyed or enslaved. The existence of slaves led to situations of intra-group inequality, which in turn created problems involving injustice.

As a result of continual conflicts between groups, there are frequent changes taking place in their personnel. The vanquished are continually being absorbed by victorious groups. In a given successful group two classes are at once established, namely, the victors and the vanquished. Classes are thus continually arising out of new juxtapositions of heterogeneous racial elements.²

It was in an intense form of group self-interest that Gumplowicz found the mainspring of social progress. This self-interest leads to an exaggerated group appraisal, a strong degree of group unity, a state of warfare between groups—and perhaps progress. Basic to this group self-interest, there are the material needs of the members of the group; the economic desires and the tendencies. The group is bound together by various factors, such as a common social life, a common language, religion, and culture.

Gumplowicz advocated a theory of potential race equality. He argued against innate racial superiority and racial inferiority. He doubted the existence of any pure races. Each race is a compound of other races, and hence races are potentially similar in fundamental respects. Na-

¹ Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Der Rassenkampf*, Innsbruck, 1883, p. 64.

² Gumplowicz, *Grundriss der Sociologie*, translated by Moore, 1885, p. 134.

tional progress, therefore, holds no connection with race purity.

Gumplowicz minimized the importance of the individual. Groups rule. Centuries of traditions dominate. The thoughts of the individual are almost, if not entirely, a mere reflection of the social environment. The group develops group pride or group disloyalty in the minds of its members. The distinguished leader is largely the man who expresses the will of the group during the group crisis. Gumplowicz makes only a brief reference to the process of interaction between the individual and the group. An underlying theory of natural determinism vitiates much of Gumplowicz's ideas concerning the individual.

Inasmuch as society, like individuals, passes through a cycle of growth and decay, subject to unchangeable natural and societal laws, there is no justification for individual interference with social processes. In fact, this theory led Gumplowicz into pessimistic conclusions concerning life. He failed to see that societal life is not necessarily a series of hopeless cyclical conflicts, and that social processes are becoming increasingly subject to human control—for good or ill. He did not appreciate the fact that groups are not subject to laws of cyclical growth and decay after the manner of individuals. Hence, his conflict theory of societal life ended in confusion and pessimism.³

NIETZSCHE

A reference was made in Chapter XI to the theories of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). This German philosopher developed the idea of social conflict, basing it on the concept of the "will to power." Leaders desire power. They enjoy exercising power and they thrive under that exercise. Jealousy of the leaders arises. The weaker members of society join together against the possessors of power. They develop a will to power, but of a weaker

³ Gumplowicz, *Sociologie und Politik*, p. 94.

type than that of the leaders. Conflicts ensue between the will to power of the superior and the will to power of the inferior.

The superior and the inferior types each possess a distinctive code of morality.⁴ The supermen develop a harsh and rigorous attitude toward themselves and others. They gird and prepare themselves for the crises of life. They strive to augment their power. They become self-contained. They take pride in crushing weakness and in deifying strength. Their morality stresses those factors in life which create power. They feel a condescending pity for the weak. They experience no sense of responsibility for the inferior classes. Since supermen are the supreme goal of nature, supermen feel that all persons and things should contribute to increasing the power of supermen.⁵ It is a waste of energy for supermen to give their lives in behalf of inferior persons. They are interested only in the welfare of other supermen.

The morality of the inferior is of a type which furthers weakness. It accents sympathy. It emphasizes gregariousness. The inferior creates a slavish, cringing, meek morality. They sacrifice themselves readily and humbly in behalf of others who may be inferior to themselves.

Nietzsche believed in a eugenics program. He declared that marriages should be arranged with a view to producing supermen. Nietzsche's deterministic view of natural evolution led him to believe, however, that equality of privileges is unattainable. He opposed democracy because its theory of equal opportunities contradicts the tendencies of nature. He was no socialist. He asserted that an aristocracy of power is the only true goal for society. He carried forward the ruthless biological laws of tooth and fang into his conception of the highest types of civilization.

Moreover, the superman is a biological mutant. He appears sporadically. At this point Nietzsche's inconsis-

⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*, New York, 1897, p. 46.

⁵ Nietzsche, *The Will to Power*, 1889, pp. 90, 269, 660 ff.

ency becomes obvious. For example, if geniuses appear sporadically, and without reference to biological laws, why attempt to arrange marriages so as to produce supermen? To get himself out of the dilemma, Nietzsche postulated cyclical returns of supermen and lost his bearings in trying to interpret an endless circular movement in social evolution, endlessly repeating itself. In an applied form Nietzsche's philosophy has appeared in German political life, but to the defeat of Germany.

In starting points, Nietzsche and Gumplowicz were widely different. Nietzsche began with an apotheosis of the man of power and extolled the achievements of supermen. Gumplowicz had little place for the individual, even for the most powerful. Both sets of theories ended in a deterministic philosophy of individual and social despair.

PATTEN

An unusually fundamental delineation of social conflict has been advanced by Simon N. Patten in his *Theory of Social Forces*.⁶ Human society is the product largely of a pain economy in which the requisites for survival are determined "by the enemies and pains to be avoided." In a like manner a pain morality and a pain religion develop. The purpose of the pain morality is "to keep persons from committing acts and putting themselves in situations which lead to destruction." The pain religion, likewise, aims to invoke the aid of higher powers in the human conflict with enemies and death. The social forces in a pain economy have been builded up in the form of sets of ideals, instincts, and habits.

Society, however, is now in a transition stage—entering a pleasure economy. A large number of the sources of pain have been eliminated through the inventive and administrative phases of civilization. Dangerous beasts and reptiles, barbarous invasions, and superstitious interpretations are uncommon among the advanced human groups.

⁶ S. N. Patten, *A Theory of Social Forces*, 1896, Ch. IV.

No nation, unfortunately, has been able to live under a pleasure economy. Its members have not built up sets of instincts, habits, and ideals that withstand the effects of a pleasure economy. Consequently, individuals and nations have fallen into lethargy, vice, and decay. The enemies to a pleasure economy are found within the individual; these are as yet unconquered under the allurements of a pleasure environment.

CARVER

Another type of conflict theory of society is advanced by Thomas Nixon Carver. Professor Carver begins his analysis with a discussion of the conflict of human interests. Originally all conflicts were settled on the basis of might. But conflicts between persons who are beginning to think, sometimes lead one or each of the contending parties to a consideration of adjusting the conflict by other than physical strife. At this point the concept of justice begins to take form.

Justice, according to Dr. Carver, is "that system of adjusting conflicting interests which makes the group strong and progressive."⁷ Virtue and strength are pronounced identical, and strength is defined "according to its ability to make itself universal."

Conflict arises out of scarcity. Where two men want the same thing, conflict ensues. It is this antagonism of interests which produces moral problems and furnishes a basis for determining justice and injustice. One reason for the lack of supply of things which people seek is that in society human wants are unduly expanded. If wants could be kept low and production high, an adaptation of people to things would take place which would greatly lessen conflict.

Conflicts take place in three different fields: (1) between man and nature, (2) between man and man, and

⁷ T. N. Carver, *Essays in Social Justice*, Harvard University Press, 1915, pp. 30, 34.

(3) between the different interests of the same man.⁸ If there were no such conflicts, there would be no moral problems. The result would be paradise.

The institutions of property, the family, and the state have developed out of antagonism of interests, which in turn, as has been said, is the result of scarcity. If things were not scarce, no one would think of claiming property in anything. In a similar way the kinship group becomes desirous of possessing property and hence acquires unity. In asserting that *the* unifying principle in the family is an economic one, Dr. Carver espouses a theory of economic determinism. In fact, he holds that "the economic problem is the fundamental one, out of which all other social and moral problems have grown."⁹

Dr. Carver somewhat softens his rigorous social theories when he admits that there may be a few people in the world whose feeling of humanity is strong enough to overbalance an antagonism of interests and to lead them to treat the world as a normal individual treats his family.¹⁰ A world of such people would make a world of communism. But such a world is unthinkable, because world-loving people are social aberrations. The individual whose altruism is such that he gladly gives his body to a tiger, is not helping to transform the world into a world of saints but into a world of tigers.¹¹ Extreme forms of benevolence and meekness constitute the very food upon which selfishness fattens.¹²

Professor Carver, therefore, points out two sources of conflict, namely, scarcity of desirable things and self-centered appreciation. These two bases of conflict are fundamentally natural and normal. Conflicts appear, how-

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49, 50.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹² *Op. cit.*

ever, in a great variety of forms. This classification of the methods of struggling for existence is fourfold.¹³

(1) There is a group of conflicts which are primarily destructive, such as war, robbery, dueling, sabotage, brawling. These conflicts are all crude, primitive, brutal. They represent man at his lowest ebb. They are militant in character, depending upon the individual's power to destroy, to harm, or to inflict pain and injury.¹⁴

(2) Deceptive conflicts are of an order slightly higher than the militant. They include thieving, swindling, adulteration of goods, false advertising. They imply a greater degree of intelligence than the purely destructive types of conflict.

(3) Another form of conflict is persuasive in character, for example, political, erotic, commercial, and legal conflicts. Political competition includes seeking governmental appointments, running for office, campaigning for a political party. Erotic conflicts are in the main different forms of courtship. Commercial persuasion utilizes the agencies of advertising and salesmanship. Legal conflicts include litigations in the courts. In all these illustrations the individual strives to further his own interests by his persuasive ability. Oftentimes resort is made to cheap persuasive methods, such as demagoguery or political claptrap. Sometimes the persuasion falls to the level of deception and, occasionally, to destructive depths.

(4) The highest form of conflicts are the productive types. Some productive conflicts refer to rivalries in producing economic goods; others to rivalries in rendering services. In his *Essays in Social Justice*, Professor Carver discusses three forms of economic competition at length. Here he includes competitive production, competitive bargaining, and competitive consumption of economic goods. The second class has already been referred to as commer-

¹³ T. N. Carver, *Principles of Political Economy*, Ginn, 1919, pp. 37 ff.

¹⁴ *Essays in Social Justice*, p. 86.

cial persuasion. Competitive production increases the supply of economic goods and "always works well." Competitive consumption, however, "always works badly." It means "rivalry in display, in ostentation, in the effort to outshine or outdress all one's neighbors, or at least not to be outshone or outdressed by them." It is usually deceptive; it has no productive features about it. It may even assume a form of waste and destruction. The highest type of conflict is friendly rivalry in rendering service to other people.

Professor Carver would have self-interest direct its effort toward the welfare of the nation. Since neither law nor government can eliminate self-interest, the next best thing is to connect it with national well-being. Nearly all useful things that are done in a community are undertaken through self-interest.¹⁵ Even cooperation is a form of competition.¹⁶ The purpose of cooperation is to enable groups of individuals to compete more effectively against opposing groups.

Competition is not an evil in itself. The spirit which dominates competition is the important thing. Some people are motivated by the pig-trough philosophy, which emphasizes struggle for the sake of possession and consumption of goods. The workbench philosophy accents "action and not possession, production and not consumption."

These theories, excellent in many particulars, apparently do not rate at full value the fact that education and love can and do modify the self-interest of the individual, and at the same time direct the attention of the individual toward unselfish service. In stressing service through achievement and production, they neglect to emphasize achievement through service. Competition in rendering unselfish service is underrated.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁶ *Principles of Political Economy*, p. 43.

NOVICOW

It was Novicow, the Russian sociologist, who laid bare the alleged benefits of war, showing that the gains which come from war may be obtained through other methods of social interaction.¹⁷ Novicow argued forcefully that the real enemies of a group of people are disease germs and death, not the best people of other nationality groups. Novicow's vision enabled him to perceive the foolishness of men who lock themselves together in destructive conflict, when the real enemies are microscopic disease bacteria and the gaunt, black specter of death.

Another type of conflict theory of far-reaching and fundamental importance is Durkheim's theory of Division of Labor.¹⁸ The earliest division of labor is that involving the care of children on one hand, and hunting and fighting on the other—in other words, the division of labor between the sexes. With the progress of the centuries, labor became repeatedly subdivided until today occupational specialization is outstanding. Its social meanings, however, are not clear.

Increasing density of population has made specialization necessary. Survival has required specialization. With this division of labor has come division of interests—and conflicts. Industrial conflicts are due in part to division of labor. Occupational specialization, moreover, has resulted in a decline of mechanical solidarity, or likemindedness. Increase in organic solidarity, that is, in organized and coordinated solidarity does not keep pace with the decrease in mechanical or likeminded solidarity caused by increasing division of labor and specialization. Hence, Durkheim develops the concept of constraint as being society's only recourse in order to meet the increasing conflict nature of societary life.

¹⁷ J. Novicow, *War and its Alleged Benefits*, translated by Seltzer, Holt, 1911.

¹⁸ *De la Division du Travail Social*, Paris, 1893. Durkheim's concept of "collective representations" is also significant at this point. Collective representations refer to the symbolical values of a group, such as the flag, its sacred writings, its canonical heroes.

Conflict bulks large in the sociology of Edward A. Ross. Any interference with the carrying out of the individual's plans and with the satisfying of his interests creates opposition. The best characteristic of the phenomenon of opposition is that it awakens and stimulates.¹⁹ Competition operates according to psychologic laws; for example, the intensity of competition varies according (1) to the degree of personal liberty, (2) to the rate of social change, and (3) inversely as the efficiency of the selective agents.²⁰

One of the most important forms of competition is found in industrialism. The invention and adoption of the power-driven machine has created an industrialism which is moulding and transforming society in startling ways, and which is causing "its members more and more to cluster at opposite poles of the social spindle."²¹ Professor Ross expresses slight hope that the ownership of industrial capital will be disseminated through the working class according to the conflict rules of the present economic system.

While source materials concerning the conflict theories of Albion W. Small are presented at the close of this chapter, the discussion of them will be taken up in the next chapter in connection with the theme of cooperation. Gabriel Tarde's analysis of conflict will be taken up in the chapter on psycho-sociologic thought. Park and Burgess' theory of conflict will be introduced here and referred to in later chapters. To them conflict is a conscious expression of the struggle for the maintenance or acquisition of status. It is an outgrowth of competition, which is an unconscious struggle for status. It is a stage in the social process that is followed normally by accommodation and assimilation—the essential elements in cooperation.

In general, the social conflict doctrines, when carried to the extreme, fail to recognize that conflict and cooperation are correlative social processes. Humanly speaking, one is as old as the other. Both spring from the deepest types of human needs. While the earliest types of associative

¹⁹ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, Century, 1920, p. 167.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 207, 206.

life may have been characterized by a predominance of conflict, the highest stages are ruled by the cooperative spirit. This transition together with the leading cooperation theories of social progress will be taken up in the chapter which follows.

INTERGROUP CONFLICTS²²

Therefore, we must remember not only that contiguous groups are diverse in origin, but also that they have been undergoing different courses of development. We must also remember that every racial group persists in a given condition until forced out of it and into another through the action of some other group, and such action is pre-eminently called social.

In other words, each alteration in the social condition of a group must always have a sufficient social cause, which is always the influence of another group. This is a law, and can be amply illustrated from history and experience. An important proposition for the methodology of sociology follows from it, viz., whenever an alteration in the condition of a group is perceived we should inquire what influences exerted by another group produced it. It follows, also, that a rapid and varied development and frequent social changes occur only under the continual reciprocal influence of many foreign (heterogen) groups, that is, in states and systems of states.

This brings us very close to the definition of a social event or process. When two or more distinct (heterogen) groups come in contact, when each enters the sphere of the other's operations, a social process always ensues. So long as one unitary, homogeneous group is not influenced by or does not exert an influence upon another it persists in the original primitive state. Hence, in distant quarters of the globe, shut off from the world, we find hordes in a state as primitive, probably, as that of their forefathers a million years ago. Here, very likely, we are dealing with an elementary, primitive, social phenomenon, or, better, with a social element, but not with a social process nor with a social change.

But as soon as one group is exposed to the influence of another, the interplay of mutual forces ensues inevitably and the social process begins. When two distinct (heterogen) groups come together, the natural tendency of each is to exploit the other, to use the most general expression. This, indeed, is what gives the first impulse to the social process. This tendency is so inherent in every human group, so natural and indomitable, that it is impossible to conceive of groups coming together without displaying it, without generating the social process.

²² Reprinted by permission from Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Outline of Sociology*, translated by F. W. Moore, in "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science," 1899.

The course of the process depends upon the natural constitution of "mankind" and the tendencies peculiar to all human hordes and social communities. Since these factors differ only as one individual or, at most, one species from another and everywhere exhibit the same generic characteristics the process is essentially the same everywhere.

True, the human race is composed of an endless variety of species; the different hordes and tribes are combined in many ways and produce a variety of social formations or collective entities which in turn act upon one another; even the influence of time and place yields a diversity of effects; so that the social process nevertheless presents endless variety and individuality of development. But the differences are transient and local. It is the task of sociology—and by no means an easy one—in the midst of diversity to find the controlling social laws, to explain the miscellaneous variety of social development by the simplest forces in operation and to reduce the countless shapes it assumes to a simple common denominator.

All social laws, indeed, all universal laws as well, have one characteristic in common: they explain the becoming, but never the beginning of things, the ultimate origin. This limitation must be insisted upon the more emphatically since the human mind is given to inquiring after the genesis of things. It desires knowledge of the first arising, the ultimate origin—a tendency fatal to science; whereas with all the laws cognizable it can apprehend only the perpetual becoming.

Hence, none of the questions about the ultimate origin of human associations belong in sociology, if indeed they belong in any science whatever! Sociology begins with the countless different social groups of which, as can be irrefutably proven, mankind is constituted. (pp. 84-86)

It has already been pointed out that it is not the size of the social group which determines its power. The lords were always in a minority, and in modern states with millions of inhabitants the power rests with the "upper ten thousand." The intimacy of the union and the resultant organization and discipline together with mental superiority complement numerical inferiority giving the minority the preponderancy. The minority applies the strategical maxim: march as individuals, strike as one. The masses always lack unity and organization as the result partly of their great bulk, partly of indolence. Since the result of the social struggle depends on discipline the minority has the advantage because it is small. Besides there will be greater intimacy and more common interests; the group-making factors will be more numerous, more intense and more permanent.

The more indolent a man is the less appreciation he has for the ideal goods of life. As he has fewer wants he has fewer interests in common with other men and is less energetic in defending them.

The power of a social group increases with the number of common interests among its members irrespective of its size. When success depends on numbers it relies on uniting with other social groups. This is very important; it is the key to social politics. The number of common interests necessarily varies inversely with the number of individuals in the social group. For though the number of interests increases as conditions improve, it is the condition of the minority especially that improves since the majority must labor and serve to produce it.

Prosperity is the natural lot of the minority; with improved conditions the number of interests increases; with these the intensity of social cohesion; and this gives more social power.

In the final analysis the intensity of the union depends upon the personal character of the individuals. But as their mutual intercourse is made easier by custom, and as good customs grow with common welfare and culture the union is strengthened too.

The highest and smallest aristocratic circles are mightier than all the other social groups in the state though a thousand times larger. The masters united in a guild are stronger than the journeymen and laborers.

In times of revolution everything may depend on numerical strength and then the small groups are at a disadvantage. Their power can be realized only under normal conditions of political organization. But this must be considered the normal condition of civilized man.

Each group exerts whatever power it normally possesses and tries to have its relative position recognized in the state in the form of rights. But every right is made the basis of renewed efforts. Human desires are constantly growing and no social group ever rested content with what it had obtained; on the contrary present attainments are used to increase power and satisfy new desires.

From this fundamental law the conduct of each social group can be definitely predicted in every case. It will strive, like the state, to increase its power. But the struggle does not depend on the individual. Though there are always individuals who deviate first one way and then the other, they, like meteoric stones which are loosened from their planet and fly off in all directions, are abnormal, and do not influence the behavior of the group as a whole.

In its political actions each social group is a perfect unit. It opposes other social groups in behalf of its own interest solely and knows no standard of conduct but success.

The struggle between social groups, the component parts of the state, is as inexorable as that between hordes or states. The only motive is self-interest. In "Der Rassenkampf" we described the conflict as a "race-war" for such is its inexorable animosity that each group that is able tends to become exclusive like a caste, to form a consanguineous circle, in short, to become a race.

What is the character of the struggle between the social groups? What are the methods and the means? No general answer can be given; for they differ with the position which the groups occupy in the state, with the amount of power and the instruments which they possess.

The refusal to perform religious rites is an instrument in the hands of the priesthood. The higher nobility can make certain lucrative and influential offices exclusive. The guild-masters require "proof of competency." Attorneys restrict the privileges of practicing law. Manufacturers insist on free trade in grain. Laborers strike, etc., etc. The social struggle consists in establishing appropriate institutions for increasing the power of one social group at the expense of the others. However it may be with the individual the society never errs in seizing and applying the right means; its instincts are always right.

If this seems to be a contradiction consider the actual experience of history. At every step it shows the mistakes of even the cleverest individuals and the demoniacal cleverness of society infallible as natural law. Theories and passions often confuse the individual; but society never fails for it never reflects and never chooses but naturally follows the powerful attraction of its own interests.

THE FIELD OF COMBAT

It is a peculiarity of the social struggle that it must be conducted by a collective whole. Previous organization into assemblages is necessary, and every society must secure some suitable organ for conducting the social struggle. Thus the ruling classes through their parliaments exercise the legislative power and are able by legal institutions to further their own interests at the cost of others.

Nothing impresses thinking men so seriously as the contemplation of the social struggle, for its immorality offends their moral feelings deeply. Individuals can consider ethical requirements, they have consciences, but societies have none. They overfall their victims like avalanches with irresistible destroying power. All societies, large and small, retain the character of wild hordes in considering every means good which succeeds. Who would look for fidelity, veracity, and conscience in the intercourse of the "most civilized" states of the

world? Lying and deceit, breach of confidence and betrayal is on every page of their history; and saddest of all, no one can foresee whether it will ever be different, though the noblest men may stand at the head of affairs, with the highest intentions. (pp. 143-145)

SOCIAL CONFLICTS²³

Forms of Human Conflict

Militant	{	War Rape Duelling Brawling Sabotage
Gambling		
Persuasive	{	Political { Courting for royal favors Running for office Campaigning for a cause Erotic { Polite social intercourse Courting Legal { "Leaving it to the crowd" Litigation before courts
Economic Achievement	{	Competitive Production Competitive Bargaining Competitive Consumption
Recreational	{	Games Sports Dramatics Fiction

In Chapters II and III the sources of conflict have been shown to be—first, scarcity of desirable things; second, self-interest or self-centered appreciation. There being fewer of certain things than people desire—people uniformly preferring their own satisfaction or that of those near to them to the satisfaction of other people—the conflict of interests is unavoidable. This conflict shows itself, however, in a great variety of forms, the chief of which are outlined in the foregoing diagram.

By the Militant form of conflict is meant any form in which one's success depends upon one's own power to destroy, to harm, or to

²³ Reprinted by permission from T. N. Carver, *Essays in Social Justice*, Harvard University Press, 1915.

inflict pain or injury. One strives to get what one wants by inflicting injury upon one's rivals, and in order to succeed in this form of conflict, one must develop one's powers of destruction.

Under Gambling is included every method of securing what one desires by leaving it to chance. It is a cheaper and less destructive method than any of the militant forms of conflict, though it is not likely to result in any closer approximation to justice.

Under the Persuasive forms of conflict are included every method by which one furthers one's own interests by the exercise of one's powers of persuasion. Under this method one must beat one's rival by competing with him in some kind of persuasive contest, by argument, debate, or oratory; by manners, dress, or personal popularity; or by ogling, demagoguery, or political claptrap.

By the method of Economic Achievement is meant any conflict or competition in which one strives to get what one wants either by producing it, or by bargaining, or by conspicuous consumption.

Under the Recreational forms of conflict we include every attempt to amuse ourselves by engaging in some kind of contest, by observing a make-believe contest as it is placed on the stage, or by reading the story, real or fictitious, of some of the multifarious forms of conflict outlined above.

One conspicuous fact about human conflict in general is that no one is absolutely confined to any of the methods outlined in this diagram. He who is beaten in one form of conflict may, unless restrained by conscience or social force, resort to another form to regain what he has lost. Generally the tendency is to resort to the more primitive rather than the less primitive form. That is to say, a gambler who is beaten in the game may attempt by the use of knife or pistol to regain what he has lost. In other words, he reverts from the gambling to the militant type of conflict. The courtier who has failed to get the favorable ear of the king, having been beaten by a rival, may challenge his successful rival to a duel, as may also the defeated candidate for office in a democracy, or the defeated suitor for the hand of a lady. These are all cases of reverting from a less primitive to a more primitive form of conflict. A political party which is beaten in a general campaign for a cause is also under temptation to start an insurrection, as has happened many times in history, attempting to regain by war what has been lost in politics.

In the field of Economic Achievement there is an equal tendency to revert to a more primitive form of conflict. They who are beaten in economic competition are under temptation to go into politics in order that they may win back, if possible, in that form of conflict what they have lost in the other. If they are beaten both in eco-

nomic and the political fields, they are still under temptation to revert to sabotage, which is one of the militant forms of conflict. This temptation is peculiarly strong because of the fact that they who are in a strong position economically are almost of necessity in a weak position in politics, or, contrariwise, they who are in a weak position economically are almost of necessity in a strong position in politics or war.

The reason for this is that, other things equal, the fewer there are in a given competitive group, the stronger is their economic position, but the weaker their political or militant position. If there are only a few men capable of producing a certain commodity, and the commodity is, therefore, scarce, or if there are only a few capable of rendering a given service, the commodity or the service of each one will be in great demand. The supply is less than is demanded and they who control the limited supply are necessarily in a strong economic position. But the very fact that they are few in numbers makes them weak politically in the sense that they control fewer votes than others. Contrariwise, if there are a very large number capable of producing a given commodity, or rendering a given service, so that the commodity or service is very abundant, it will, other things equal, sell at a low price. The fact of the numerical strength of the members of this competing group puts them in a weak position economically. They are pretty certain to be beaten in the economic form of competition. But the very source of their economic weakness is the source of their political strength. They have an excellent opportunity, therefore, to win back by political agitation what they lost in economic competition. Even if they fail in political agitation, they still have a chance (or are likely to think they have) if they are numerous enough, to win by the militant form of conflict, that is, by reverting to violence, sabotage, the general strike, or some other militant method.

In a later chapter on "The Redistribution of Human Talent" we shall attempt to show the economic advantages of such a redistribution of talent as will make one competing group approximately as numerous, relatively to the demand for it, as any other competing group. What has already been said in this chapter ought to be sufficient to prove that the same thing would be politically expedient; that is to say, if one competing group becomes so very numerous, relatively to others, as to put it at a very great disadvantage in economic competition, it will have a strong temptation to revert, first, to political and later to those militant forms of conflict, that mean the destruction of the state and of civilization itself.

In view of the multiplicity of forms in which the conflict of human interests may show itself, it must appear futile even to attempt to

repress all forms. We may repress certain forms but in so doing we are likely to increase the intensity of others. If we repress, for example, all the militant forms of conflict, the combative instincts of mankind together with the conflict of interests will cause them to compete or contest with one another in the other fields. There being more contestants in these other fields, the contest will become more intense. If we repress both militancy and gambling, we still further tend to concentrate and intensify the conflict in the remaining fields. If it were possible to stop all economic competition, as is sometimes proposed, by universal ownership and operation, we should not lessen the combative instinct nor the rule of self-interest. We should merely concentrate it in the political field. In fact, under such a system as this, every business or industrial position would become at once a political position. We would show our rivalry and our preference for ourselves by struggling more intensely than we now do for political office or preferment. Every one would, in other words, become a candidate for some political office, there being no other way to make a living. Incidentally it may be remarked that this would be an exceedingly wasteful form of competition, more wasteful than economic competition. When two farmers compete with one another in producing corn, more corn is likely to be grown as the result of that competition. When two candidates compete for a given office, the time which they spend in campaigning is wasted—it produces nothing. (pp. 85-89)

Of the three forms of economic competition the most advantageous and least harmful is that of competitive production; production is service. Competitive production is, therefore, rivalry in the performance of service. In competitive bargaining we have more opportunities for harm because there are so many opportunities for deception and fraud. Most of the charges brought against the competitive system apply to bargaining rather than to production. However, a mutual exchange of service or commodities on a fair and equitable basis is a highly useful operation. If A has something which he does not want but B does, and B likewise has something which he does not want while A does, it is obviously to the advantage of both to effect an exchange. However, in the actual process of exchange we may normally expect both A and B to higggle for an advantage and both are under temptation to deceive, and deception is always immoral. Because of the persistence of this temptation, a great deal of our law and legal procedure is concerned with the task of preventing deception without interfering with legitimate exchange. It is a difficult problem; but because a thing is difficult is no reason for not doing it.

When we come to the field of competitive consumption, however, there is little that can be said in defence of it. It is the result of the lowest and least defensible quality in human nature. It is the result of the desire to outshine our neighbors, or to avoid being outshone by them. The desire to show off, to attract notice, and all the other tendencies which are summed up under the one word "vanity" are at work here.

While this is by far the worst form of economic competition, producing more evils than any other, having less that can possibly be said in its defence, it is a striking fact that comparatively few of our modern social reformers have given any attention to it whatever. They have attacked business competition, competition in production, competition in exchange, but are singularly silent on competition in consumption. The older preachers of righteousness of a somewhat narrow and orthodox school preached incessantly against vanity and luxury. In this respect they were wiser economists and more rational reformers than the so-called liberal school of the present day. Their teachings on this particular subject would do vastly more for society and for the poor themselves than all the radical leaders of the present day. (pp. 91-92)

IRRATIONALITY OF WAR²⁴

That is why, I must repeat, the contact of two social groups may produce the most unlike consequences, alliance as well as conflict. No grim *fatality* obliges us to massacre one another eternally like wild beasts. All the theories based on that alleged fatality are pure phantasmagorias absolutely devoid of all positive reality.

At this point I must bring up another error which has been the cause of much abuse lately—the alleged race wars. They, too, are mere creations of the fancy. Until now there have been no race wars, for the simple reason that the races have not been conscious of their individuality. When the wars for the political domination took place between two linguistic groups, they became race wars by chance. The Germans did not fight the Slavs on their eastern boundary because they hated them, but in order to acquire territory which they coveted.* The French made conquests along the Rhine, not from hatred of the Germans, but to increase the size of their state. They fought the Spaniards for the same purpose, though the Spaniards like themselves are Latins.

(*The wars Charlemagne waged against the Saxons were just as cruel as the wars of the Germans against the Slavs. Yet Charlemagne and the Saxons both belonged to the Teutonic race.)

²⁴ Reprinted by permission from J. Novicow, *War and its Alleged Benefits*, translated by Thomas Seltzer, Henry Holt and Company, 1922.

The idea of nationality, which is more concrete, is of very recent origin, that of race all the more so. The Slavs have had the consciousness of the unity of their race only since the works of Safarik and his emulators, that is, for only about sixty years. The Swedes, the Danes, and the Germans are Teutons. That has not prevented them from fighting one another furiously, and it did not impel them to adopt common institutions. Nothing is more conventional than the idea of race. Where can the boundary lines between races be drawn? We settle them arbitrarily from purely subjective considerations. Hence, racial differences have had but a slight influence upon political history. The Arabs and Spaniards, it would seem, formed two quite distinct races between whom an alliance was impossible. Yet what do we find in fact? That the famous Cid Campeador, Spain's national hero, sometimes allied himself with Mohammedan emirs and fought Christian princes. The object of the wars in the Middle Ages was to obtain possession of as much territory as possible, and until the present time that has been the chief cause of wars. I challenge any one to cite a single campaign consciously undertaken for the purpose of upholding the interests of a race. (pp. 119-121)

When we shall cease to be blinder than moles, we shall understand the elementary truth that the questions dividing the civilized nations are mere bagatelles, bits of folly and puerility. To shed torrents of blood for the possession of a province is an act of childishness. Our awfulest enemies, the elements and germs and insect destroyers, attack us every minute without cease, yet we murder one another as if we were out of our senses. Death is ever on the watch for us, and we think of nothing but to snatch a few patches of land! About 5,000,000,000 days of work go every year to the displacement of boundary lines. Think of what humanity could obtain if that prodigious effort were devoted to fighting our real enemies, the noxious species and our hostile environment. We should conquer them in a few years. The entire globe would turn into a model farm. Every plant would grow for our use. The savage animals would disappear, and the infinitely tiny animals would be reduced to impotence by hygiene and cleanliness. The earth would be conducted according to our convenience. In short, the day men realize who their worst enemies are, they will form an alliance against them, they will cease to murder one another like wild beasts from sheer folly. Then they will be true rulers of the planet, the lords of creation.

Of old, man was the game hunted by man. In our modern states, immense communities of mutual spoliation, man is frequently the slave of man. We shall attain the culmination of prosperity realizable here below when man becomes the ally of man. (pp. 129-130)

THE SOCIAL PROCESS²⁵

The social process is a continuous rhythm of the *individualization* of structures arising anew out of others already in existence, i.e., the reappearance in the social realm of the biological phenomena of the propagation of organisms; and, on the other hand, of the *socialization* of social structures already existing, i.e., the reappearance in the social realm of the physiological phenomenon of the somatic upbuilding of organisms. Social differentiation is as limitless as the increase of organisms. Both individualization and socialization have their roots in the inborn interest of the individual; or, in turn, in the concrete interest of each social structure. Differentiation is stimulated by variation of interests. This variation of interests, however, is the consequence of the increase of numbers, and of the quest for food, under the influence of different life-conditions. In the individualizing side of the process, variation asserts itself. In the socializing side, the evolution of the social structure is foremost.

Differentiation (or impulse to individualism) has its boundaries in the number of individuals; i.e., differentiation can go on up to the *atomization of society*, because each individual may regard *his own* interest as the content of a social structure. *Socialization* (or impulse to form communities) is bounded only by "humanity"; i.e., "humanity" may become a social structure, if throughout that most inclusive range a unifying interest comes to be felt as a need. The practical boundaries of differentiation are, however, those interests which arise in the struggle for existence, from the requirements of men in connection with the life-condition. The practical boundary of socialization is the extent of copartnership which these interests find to be feasible.

Differentiation, consequently, frees men from irksome social restraints, so that they may live for those interests which are inborn, or to which they have become devoted through social influence. Differentiation, accordingly, fluctuates along the line of social necessity, between variations of the individual will.

Socialization, on the other hand, confines men in restraints, in order to reach the needed support and cooperation for fulfilling and securing their natural or supposed interest; or in restraints which the force of social conditions imposes upon them. Socialization vibrates along the line of social necessity, between voluntary submission for the sake of a social interest, and forcible subjugation under an alien interest.

²⁵ Reprinted with permission from "Ratzenhofer's Epitome of His Theory," translated by Albion W. Small in his *General Sociology*, University of Chicago Press, 1905.

For differentiation, as well as for socialization, *social necessity* is either the interest involved and implicit in the immanent capabilities of men, or that which is prescribed by the life-conditions and determined by the social situation. Subjective motive and external compulsion may temporarily veto the social necessity, but in the result of general evolution it nevertheless arrives at unlimited realization.

The more men spread over the available places of abode (life-conditions) in consequence of increase of numbers, i.e., the more occasions for social variation enter—the more variations of individual choice (departures from social necessity) will occur in the social process, so that socializing restraint (subjugation) is necessary in order to bring social necessity to its proper influence. Every subjugation determines a relation of control. The social type of this reciprocal relationship is the State.

But because the individual will degenerate, the socializing constraint degenerates also, and it produces systems of control which are contrary to social necessity, i.e., States which do not fulfill their task of procuring social order. Then differentiation, supported by public intercourse and the aggrieved interests in the State, interposes, and dismembers, reforms, or destroys the State, until the demands of social necessity are satisfied.

The species of control in the State depends upon the evolutionary stage of the social process. The transition from the simple to the complex social structure, the progress from the destruction of all alien social structures to varying blending of them, is marked by the State in which conquerors rule. The predominance of peaceful interests, on the basis of a community character assured by conquest, opens the culture-State. This State attempts to bring the necessity of control over the subjugated into harmony with creative culture-freedom.

Struggle and war, in general social disturbances, consolidate social structures. They are, consequently, sources of political power. Culture and commerce weaken the social bond. They are, consequently, sources of social differentiation and of political dismemberment; but at the same time they occasion extension of the social relationship.

Just as variation leads to relative perfection and complexity of organisms, so social differentiation produces a more highly developed and complicated combination of social structures in superordination, coordination, and subordination. Through their interests and life-conditions these structures are in reciprocal dependence, which extends as far as societary contacts are possible between them. While social structures originally occupied a kind of isolated position within their environment, contacts between them became later more frequent, until at last men are surrounded by a web of *social relation*.

ships, which may sometimes make "humanity" take on the appearance of a social structure. Propagation, sustentation, and exploitation are the *causes*; war, culture, and commerce, the *means*; harmonious satisfaction of interests, the *end* of this social development. (pp. 191-194)

In the degrees in which the culture-State takes the place of the conquest-State, the differences among men in the satisfaction of interests equalize themselves. Political, social, and industrial inequality among men transform themselves again into such inequality in participation of enjoyment as prevailed in primitive social conditions. General socialization of men complicates the social structure, to be sure. It tends, however, to produce concord through increasing perfection of the social organization; nevertheless, with existing varieties of life-conditions it cannot remove all occasions of social conflict.

Social order is an organizing of the struggle for existence, for the purpose of assuring sustenance and the propagation of wholesome generations. It is, accordingly, justifiable to assume, as the conclusion of social development, a condition in which, in spite of manifoldness of individualities in adaptation to their occupations, there will ensue a cultural, political, and social equality of men under the leadership of individuals who are intellectually and morally perfect. Under a system of control by ethical and intellectual authority, social development without degeneration of inborn and acquired interests might be possible; but the equality must remain for an incalculable period modified by inequality and by changes of life-conditions. (p. 195)

ELEMENTS OF THE SOCIAL PROCESS²⁶

In the beginning were interests. We are now using the word in the same sense in which it is familiar in business and politics. Nothing would be gained by greater exactness of terms at present. We shall have to provide for closer analysis later. Both something in men that makes them have wants, and something outside of men that promises to gratify the wants, is implied by the word "interest." We need not now enter into these details, but may frankly speak as we do when we refer to the farming interests, or the banking interests, or the labor interests, or the interests of the "machine."

The primary interest of every man, as of every animal, is in sheer keeping alive. Nobody knows how many ages men consumed in getting aware of any other interest. This primary animal interest can never be outgrown, although it is doubtful if we ever observe it

²⁶ Reprinted with permission from A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, University of Chicago Press, 1905.

alone in normal human beings. In nearly all men who have left traces of their mode of life, we find indications, faint perhaps, that the radical interest is in partnership with a few generically unlike interests. Among more highly developed men the latter display innumerable specific variations, and enter into countless combinations.

For example a universal form of the primary interest is the food-interest. Men must eat to live. This is true no more and no less of the primitive savage than of the poet laureate. It is true no less of men who eat roots or uncooked flesh, than of the men who make up their bill-of-fare according to the gastronomic standards of any capital, from Peking to London. It is true no more and no less of the men whose food is so precarious that they first eat their vanquished enemies before exploiting their lands than of the men who start bread riots in the streets of Milan, or who call a strike in New York, or who plan over a banquet table to suppress a strike in Chicago. The interest is at bottom, and in social effects, in principle one. In variations and in ratio of social effects it is infinitely variable and dependent upon countless shadings of circumstance.

Again, the food-interest is merely foremost in a group of interests that are in the most intimate sense peculiar to the body, the animal part of men. They are all the interests that seek their satisfaction in the activities and enjoyments of the body. In this group the sex-instinct is usually made coordinate with the food-interest, and it is doubtful if there is a third approaching these in importance. I venture to call all the other positive types of bodily interest by the general name of *the work-interests*. Whether this is a good designation or not, I mean by it all the impulses to physical activity for its own sake. I mean the impulses to physical prowess and skill, that vary from the pranks of childhood to the systematical trial of skill among athletes. The three species of interest which I call food, sex, and work make up one genus of human interests, to which I give the name *the health-interest*. By this phrase I mean all the human desires that have their center in exercise and enjoyment of the powers of the body.

So far as I am able to account for the activities of men, they all run back to motives that have their roots in combinations of his health-interest with interests that arrange themselves in five other groups. Men have a distinct interest in controlling the resources of nature, in asserting their individuality among their fellows, in mastering all that can be known, in contemplating what seems to them beautiful, and in realizing what seems to them right. I have not been able to find any human act which requires, for explanation, any motive that cannot be accounted for by specialization and combinations of these interests. Each of the groups has subdivisions,

more or fewer than those of the first. All men, however, from the most savage to the most highly civilized, act as they do act, first, because of variations in the circumstances of their environment, both physical and social; second, because of variations and permutations of their six elementary interests. I name these for convenience: *Health, Wealth, Sociability, Knowledge, Beauty, and Rightness.* (pp. 196-198)

All this brings to us the very commonplace conclusion that *the fundamental sociological problem*, viewed with reference to further achievement or progress, *is the problem of stating the actual conflict of interests in present society.* What is the actual division of the people of the United States, for example, in the pursuit of ends, and to what extent is this division necessary antagonism of the people against each other? (p. 373)

Our general proposition then is, that the chronic conflict of interests in America today, and elsewhere with different accidents; the conflict that produces the most tension, the conflict that involves the most radical differences, the conflict that is fundamental to most of the specific issues which produce acute social disorders, is the fundamental hostility between those types of people who think that institutions should always be responsible for their stewardship to the living generation, and those other types of people who act on the assumption that institutions can do no wrong. (pp. 381-382)

To bring out the extreme nature of this conflict most distinctly, we may put the extreme claims of the opposing tendencies in contrast with each other. The ultimatum of the one element is in effect this: The present social system must and shall be preserved. It rests on the sovereign will of God and the inviolable order of nature. It is like the atmosphere or the seasons—not to be challenged by human wisdom, nor reconstructed by man's craft. It came into being by operation of laws which cannot be controlled, and it will persist in spite of impudent spasms of revolt. To question this social order is intellectual stupidity and social treason. Every sign of disposition to treat these self-evident truths as legitimate subjects for debate should be disapproved, discouraged, and, if need be, suppressed.

On the contrary, the ultimatum of the opposite element is on these lines: The existing social system must and shall be destroyed. It is a crazy mixture of accident, and design, and compromise, with a negligible unknown modicum of necessity. It is like our tools and our amusements, the creature of our knowledge and our choice and our contrivance, to be cast aside the moment we know better or acquire more skill, or to be exchanged to suit variations of our taste.

It was constructed to meet particular occasions, and, in spite of impotent opposition to the march of human progress, it will be re-constructed to fit changed conditions. To question these self-evident truths is intellectual stupidity and social treason. Every refusal to accept these positions without qualification should be taken as conclusive evidence of treachery against the general welfare. It should be denounced, discredited, and defeated. (pp. 383-384)

The essential conflict today is between the intellectual, the knowledge interest, and all the other interests combined. The primary issue, between groups, within groups, and even between conflicting motives in the individual, is that of *assumption*, on the one hand, and *knowledge*, on the other, as the basis of action. Shall we first of all desire to know, or even consent to know, all the bearings of our conduct, before we choose our course of action; or shall we take refuge in the claim: Whatever is, is right, if it favors us, and whatever is, is wrong, if it balks our wish? (p. 387)

The history of democracy may be said to have shown two things: first, that democracy escapes anarchy by incorporating in disguised form the essential strength of monarchy; second, democracy achieves progress, in spite of its contained contradictions, by gradual socialization of the conflicting interests. For our academic purposes we may express the particular problem of socialization which modern societies have reached, in the extremely abstract formula: The radical social problem is how to intellectualize the present conflict of interests, or to transform direct conflict of interests into an intelligent teleological program. (pp. 389-390)

These statements imply all the reasons for the study of fundamental sociology. From first to last, our life is a web woven by our interests. Sociology might be said to be the science of human interests and their workings under all conditions, just as chemistry is sometimes defined as "the science of atoms and their behavior under all conditions." Man at his least is merely a grubbing and mating animal. He has developed no interests beyond those of grubbing and mating, or those tributary to grubbing and mating. Every civilization in the world today carries along a certain percentage of survivals of this order of interests, and societies still exist wholly on the level of these interests. On the other hand, some men develop such attenuated spiritual interests that they pay only perfunctory and grudging tribute to the body at all, and live in an atmosphere of unworldly contemplation. Between these extremes are the activities of infinitely composite society, moved by infinite diversities of interests. These interests, however, as we have seen, are variations and permutations of a few rudimentary interests. Our knowledge

of sociology, i.e., our systematized knowledge of the human process, will be measured by the extent of our ability to interpret all human society in terms of its effective interests. (p. 442)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The meaning of the concept, social conflict.
2. The mainspring of progress according to Gumplowicz.
3. The relation of the individual to the group, as set forth by Gumplowicz.
4. The nature of Nietzsche's superman.
5. The difference between Gumplowicz' and Nietzsche's attitude toward the "individual."
6. The distinction between a pain economy and a pleasure economy.
7. The fatal effects upon a nation of a pleasure economy.
8. The cause of conflicts as indicated by Carver.
9. The chief social cause of economic scarcity.
10. The three fields where conflicts occur.
11. The cause of moral problems.
12. The practical danger of altruism.
13. Types of destructive conflicts.
14. The meaning of deceptive conflicts.
15. The scope of persuasive conflicts.
16. The difference between competitive production and competitive consumption.
17. The contrast between pig-trough philosophy and work-bench consumption.
18. The real enemies of mankind, as seen by Novicow.
19. The useful phases of conflict.

CHAPTER XXI

COOPERATION THEORIES IN SOCIOLOGY

ONE OF the first persons to work out a systematic interpretation of cooperation was Giovanni Vico (1668-1744), an Italian philosopher.¹ Vico rejected the social contract idea because he believed that it was a false interpretation of the true principle of cooperation. The concept of a social contract embodied an artificial and metaphysical notion of social life.

In his chief work, *Principles of a New Science Concerning the Common Nature of Nations*, Vico inaugurated a study of actual social phenomena. He sought to discover possible social laws. He attempted to cast aside the accidental social elements and to organize the regularities of social phenomena into laws. He searched for the laws governing the growth and decay of societies. He undertook to analyze the history of human society.

Although Vico's important treatise was not known outside of Italy until a century and a half after it was originally published, it contained a statement of the factor which is basic to any sound cooperation theory of social progress. Vico was one of the first writers to describe the principle that all human groups have a common nature. His comparative studies of human institutions everywhere, led him always to the belief in the common mind of mankind, a concept which in recent years has been elaborated by D. G. Brinton. For this contribution Vico has been called "the father of sociology."

According to Vico, the fundamental social movement is a gradual unfolding or evolution of social institutions in

¹ Cf. S. H. Swinny, "Giambattista Vico," *Sociological Rev.*, Jan., 1914, pp. 50-57.

response to the common needs of people. Society owes its development in part to the reflections of the wise, as the social contract theorists have said, but also to the human feelings even of the brutish. This natural sociability of man has furnished the chief basis for the rise and development of the spirit of cooperation.

The natural sociability of human beings has led, more or less consciously on the part of man, to the establishment of necessary social relations and institutions. The purpose of social organization is to produce perfect human personalities. Vico outlined the evolutionary character of society according to the spiral theory, namely, that society does return upon itself but that, when it completes a cycle, it is upon a higher plane of cooperation than when the given cycle began. Vico also made religion a necessary principle of progress. Although in adjusting himself to the prevailing theological dogmas of his time, Vico committed serious scientific errors, he nevertheless is deserving of special credit for his emphasis upon the common nature and natural sociability of mankind.

Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the celebrated Dutch scholar, gave to social thought the international concept. He advanced the idea of the coming cooperation among the nations—nations which in his time were moved primarily by jealousy and hatred in their relations with one another. Grotius was the originator of a definite set of principles and laws for international cooperation. His work in this regard accentuated the importance of like-mindedness in matters of international polity.

Spinoza, whose contributions regarding the concept of sovereignty have already been stated, declared that the instinct to acquire is naturally stronger than the tendency to share. Hence, man must be educated to perceive the advantages of cooperative living. When this appreciation occurs, when the advantages of cooperation become clear, then man will sublimate his egoistic and self-seeking desires to altruistic communal living. As man comes to un-

derstand, step by step, the values of cooperative conduct, he will overcome, degree by degree, his egoistic impulses.

The references which were made in Chapter XIV to the work and the writings of certain socialists, such as Robert Owen, form another link in this discussion of the development of the cooperation concept. While the experiments in consumers' cooperation, such as the activities of the Rochdale Pioneers, have had splendid success in many countries, they have demonstrated that they can flourish only in an environment where the cooperative spirit rules. While the experiments in producers' cooperation have often failed and have not yet as a class been successful, they have testified to the absence of a developed cooperative spirit rather than to the failure of the principle upon which they are based.

KROPOTKIN

Peter Kropotkin, whose opposition to socialism was indicated in Chapter XIV, rendered a useful service in writing his *Mutual Aid; a Factor in Evolution*. Kropotkin, a loyal Darwinian, protested against the falsely labeled "social Darwinianism."² Kropotkin made plain that Darwin's interpretation of evolution while stressing the struggle for existence, also pointed out that there is in evolution a powerful tide of cooperation. The logical conclusion of this treatment of evolution, according to Kropotkin, is not a phase of "social Darwinianism" with its emphasis upon a biological struggle in the highest human realms, but a world of human association in which the cooperative spirit has risen to a position of control over physical force and egoistic desire.

Kropotkin studied animal life extensively and concluded that, although there was among animals a severe struggle against a heartless Nature, there was essentially

² Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid; a Factor in Evolution*, Doubleday, Page, 1902, p. 3.

no bitter struggle for existence "among animals belonging to the same species."³ There is no pitiless inner war for life within this species, and moreover, this alleged war is not a condition of progress. War, declared Kropotkin, is not a condition of social progress.

Kropotkin considered the clan and the tribe rather than the individual or even the family the starting point of society. The tribe itself developed a morale on the basis of beliefs in its common origin and in the worship of common ancestors. Then the possession in common of certain lands served to arouse new tribal loyalties. These loyalties expressed themselves in the form of "con-jurations," sworn agreements, and ultimately in fraternities and guilds for mutual support. Kropotkin believed that primitive man was naturally peaceful, and that he fought from necessity rather than from ferocity.

In primitive communal organization the judge and military chief united for "mutual insurance of domination," drawing to their support the slavish loyalty of the witch-doctor or priest. In the twelfth century, however, the old communal spirit broke forth with "striking spontaneity all over Europe"; it stopped for a time the growth of the despotic monarchies of Europe; it produced endless numbers of communes.

The free cities developed under the shelter of communal liberties, and in them art and invention flourished, producing the beauty of Raphael, the vigor of Michaelangelo, the poetry of Dante, and "the discoveries which have been made by modern science,—the compass, the clock, the watch, printing, gunpowder, the maritime discoveries, the law of gravitation."⁴

Then, there came the modern State formed by a triple alliance of the military chief, the Roman judge, and the

³ *Op. cit.*, p. vii; cf. Kropotkin, *Fields, Factories, and Workshops*, Putnam, 1901, Ch. I.

⁴ "The State: Its Historic Rôle," London, 1898—reproduced in *Man or the State*, by W. R. Browne, Huebsch, 1919, p. 21.

priest. The industrial revolution and the rise of capitalism furthered the interests of the military-legal-priestly triumvirate. When the State and the Church were separated, the money baron took the place of the priest in the triumvirate. With the overthrow of militarism the power of the triumvirate is broken, and the old communal co-operative feelings of man again begin to express themselves. Kropotkin led the way in defining the law of co-operative individualism. He urged decentralization in social control and attacked monopolies of all types, public as well as private. Although he exaggerated the rôle of mutual aid in primitive society, considering it the main social factor, he nevertheless rendered a valuable service in giving the world a vigorous presentation of a significant concept.

RATZENHOFER

The social process was analyzed in terms of both conflict and cooperation by Gustav Ratzenhofer (1842-1904). It is characterized by a continuous reappearance of the phenomena of individualization of structures already extant.⁵ Both differentiation and socialization arise out of the operation of human interests. Both are implicit in the nature of man. Certain human interests lead to individualization and some to socialization.

At this point we encounter Ratzenhofer's theory of force. Force and interest are made two primordial principles. These two factors work together in order to secure for the individual the largest possible degree of self development.

The struggle of pre-primitive men against the harsh phases of nature established a pre-primitive sociality. Struggle has always led to cooperation in the interests of preservation. Similarly, war leads to cooperation. In primitive society institutions arose in response to community needs. Among barbarians the increase in numbers

⁵ Gustav Ratzenhofer, *Die sociologische Erkenntniss*, Leipzig, 1898, Section 22; see A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, University of Chicago Press, 1905, Ch. XIII.

produced an increasing emphasis upon conflict, which was expressed in robberies, wars, and enslavements. Warfare led to the formation of classes and class conflicts. Class interests, as distinguished from individual interests, then began to secure definition. With the rise of capitalism, the interests of capital were asserted; and at once the interests of labor, in opposition, assumed tangible expression. A stage, however, of stable social conditions is coming, in which the whole world will be organized on the basis of a single system of economic and non-competing production and of free international exchange.⁶

Throughout this analysis Ratzenhofer gives force a leading place.⁷ He also develops a theory of a ruling aristocracy of supermen. Despite these emphases, Ratzenhofer's contribution to social thought in his theory of interests as dominating human factors, and his accent upon the rise of an increasing degree of cooperation, is noteworthy.

SMALL

Albion W. Small, whose methodology will be indicated in Chapter XXVII, has modified, corrected, and refined Ratzenhofer's theory of interests. "In the beginning were interests," says Professor Small.⁸ An "interest" is defined as an unsatisfied capacity, an unrealized condition of the organism, a tendency to secure satisfaction of an unsatisfied capacity.⁹ In its subjective phase an interest is a desire, and in its objective phase, a want. An interest is developed when the individual knows something, feels something, or wills something. Consequently, the whole individual or social process consists in developing, adjusting, and satisfying interests.

The six groups into which Small divides all interests are as follows: (1) The health interest arises from the sheer

⁶ *Soziologie*, Leipzig, 1907, pp. 13-17.

⁷ *Die sociologische Erkenntniss*, p. 233.

⁸ Albion W. Small, *General Sociology*, p. 196.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 433 ff.

interest in keeping alive. It is expressed in the food interest, the sex interest, the work interest, and includes all the desires which find satisfaction in the exercise of the powers of the body. (2) The wealth interest is encompassed in the desire for mastery over things. (3) The sociability interest is represented at its best by the appetite for personal interchanges of stimulus of a purely spiritual nature. (4) The knowledge interest arises from the curiosity impulses. The limits of its possibilities are expressed in the terms, nescience and omniscience. (5) The beauty interest secures satisfaction through an appreciation of the symmetrical phases of material and spiritual phenomena. (6) The rightness interest traverses the gamut of all other interests. It results in enjoyment when it secures the sanction of the individual's ideal self or of his whole self.

Each of these interests tends to be absolute.¹⁰ Each seeks satisfaction regardless of the others. In consequence, there is a universal conflict of interests. Moreover, there is a universal conjunction of interests. The conflict, however, is more spectacular than the conjunction. In the history of mankind this conflict has been the predominating relationship. The social process has resolved itself into a series of reactions between persons some of whose interests comport, but others of which conflict. Furthermore, the social process is a continual formation of groups and institutions around interests. It is a perpetual equating and adjusting of interests;¹¹ it is a rhythm of differentiations and integrations.

Professor Small points out that struggle and cooperation are always to a certain extent functions of each other.¹² Moreover, in the social process viewed historically, there is a movement "from a maximum toward a minimum of conflict, from a minimum toward a maximum of helpful reciprocity." The social process, thus, is a perpetual adjust-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 201 ff.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 217.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 325.

ment between the forces which "tend backward toward more struggle, and those that tend forward toward more socialization." By a minimum of conflict, Small does not mean absence of conflict, for he recognizes that stagnation would result in a society in which conflict was eliminated. By a maximum of cooperation he does not refer to a state of complete social solidification, which in turn would mean stagnation and death.

The fundamental social problem is to give free scope to those interests which require the fullest rational development of all other interests. The social problem is to intellectualize all the interests, and moreover, to intellectualize the conflict of interests. Hence the fundamental conflict today is between the knowledge interest and all other interests.¹³ Socialization, then, becomes the process of transforming conflict into cooperation.

Sociology may be said to be the study of human interests, together with their conflicts and reciprocities. It is an interpretation of human association in terms of the effective interests of man. It focalizes within one field of vision all human activities so that the persons who have the benefit of this outlook may rate their own activities in relation to the whole.

In a concrete, specific way Small has presented his theory of the social process in the book, *Between Eras, From Capitalism to Democracy*. Here is a vivid picture of the conflict between labor and capital, with the resultant misunderstandings and injustices. A young lady, Hector, observes the essential activities of labor and capital, and as a representative of capital perceives the relationship which actually exists between herself and one of the working girls. She receives large dividends, for which she puts nothing into the productive activities of the corporation. The working girl is paid low wages, but is giving her life to the industrial concern from which Hector's

¹³ Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 389, 390.

liberal dividends are pouring forth. The main end of the discussion is an argument for the establishment of the principle of industrial democracy. Professor Small urges that the employees, *per se*, be given representation on boards of directors. While this representation at first will necessarily be a minority one, it will serve the useful purpose of providing for regular meetings of the representatives of the employees around the same council table. These council meetings will enable the representatives of either party in the bitter labor-capital conflict to become acquainted with the problems which the opposing group faces. In this interchange Small sees the rise of a spirit of cooperation which will melt many of the difficulties that have sprung up in the controversy between capital and labor.¹⁴ Although Dr. Small's *Between Eras* was published in 1913, the idea of industrial representation was not considered seriously in the United States until about 1918. The initial steps which have thus far been taken toward industrial representation in the management of business and in the determination of wages, hours, and conditions of labor, have produced noteworthy cooperative results and have fully justified Small's prophetic recommendation for the solution of a world-disturbing social situation.

SOCIALIZATION

Back of the idea of socialization lies the principle of adaptation. T. N. Carver has divided adaptation into passive and active types, with the former referring to "the modification of the species itself to suit the conditions under which it lives," and with the latter employing "the modification of the conditions to suit the species."¹⁵ L. N. Bristol has made an extensive analysis of social adaptation theories.¹⁶ Passive physical adaptation comprises the

¹⁴ *Between Eras, From Capitalism to Democracy*, Inter-Collegiate Press, 1913, Ch. XXIII.

¹⁵ *Sociology and Social Progress*, Ginn and Company, 1905, p. 9.

¹⁶ *Social Adaptation*, Harvard University Press, 1915.

process of biological evolution, and passive spiritual adaptation includes psychic evolution or the non-purposeful development of language, mores, and particularly of education. Active material adaptation includes the process of industrial development, and active spiritual adaptation comprises the purposeful adjustment of the individual to his spiritual environment, social reform, and purposeful social control.¹⁷

Socialization, or social adaptation, runs the gamut of toleration, compromise, accommodation, and amalgamation. The simplest form of cooperation is mutual aid, which, however, is more popular among the lower classes than among the higher. Socialization, it may be noted here, has been shown by E. W. Burgess to be the fundamental process in the determination of social progress.¹⁸ Socialization has two aspects. "From the standpoint of the group, we may define it as the psychic articulation of the individual into the collective activities. From the standpoint of the person, socialization is the participation of the individual in the spirit and purpose, knowledge and methods, decision and action of the group."¹⁹ Socialization of a person means that he "consciously modifies his behavior and shapes his purposes to promote more efficient cooperative activity and to realize the higher welfare of the group."

This discussion may be supplemented by reference to the socialization of a group. This process has two phases. One phase relates to the organization and functioning of the group whereby "the members change from a loose heterogeneity to an organized homogeneity, with authority distributed to each, with each functioning fully in the group enterprises."²⁰ The other phase involves the relation of

¹⁷ Bristol, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

¹⁸ *The Function of Socialization in Social Evolution*, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1916.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁰ E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, Century Company, 1924. Ch. XX.

the group to other groups whereby the main purposes of the group become centered outside itself and harmonized with the welfare of all democratically organized groups and with the welfare of the world itself.²¹

An interesting phase of socialization is organization. Organization of effort results (1) in the accomplishment of ends which are unattainable otherwise, (2) in arousing a common interest intermittently in all, (3) in dividing a task into its natural parts, (4) in securing a degree of expertness, (5) in producing a coordinated, intelligent plan, (6) in eliminating needless duplication of effort.²² On the other hand, organization leads to wastes and abuses, which are: (1) overhead expenses, (2) undue time devoted to making out reports and similar routine work, (3) a loss in personal contacts, (4) a tendency to formalism and red tape, (5) an inflexibility of machinery, (6) a misapplication of power to personal ends, (7) too much specialization, (8) the organization becomes an end in itself.

Socialization, in content, is the development of a we-feeling in a number of persons, and "their growth in capacity and will to act together."²³ A very simple causal factor of this process is the age-long custom of giving a banquet, that is, in eating and drinking together. A consciousness of kind arises which, as Professor Ross believes, is not the perception of a general resemblance but "an awareness of likeness or agreement in specific matters."²⁴ Nationalism, or the process of creating a spirit of national patriotism, illustrates the meaning of the socialization concept.

The primordial social group, according to Professor E. A. Ross, is a band of mothers and their children. In such groupings preliminary socialization took place. In earliest societies definite principles of human action made them-

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

²² Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 257 ff.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 395.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 405.

selves evident.²⁵ Domination was one of the ruling principles. Note for example the domination (1) by parents over offspring, (2) by old over young, (3) by husband over wife, (4) by men over women, (5) by the military over the industrial classes, (6) by the wealthy over the poor. The chief purpose in dominating is to exploit, that is, to use other individuals as means to one's own ends.²⁶

Simmel defines socialization as "the growing into a unity."²⁷ There are circles of socialization—of identification with wider interests and larger groups. To Simmel sociology is essentially the science of socialization or of the forms of unity under which people live. The most important system of relationship in the social world is that of the leader and his followers, or of the superior and his subordinates. Without this "form" of socialization no social life would be possible.²⁸

Opposition, according to Simmel, plays a necessary rôle in socialization. Conflict makes for social unity and contributes to socialization.²⁹ It is "a positive form of interaction" between human beings and therefore is a form of socialization. Conflict brings in socializing factors, if only in terms of restraint.³⁰

Fundamental cooperation concepts are implied in Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity, with automatic reactions and like-mindedness operating in the first instance and with organization and stimulation of differences functioning in the second.³¹ Somewhat parallel to this dualism is the dichotomy of Ferdinand Tönnies³² which emphasizes *Wesenwillen* and *Kürwillen*. *Wesenwillen* re-

²⁵ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, Century Company, 1920, p. 121.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

²⁷ *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, by Nicholas Spykman, University of Chicago Press, 1925, p. 79.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

³⁰ "The Sociology of Conflict," by Georg Simmel, translated by A. W. Smail, *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, IX.

³¹ See references to Durkheim in preceding chapter.

³² *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*, Berlin, 1922.

fers to basic life-forces, wishes perhaps, which well up into natural organism-like groups, or "community" (according to Durkheim).³³ *Kürwillen* "is characterized by the predominance of deliberation and conscious choice over the strivings rooted in man's nature" and results in "society." Like the "natural areas" of cities and "primary groups" (Cooley), community represents natural processes, while society denotes artificial, telic (Ward) processes.

The sociology of L. T. Hobhouse, discussed in part in Chapter XVIII, is largely an interpretation of society in terms of increasing cooperation. Professor Hobhouse has defined social progress as the development of the principle of union, order, cooperation, and harmony among individuals. He has described a certain mutual interest, similar to Giddings' consciousness of kind, which has served to keep individuals together, from the lowest groups of savages to the highest civilized groups.³⁴

The social process, as Professor Cooley analyzes it, is not a series of futile repetitions or brutal and wasteful conflicts, but an eternal, onward growth which produces increasingly humane, rational, and cooperative beings. While the element of conflict is useful in that it awakens and directs human attention and thus leads to activity, it is limited by a superintending factor of cooperation and organization to which the contestants must adjust themselves if they would succeed.³⁵

Park and Burgess in their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* conceive of a single social process with competition and conflict being followed by accommodation (conscious adjustment) and by assimilation (conscious unification). Taken together, accommodation and assimilation are roughly equivalent to cooperation, but represent a more accurate and scientific usage of terms.

³³ Louis Wirth, "The Sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, Nov. 1926, pp. 412-422.

³⁴ L. T. Hobhouse, *Social Evolution and Political Theory*, Lemcke, 1911, p. 127.

³⁵ C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, Scribner's, 1918, p. 38.

The discussions in this and the preceding chapter have shown that the natural trend of evolution is away from a pitiless, competitive, and destructive social process, and toward a tempered, productive, and cooperative process. Of course, there are reactionary movements from time to time which halt the cooperative trend. On the other hand, the development of reason gradually eliminates the more brutal effects of conflict. Conflict, however, will always remain, as far as can now be seen, an essential factor in the processes of individual and societal growth. Through rational controls, it will operate in the direction and interest of the cooperative spirit.

Social progress is still a term of uncertain meaning. Increase in material resources and inventions is no guarantee of increase in human happiness. But increase in happiness may itself be a poor criterion of progress. Three criteria of social progress have been advanced by Clarence M. Case,³⁶ namely, (1) the degree to which a social group utilizes its physical environment, (2) the degree to which there is an equitable distribution of economic and social goods—of economic products, knowledge, culture, (3) the degree to which all the people appreciate the meaning of the social goods and of social process. From another angle each of these criteria are sub-processes of the social process. Utilization, Equalization, and Appreciation are themselves processes; each is meaningful for progress.

MUTUAL AID³⁷

If we take now the teachings which can be borrowed from the analysis of modern society, in connection with the body of evidence relative to the importance of mutual aid in the evolution of the animal world and of mankind, we may sum up our inquiry as follows:

In the animal world we have seen that the vast majority of species live in societies, and that they find in association the best arms for the struggle of life: understood, of course, in its wide Darwinian sense—not as a struggle for the sheer means of existence, but as a struggle against all natural conditions unfavorable to the species.

³⁶ "What is Social Progress?" *Jour. of Applied Sociology*, X: 109-119.

³⁷ Reprinted with permission from P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*, Alfred A. Knopf, 1922.

The animal species in which individual struggle has been reduced to its narrowest limits, and in which the practice of mutual aid has attained the greatest development, are invariably the most numerous, the most prosperous, and the most open to further progress. The mutual protection which is obtained in this case, the possibility of attaining old age and of accumulating experience, the higher intellectual development, and the further growth of sociable habits, secure the maintenance of the species, its extension, and its further progressive evolution. The unsociable species, on the contrary, are doomed to decay.

Going next over to man, we found him living in clans and tribes at the very dawn of the Stone Age; we saw a wide series of social institutions developed already in the lower savage stage, in the clan and the tribe; and we found that the earliest tribal customs and habits gave to mankind the embryo of all the institutions which made later on the leading aspects of further progress. Out of the savage tribe grew up the barbarian village community; and a new, still wider, circle of social customs, habits, and institutions, numbers of which are still alive among ourselves, was developed under the principles of common possession of a given territory and common defense of it, under the jurisdiction of the village folk-mote, and in the federation of villages belonging, or supposed to belong, to one stem. And when new requirements induced men to make a new start, they made it in the city, which represented a double network of territorial units (village communities), connected with guilds—these latter arising out of the common prosecution of a given art or craft, or for mutual support and defense.

And finally, in the last two chapters facts were presented to show that although the growth of the State on the pattern of Imperial Rome had put a violent end to all mediaeval institutions for mutual support, this new aspect of civilization could not last. The State, based upon loose aggregations of individuals, and undertaking to be their only bond of union, did not answer its purpose. The mutual aid tendency finally broke down its iron rules; it reappeared and reasserted itself in an infinity of associations which now tend to embrace all aspects of life and to take possession of all that is now required by man for life, and for reproducing the waste occasioned by life.

It will probably be remarked that mutual aid, even though it may represent one of the factors of evolution, covers nevertheless one aspect only of human relations; that by the side of this current, powerful though it may be, there is, and always has been, the other current—the self-assertion of the individual, not only in its efforts to attain personal or caste superiority, economical, political, and

spiritual, but also in its much more important although less evident function of breaking through the bonds, always prone to become crystallized, which the tribe, the village community, the city, and the State impose upon the individual. In other words, there is the self-assertion of the individual taken as a progressive element.

It is evident that no review of evolution can be complete, unless these two dominant currents are analyzed. However, the self-assertion of the individual or of groups of individuals, their struggles for superiority, and the conflicts which resulted therefrom, have already been analyzed, described, and glorified from time immemorial. In fact, up to the present time, this current alone has received attention from the epical poet, the annalist, the historian, and the sociologist. History, such as it has hitherto been written, is almost entirely a description of the ways and means by which theocracy, military power, autocracy, and, later on, the richer classes' rule have been promoted, established, and maintained. The struggles between these forces make, in fact, the substance of history. We may thus take the knowledge of the individual factor in human history as granted—even though there is full room for a new study of the subject on the lines just alluded to, while, on the other side, the mutual-aid factor has been hitherto literally lost sight of; it was simply denied, or even scoffed at, by the writers of the present and past generations. It was therefore necessary to show, first of all, the immense part which this factor plays in the evolution of both the animal world and human societies. Only after this has been fully recognized, will it be possible to proceed to a comparison between the two factors.

To make even a rough estimate of their relative importance by any method more or less statistical, is evidently impossible. One single war—we all know—may be productive of more evil, immediate and subsequent, than hundreds of years of the unchecked action of the mutual-aid principle may be productive of good. But when we see that in the animal world, progressive development and mutual aid go hand in hand, while the inner struggle within the species is concomitant with retrogressive development; when we notice that with man, even success in struggle and war is proportionate to the development of mutual aid in each of the two conflicting nations, cities, parties, or tribes, and that in the process of evolution war itself (so far as it can go this way) has been made subservient to the end of progress in mutual aid within the nation, the city or the clan—we already obtain a perception of the dominating influence of the mutual-aid factor as an element of progress. But we see also that the practice of mutual aid and its successive developments have

created the very conditions of society life in which man was enabled to develop his arts, knowledge, and intelligence; and that the periods when institutions based on the mutual-aid tendency took their greatest development were also the periods of the greatest progress in arts, industry, and science. In fact, the study of the inner life of the mediaeval city and of the ancient Greek cities reveals the fact that the combination of mutual aid, as it was practised within the guild and the Greek clan, with a large initiative which was left to the individual and the group by means of the federative principle, gave to mankind the two greatest periods of its history—the ancient Greek city and the mediaeval city periods; while the ruin of the above institutions during the State periods of history, which followed, corresponded in both cases to a rapid decay.

As to the sudden industrial progress which has been achieved during our own century, and which is usually ascribed to the triumph of individualism and competition, it certainly has a much deeper origin than that. Once the great discoveries of the fifteenth century were made, especially that of the pressure of the atmosphere, supported by a series of advances in natural philosophy—and they were made under the mediaeval city organization,—once these discoveries were made, the invention of the steam-motor, and all the revolution which the conquest of a new power implied, had necessarily to follow. If the mediaeval cities had lived to bring their discoveries to that point, the ethical consequences of the revolution effected by steam might have been different; but the same revolution in technics and science would have inevitably taken place. It remains, indeed, an open question whether the general decay of industries which followed the ruin of the free cities, and was especially noticeable in the first part of the eighteenth century, did not considerably retard the appearance of the steam-engine as well as the consequent revolution in arts. When we consider the astounding rapidity of industrial progress from the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries—in weaving, working of metals, architecture, and navigation, and ponder over the scientific discoveries which the industrial progress led to at the end of the fifteenth century—we must ask ourselves whether mankind was not delayed in its taking full advantage of these conquests, when a general depression of arts and industries took place in Europe after the decay of mediaeval civilization. Surely it was not the disappearance of the artist-artisan, nor the ruin of large cities and the extinction of intercourse between them, which could favor the industrial revolution; and we know indeed that James Watt spent twenty or more years of his life in order to render his invention serviceable, because he could not find in the eighteenth century what he would readily have found in mediaeval Florence or Bruges, that is, the arti-

sans capable of realizing his devices in metal, and of giving them the artistic finish and precision which the steam-engine requires.

To attribute, therefore, the industrial progress of our century to the war of each against all, which it has proclaimed, is to reason like the man who, knowing not the causes of rain, attributes it to the victim he has immolated before his clay idol. For industrial progress, as for each other conquest over nature, mutual aid and close intercourse over nature, have been much more advantageous than mutual struggle.

However, it is especially in the domain of ethics that the dominating importance of the mutual-aid principle appears in full. That mutual aid is the real foundation of our ethical conceptions seems evident enough. But whatever the opinions as to the first origin of the mutual-aid feeling or instinct may be—whether a biological or a supernatural cause is ascribed to it—we must trace its existence as far back as to the lowest stages of the animal world; and from these stages we can follow its uninterrupted evolution, in opposition to a number of contrary agencies, through all degrees of human development, up to the present times. Even the new religions which were born from time to time—always at epochs when the mutual-aid principle was falling into decay in the theocracies and despotic States of the East, or at the decline of the Roman Empire—even the new religions have only reaffirmed that same principle. They found their first supporters among the humble, in the lowest, down-trodden layers of society, where the mutual-aid principle is the necessary foundation of everyday life; and the new forms of union which were introduced in the earliest Buddhist and Christian communities, in the Moravian brotherhoods, and so on, took the character of a return to the best aspects of mutual aid in early tribal life.

Each time, however, that an attempt to return to this old principle was made, its fundamental idea itself was widened. From the clan it was extended to the stem, to the federation of stems, to the nation, and finally—in ideal, at least—to the whole of mankind. It was also refined at the same time. In primitive Buddhism, in primitive Christianity, in the writings of some of the Mussulman teachers, in the early movements of the Reform, and especially in the ethical and philosophical movements of the eighteenth century and of our own times, the total abandonment of the idea of revenge, or of “due reward”—of good for good and evil for evil—is affirmed more and more vigorously. The higher conception of “no revenge for wrongs,” and of freely giving more than one expects to receive from his neighbors, is proclaimed as being the real principle of morality—a principle superior to mere equivalence, equity, or justice, and more con-

ducive to happiness. And man is appealed to, to be guided in his acts, not merely by love, which is always personal, or at the best tribal, but by the perception of his oneness with each human being. In the practice of mutual aid, which we can retrace to the earliest beginnings of evolution, we thus find the positive and undoubted origin of our ethical conceptions; and we can affirm that in the ethical progress of man, mutual support—not mutual struggle—has had the leading part. In this wide extension, even at the present time, we also see the best guarantee of a still loftier evolution of our race. (pp. 218-223)

SOCIAL COOPERATION³⁸

Our thesis is that along with out-and-out struggle, i.e., self-assertion of the extremest type—and along with the externally socialized self-assertion which recognizes the self-interest of pooling issues with others; a factor quite different in temper develops in the course of the social process. We have called this the cooperative or civilizing factor. The tendency which it promotes begins to manifest itself before there is sure evidence of a conscious purpose to cooperate and to civilize. That conscious purpose does arise. It gathers definiteness and strength. There comes to be a certain assertion of purposes that locate their aim, not in the self, but in the community in which the factor functions. That community gradually widens. A few men dedicate themselves to causes which they regard as greater than themselves. They speak of these ends as "country," "humanity," "science," "art," "literature," "reform," "God." Not all of these men, by any means, actually reinforce the cooperative impulse which we assert, but some of them do. There spreads among the multitude a certain contagion of this collective spirit. While a few men may be said to locate the aim of life outside themselves, many more men locate some portion of the aim of their lives outside of themselves. Whether they are aware of it or not, this transfer or division of interest becomes an effort for the good of a society of men more or less beyond the individual sphere, and at its highest power devotion to the good of all men. (pp. 369-370)

We assert, then, that a factor of increasingly conscious, collective, cooperative, civilizing purpose has had a cumulative influence in the social process. Men's conceptions of their own interests have tended to shape themselves more and more in a setting of general interests. Collective purposes, which men did not at all connect with their individual interests, or at most only as an after-thought, or by-thought,

³⁸ Reprinted with permission from A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, University of Chicago Press, 1905.

have played an important and often decisive rôle in the drama of life. Analysis of the social process in terms of this cooperative factor is quite as essential as analysis in terms of the struggle factor.

In other words, the social process, as we actually find it, is a product not only of individuals' efforts to attain satisfactions contemplated as wholly their own, but also to realize social conditions regarded as more or less external to themselves, and desirable because of values recognized outside of themselves. The reality and the importance of this second main factor in the process have not received proportionate attention. Its operation overlays and informs the action of the struggle factor more and more decisively as human experiences mature. (pp. 370-371)

SOCIAL HARMONY³⁹

It cannot be too clearly understood that harmony is **not** the same thing as order resting upon mere repression. We are apt to identify personal morality with self-control and good government with the maintenance of order. But in either case order resting upon repression is not harmony. The impulse which is merely held down is still subsisting as a source of inner conflict. Possibly by persistent repression it may be extinguished, but contemporary psychology sees reason to think that even so it is either apt to emerge again in another form, or to become the center of a deep-seated division operating below the threshold of our conscious life with ill effect psychological or physical. Still, it may be said, there are impulses with which we can make no compromise. Their satisfaction, to take our own criterion, is radically inconsistent with the main bent of our permanent feeling. Excise them and a harmony of the rest of our nature is impossible. Admit them and no consistency can be reached. We cannot deny *a priori* that this is so. There may be radically bad impulses, original sin, and we may have to cut off a hand or a foot to enter the kingdom of Heaven. That is, there may be within our nature radical disharmonies which we have to accept as we accept what is untoward in external nature, our business being merely to minimize the ill effects as best we can. But this we can say, that if or in so far as an impulse can be so guided as to consist with other requirements which we accept as necessary, then its repression is an unnecessary disharmony. There is a deep distinction between the repression of a fundamental impulse and the governance of the temporary desire in which such an impulse manifests itself. If something fundamental and ineradicable is persistently repressed, there

³⁹ Reprinted with permission from L. T. Hobhouse, *The Elements of Social Justice*, Henry Holt and Company, 1922.

is a permanent disharmony. Conversely, a harmonious personality develops in so far as the fundamental needs find satisfying expression in a consistent life. Just the same principles apply in social relations. It is possible, it is in fact necessary, to use a certain measure of repression in maintaining order, but in so far as that which is silenced is the voice of any real and persistent need of any class of men there remains a standing disharmony, and if this need could in fact be met without prejudice to the needs which are admitted it is an unnecessary disharmony and therefore wrong. Social, like personal development, will consist in finding more adequate expression for the fundamental needs not of some men but of all in a consistent working scheme. In such, repression as such is disharmony and is justified only so far as forced on us by something which we do not know how to work in with the partial harmony that we seek to preserve. Harmony is a plastic principle which does not destroy but remoulds.

The inner harmony of feeling and effort will be reflected as far as we control the conditions of nature in an outer harmony of attainment. In every gratified impulse we fulfil some part of our nature. If the fulfillment too often disappoints us it is because our nature is not in harmony with itself, and what is our gain is also our loss. It is this disharmony, supported perhaps by a fatalistic sense of the overwhelming power of the physical world, which has governed the pessimistic view of human achievement which has bidden us to seek the good rather in renunciation than in achievement. But here we touch upon a contrast between the individual and the collective point of view. The individual may renounce all on his own account in order that he may better serve the good of mankind, but why should mankind as a whole renounce? Only it would seem for one of two reasons. One would be, that its aims and interests are radically discrepant, which ceases to be true if a way of harmony is found. The other would be that, let men work together as they will, the way of nature is too hard for them, the major events of life, the ills that flesh is heir to, the death of those we love, the ultimate physical limitations on human progress, the "unscalable walls fixed with a word at the prime." To this the reply is that human power expands in self-accelerating measure, and that we can no longer fix the possible limits of the control of natural conditions by intelligence, provided always that the will to cooperate overcomes the dispersive forces. We do not yet know what man can make of human life when he sees it as a whole susceptible of a harmonious fulfillment. Through recorded history many good men have worked for many ends, most of them containing some good. But history is full of their contentions. Suppose that the soul of goodness that was in them all

could have understood its own meaning so that in place of internecine conflict there had been steady cooperation. It is not unreasonable to infer that under such conditions the world would have become a very different place from the world which we know. To forward this understanding is precisely the work of social philosophy. We set before ourselves a conception of the harmonious fulfillment of human capacity as the substance of happy life, and we have to enquire into the conditions of its realization. We consider laws, customs, and institutions in respect to their functions not merely in maintaining any sort of social life, but in maintaining or promoting a harmonious life. The entire conception is, if you will, experimental, and the experiment that is to justify it must be made in practice. (pp. 17-21)

SOCIALIZATION⁴⁰

Socialization is the development of the *we*-feeling in associates and their growth in capacity and will to act together. The process is affected by various conditions and circumstances and is not the same for those who never come into personal contact as for members of a primary group.

EARLY IMPRESSIONS OF SCENE

Sons of the same land have a mutual sympathy for the identity of their early impressions from the physical environment. Not that they will love one another—unless they meet homesick in a far country—but when they have to choose between strangers and their countrymen, they will prefer the latter. The recurrent unheeded impressions constitute, as it were, the stable background of individual experience. When people discover that they have the same background they are pleased and draw together. (p. 279)

From the reminiscences exchanged on an "old settlers' day" it is evident that what knit the hearts of the pioneers was the vivid experiences they passed through together—intense social pleasure at merrymakings and celebrations as well as suffering and anxiety caused by floods, drouths, blizzards, prairie fires, and Indian outbreaks. If foreign-born are interspersed among native settlers such experiences bring them all into sympathetic relations, and then the interchange of ideas gradually assimilates them. The non-British immigrants into the American colonies in the eighteenth century were assimilated much sooner when they settled on the Indian-fighting frontier than when they dwelt in groups on the safe seaboard strip.

⁴⁰ Reprinted with permission from E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, The Century Company, 1923.

The expansive emotions enlarge the heart more than do the depressive emotions. Golden moments, when one escapes from confining walls and beholds large horizons, when one has a delicious and unwonted sense of free and onward life, beget the *we*-feeling. Religious conversion is such an experience, and it ought to show itself in a greater force and range of sympathy and love.

During the early days of the first Russian revolution people were lifted out of themselves. Strangers met each other and suddenly talked like old friends. In a milk shop people would help themselves and leave the right pay. The worst-looking specimen of a man would step off the path into the wet snow to make room for a woman or child. "A boundless bright good will flowed like waves from all the streets up into every room in the town. It was one of those vast miracles that come to a nation only at moments." "It was a dazzling revelation of the deep powers for brotherhood and friendliness that lie buried in mankind." It passed soon, because differences of aim and ideas made themselves felt.

Common hardships, perils, and maltreatment, as well as common deliverance, success, and triumph, socialize those who react to them in the same way. But unlike reaction to strain sunders men, as we see in the antipathy of martyrs to apostates, of fighters to skulkers, of rebels to cringers. Not those in the *same situation* but those *who feel and act alike in the same situation are drawn together*.

THE COMMON MEAL

From savage life on, eating and drinking together has been the favorite reviver of good feeling and the seal of amity, because feasting together begets a genial and expansive frame of mind. The ancient village community sets such store by it that every available opportunity, such as the commemoration of the ancestors, the religious solemnities, the beginning and end of the field work, the births, the marriages, and the funerals, were seized upon to bring the community to a common meal. Even now, when we wish to weave a bond of fellowship or to fire men to join in a generous undertaking, we gather them about the banquet board. Indeed, to "break bread together" has a symbolic, even a mystic, significance, and we will not sit at meat with those against whom we intend to draw a color line or a social line. (pp. 280-281)

The members of a large well-ordered family are trained out of their native egoism by constant practice in adjustment to others. Hence, among those apt in winning and leading men—politicians, labor organizers, evangelists, and promoters—are found an unusual number who grew up with several brothers and sisters and so had no chance to form the solo habit.

Membership in an enduring and exclusive organization cannot but lift one "out of himself." The common name, war cry, or flag, symbolizing the identity of the group, becomes in time an independent center of emotion, a charged Leyden jar. With its distinctive banner, color, slogans, songs, festivals, and commemoration day, the group takes on personality and attracts a love which is not the same thing as love for its present members. Not only state and church gather such stimuli to feeling but, as well, colleges, political parties, and religious and fraternal orders.

To be hated and set upon by a common enemy generates the *we*-feeling. This is the case of the boys' gangs, which can survive the persecution of other gangs only if the members are loyal to one another. In the gang, therefore, is born that spirit of loyalty which lies at the foundation of most social relations. (pp. 282-283)

The socializing factors so far considered involve some kind of resemblance. Sympathy springs up between those who feel themselves to be *alike* in some essential, who have some momentous experience, emotion, or possession *in common*. Professor Giddings therefore argues that what knits human beings together is the *consciousness of kind*.

COMMUNITY OF INTEREST

Perception of resemblance, however, is not the only thing that socializes. We are drawn toward the unlike if consistently they are found to be helpful to us, and become alienated from even our kindred if continually they get in our way. In other words, community of interest tends to socialize. *Interest* does not work so immediately and dramatically as *likeness and difference*, but it produces great effects if there be time for it to work.

Hearty cooperation in matters of moment is a great socializer. Fellow feeling quickly develops among fighters in the same cause. "Comrade" is a word to conjure with. Agitated by strong common emotions—fear, anxiety, grief, and elation—those who have long striven shoulder to shoulder against the same foe become dear to one another. (pp. 285-286)

SOCIALIZATION AND CONFLICT⁴¹

That conflict has sociological significance, inasmuch as it either produces or modifies communities of interest, unifications, organizations, is in principle never contested. On the other hand, it must appear paradoxical to the ordinary mode of thinking to ask whether

⁴¹ Reprinted by permission from Georg Simmel, "Sociology of Conflict," translated by A. W. Small, *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, Vol. IX:490-491.

conflict itself, without reference to its consequences or its accompaniments, is not a form of socialization. This seems, at first glance, to be merely a verbal question. If every reaction among men is a socialization, of course conflict must count as such, since it is one of the most intense reactions, and is logically impossible if restricted to a single element. The actually dissociating elements are the causes of the conflicts,—hatred and envy, want and desire. If, however, from these impulses conflict has once broken out, it is in reality the way to remove dualism and to arrive at some form of unity, even if through annihilation of one of the parties. The case is, in a way, illustrated by the most violent symptoms of disease. They frequently represent the efforts of the organism to free itself from disorders and injuries. This is by no means equivalent merely to the triviality, *si vis pacem para bellum*, but it is the wide generalization of which that special case is a particular. Conflict itself is the resolution of the tension between the contraries. That it eventuates in peace is only a single, specially obvious and evident, expression of the fact that it is a conjunction of elements, an opposition, which belongs with the combination under one higher conception. This conception is characterized by the common contrast between both forms of relationship and the mere reciprocal indifference between elements. Repudiation and dissolution of social relation are also negatives, but conflict shows itself to be the positive factor in this very contrast with them, viz., shows negative factors in a unity which, in idea only, not at all in reality, is disjunctive. It is practically more correct to say, however, that every historically actual unification contains, along with the factors that are unifying in the narrower sense, others which primarily make against unity. (pp. 490- 491)

Our discussion thus far has found evidence among the parties in conflict of many kinds of unification; minglings of antithesis and synthesis; the erection of the one above the other; reciprocal limitations as well as promotions. Parallel with this is to be found the further sociological significance of struggle; namely, the influence which it exercises, not upon the relation of the parties to each other, but rather upon the inner structure of each party. Daily experience shows how easily a conflict between two individuals changes the individual himself. Entirely apart from its distorting or purifying, weakening or strengthening, consequences for the individual, the change occurs through the preliminary conditions which struggle imposes. There must be inner alterations and adaptations demanded by the exigencies of conflict. The German language affords a peculiarly apposite and simple formula for these immanent alterations. The champion must "pull himself together"; that is, all his energies must be concentrated upon a single point at once, in order that at

any moment they may be exerted in the direction demanded. In peace he may allow himself more latitude; that is, he may indulge the individual energy and interests of his nature which may take courses in various directions and somewhat independently of each other. In times of attack and defense, however, the consequences of this indulgence would be a waste of energy through counter efforts of the different impulses, and a loss of time through the necessity of assembling and organizing them in each instance. In such cases, therefore, the whole man must assume the form of concentration as his essential line of battle and means of defense. Conduct formally the same is demanded in the like situation of the group. The necessity of centralization, of energetic mobilization of all the elements, which alone guarantees their utilization for all possible demands without dissipation of strength and time, is a necessity, so matter-of-course in a case of conflict that, as a whole, it calls for no discussion. The familiar reaction between despotic constitution and martial tendencies in a group rests upon the formal ground; war demands the centralized energizing of the group-form, which despotism most easily guarantees. And on the other hand, if this has once taken place, the energies thus bound together and consolidated with each other strive very easily for the most natural discharge—for a foreign war. An illustration of this correlation may be cited from its opposite, on account of its characteristic precision. The Eskimos of Greenland are one of the anarchistic peoples; no sort of chieftainship exists among them. In fishing they are inclined, to be sure, to follow to some extent the most experienced man, but he possesses no sort of authority, and against one who separates himself from the community undertaking there is no means of restraint. Now, it is said of these people that the only way in which quarrels are fought out among them is by a singing duel. If one of them believes himself to have been injured by another, he composes some satirical verses and produces them in a popular gathering drawn together solely for this purpose. Thereupon the opponent answers in similar fashion. Accordingly, the absolute absence of all warlike instinct and the equally absolute absence of all political centralization correspond with each other. Among the organizations of the aggregate group, therefore, that of the army is always the most centralized, with perhaps the single exception of the fire guard, which encounters necessities absolutely the same in form. In such organization, through the unlimited command of the central authority, every independent movement of the elements is excluded, and therefore the impulse which proceeds from this source of command realizes itself without any dynamic loss in the movement of the whole. That which characterizes a federated state as such is its unity as a war-making

power. In all other particulars each state may retain its independence; in its military system this is impossible, if a federated relationship is to exist at all. The perfectly federated state has, therefore, been described as the one which in its relation to other states—essentially in its military relation—constitutes an absolute unity, while its members in their relationship to each other possess complete independence. (pp. 672-674)

FORMS OF SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP⁴²

The most important form of relationship in the whole social world is the relationship between the leader and his followers, between the superior and his subordinates. It is a form of socialization without which no social life would be possible, and the main factor sustaining the unity of groups. Superiority and subordination constitute the sociological expression of psychological differences in human beings, and wherever these are associated, there they appear in a more or less pronounced form.

This relationship between superior and inferior assumes oftentimes the appearance of a one-sided operation. It seems as if the superior exerts an influence which the inferior merely undergoes. But the latter is by no means a purely passive agent. The subordinate in turn exerts an influence on the superior, and it is only by virtue of this interaction of the two that in the relationship the one takes the position of a superior and the other the position of subordinate. The relationship of superior to inferior is a form of interaction between individuals and therefore a form of socialization. It always allows a certain amount of independence and spontaneity on the part of the subordinate. In some cases of superiority and inferiority the amount of spontaneity and independence of the subordinate is great, in others small; but it is never wholly absent. Even in the case of the worst tyranny, the subordinate has the choice between submission and punishment. However little consolation the existence of this alternative may bring to the individual in question, it shows none the less that the superior-inferior relationship cannot be established without some active participation on the part of the subordinate. This submission is not purely passive, but has an active aspect as well, and the resulting relationship is a form of social interaction.

What is called "authority" requires also a much more active participation on the part of those who submit to it than is generally supposed. To call a human being an authority means to ascribe to his

⁴² Reprinted by permission from *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, by N. Spykman, University of Chicago Press, 1925.

judgments and decisions a certainty and an infallibility which are otherwise ascribed only to universal postulates and logical deductions. This authority can become established in two different ways. In the first instance, it results from the fact that a superior individual inspires in his group such a faith and confidence in his opinions and decisions that they obtain for that group the character of objective validity. In becoming an authority, his quantitative significance turns into a new quality with objective status. In the second instance, the authority becomes established by a different process. It occurs when a superindividual organization like the state, the church, or the school transfers to the individual a power of decision and a dignity which he could not inspire or obtain through his own personality. In the first instance the authority develops out of the individuality, in the second instance it descends into the individual from the outside. But in neither case can the transition occur without the active belief of those who submit to the authority. The transformation of the value of the individual into a superpersonal value is brought about by the believers in the authority. Authority is a sociological product requiring the spontaneous and active participation of the subordinates.

Another variation of the superior-inferior relation is the relationship indicated by the word "prestige." This relationship, however, does not contain any superpersonal element. For that reason the existence of an active, spontaneous participation on the part of those who admit the prestige of an individual is more clearly visible. Like all other superior-inferior relations, it is a form of socialization involving an interaction between all the elements concerned. (pp. 95-7)

The superior-inferior relationships may be classified in three different types. The superiority may be exercised by a single individual, by a group, or by an objective principle in the form of a social or ideal superindividual power.

The acceptance of leadership and the subordination to authority are therefore not the only forms of interaction that make for social unity. The conflicts and oppositions between the elements fulfil the same function. They, too, contribute to the total process of socialization and must therefore be investigated with reference to that function.

That conflicts have sociological significance, inasmuch as they either produce or modify communities of interest, unifications, and organizations, has in principle never been contested. But apart from this sociological significance which accrues to conflict through its consequences and accompaniments, it has a sociological significance in and for itself owing to the fact that it is a positive form of interaction between individuals and, as such, a form of socialization.

Struggles and conflicts have a positive sociological significance in contrast with dissolutions and repudiations of socialization, which are both negative. An antagonism between elements may arise from different subjective impulses, wants, desires, envies, or hatreds. But once the antagonism has arisen, the function of the actual struggle or conflict is to overcome the existing dualism and to arrive at some form of unity, even if it involves the destruction of one of the parties. The conflict itself is but the resolution of the tension between two elements. That a conflict eventually terminates in a peace, either in the form of coordination or in the form of subordination, is only the obvious expression of the fact that it is a special form of synthesis between elements. It is a higher concept which contains and implies both union and opposition.

The positive sociological function of tension and repulsion is most clearly manifest in social structures which consist of a hierarchy of classes. The caste system of India does not derive its form solely from the internal coherence of element within each caste, but also from the external repulsion between castes. The opposition and enmity between them prevent the gradual disappearance of the class boundaries and are therefore positive contributing factors in the preservation of the existing structure. But opposition does not merely function as a means to the preservation of a total system of relationships. In many forms of socialization it is an integral part of the relationship itself. This is illustrated by the function of opposition, aversion, and antipathy in certain types of relationship.

Opposition between elements within an association is not merely a negative factor. It is often the only means of maintaining associations which would otherwise be unendurable. The power and the right to oppose tyranny, egotism, and lack of tact make it possible to protect the integrity of the individuality on the one hand, while maintaining on the other hand interrelations which would otherwise have to be dissolved. Opposition is then not only a means for the preservation of the relationship, but is also one of the concrete functions of which the relationship actually consists. Aversion and antipathy as the latest subjective forms of opposition serve in a similar fashion in other types of socialization.

Although antagonism by itself does not constitute socialization, it is seldom lacking as a positive sociological element in human association. Socializations might be classified in a series according to the proportion between the unifying and opposing tendencies of which they consist. There are conflicts in which the unifying aspect of socialization is wholly absent. Such a marginal case is the conflict between the thug and his victim. When a struggle of this sort goes

as far as complete annihilation, then the unifying element becomes nil. But in such a case the concept of reciprocal action is really no longer applicable, because that annihilation means the non-existence of the other party to the reaction. On the other hand, as soon as any sort of consideration or any limitation of violence is present, there comes into play by virtue of that fact a socializing factor, if only in the form of restraint. (pp. 112-114)

SOCIAL PROGRESS⁴³

In the first place the idea of "change" itself is not perfectly clear. Many people, since the days of Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer, have fallen into the unthinking habit of identifying progress with evolution. But evolution, as we are now coming to realize, contains absolutely not the slightest guarantee of progress, simply because it is not necessarily change for the *better*. The essential process, according to the evolutionary hypothesis, is *adaptation to conditions*, and the conditions may be such as will lead to change for the worse just as easily as to change for the better. *Change* itself is simply a failure to persist unaltered; failure to maintain identical relations or qualities. Change means simply this process of becoming *different* in any sense. *Evolution* means the same thing, with the further idea that the latter changes in the process grow out of those that preceded, through some directly causal connection; that the latter *are* by virtue of the fact that the former *were*; and that the whole causally connected chain of events represents the unrolling or unfolding (i.e., the evolution) of resident forces or potentialities present in some sense from the beginning within the series.

"Evolution" thus appears to be a term lying midway between mere meaningless "change" and the highly evaluative and subjective concept known as "progress." But it is very far from being a synonym for "progress," and cannot be made to fill the same rôle in human thinking, in spite of those who vainly imagine that by spelling the word with a capital letter they can make it do not only that feat, but even take the place of Divine Providence itself.

As already remarked, "progress" signifies change for the better. It is thus subjective, inasmuch as it implies that the speaker has framed a value-judgment about the change which he calls "progress," and pronounces it a change for the better. Progress thus means not mere change, nor even change incidental to the orderly unfolding of resident forces as in the case of evolution, but change for the better.

⁴³ Reprinted by permission from Clarence Marsh Case, "What is Social Progress?" *Jour. of Applied Sociology*, Vol. X.

If now some one asks, What is meant by the *better*? we may fitly reply that it is simply *more of the good*. But if pressed to define "the good" we shall at once find ourselves in difficulties from which neither the sociologists, the ethicists, nor the philosophers can easily deliver us. (pp. 109-111)

Space will not permit of any sort of an adequate statement, yet to escape a seemingly negative conclusion I shall set forth in the following paragraphs a formulation of social progress in terms of three sub-processes which seem to stand out when one turns to life itself to ascertain what the good actually is that human beings are seeking.

First of all they are seeking to utilize their physical environment. The impressive opening of Sumner's *Folkways* applies here: "The first task of life is to live." It is not merely the primal task but also the fundamental and constantly recurring task. Therefore, one large phase of the movement called progress must consist of all ways and means for a fuller *utilization* of the materials and forces of nature. This is a matter of "production" in the broadest sense. Such a utilization of environment is the central process in human life as distinguished from all lower forms of life. Man not only is adapted to his environment, but adapts it to himself, in an ever-increasing degree by means of discoveries and inventions, directed by means of that planning, adjusting, purposeful intelligence which is his distinctive attribute as man.

The sum total of these achievements constitutes civilization, as Ward expressed it. Its fundamental importance for human progress becomes the basis of the economic interpretation of history advocated by Marxian socialism, the dogmas of the "geographic determinists,"⁴⁴ and of the stress laid on the "maintenance mores" by Sumner and his disciples.⁴⁵ Human beings, like all organic beings, must meet the physical conditions of life or perish under the hand of natural selection. The degree of success with which this effort is rewarded sets the limits within which all other, less materialistic, activities must take place. A social group so low in the scale of productive efficiency as to require all its waking hours and energies in the quest for food could attain no other forms of good than those which directly further the business of getting a living, or such at least as might be enjoyed as merely incidental and in no way subtracting from the all-absorbing task of keeping body and soul together. Taken in its extreme and simplest form this proposition is a mere truism, and it would be unnecessary to record it but for the

⁴⁴ Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, Ch. IX.

⁴⁵ Sumner's *Folkways*; Keller's *Societal Evolution*; Fairchild's *Applied Sociology*.

not uncommon tendency to overlook it in societies where a surplus of food and shelter has permitted the accumulation, through leisure time, of a considerable superstructure of higher culture, whose humble foundations are thereby obscured for the unreflecting observer. Nevertheless, the old problem is ever at the base and center of life, and with such urgency that under the head of aids to *utilization* must be placed a multitude of the elements of progress, such as strong physique, good health, clear mentality, knowledge of materials and forces of nature, improved tools and methods of technology, industrial organization, and in short everything which enables human groups to produce a large supply of economic goods and services, or in other words, to adapt themselves to the environment and the environment to themselves.

In the second place, all men are vitally interested in *distribution*, not only economic, but *social* distribution in the broadest sense. Therefore, a large element in progress will consist in the equitable distribution not merely of the *product*, but also of the social relations which emerge in the process itself. That is to say, the problem of distribution, sociologically speaking, is more than a matter of the apportionment of economic utilities, goods, and services. It is almost, if not quite, equally a question of distributing the *producers* themselves. In other words, the processes of production create a whole series of relations between the producer and his work, the producer and other producers, and the producer and the product. These several positions carry with them a greater or lesser participation in the laborious toil, the pleasurable exercise of authority, or the enjoyable consumption of utilities; which participation is part and parcel of the productive process in the broad social sense as here used. A very marked and very wide gradation of advantages is involved in the industries of every human group. It is therefore of utmost importance to all men that there be not only an equitable division of the product, but also a fair distribution of the duties, opportunities, enjoyments, and honors coincident to the processes of production, remembering that from these things flow, more or less directly, access to knowledge, culture, refinement, and even character to a large extent. For this process I prefer, as less narrowly misleading, the term, *equalization*.

This, as will be observed, brings us to the conclusion that progress is essentially a *democratic* movement, for equalization in the sense here indicated is practically synonymous with democracy in its wider and more fundamental aspects. Viewed from this angle progress includes all tendencies and movements which operate to equalize opportunities for education and truly democratic vocational prep-

aration, thereby tending to break up the present evil alliance between the worst toil and the lowest pay. It includes also forces which make war on private monopoly and unjust privilege, and hereditary social parasitism through unlimited inheritance; all social legislation aiming to redistribute the burdens of congenital and superinduced poverty, insuring the economically weak against the vicissitudes of life (unemployment, accident, and sickness), and rendering the unfit as fit as science and humanitarianism together can make them. Another important element of this process of social distribution would be all influences tending to dignify every honest and useful calling in itself, but this might fall more properly under the following category.

In the third place, growth in *appreciation* is an essential element in our present conception of progress. The word is used in its usual sense, meaning to estimate things in terms of worth or value, to apprehend experience from the standpoint of excellence, preciousness, and relative significance.⁴⁶ By this I mean to say that the progress of any human group cannot be fully expressed in terms of utilization and equalization, since more important for human happiness than the possession of much goods, or even their equitable distribution, is the capacity to appraise them adequately and enjoy them wisely—in a word to *appreciate* the whole process and the elements in it. A sty of swine, all equally well fed, equally well combed, and equally well bedded, might fulfill the purposes of progressive utilization and equalization in some degree, but it could hardly be taken as symbolic in any sense of a progressive human society. Whatever else it may imply, our conception of social progress must contain the three ideas of an increasing utilization, equitable distribution, and adequate appreciation of the goods of life, and that may be counted good which contributes to any or all of these ends.

When it comes to naming some of the specific things which might justly be placed in this third category it appears at once that we are here within the realm of the more spiritual goods, namely, the intellectual, esthetic, moral, and religious values. No theory of progress dare neglect them, for they constitute the richest and most enduring sources of happiness, and any purely materialistic conception of progress, whatever it might promise of sleek and well-fed contentment, would be less than human in its terms and its spirit. As specific examples under this head would come scientific pursuit of knowledge, enjoyment of art, love of refined social relationships, and the consolations of philosophy and religion. No adequate theory of progress will overlook these "goods" which are appreciated rather

⁴⁶ The reader may prefer the term "valuation," as used by Professor Cooley, in *Social Process*, Ch. XXV.

than consumed; and a complete view of human happiness must make room not only for the creeds and the faiths, but even for the shining illusions of human experience.⁴⁷

I submit that Utilization, Equalization, and Appreciation, as above defined, represent three social processes which together constitute the larger, all-inclusive process known as Social Progress. Being a social process, progress is necessarily multifarious, multitudinous, and characterized by infinite richness of detail. But these details are seen upon scrutiny to follow more or less clearly defined behavior-patterns, which, because they are constantly recurrent in all human groups, have been fitly called *social processes*. These processes in turn seem to reduce themselves to the three large categories or processes named above.

Of the three, Utilization deals with measurable, material things, and is least subject to dispute. Equalization is much more complex than the crude demand for an equal division of goods, but it is nevertheless capable of being stated in quite unequivocal terms. Appreciation is the most subtle of the three processes, and almost the most important in both the personal and impersonal senses. Therefore, in this field occur disputes the most numerous, the most heated, and the most interminable. Precisely at this point my effort to define social progress objectively faces the greatest danger of shipwreck. And the peril is so much the greater in view of the fact that the very process of Equalization itself, to say nothing of Utilization, must be guided and judged in part by the ideals and standards which can be worked out only within the realm of Appreciation.

However that may be, I am convinced that when we make "social progress," that is, when society changes for the better, which means more of the *good*, the multifarious seekings of men will be so directed along these fundamental lines of endeavor that we shall have more good things, a clearer and truer conception of what is really good, and more of the good in both forms for all. (pp. 114-119)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. Vico as the father of sociology.
2. Vico's spiral theory of progress.
3. Grotius' international concept.
4. Spinoza's plan for the overcoming of egoistic impulses.
5. The chief reason for the partial failure of producers' cooperation.

⁴⁷ See the chapter on "Illusions," by Professor Ross, in his *Social Control*.

6. Kropotkin's attitude toward cooperation.
7. Cooperative individualism according to Kropotkin.
8. The nature of an interest as conceived by Small.
9. A maximum of cooperation as defined by Small.
10. Small's statement of the fundamental conflict today.
11. Small's definition of sociology.
12. The chief merit of industrial representation on boards of directors.
13. The earliest social group.
14. One of the earliest principles of human action.
15. The earliest form of cooperation.
16. The concept of socialization according to Simmel.
17. The "social harmony" concept.
18. The strong points of "organization."
19. The main weaknesses of "organization."
20. The principles of social progress as outlined by Dr. C. M. Case.

CHAPTER XXII

PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC THOUGHT

History of the importance

A LARGE number of references have already been made to psycho-sociologic thought. In origin it may be traced to the primitive days of the race. The folkways reveal keen phases of psycho-sociologic observations. Undoubtedly, many phases of the psychic nature of group activities were known to the leaders of ancient civilizations. Plato wrote on the importance of custom and custom imitation as a societal force. Aristotle understood the psycho-social nature of man when he observed that property which is owned in common is least taken care of, and when he declared that a fundamental test of good government may be found in the attitude of a people toward public service. In his theory of social attitudes Aristotle made a distinct contribution to psycho-sociologic thought.

Thomas More analyzed the causes of human actions. He was a worthy social psychologist when he protested against heaping punishment upon human beings, without attempting to understand the causes of criminal conduct and without seeking to remove the societal causes of such conduct. Bodin postulated a theory of interests in his explanation of social evolution. He made the common economic, religious, and other interests of man the basis of social organization. These interests, according to Bodin, led primitive families to form a community of organization or government.

It was Hobbes who believed that man originally was a being of entirely selfish interests. Man's interest in others was based on their ability to cater to his own good. This theory still has strong support; there are large numbers of persons who today apparently are living according to this

rule. Nations oftentimes still seem to be motivated by no higher principle. On the basis of an introspective psychology, Hobbes made the scientific observation that "he that is going to be a whole man must read in himself—mankind." Such a person must not simply find in himself this or that man's interests, but the interests of all mankind.

George Berkeley (1685-1753), bishop of Cloyne and eminent philosopher, in his *Principles of Moral Attraction* attempted to point out the analogies between the physical and social universe. His work was stimulated by the discoveries of Isaac Newton. He tried to apply the Newtonian formulas to society. While his "physical analogies" are of little value, they represent a stage in the rise of psycho-sociologic thought. He made the social instinct, or the gregarious instinct, in society the analogue of the force of gravitation. The centrifugal force in society is selfishness; and the centripetal, sociability. As the attractive force of one mass for another varies directly in relation to the distance between them, so the attraction of persons for one another varies directly in proportion to their resemblances. The physical analogies, however, could not be carried far without being lost in the realm of absurdity.

HUME

The Scotch philosopher, David Hume, has been called the father of social psychology because of his splendid analysis of sympathy as a social force. "Let all the powers and elements of nature conspire to serve and obey one man, . . . he will still be miserable, till you give him some person at least with whom he may share his happiness, and whose esteem and friendship he may enjoy."¹ "Whatever other passions we may be actuated by, pride, ambition, avarice, curiosity, revenge, or lust,—the soul or animating principle of them is sympathy."²

¹ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, edited by Selby-Bigge, Oxford, 1896, p. 363.

² *Ibid.*, p. 362.

But sympathy is not always limited in its operation to the present moment. Through sympathy we may put ourselves in the future situation of any person whose present condition arouses our interest in him. Moreover, if we see a stranger in danger, we will run to his assistance.

Vice was defined by Hume as everything which gives uneasiness in human actions. By sympathy, we become uneasy when we become aware of injustice anywhere. "Self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of justice; but a sympathy with public interest is the source of the moral approbation which attends that virtue."³ There is a continual conflict between self-interest and sympathy, both in a person and between persons in society. Although at times this self-interest seems to predominate, "it does not entirely abolish the more generous and noble intercourse of friendship and good offices."⁴

Sympathy causes people to be interested in the good of mankind.⁵ But whatever human factor is contiguous either in space or time has a proportionate effect on the will, passions, and imagination.⁶ It commonly operates with greater force than any human factor that lies in a distant and more obscure light. This principle explains why people often act in contradiction to their interests, and "why they prefer any trivial advantage that is present to the maintenance of order in society."

ADAM SMITH

In accordance with the analysis of sympathy by Hume, Adam Smith made sympathy a leading concept in his theory of political economy. Smith also carried the concept of self-interest, with the resultant conflict between self-interest and social interest, into nearly all his economic theories.

³ Hume, *op. cit.*, pp. 499, 500.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 521.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 575 ff.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 535.

According to Adam Smith there are four classes of people in modern life. (1) There are those who live by taking rent. They have social interests but are not socially productive; they grow listless and careless. (2) There is the class which takes wages. This group is large, productive, and socially interested, but their widespread lack of education makes them subject to the passions of the day, and hence socially useless or even harmful. (3) Those who take profit have interests at direct variance with the welfare of society. Their egoistic interests become unduly developed; their public attitudes are usually dangerous to all except themselves. (4) The fourth group is composed of all who derive a living from serving one or more of the three aforementioned classes. The interests of the three first-mentioned groups often clash, leading to destructive social conflicts. Despite this conclusion, Adam Smith was an advocate of *laissez faire*. He urged that natural laws be allowed to express themselves normally.

In 1859, Moritz Lazarus and Heymann Steinthal began to contribute to social thought in the *Zeitschrift für Völker-Psychologie und Sprachwissenschaft*. They applied psychological methods to the study of primitive society. In this journal they made notable contributions concerning the social customs and mental traits of early mankind. It is in this field, which was discussed in Chapter XVIII, that the original work of such men as Franz Boas, W. G. Sumner, W. I. Thomas, and L. T. Hobhouse belongs. Fundamental pioneering in psycho-sociologic thought was done by Lester F. Ward (see Chapter XVII). Ward opposed the prevailing belief of his time, and particularly of Herbert Spencer, that society must continue as it now is going on, namely, an exhibition of a blind struggle of competitive forces. He not only perceived the rise of mind out of obscure processes of social evolution, but more important still, he noted the part that mind may play in modifying the course of social forces. Although he considered the human desires to be the dynamic social elements, he gave

to mind, through its power of prevision, the prerogative of directing the desires of mankind. Moreover, he pointed out the direction in which mind could best guide the desires. He urged a sociocracy in which the desires of a person are so controlled that they operate only when in harmony with the welfare of other persons. For establishing these fundamental considerations, Ward ranks high in the history of psycho-sociologic thought.

TARDE

The chief founder of social psychology was Gabriel Tarde (1834-1904). He wrote the first important treatise in the field of the psychology of society. The *Lois de l'imitation* established Tarde's reputation as a social psychologist, and at the same time aroused the world of thought to the existence of a new phase of social science. Tarde was a jurist who inquired into the causes of antisocial conduct. He was greatly impressed by the observation that criminal acts are committed in waves. Upon examination of this fact he found imitation to be a potent factor, and began to analyze the laws of imitation. This study soon showed that not all is imitation but that much human conduct arises out of opposition. His analysis of the laws of opposition led him to the conclusion that imitation and opposition are the bases of a third social factor, invention. The social process, as he observed it, is characterized (1) by an ever-widening imitation of inventions, (2) by the opposition of conflicting circles of imitation, and (3) by the rise of new inventions (out of these oppositions), which in turn become the centers of new imitations. Thus, the social process goes on, endlessly and unconsciously or consciously. To understand society, Tarde believed that one must understand how minds act and interact.

Tarde's work, first presented in *Les Lois de l'imitation*, was formally developed in his *Logique sociale*, and summarized in his *Lois sociale* (English translation, *Social*

Laws). Together, these books constitute a unique social theory. Although Tarde's approach to the psychology of society was objective and sociological, and although he did not give serious attention to the purely psychological nature of the mind nor to the instinctive bases of conduct, he nevertheless made a contribution to social thought which is interesting.

Society, according to Tarde, is a group of people "who display many resemblances, produced either by imitation or by counter-imitation."⁷ Again, he says that society is "a group of distinct individuals who render one another mutual services."⁸ Societies are groups of people who are organized because of agreement or disagreement of beliefs.⁹ "Society is imitation."¹⁰ The outstanding element in social life is a psychological process in which inventions are followed by imitations, which when coming into inevitable oppositions produce new inventions.

To the degree that a person is social he is imitative. In the way that vital, or biological, resemblances are due to heredity, so human resemblances are caused by imitation. The closer the human resemblances between persons, even though they be occupational competitors, the larger will be the proportion of imitations and the closer the social relationships. The father will always be the son's first model.¹¹ A beloved ruler will so fascinate his people that they will imitate blindly, yea, even be thrown into a state of catalepsy by him. In such a case imitation becomes a kind of somnambulism.¹²

Imitations are characterized by inclines, plateaus, and declines.¹³ The incline refers to the period of time which an imitation requires for adoption. The plateau is the length of time during which an imitation is in force. The

⁷ Gabriel Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*, translated by Parsons, Holt, 1903, p. xvii.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 146.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

decline, of course, has to do with the passing away of an imitation. Each of these phases is of varying length—dependent upon the operation of almost countless socio-psychical factors. It is this career through which all imitations must pass that is the important phase of history.¹⁴

There are two causal factors determining the nature of imitation: logical, and non-logical.¹⁵ Logical causes operate when the imitator adopts an innovation that is in line with the principles that have already found a place in his own mind. Extra-logical, or non-logical, imitations are those which are determined by the adventitious factors of place, date, or birth of the individual.

LAW OF IMITATION

The fundamental law of imitation, stated in simplest terms, is that the superior are imitated by the inferior, for example: the patrician by the plebeian; the nobleman by the commoner; the beloved by the lover.¹⁶ A more accurate statement of the law of imitation is that "the thing that is most imitated is the most superior one of those that are nearest." The term "superior" in all these cases must be used in the subjective sense, that is to say, that which seems to the specific individual to be superior, not necessarily that which actually is the superior, is imitated.

A country or period of time is democratic if the distance between the highest and lowest classes is lessened enough so that the highest may be imitated freely by the lowest.¹⁷ Democracy will keep the distance between classes reduced to that minimum where imitation may operate.

An important phase of sociology involves the knowledge and control of imitations.¹⁸ Sociological statistics should

¹⁴ *Laws of Imitation*, p. 39.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 141 ff.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 213; cf. Tarde, *Social Laws*, translated by Warren, Macmillan, 1907, p. 65.

¹⁷ *The Laws of Imitation*, p. 225.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

determine (1) "the imitative power which inheres in every invention at any given time and place"; and (2) "the beneficial or harmful effects which result from the imitation of given inventions."

Imitation is divided into sets of complementary tendency; custom imitation and fashion imitation, sympathy imitation and obedience imitation, naïve imitation and deliberate imitation.¹⁹ Everywhere custom imitation and fashion imitation are embodied in two parties, divisions, or organizations—the conservative and the liberal.²⁰

Through custom imitation, usages acquire autocratic power. They control habit, regulate private conduct, and define morals and manners with imperial authority. Usages are frequently extra-logical imitations. Usages are commonly accepted first by the upper classes. They usually are related primarily to objects of luxury; they stick tenaciously to the leisure-time phases of life. Their most favorable *milieu* is a social and individual status of ignorance.

Fashion imitation rules by epochs, for example: Athens under Solon, Rome under Scipio, Florence in the fifteenth century.²¹ These epochs of fashion produce great personalities—illustrious legislators, and founders of empire. Whenever the currents of fashions are set free, the inventive imagination is excited and ambitions are stimulated.

Fashion imitation has a democratizing influence. A prolonged process of fashion imitation ends "by putting pupil-peoples upon the same level, both in their armaments and in their arts and sciences, with their master-people."²² In fact, the very desire to be like the superior is a latent democratizing force.

The counterpart of imitation is opposition. Opposition, however, may be a very special kind of repetition. There are two types of opposition: interference-combinations and

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 288.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 341 ff.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 369.

interference-conflicts.²³ The first type refers to the coming together of two psychological quantities of desire and belief with the result that combination takes place and a total gain is made. The second type refers to the opposition resulting from incompatible forces. In this case an individual or social loss is registered.

From another standpoint, opposition appears in one of three forms, namely, war, competition, or discussion.²⁴ Conflicts often pass through these three forms, which are obedient to the same law of development, but in order are characterized by ever-widening areas of pacification, alternating, however, with renewals of discord. As war is the lowest, most brutal form of conflict, discussion is the highest, most rational form.

Opposition in human life is society's logical duel.²⁵ This duel sometimes ends abruptly when one of the adversaries is summarily suppressed by force. Sometimes a resort to arms brings a military victory. Sometimes a new invention or discovery expels one of the adversaries from the social scene.

INVENTION

The logical result of opposition is invention or adaptation. "Invention is a question followed by an answer."²⁶ Invention, or adaptation, at its best is "the felicitous interference of two imitations, occurring first in one single mind."²⁷ Inventions grow in two ways: (1) in extension—by imitative diffusion; and (2) in comprehension—by a series of logical combinations, such as the combination of the wheel and the horse in the inventions of the horse-cart.²⁸

²³ *Laws of Imitation*, p. 30.

²⁴ *Social Laws*, p. 132.

²⁵ *Laws of Imitation*, p. 169.

²⁶ *Social Laws*, p. 195.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 204.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 171; cf. Tarde, *La logique sociale*, Paris, 1898, Ch. IV.

Inventions partially determine the nature of new inventions and new discoveries. A new invention makes possible other inventions, and so on. Each invention is the possible parent of a thousand offspring inventions.

To be inventive, one must be wide-awake, inquiring, incredulous, not docile and dreamy, or living in a social sleep. The inventor is one who escapes, for the time being, from his social surroundings.²⁹ Inventing develops from wanting. A man experiences some want, and in order to satisfy his wants he invents. Inventiveness is contrary to sheepishness.

Since an invention is the answer to a problem, inventions are the real objective factors which mark the stage of progress. But invention, according to Tarde, becomes increasingly difficult. Problems naturally grow increasingly complex as the simpler ones are mastered. Unfortunately, the mind of man is not capable of indefinite development, and therefore will reach a limit in solving problems.³⁰ At this point, Tarde's argument can neither be proved nor disproved. Apparently, man's ability to solve problems increases with his training and experience in that connection. Moreover, man appears to be at the very dawn of his possibilities in the field of invention. He is only beginning to gather together systematically the materials for inventing, and to understand slightly the principles of inventing.

Inventors are imitative.³¹ This statement is but another way of saying that inventions are cumulative, that they come in droves, that they are gregarious. A new discovery will arouse the ambition of many wide-awake persons to make similar discoveries. "There is in every period a current of inventions which is in a certain general sense religious or architectural or sculptural or musical or philosophical."³²

²⁹ *Laws of Imitation*, p. 87.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 344.

³² *Ibid.*

Invention and imitation represent the chief forces in society.³³ Invention is "intermittent, rare, and eruptive only at certain infrequent intervals." It explains "the source of privileges, monopolies, and aristocratic inequalities." Imitation, on the other hand, is democratic, leveling, and "incessant like the stream deposition of the Nile or Euphrates." At times the eruptions of invention take place faster than they can be imitated. At other times imitations flow in a monotonous circular current.

The contributions of Tarde to social thought have stimulated numerous investigators to enter the field of social psychology. While Tarde's thinking has been severely criticized by the psychologists, and modified by the sociologists, it has opened mines of valuable ores. Not the least important was the impetus which the Tardian thought gave to American writers, such as E. A. Ross.³⁴ Tarde's name will be long remembered for the way in which he developed the concept of imitation. In recent years, however, much that Tarde called imitation has been more accurately explained in stimulus-response and behavior-pattern terms. "Imitation," therefore, plays a rôle of greatly reduced importance in psycho-sociologic thought. The current tendency is to think of behavior patterns (systems of neurones connecting affectors, sense organs, and effectors) automatically released by proper stimuli. "Unconscious imitation" thus is nearly if not entirely eliminated, while "conscious imitation" occupies a greatly reduced and modified rank in present-day social thought.

Imitation is pronounced not only a result, but "an irrelevant result" by Ellsworth Faris.³⁵ Imitation is not considered an instinct, but "a mere accident of" three quite "distinct types of mechanism." (1) Mob mechanisms release attitudes already existing. Such results are immediate and unwitting. (2) Gradual acquisition of dialects

³³ *Laws of Imitation*, p. 387.

³⁴ E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, Macmillan, 1908, p. viii.

³⁵ "The Concept of Imitation," *Amer. Jour. of Sociology*, Nov., 1926, pp. 367-78.

or slow forming of opinions assumes the operation of precedent processes. Not all react in the same way to similar stimuli. (3) There is conscious, volitional, and planned "imitation," such as fashion imitation. Painted lips may be the vogue. Many imitate them, but many do not. And why not? One said to me, "I'm not that kind of a girl." And this is the real underlying explanation of all conscious copying. If she is that kind of a girl, she will imitate what seems to her to advance her status in the desired direction.³⁶

Although Walter Bagehot, an English publicist, in an epoch-stirring book, *Physics and Politics*, published an important chapter on "Imitation" as early as 1872, it was Tarde's *Lois de l'imitation* in 1890 which at once gave to "imitation" a wide popularity. In the United States, Michael M. Davis, Jr., has written an excellent summary of Tarde's socio-psychologic thought.³⁷ As an extensive digest of Tardian thought, Dr. Davis' *Psychological Interpretations of Society* is unsurpassed.

In 1892, Professor H. Schmidkunz published an elaborate work on the *Psychologie der Suggestion*. This book is an important pioneer work. In the English language, the writings of Boris Sidis on the psychology of suggestion are well known. Professor E. A. Ross has given an intensive treatment of the theme in his *Social Psychology*. In these various discussions, however, the fact is not made clear that suggestion and imitation are correlative phases of the same phenomenon. The point, also, is not developed that suggestion-imitation phenomena are natural products of social situations in which like stimuli normally produce like responses.

In 1895, the first book by Gustave Le Bon on crowd psychology was published. Le Bon has also written on the psychology of revolutions, of war, and of peoples. He gave

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

³⁷ M. M. Davis, Jr., *Psychological Interpretations of Society*, Longmans, Green, 1909.

a limited definition to the term, crowds, and then applied the term to nearly all types of group life. He conceived of crowds as "feeling phenomena." They are more or less pathological. Since the proletariat are subject to crowd psychology, they are untrustworthy and to be regarded perpetually with suspicion. A sounder, more synthetic, and historical position concerning the psychology of groups and of society is taken by G. L. Duprat in *La Psychologie sociale*.

Italian contributions in the field of crowd and group psychology are represented by Paolo Orano's *Psicologia sociale*, which includes only a partial treatment of the subject that is indicated by the title; and by Scipio Sighele's *La foule criminelle* and *Psychologie des sectes*. Permanent groups, according to Sighele (following Tarde), are either sects, castes, classes, or states.³⁸ The sect is a group of individuals which possesses a common ideal and faith, such as a religious denomination or a political party. The caste arises from identity of profession. The class is characterized by a strong unity of interests. States possess common bonds of language, national values, and national prestige.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF KIND

The concept of "consciousness of kind" was developed by Franklin H. Giddings in his *Principles of Sociology* (1896). Consciousness of kind is the original and elementary subjective fact in society.³⁹ Professor Giddings defines this term to mean "a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like mind with itself." In its widest meaning, consciousness of kind marks the difference between the animate and the inanimate. Among human beings it distinguishes "social conduct" from

³⁸ Tarde, *L'opinion et la foule*, Paris, 1901, pp. 177 ff. Cf. Sighele, *Psychologie des sectes*, Paris, 1898, pp. 45 ff.

³⁹ F. H. Giddings, *Principles of Sociology*, Macmillan, 1896, p. 17.

purely economic or purely religious activity. Around consciousness of kind, as a determining principle, all other human motives organize themselves.

People group together according to the development of the consciousness of kind in them. Roughly speaking, there are four such groupings.⁴⁰ (1) The non-social are persons in whom the consciousness of kind has not yet developed—in whom it finds imperfect but not degenerate expression, and from whom the other classes arise. (2) The antisocial, or criminal, classes include those persons in whom the consciousness of kind is approaching extinction. They detest society. (3) The pseudo-social, or pauper, classes are characterized by a degeneration of the genuine consciousness of kind. (4) The social classes are noted for a high development of the consciousness of kind; they constitute the positive and constructive elements in society. At the head of the list are the pre-eminently social. These people devote their lives and means to the amelioration of society; they are called the natural aristocracy of the race, the true social élite.

Consciousness of kind is made possible in part by the operation of physical factors. Fertility of soil is one of the sources of human aggregation. Favorable climate makes aggregation possible. Aggregation of population is either genetic (due to the birth rate) or congregative (due to immigration). Aggregation leads to association—the proper *milieu* for the growth of consciousness of kind.

Aggregation guarantees social intercourse, which is a mode of conflict. Conflict, according to Professor Giddings, becomes the basis of social growth.⁴¹ Primary conflicts are those in which one adversary is completely outdone, and hence likely to be crushed, by the other. Secondary conflict refers to the contests between more or less

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 126 ff.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 101 ff. Cf. Giddings, *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, Macmillan, 1911, Ch. III.

evenly balanced forces. Primary conflict is conquest; secondary conflict is growth. Among people secondary conflict leads to the development of consciousness of kind through the successive steps of communication, imitation, toleration, cooperation, alliance. The supreme result is the production of pre-eminently social classes. Of these various factors, Professor Giddings particularly stresses imitation. "It is the factor of imitation in the conflict that gradually assimilates and harmonizes."⁴²

Association reacts upon individuals and produces self-consciousness, which in turn creates social self-consciousness, or group awareness of itself. Social self-consciousness is characterized by rational discussion. With the rise of discussion, social memory, or traditions, becomes possible. Moreover, a sense of social values arises. Public opinion springs from the passing of judgment by the members of the group upon any matters of general interest.⁴³

Social memory, or traditions, becomes highly differentiated.⁴⁴ It consists of impressions concerning the tangible world, the intangible world, and the conceptual world. The traditions in any field, plus current opinion in that field, form the standards, ideals, faiths, "isms" of the time. For example, the integration of economic traditions with current economic opinions is the general standard of living of the time and the place. The integration of the esthetic tradition with current criticism is taste, and the modification of a traditional religious belief by current religious ideas is a faith.

Inasmuch as consciousness of kind is the psychological basis of social phenomena, it is natural that the chief social value is the kind itself, or the type of conscious life that is characteristic of the society.⁴⁵ The social cohesion is an-

⁴² *Principles of Sociology*, p. 109; *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, pp. 157 ff.

⁴³ *Principles of Sociology*, p. 138.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 141 ff.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 147 ff.

other important social value. Social cohesion is vital to the unity of any group; therefore the group is usually willing to make many sacrifices in its own behalf. The distinctive possessions and properties of the community, such as territory, sacred or historic places, heroes, ceremonies, constitute the third class of social values. A fourth group is found in the general principles which promote the growth of the group; for example, the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity. The social values largely determine the social choices of groups and the nature of social organizations.

STRUCTURAL DUALISM

Professor Giddings develops an interesting theory of the dualism in social structures. Civilization is marked by the contemporaneous existence of public and private associations. Civilized society affords four main sets of dualistic associations: political, juristic, economic, and cultural. In the political field there are private political parties and the public association, namely, the government or the political party in power. Among juristic associations there are the privately-organized vigilance committees and the public associations, such as the police, the courts, the prisons. In the realm of economics there are private individual entrepreneurs, partnerships, corporations; and on the other hand, there are the governmentally-owned railroads, postal service, the water systems, the coinage systems. In regard to cultural associations we may note the privately endowed universities and state universities, privately organized churches and state churches, private charities and public charities. This dualism in social structure is supported by Professor Giddings on the grounds that private associations are needed for purposes of initiation, experimentation, and stimulation; and the public associations serve the useful purposes of regulation and maintenance of balance among various contending factors.

The highest test of social organization is the development of social personality. An efficient social organization is one which makes its members "more rational, more sympathetic, with an ever-broadening consciousness of kind."⁴⁶

In recent works Professor Giddings has developed the concept of pluralistic behavior. "Any one or any combination of behavior-inciting stimuli may on occasion be reacted to by more than one individual."⁴⁷ The character of pluralistic reactions, whether similar or dissimilar, simultaneous or not, equal or unequal, is determined by two variables: (1) the strength of the stimulation; (2) the similarity or dissimilarity of the reacting mechanisms.⁴⁸ Thus Professor Giddings considers pluralistic behavior the subject matter of the psychology of society, or sociology.

In 1897, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, by J. Mark Baldwin, was printed; it bears the subtitle of "A Study in Social Psychology." This was the first time that the term, *social psychology*, had appeared in the title of a book in America, though three years earlier, in 1894, one of the leading parts of Small and Vincent's *Introduction to the Study of Society* was designated "social psychology" and included a discussion of social consciousness, social intelligence, and social volition. Baldwin's *Social and Ethical Interpretations* and Giddings' *Principles of Sociology* appeared almost simultaneously, one by a psychologist and the other by a sociologist. One was written from the genetic viewpoint, and the other from the objective viewpoint; one dealt primarily with social psychology, and the other with a psychology of society; one was built around the concept of the social self, and the other around the concept of a consciousness of kind. They both hastened the development of an organic psychology.

⁴⁶ *Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, p. 541. Cf. Giddings, *Inductive Sociology*, Macmillan, 1914, Part III.

⁴⁷ *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXV: p. 387.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 388.

BIPOLAR SELF

Professor Baldwin demonstrated that the self is largely a product of the give-and-take of social life. A child becomes aware of his self by setting himself off from other selves. It is in group life, that is, in contact with other selves, that the child develops a self consciousness.

Moreover, the self is bipolar. One end of the self-pole is characterized by what one thinks of himself, and the other end by what he thinks of other persons.⁴⁹ "The ego and the alter are to our thought one and the same thing."⁵⁰

People are so much alike because they are imitative. It is imitation which keeps people alike. Imitation is either (1) a process whereby one individual consciously or unconsciously copies another individual, or (2) the copying of a model, that is, adopting a model which arises in one's own mind.⁵¹

Baldwin found the law of social growth in the particularization by the individual of society's store of material, and by the generalization on the part of society of the individual's particularizations. The essence of the first phase of this process is invention and of the second, imitation. Baldwin considered invention and imitation the two fundamental processes of social growth.

In this chapter the importance of the psychological approach to an understanding of societary processes has been demonstrated. In the chapter which follows the reader will find further materials showing the tremendous vitality of psycho-sociologic thought.

REPETITION, OPPOSITION, AND ADAPTATION⁵²

In the first place, then, men began to perceive some similarities in the midst of these differences, some *repetitions* among these variations. Such are the periodic return of the same condition of the

⁴⁹ J. M. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, Macmillan, 1906, p. 15.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 529 ff.

⁵² Reprinted by permission from Gabriel Tarde, *Social Laws*, translated by H. C. Warren, The Macmillan Company, 1907.

heavens, the cycle of the seasons, the regularly repeated succession of ages among living creatures—youth, maturity, and old age—and the traits common to individuals of the same species. There is no science of the individual as such; all science is general; that is, it considers the individual as repeated, or as capable of indefinite repetition.

Science is the coordination of phenomena regarded from the side of their *repetitions*. But this does not mean that differentiation is not an essential mode of procedure for the scientific mind. It is the duty of science to differentiate, as well as to assimilate; but only to the extent that the object differentiated is a *type* in nature yielding a certain number of copies, and capable of indefinite reproduction. A specific type may be discovered and carefully defined, but, if it be found to belong to a single individual only, and to be impossible of transmission to posterity, it fails to interest the scientists, except as a curious monstrosity. Repetition means the production of something that at the same time preserves the original; it implies simple and elementary causation without creation. The effect reproduces the cause point by point, just as in the case of transmission of movement from one body to another, or the transmission of life from a living being to its progeny.

But in addition to the question of *reproduction*, the phenomena involved in *destruction* are of interest to science. And hence, in every sphere of fact to which she directs her attention, science must endeavor to discover, in the second place, the *oppositions* that exist there and are germane to her object. Thus, she must consider the equilibrium of forces, the symmetry of forms, the struggles of living organisms, and the strife among all creatures.

But this is not all, nor even the most important element. The *adaptations* of phenomena, and their relations in creative production, must above all be dealt with. The scientist labors continually to detect, disentangle, and explain these harmonies. With their discovery, he succeeds in establishing a higher adaptation, namely, the harmony of his system of notions and hypotheses with the interrelations of facts.

Thus science consists in viewing any fact whatsoever under three aspects, corresponding, respectively to the repetitions, oppositions, and adaptations which it contains, and which are obscured by a mass of variations, dissymmetries, and disharmonies. The relation of cause and effect, in fact, is not the only element which properly constitutes scientific knowledge. (pp. 3-5)

Repetition, opposition, and adaptation, I repeat, are the three keys which science employs to open up the arcana of the universe. She

seeks before all else, not the mere causes, but the laws that govern the repetition, opposition, and adaptation of phenomena. These are three different species of laws, which must certainly not be confounded, yet they are quite as closely connected as they are distinct. In biology, for example, the tendency of species to multiply in geometric progression (a law of repetition) forms the basis of the struggle for existence and natural selection (a law of opposition); and the appearance of individual variations, the production of various individual aptitudes and harmonies, and the correlation of parts in growth (laws of adaptation) are necessary to the proper functioning of both. (pp. 7-8)

Thus, the law of repetition—whether we mean by this the undulatory and rotatory repetition of the physical world, the hereditary and habit-like repetition of the world of life, or the imitative repetition of the social world—implies a tendency to move along a path of steady growth, from a comparatively infinitesimal to a comparatively infinite scale. The law of opposition is in no way different; it consists in an ever widening sphere, beginning with a certain point in the world of life; this point is the brain of some individual, and more specifically a cell in this brain, where a contradiction between two beliefs or two desires is produced by an interference between imitative rays from without. Such is the fundamental social opposition, which is the moving principle of the bloodiest wars, in the same way that the fundamental social repetition is the specific fact of the existence of some first imitator, who forms the starting-point of a great epidemic of custom. Finally, the law of adaptation is similar; the fundamental social adaptation is some individual invention that is destined to be imitated, that is, the felicitous interference of two imitations, occurring first in one single mind; and this harmony, though quite internal in origin, tends not only to externalize itself as it spreads, but also to unite with some other invention, in a logical couple, thanks to this imitative diffusion, and so on, until, by successive complications and harmonizations of the harmonies, the grand collective works of the human mind are constructed—a grammar, a theology, an encyclopedia, a code of laws, a natural or artificial organization of labor, a scheme of aesthetics, or a system of ethics.

Thus, in a word, everything undoubtedly starts with the infinitely minute; and we may add that it probably returns thither; this is its alpha and omega. Everything that constitutes the visible universe, the universe accessible to observation, proceeds, as we know, out of the invisible and inscrutable—out of a seeming nothingness,—whence all reality emerges in an inexhaustible stream. (pp. 203-5)

IMITATION⁵³

Social relations, I repeat, are much closer than individuals who resemble each other in occupation and education, even if they are competitors, than between those who stand most in need of each other. Lawyers, journalists, magistrates, all professional men, are cases in point. So society has properly been defined by common speech as a group of people who, although they may disagree in ideas and sentiments, yet, having had the same kind of bringing up, have a common meeting ground and see and influence one another for pleasure. As for the employees of the same shop or factory who meet together for mutual assistance or collaboration, they constitute a commercial or industrial society, not a society pure and simple, not a society in the unqualified sense of the word. (pp. 64-65)

Society may therefore be defined as a group of beings who are apt to imitate one another, or who, without actual imitation, are alike in their possession of common traits which are ancient copies of the same model.

We must not confuse the social type of a given place or period, as it is more or less incompletely reproduced in every member of the social group, with the social group itself. What constitutes this type? A certain number of wants and ideas which have been created by thousands of time-accumulated inventions and discoveries. Their wants harmonize to a certain extent, that is, they contribute to the supremacy of some dominant desire which is the soul of a given epoch or people. The ideas or beliefs also harmonize more or less; that is, they are logically related to one another or, at least, they do not in general mutually contradict one another. This two-fold, always incomplete, and in certain notes, discordant accord, which is gradually established between things which have been fortuitously produced and brought together, may be perfectly well compared to what is called in a living body organic adaptation. But it has the advantage of being free from the mystery which is inherent in this latter kind of harmony; it points out in extremely clear terms the relations of means to an end or of consequences to a principle, two relations which amount, after all, to one, the latter one of two. What is the meaning of the incompatibility or discord that may exist between two organs, or conformations, or characteristics taken from two different species? We do not know, but we do know that when two ideas are incompatible it means that one of them implies a negative to the affirmative of the other and that for the same reason the

⁵³ Reprinted by permission from Gabriel Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*, Parson's translation, Henry Holt and Company, 1903.

consistency of two ideas means the lack, or the apparent lack, of all such implications. Finally, we know that when two ideas more or less agree, it is because the one implies in a more or less considerable number of its aspects the affirmation of a more or less considerable number of the points which the other affirms. There is nothing less obscure, nothing more enlightening, than these psychical acts of affirmation and negation. In them the whole life of the mind is wrapped up. Nor is there anything more intelligible than their opposition. In it is expressed the opposition between desire and repulsion, between *velle* and *nolle*. Thus we see that a social type or what is called a particular civilization is a veritable system, a more or less coherent theory, whose inner contradictions eventually strengthen themselves or eventually break out and force its disruption. Under such conditions it is easy to understand why there are certain pure and strong types of civilization and certain mixed and feeble types, and why the purest types change and decay upon the addition of new inventions which stimulate desires and beliefs and disturb the balance of old desires and faiths; why, in other words, all inventions cannot be added to others, and why many can merely be substituted for others, those, namely, that stimulate desires and beliefs which are implicitly or explicitly contradictory in all the logical exactness of the word. Therefore, in the oscillations of history there is nothing but endless additions and subtractions of quantities of faith or desire which are brought forward by discoveries and which reinforce and neutralize one another, like intersecting vibrations.

This is the national type which, as I have said, is repeated in every member of the nation. It is like a great seal, which makes an imperfect mark upon the bits of wax which it stamps, but which could not be completely recast without comparing all its compressions. (pp. 69-70)

To sum up, to the question which I began by asking: What is society? I have answered: Society is imitation. (p. 74)

In reality, the thing that is most imitated is the most superior one of those that are nearest. In fact, the influence of the model's example is efficacious inversely to its distance as well as directly to its superiority. Distance is understood here in its sociological meaning. However distant in space a stranger may be, he is close by, from this point of view, if we have numerous and daily relations with him and if we have every facility to satisfy our desire to imitate him. This law of the imitation of the nearest, or the least distant, explains the gradual and consecutive character of the spread of an example that has been set by the highest social ranks. We may infer, as a corollary, when we see a lower class setting itself to imitating for

the first time a much higher class, that the distance between the two has diminished.

A period is called democratic as soon as the distance between all classes has lessened enough, through various causes, to allow of the external imitation of the highest by the lowest. In every democracy, then, like our own, where the fever of subjective and objective assimilation is intense, we may be sure of the existence of an established or incipient social hierarchy of recognized superiors, of superiors through heredity or selection. In our own case it is not difficult to perceive by whom the ancient aristocracy was replaced after the sceptre of the refinements of life had in large part slipped from its grasp. In the first place the administrative hierarchy has been growing more complicated, adding to its height by increasing the number of its functionaries. The same thing is true in the case of our military hierarchy because of the reasons which have forced modern European States to become military nations. Prelates and princes of the blood, monks and cavaliers, monasteries and chateaux, have been suppressed to give place to publicists and financiers, to artists and politicians, to theatres, banks, bazaars, barracks, government buildings, and to other monuments that are grouped within the circumference of a capital. Here celebrities of every kind congregate. Now what are all the different kinds and degrees of glory or notoriety that are known to society, but a brilliant hierarchy of either filled or vacant places which the public alone is free, or thinks it is free, to dispose of?

Now, instead of becoming more simple and more humble, this aristocracy of place, this platform of brilliant stations, grows more and more impressive through the very effect of democratic transformations which lower national and class walls and give a more and more universal and international suffrage to the candidates for fame. The amount of glory that may be divided among the actors increases in proportion to the number of spectators who are clapping or hissing in the pit, and the distance between the most obscure onlooker and the most applauded player accordingly enlarges. (pp. 224-226)

In the prodigious growth, in the hypertrophy of great cities and, especially, of capitals, where oppressive privileges take root and ramify, while the last traces of the privileges of the past are jealously effaced, is to be found the kind of inequality which modern life creates and which it finds indispensable, in fact, in managing and promoting the great currents of its industrial production and consumption, i.e., of imitation on an immense scale. The course of a Ganges like this necessitated a Himalayas. Paris is the Himalayas of France. Paris unquestionably rules more royally and more orien-

tally over the provinces than the court ever ruled over the city. Every day the telegraph or the railroad distributes its ready-made ideas, wishes, conversations, revolutions, its ready-made dresses and furniture, throughout the whole of France. The suggestive and imperious fascination which it instantaneously exerts over this vast territory is so profound, so complete, so sustained, that it no longer surprises anyone. This kind of magnetism has become chronic. It is called liberty and equality. It is futile for the city laborer to consider himself a democrat in working for the destruction of the middle classes (engaged as he is in rising into the middle class himself); he is none the less an aristocrat himself, the much admired and the much envied aristocrat of the peasant. The peasant is to the laborer what the laborer is to his employer. This is the case of the emigration out of the rural districts. (p. 226)

STAGES OF PERSONALITY GROWTH⁵⁴

One of the most interesting tendencies of the very young child in its responses to its environment is the tendency to recognize differences of personality. It responds to what has been called "suggestions of personality." As early as the second month it distinguishes its mother's or nurse's touch in the dark. It learns characteristic methods of holding, taking up, patting, and adapts itself to these personal variations. It is quite a different thing from the child's behavior toward things which are not persons. I think this is the child's very first step toward a sense of the qualities which distinguish persons. The sense of uncertainty grows stronger and stronger in its dealings with persons. A person stands for a group of experiences quite unstable in its prophetic as it is in its historical meaning. This we may, for brevity of expression, assuming it to be first in order of development, call the "*projective stage*" in the growth of the child's personal consciousness.

Further observation of children shows that the instrument of transition from such a projective to a subjective sense of personality is the child's active bodily self, and the method of it is the *function of imitation*. When the organism is ripe for the enlargement of its active range by new accommodations, then he begins to be dissatisfied with "projects," with contemplation, and starts on his career of imitation. And of course he imitates persons.

Further, persons are bodies which move. And among these bodies which move, which have certain projective attributes, a very peculiar

⁵⁴ Reprinted by permission from J. M. Baldwin, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, The Macmillan Company, 1906.

and interesting one is his own body. It has connection with certain intimate features which all others lack—strains, stresses, resistances, pains, etc., an inner felt series added to the new imitative series. But it is only when a peculiar experience arises which we call effort that there comes that great line of cleavage in his experience which indicates the rise of volition, and which separates off the series now first really *subjective*. What has formerly been “projective” now becomes “subjective.” This we may call the *subjective* stage in the growth of the self-notion. It rapidly assimilates to itself all the other elements by which the child’s own body differs in his experience from other active bodies—all the passive inner series of pains, pleasures, strains, etc. Again, it is easy to see what now happens. The child’s subjective sense goes out by a sort of return dialectic to illuminate the other person’s. The “project” of the earlier period is now lighted up, claimed, clothed on, with the raiment of selfhood, by analogy with the subjective. The subjective becomes *ejective*; that is, other people’s bodies, says the child to himself, have experience in them such as mine has. They are also *me’s*; let them be assimilated to my me-copy. This is the third stage; the *ejective*, or social self, is born.

The “ego” and the “alter” are thus born together. Both are crude and unreflective, largely organic. And the two get purified and clarified together by this twofold reaction between project and subject, and subject and eject. My sense of myself grows by imitation of you, and my sense of yourself grows in terms of my sense of myself. But *ego* and *alter* are thus essentially social; each is a *socius* and each is an imitative creation.

This give-and-take between the individual and his fellows, looked at generally, we may call the *Dialectic of Personal Growth*. It serves as the point of departure for the main positions developed in the following pages.

THE PERSON AS A SELF

The outcome serves to afford a point of departure for the view that we may entertain of the person as he appears to himself in society. If it be true, as much evidence goes to show, that what the person thinks as himself is a pole or terminus at one end of an opposition in the sense of personality generally, and that the other pole or terminus is the thought he has of the other person, the “alter,” then it is impossible to isolate his thought of himself at any time and say that in thinking of himself he is not essentially thinking of the alter also. What he calls himself now is in large measure an incorporation of elements that, at an earlier period of his thought

of personality, he called some one else. The acts now possible to himself, and so used by him to describe himself in thought to himself, were formerly only possible to the other; but by imitating that other he has brought them over to the opposite pole, and found them applicable, with a richer meaning and a modified value, as true predicates of himself also. (pp. 13-16)

CONSCIOUSNESS OF KIND⁵⁵

Since contract and alliance are phenomena obviously more special than association or society, and imitation and impression are phenomena obviously more general, we must look for the psychic datum, motive, or principle of society in the one phenomenon that is intermediate. Accordingly, the sociological postulate can be no other than this, namely: The original and elementary subjective fact in society is *the consciousness of kind*. By this term I mean a state of consciousness in which any being, whether low or high in the scale of life, recognizes another conscious being as of like kind with itself. Such a consciousness may be an effect of impression and imitation, but it is not the only effect that they produce. It may cause contract and alliance, but it causes other things as well. It is therefore less general than impression and imitation, which are more general than association. It is more general than contract and alliance, which are less general than association. It acts on conduct in many ways, and all the conduct that we can properly call social is determined by it. In short, it fulfills the sociological requirement; it is coextensive with potential society and with nothing else.

In its widest extension the consciousness of kind marks off the animate with the inanimate. Within the wide class of the animate it next marks off species and races. Within racial lines the consciousness of kind underlies the more definite ethnical and political groupings, it is the basis of class distinctions, of innumerable forms of alliance, of rules of intercourse, and of peculiarities of policy. Our conduct towards those whom we feel to be most like ourselves is instinctively and radically different from our conduct towards others, whom we believe to be less like ourselves.

Again, it is the consciousness of kind, and nothing else, which distinguishes social conduct, as such, from purely economic, purely political, or purely religious conduct; for it is precisely the consciousness of kind that, in actual life, continually interferes with the theoretically perfect operation of the economic, the political, or the religious motive. The workingman who, in pursuing his economic in-

⁵⁵ Reprinted by permission from F. H. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, The Macmillan Company, 1913.

terest, would take the best wages he could get, joins in a strike which he does not understand, or of which he does not approve, rather than cut himself off from his fellows to be a scab among scabs. For a similar reason, the manufacturer who questions the value of protection to his own industry, yet pays his contribution to the protectionist campaign fund. The southern gentleman who believed in the cause of the Union none the less threw in his fortunes with the Confederacy if he felt himself to be, on the whole, one of the southern people and a stranger to the people of the North. The liberalizing of creeds is accomplished by the efforts of men who are no longer able to accept traditional interpretations, but who strongly desire to maintain associations which it would be painful to sever.

In a word, it is about the consciousness of kind, as a determining principle, that all other motives organize themselves in the evolution of social choice, social volition, or social policy. Therefore, to trace the operation of the consciousness of kind through all its social manifestations is to work out a complete subjective interpretation of society. (pp. 17-19)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. Aristotle's test of a good government.
2. Hobbes' idea of a good citizen.
3. Hume's rôle as the father of social psychology.
4. Adam Smith's fourfold classification of people.
5. L. F. Ward's contribution to psycho-sociologic thought.
6. Tarde's claim to being the founder of social psychology.
7. Tarde's conception of the social process.
8. The meaning of imitation plateaus.
9. The difference between logical and non-logical imitation.
10. The essence of a democratic nation-group.
11. The complementary tendencies of imitation.
12. The democratizing influences of fashion imitation.
13. The three forms of "opposition."
14. The nature of invention.
15. Methods by which imitation grows.
16. The relation of an invention to future inventions.
17. The relation between inventiveness and sheepishness.
18. Le Bon's suspicion of the masses.
19. The meaning of consciousness of kind.

20. Differences between non-social, pseudo-social, and pre-eminently social persons.
21. The two types of aggregation.
22. Distinctions between primary and secondary conflicts.
23. Giddings' concept of dualistic "associations."
24. The self as "bipolar."
25. Reasons for people being so much alike.

Psychology (Biological and
Medical Psychology)
CHAPTER XXIII

Wed -
Fri -
PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGIC THOUGHT

(CONTINUED)

a new school (old school) Cooley
IN 1902, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, by Professor Charles H. Cooley, was published. This book was at once accepted as an authority on the integral relationship of the individual self and the social process. It was followed in 1909 by *Social Organization*, and in 1918 by *Social Process*. The three books constitute a chronological development of a logical system of psycho-sociologic thought.

The first volume treats of the self in its reactions to group life; the second explains the nature of primary groups, such as the family, playground, and neighborhood, of the democratic mind, and of social classes; the third analyzes the many elements in the processes by which society is characterized. The chief thesis of the three volumes is that the individual and society are aspects of the same phenomenon, and that the individual and society are twin-born and twin-developed.¹

An individual has no separate existence. Through the hereditary and social elements in his life he is inseparably bound up with society.² He cannot be considered apart from persons. Even the phenomena which are called individualistic "are always socialistic in the sense that they are expressive of tendencies growing out of the general life."³ It is not only true that individuals make society, but equally true that society makes individuals.

¹ C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, Scribner, 1909, p. 5.

² C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Scribner, 1902, p. 3.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Professor Cooley has given an excellent presentation of what he calls the looking-glass self. There are three distinct psychic elements in this phenomenon: (1) the imagination of one's appearance to another person; (2) the imagined estimation of that appearance by the other person, and (3) a sense of pride or chagrin that is felt by the first person. The looking-glass self affects the daily life of all individuals. "We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined one, and so on."⁴ Even a person's consciousness of himself is largely a direct reflection of the opinions and estimates which he believes that others hold of him.⁵

Professor Cooley makes a lucid distinction between self consciousness, social consciousness, and public consciousness. The first is what I think of myself; the second, what I think of other people; and the third, a collective view of the self and the social consciousness of all the members of a group organized and integrated into a communicating group.⁶ Moreover, all three types of consciousness are parts of an organic whole. Even the moral life of persons is a part of the organic unity of society. Social knowledge is the basis of morality. An upward endeavor is the essence of moral progress.

The three groups which Professor Cooley has called primary are so labeled because through them the individual gets "his earliest and completest experience of social unity."⁷ The family, play groups, and neighborhoods remain throughout life as the experience bases from which the more complex phases of life receive their interpretation.

An unbounded faith in human nature is enjoyed by Professor Cooley. Human nature comprises those sentiments and impulses which are distinctly superior to those of the

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 152 ff.

⁵ *Social Organization*, *ibid.*, p. 11.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

higher animals, such as sympathy, love, resentment, ambition, the feeling of right and wrong.⁸ The improvement of society, according to Professor Cooley, does not involve any essential change in human nature but rather "a larger and higher application of its familiar impulses."⁹

Communication is a fundamental concept in Professor Cooley's system of social thought. Communication is "the mechanism through which human relations exist and develop."¹⁰ Professor Cooley has pointed out that not only does language constitute the symbols of the mind, but that in a sense all objects and actions are mental symbols. Communication is the means whereby the mind develops a true human nature. The symbols of our social environment "supply the stimulus and framework for all our growth." Thus the communication concept furnishes a substantial basis for understanding the psycho-sociologic phenomena which are ordinarily called suggestion and imitation.

Personality has its origin partly in heredity and partly "in the stream of communication, both of which flow from the corporate life of the race." A study of communication shows that the individual mind is not a separate growth, but an integral development of the general mind.¹¹

The means of communication developed remarkably in the nineteenth century, chiefly in the following ways: (1) in expressiveness, that is, in the range of ideas and feelings they are competent to carry; (2) in the permanence in recording; (3) in swiftness of communication; and (4) in diffusion to all classes of people.¹² Thus society can be organized on the bases of intelligence and of rationalized and systematized feelings rather than on authority, autocracy, and caste.

A free intercourse of ideas, that is, free and unimpeded communication, will not produce uniformity. Self feeling

⁸ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 28.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

will find enlarged opportunities for expression. An increased degree of communication furnishes the bases for making the individual conscious of the unique part he can and should play in improving the quality of the social whole. On the other hand, freedom of communication is tending to produce "the disease of the century," namely, the disease of excess, of overwork, of prolonged worry, of a competitive race for which men are not fully equipped.¹³

Public opinion, according to Professor Cooley, is not merely an aggregate of opinions of individuals, but "a co-operative product of communication and reciprocal influence."¹⁴ It is a crystallization of diverse opinion, resulting in a certain stability of thought. It is produced by discussion. Public opinion is usually superior, in the sense of being more effective, than the average opinion of the members of the public.

The masses make fundamental contributions to public opinion, not through formulated ideas but through their sentiments. The masses in their daily experiences are close to the salient facts of human nature. They are not troubled with that preoccupation with ideas which hinders them from immediate fellowship. Neither are they limited by that attention to the hoarding of private property which prevents the wealthy from keeping in touch with the common things of life.

The striking result of the social process is the development of personalities. The social process affords opportunities which individuals, ambitious and properly stimulated, may accept. Education may perform a useful function in adjusting individuals to opportunities. But education often fails because it requires too much and inspires too little; it accents formal knowledge at the expense of kindling the spirit.¹⁵

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹⁵ Cooley, *Social Process*, Scribner, 1918, pp. 68 ff

Social stratification hinders.¹⁶ It cuts off communication. It throws social ascendancy into the hands of a stable, communicating minority. The majority are submerged in the morass of ignorance. Degrading neighborhood associations, vicious parents, despised racial connections—these all serve to produce stratification and to hinder progress.

Professor Cooley holds that in the social process the institutional element is as essential as the personal.¹⁷ Institutions bequeath the standard gifts of the past to the individual; they give stability. At the same time, if rationally controlled they leave energy free for new conquests. Vigor in the individual commonly leads to dissatisfaction on his part with institutions. Disorganization thus arises from the reaction against institutional formalism manifested by energetic persons. It may be regarded as a lack of communication between the individual and the institution. Formalism indicates that in certain particulars there has been an excess of communication.

The economic concept of value has long been analyzed in individualistic terms—the economic desires arise out of “the inscrutable depths of the private mind.” To this explanation Professor Cooley replies that economic wants, interests, and values are primarily of institutional origin; they are socially created. Pecuniary valuations are largely the products of group conditions and activities.

It is in a rational public will that Professor Cooley sees the salvation of the social process. While he repeatedly expresses a large degree of faith in human nature as it is, he looks forward to a day, rather remote, when communication and education will enable all individuals to take a large grasp of human situations and on the basis of this grasp to express effectual social purposes. Unconscious adaptation will be superseded by the deliberate self-direction of every group along lines of broadening sympathy and widening intellectual reaches.

¹⁶ Cooley, *Social Organization*, Chs. XVIII, XXV-XXVII.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 320; cf. *Social Process*, p. 297 ff.

Professor Cooley has earned the title of a sound, sane, and deep sociological thinker. His contributions to social thought are found in his lucid descriptions of the social process from which personalities and social organizations arise, in his keen analysis of communication as the fundamental element in progress, and in his emphasis upon rational control through standards.

MCDUGALL

The year 1908 is a red letter year in the history of sociopsychologic thought. In that year two important treatises appeared, one written by William McDougall and the other by Edward Alsworth Ross. The former was developed from the psychological standpoint; the latter, from the sociological point of view.

Mr. McDougall considers social psychology largely as a study of the social instincts of individuals; Professor Ross concentrates attention upon the suggestion and imitation phases of societal life. In a sense Professor Ross begins his analysis where Mr. McDougall concludes.

Mr. McDougall treats the instincts as the bases of social life. He makes them the foundation of nearly all individual and social activities.¹⁸ Instincts are biologically inherited; they cannot be eradicated by the individual. Instincts constitute the materials out of which habits are made. Consciousness arises only when an instinct or a habit (that is, a modified instinct) fails to meet human needs.

The primary instincts are the sex and parental, the gregarious, curiosity, flight, repulsion. Each is accompanied by its peculiar emotion, for example, the instinct of flight by the emotion of fear, the instinct of curiosity by the emotion of wonder. This instinct-emotion theory is, however, drawn out until it seems to become academic rather than actual in its details.

Professor McDougall points out that the instincts are the basic elements upon which all social institutions are

¹⁸ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Luce, 1914, pp. 23 ff.

built.¹⁹ For example, the sex and parental instincts are the foundations of the family; the acquisitive instinct is an essential condition of the accumulation of material wealth and of the rise of private property as an institution. Pugnaciousness leads to war.

This emphasis upon the instincts reaches an extreme form in W. Trotter's *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, where the herd instinct is made all-dominant. According to Mr. Trotter the herd instinct arouses fear in the individual and rules him through rigorous conventional means—in a large percentage of cases to his detriment.

In conjunction with his theory of instincts, Professor McDougall has advanced a noteworthy conception of the sentiments. The three leading expressions of sentiment are love, hate, and respect. Sympathy is regarded as an elemental sentiment, in fact, as an emotion in its simplest form. A sentiment is "an organized system of emotional tendencies centered about some object." The sentiments comprise an important phase of the self, and function powerfully in determining social conduct.

ROSS

It was in 1901 that Professor E. A. Ross made his initial contribution to psycho-sociologic thought—seven years before his *Social Psychology* was published. His first great work was *Social Control*. In this excursus he defined social psychology as the study of "the psychic interplay between man and his environing society."²⁰ This interplay is twofold: the domination of society over the individual (social ascendancy); and the domination of the individual over society (individual ascendancy). Social ascendancy may be either purposeless (social influence) or purposeful (social control). Social psychology, according to Professor Ross, deals with psychic planes and currents; it does not treat of groups, which is a part of the preserve of psychological sociology.

¹⁹ McDougall, *op. cit.*, pp. 268, 322, 279.

²⁰ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, Century, 1920, Chs. XXXIV, XXXV. Cf. Ross, *Social Control*, Macmillan, 1910, Chs. VII, VIII.

The psycho-sociologic grounds of control are found in such factors as sympathy, sociability, an elemental sense of justice, and particularly in group needs. There are individuals whose conduct exasperates the group. "In this common wrath and common vengeance lies the germ of a social control of the person."²¹

Perhaps the best part of Professor Ross' discussion of social control is his analysis of the agents of control.²² Public opinion and law are the two most important means of controlling individuals. The weakness of one, in this connection, is its fitfulness; of the other, its rigidity. Personal beliefs and ideals function widely and effectively because of their subjective character. An individual may escape the operation of law; he can hide away from the winds of public opinion; but he cannot get away from his own ideas and conscience. It is for this reason that religious convictions are powerful. Art as a means of social control is commonly underrated. It arouses the passions, kindles sympathies, creates a sense of the beautiful and perfects social symbols, such as Columbia, La Belle France, Britannia.²³

Systems of social control are political or moral.²⁴ The political form is more or less objective, is likely to be in the hands of a few, is apt to be used for class benefit. The ethical arises from sentiment rather than from utility; it is more or less subjective; it permeates the hidden recesses of life. The ethical system is usually mild, enlightening and suasive "rather than bold and fear-engendering." Individuals are ordinarily aware of political control, but the far-reaching influences of ethical control they little suspect.

The two most difficult problems for society to solve in connection with social control are these: (1) what measures of control may be best imposed; and (2) how these

²¹ *Social Control*, pp. 49 ff.

²² *Ibid.*, Chs. X ff.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 257 ff.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 411 ff.

measures should be imposed.²⁵ The variety of disciplines which society may use varies from epithets to capital punishment. The methods vary from the democratic one of social self-infliction to the direct autocratic procedure. Too much control produces either stagnation or revolution, depending on the amount of energy the rank and file may possess. Too little control leads to anarchy, or at least to a reign of selfishness. A paternal social control may cause resentment or a crushing of self-respect.

Suggestion and imitation are social elements that Professor Ross has described in detail.²⁶ He has demonstrated that the more gregarious species are more suggestible than the species whose members are more or less solitary; that southern races are more suggestible than northern races, because of the different climatic effects upon temperament; that children are more suggestible than adults, because children possess a small store of facts and an undeveloped ability to criticize; that people of a nervous temperament are more suggestible than persons who are phlegmatic, because of difference in sensibility; that women are more suggestible than men, because they have not had the broadening influences which men have enjoyed, such as "higher education, travel, self-direction, professional pursuits, participation in intellectual and public life."²⁷

The laws of imitation, particularly of fashion imitation and rational imitation, which M. Tarde was the first to outline, have been elucidated and illustrated by Professor Ross. He has cut boldly into the shams of fashion, convention, and custom, and made a strong plea for rationality in these fields. He has shown how mob mind, the craze, and the fad sweep not simply foolish and light-headed persons off their feet, but also those who are sane and sensible. In fact, he has made clear that even the

²⁵ Ross, *op. cit.*, Ch. XXXI.

²⁶ Ross, *Social Psychology*, Macmillan, 1908, Ch. II.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 70. Cf. McDougall, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Ch. IV.

most level-headed are blindly or slavishly governed by custom or fashion or both. He does not develop, however, the fact that imitation is largely a result of like-mindedness and common social stimuli. He implies an individual rather than a group origin of suggestion-imitation phenomena.

It is in discussion that Professor Ross sees one of the main hopes of progress.²⁸ Discussion brings conflicts to a head, and leads to group progress. Discussion changes a person's opinions. Adequate discussion leads to the settlement of a conflict and the creation of an established public opinion, which remains in force until a new invention occurs, a resultant conflict ensues, and a new public opinion comes into power.

In 1920, Professor Ross made his largest and most important contribution to social thought in his *Principles of Sociology*. This work, however, is essentially a treatise in social psychology. The original social forces are the human dispositions, instincts.²⁹ The derivative social forces are societal complexes which tend to satisfy instinctive cravings. Professor Ross' classification of the derivative social forces, or interests, is primarily fourfold. These fundamental interests are wealth, government, religion, and knowledge. This classification contains only two, or at best three, of the six groups of interests which are found in Professor Small's exhibit.

Professor Ross' analysis of the process of socialization has been indicated in Chapter XXI. This phenomenon is to be sharply distinguished from ossification, which is the hardening of social life into rigid forms.³⁰ Groups often become unduly solidified. The salvation of such a situation lies in individuation, which is a process of pulverizing social lumps and releasing the action of their members.³¹

²⁸ Ross, *Social Psychology*, Ch. XVIII.

²⁹ E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, Century, 1920, p. 42.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Ch. XLII.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Ch. XXXVI.

Any movement that develops the spirit of personal liberty leads to individuation.

"Commercialization is the increasing subjection of any calling or function to the profits motive."³² The various factors which hold the profits motive in check are: (1) pleasure in creative activity; (2) pride in the perfection of one's product; (3) the desire to live up to accepted standards of excellence; (4) abhorrence of sham in one's work; (5) interest in the welfare of the customer; (6) the social service motive. The profits motive, however, receives support from many social tendencies, notably: (1) the increasing distance between producer and consumer; (2) the growing differentiation between principals and subordinates; (3) the increasing importance of capital in the practice of an art or occupation.

Professor Ross has set forth a valuable exhibit of the canons of social reconstruction.³³ (1) Reforms must not do violence to human nature. (2) They must square with essential realities. (3) They should be preceded by a close sociological study of the situation which it is planned to change. (4) Reforms should be tried out on a small scale before being adopted on a large scale. (5) A reform should be the outcome of a social movement. (6) Under a popular government, reforms should move according to legal and constitutional methods.

In regard to the improvement of social institutions, Professor Ross rests his argument on the importance of standards. "Standards are, perhaps, the most important things in society."³⁴ Although invisible and intangible they reveal, better than anything else, the quality of a society.

The current standards of the family may be improved through imparting sound ideals of marriage, through fixing these ideals everywhere in social tradition, and through making "the social atmosphere frosty toward foolish and

³² Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, Ch. XXXVIII.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 549 ff.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 564.

frivolous ideals of marriage."³⁵ Young people may well be taught to look upon divorce as a moral shipwreck. Loyalty to the state or society has its origin in the obedience of children to parents in the family. A sound family life, thus, is rated by our author as the bulwark of society.

In regard to industry, it is pointed out that the principle of the soviet is associated in an entirely accidental way with Bolshevism.³⁶ The soviet may well be judged on its own merits. The principle upon which citizens may be grouped for purposes of securing representation in government is not yet settled. Is a given geographical area a better unit for securing representation than occupational areas?

State socialism is objected to by Professor Ross on the grounds that it leaves the citizen so remote "from that which most vitally concerns him, viz., the regulation of the industry in which he works, that his yearly vote may be a mere fribble and he little better than a state serf."³⁷ Guild socialism, on the other hand, urges that each branch of industry shall organize itself democratically, and that the state shall be organized not with provinces and localities as semi-autonomies but with industries exercising a degree of autonomy. Our author endorses the general shift which is occurring at the present time from the coercive side to the service side of industrial life.

Professor Ross has deduced several important sociological principles of general import. These he calls the principle of anticipation, the principle of simulation, the principle of individualization, and the principle of balance. By the principle of anticipation, he means that a known policy of an institution will come to be anticipated by the members of the institution and will result in modifying behavior.³⁸ Unfair advantage is often taken of people on

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 590.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 626.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 632.

the basis of this principle. For example, children frequently count on favor and leniency. The false beggar's whine is often effective. It is in this connection that genuine social reform differs from a common conception of charity, for the former method fits people to run, clears their course, and incites them to make the race,³⁹ while the latter fails to render assistance of permanent value.

The principle of simulation refers to the common tendency of "the unworthy to simulate every type or trait which has won social approval, in order to steal prestige from it."⁴⁰ Commercial competition has produced adulterations, misbrandings, counterfeiting. There is the professional athlete, who sometimes poses as a sincere enthusiast for physical development. Politicians are often expert dissemblers.

The principle of individualization refers to giving individuality a reasonable chance for growth. As society grows more complex, institutions more ossified, and life more standardized, the average person is increasingly in danger of being crushed; at least, his opportunities for self-expression become fewer. There is need of constant vigilance in education in allowing for individual differences, in industry for safeguarding the laborer in expressing his personality in his work, in government in permitting free discussion.

The principle of balance is stated by Professor Ross as follows: "In the guidance of society each social element should share according to the intelligence and public spirit of its members and none should predominate."⁴¹ There has been in the past, and even now there is in all countries, a bitter struggle taking place between classes apparently on the basis that some one class should rule all the other classes. Society has suffered immeasurably in this way.

³⁹ Ross, *op. cit.*, p. 652.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 653.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 693.

Sometimes society has been the victim of the rulership of the dead, of the rulership of masculinism, of clericalism, of militarism, of commercialism, of legalism, of leisure class ascendancy, of intellectualism, of proletarianism, but always by one class lording it over the weaker classes until some one of the weaker classes acquires strength enough to overthrow the class in power.

The socio-psychological thought of Professor Ross has penetrated the farthest reaches of human life. It has been stated in lucid, stimulating language. It has commanded the attention of socially-thinking persons in many lands. It has defined the field of sociology, giving the psychological approach.

WALLAS

Special attention may be given to the concept of "the great society," as used by Graham Wallas. The Great Society is a name for current human society, the product of mechanical inventions, industrial production, commercial expansion, democratic evolution—highly organized and intricately complex. It is ruled, in the main, by men "who direct enormous social power without attempting to form a social purpose," and it is composed to a surpassing degree of persons who recognize the power of society but dimly and who often treat society with distrust and dislike.⁴²

Mr. Wallas substitutes organization for organism as a fundamental social concept. He makes a distinction between thought organizations, will organizations, and happiness organizations. Thought organizations are those institutions in society whose main function is the organization of thought, such as discussion groups, ranging from a philosophical club to an ordinary committee that is called together to plan new legislation. At this point Mr. Wallas asserts that he has attended perhaps 3,000 meetings of municipal committees, of different sizes and for different purposes, and that he is sure that at least half of the men

⁴² Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, Macmillan, 1914, p. 11.

and women with whom he has sat "were entirely unaware that any conscious mental effort on their part was called for."⁴³ They attended in the same spirit that many persons attend church, namely, in the spirit that if they merely attend they are doing their duty, and that some good must come of it.

Will organizations come into existence because of imperfect social machinery. In industry three types of will organizations are striving for mastery—the institution of private property, represented by the individualists; the state, represented by collectivists; labor organizations, represented perhaps by syndicalists. There is urgent need for "the invention of means of organizing the conflicting wills of individuals and classes within each nation more effective than reliance upon any single 'principle,' whether representation, property, or professionalism."⁴⁴

The organization of happiness has not proceeded far. Efficiency has supplanted happiness as a modern god. The ideal of making money has shadowed the ideal of making people happy. A social system organized on the basis of happiness avoids both destitution and superfluity, employs the Mean as the standard for the representation of all social interests as well as for all faculties of individuals, avoids the Extreme in all things.⁴⁵

ELLWOOD

The writings of Charles A. Ellwood deal particularly with that part of sociological thought which rests upon psychological theory. Professor Ellwood defines a society as "a group of individuals carrying on a collective life by means of mental interactions."⁴⁶ As a result of mental interactions coordination or coadaptation of the activities of the members is effected.

The psychological basis of social interactions is found in such characteristics of the individual as spontaneity,

⁴³ Wallas, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 319.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 368.

⁴⁶ C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, Appleton, 1912, Ch. IX.

instincts, emotions, consciousness, mind. Organisms possess spontaneity, that is, movements are set up in them without the apparent aid of external causes.⁴⁷ The organism, however, is dependent largely upon the environment for the development of its potentialities, "but the essential ground for the beginning of its activities lies within—in its own organic needs." Instincts, the product of natural selection, represent preformed neurological pathways that developed "in response to the demands of previous life conditions." The emotions, also hereditary, are complexes of feelings and sensations. The desires are complex combinations of feelings and impulses which are accompanied by an awareness of the objects that will satisfy the impulse.⁴⁸ Consciousness develops to solve problems which the instincts cannot meet. At first, consciousness is largely a selective activity. It develops, however, into a highly complex agency for mastering the problems of life and the universe. Mind is a product of the social life-process. It has arisen under conditions of association.

One of the most fundamental phases of the associational process is communication. The need of acting together has given rise to intercommunicative symbols.

Professor George H. Mead has given a thoroughgoing discussion of communication, language, and the consciousness of meaning.⁴⁹ He begins with a social situation, where the actions of one person serve as stimuli to other persons, whose responses in turn act as stimuli to the first person. Thus life is a series of actions, stimulations, responses, resultant stimulations—these activities constitute gestures or symbols with meanings. Symbols and the consciousness of meaning of these symbols are the main elements in communication.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

⁴⁹ G. H. Mead, "Social Consciousness and the Consciousness of Meaning," *Psychological Bulletin*, VII: 405.

Communication, says Professor Ellwood, is "a device to carry on a common life-process among several distinct, though psychically interacting, individual units."⁵⁰ This definition probably emphasizes unduly the "individual units," which are doubtless a product, in part, of the stream of social life. Suggestion is an elemental, but quick form of communication, related in its simpler phases to sympathetic emotion. Imitation is a common mechanism whereby actions and ideas spread. Communication in the form of oral and written language is the chief mechanistic factor in securing social change.

The contention of Ward that primitive man was anti-social is refuted by Professor Ellwood, who points out that according to social anthropology the so-called anti-social traits of earliest man are not found fully developed among "savages" but among people of later ages. Primitives were characterized by a narrow sociality, confined largely to the family and small groups.⁵¹

Professor Ellwood's theory of social change is of two-fold character: unconscious and conscious,—the former being characteristic of the lower stages of social evolution, and the latter, increasingly characteristic of the higher stages.⁵² The forms of unconscious social change are manifold.

Natural selection tends to crush and destroy the weaker individuals and the weaker groups. Another type of unconscious social change is that which comes through gradual disuse of certain cultural elements. One generation fails to copy the preceding in all particulars. Another set of sources of unconscious social change is found in the shifting of relationships between individuals that is produced by "the increase of population, a new physical environment, a new cultural contact, a new discovery or

⁵⁰ Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, p. 153. Cf. *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 149.

⁵¹ Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, p. 138.

⁵² Ellwood, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, p. 149.

a new invention." In fact, Professor Ellwood states that all social changes start in an unconscious way.⁵³

Conscious change begins with the awareness on the part of one or more persons that some social habit is not functioning well. Through communication, this awareness spreads from person to person. Discussion ensues. At first, discussion is largely critical of the unsatisfactory social situation. The useless or harmful elements in the situation receive first attention. As discussion proceeds, it takes on a more constructive nature, that is, it becomes projective, planful, positive. It suggests a change to be made. It becomes transformed into a more or less stable public opinion, demanding a substitution of a proposed way of doing for the old. The chief elements in guaranteeing conscious readjustments are free communication, "free public criticism, free discussion, untrammelled formation of public opinion, a free selection of social policies and social leaders."⁵⁴ The selective process in conscious social change is public opinion, whose social function it is to mediate in the transition from one social habit to another.

Conscious social change in Western Civilization is endangered on one hand by an excessive individualism, and on the other by a socialism which threatens to suppress individual initiative and to underemphasize the rôle of mental and moral character. Professor Ellwood urges the importance of an education which will socialize the individual and at the same time develop a high type of personal character.

Social change, also, takes place under socially abnormal conditions, so long as societies fail to keep "a high degree of flexibility in their habits and institutions."⁵⁵ Autocratic rulers, propertied classes, ecclesiastical classes, special groups in power, a general intellectual stagnation, are factors which tend to resist institutional flexibility. If this

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 151.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 170.

adaptability does not exist, then social conditions will produce revolutions. If the ruling autocracy is so powerful that the lives of all objectors are snuffed out, then revolution is indefinitely postponed. If the energetic forces within a society are hampered greatly in securing constructive opportunities for expression, they become forces of discontent and agents of revolt. If a revolution comes, then much that is worthy in social organization will be obliterated along with the unworthy, confusion will reign and a reversion to the brutal stages of societal life is easily possible.

In his discussion of "the social problem," Professor Ellwood points out that the good fruits of the World War are in danger of being destroyed by "the blindness and selfishness of some in our socially privileged classes, the fanatic radicalism and class hatred of some of the leaders of the non-privileged."⁵⁶ The forces which are combining against making the world safe for democracy today are national imperialism, commercialism, materialistic standards of life, class conflicts, religious agnosticism, and a reckless attitude toward marriage and the family.⁵⁷ The social problem, from one angle, becomes the problem of training people to live together justly, constructively, and cooperatively.

As Turgot indicated, the only way to avert social revolution is through suitable and well-timed reforms. Today, the reforms most urgently needed are threefold: the substitution of an unselfish internationalism for a selfish nationalism, of a spiritual civilization for a rampant materialism, and of a socialized human race for individualized peoples. To bring about these changes is a gigantic task, namely, *the social problem*.

Civilization is a complex of social values. Professor Ellwood's classification of values is widely different from

⁵⁶ Ellwood, *The Social Problem*, Macmillan, 1919, p. 2.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

the analysis that Professor Giddings has made (given in the preceding chapter). According to Professor Ellwood, Western Civilization is represented by the following groups of social values historically derived: (1) a set of spiritual and ethical values, described by the ancient Hebrews; (2) a set of esthetic and philosophic concepts from the Greeks; (3) a set of administrative and legal forms of Roman origin; (4) a set of personal liberty beliefs of early Teutonic derivation; (5) a scientific spirit and technique, originating during the Renaissance; (6) economic efficiency, born of the industrial revolution; and (7) an extensive group of humanitarian values, the product of the nineteenth century. This vast and complicated Western Civilization needs, however, to remove from its structure the three "rotten pillars" of hyper-individualism, materialism, and selfish nationalism, substituting for each its spiritualized and socialized counterpart.

Human nature is the most modifiable thing that we know. Ordinary human behavior is an indefinite compound, and hence is subject to change by changing the elements of the compound. "Through science, man will be enabled more and more to master nature and to control his own behavior" is Ellwood's belief as stated in his book, *The Psychology of Human Society*, which contains a refinement and a mature statement of the major psychosociologic points advanced in earlier treatises by the same author.⁵⁸

HAYES

The nature of social control, according to the analysis by Professor E. C. Hayes, is "to secure the completed and most harmonious realization of good human experience, regarded as an end in itself."⁵⁹ Social control should prevent activities which do not bear the test of reason, and should elicit those which stand that test, when judged by their own intrinsic value and by their effect upon other

⁵⁸ *The Psychology of Human Society*, D. Appleton and Company, 1925.

⁵⁹ E. C. Hayes, *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Appleton, 1915, p. 586.

values. This statement of the purpose of social control is similar to that of other standard interpretations of the matter.

There are two types of social control. The first is control by sanctions, and the second by social suggestion, sympathetic radiation, and imitation. Social sanctions refer to proffered rewards and threatened punishments. Professor Hayes, however, makes not law but personality the ultimate basis of social order. Repression of crime is a correct social procedure but of a distinctly lower grade than the movement to raise the moral character of those who never go to prison. *The* problem of social control is to take the instinctive tendencies of each individual when he is young and make them over into a disposition that is characterized by the four following traits: (1) reliability, or honesty; (2) controlled animalism, or temperance regarding eating, drinking, and other animal propensities; (3) steadiness in endeavor; (4) the social spirit, or justice.⁶⁰

Professor Hayes' statement of the agencies of social control is similar in purport to the list that Professor Ross has given. Education is considered the chief agency of social control. Education can determine the direction of ambition; education can shift the emphasis in social valuations. Professor Hayes recognizes the import of heredity and how the degree of individual achievement is "more dependent upon heredity than upon the directions of effort." Society, however, has the power to decide which of its members shall develop as far as their potential abilities will permit, and also the power to determine the direction the activities of its members shall take.⁶¹

Among educational agencies of control the family ranks first.⁶² The power of the family at its best in building per-

⁶⁰ Hayes, *op. cit.*, pp. 586 ff.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 664 ff.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 669.

sonality is comparable to the influence in this connection of all other agencies combined. The profession of mother-work is more important to society than any other profession.

VEBLEN

The social psychology of business enterprise, of the leisure classes, of the machine process, of industry and workmanship has been indicated by Thorstein Veblen. The unique, incisive work of Mr. Veblen is presented in several books, chief of which are his *Theory of the Leisure Class*, *Theory of Business Enterprise*, and *Instinct of Workmanship*. Mr. Veblen's ideas can best be illustrated by referring to his "canons."

The Canon of Pecuniary Emulation describes the restless straining of certain persons to outdo one another in the possession of wealth.⁶³ Such possession is interpreted as conferring honor on its possessor. Wealth becomes intrinsically honorable. The Canon of Pecuniary Beauty refers to the impression that things are beautiful in proportion as they are costly.⁶⁴ The marks of expensiveness come to be regarded as beautiful features.

The Canon of Conspicuous Consumption is a term which describes a method of showing off one's wealth by an elaborate consumption of goods.⁶⁵ Conspicuous consumption is seen more in matters of dress than in any other line of consumption. The Canon of Conspicuous Leisure is the rule which some people are following when they live a life of leisure as the readiest and most conclusive evidence of pecuniary strength.⁶⁶ Sometimes a man keeps his wife frittering her time away in a doll's house in order to achieve a wealth status.

The Canon of Leisure Class Conservatism is Veblen's label for the conservative tendencies of the wealthy. Those whom fortune has greatly favored are likely to be

⁶³ T. Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Macmillan, 1912, p. 31.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 169.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

content with things as they are. Such people are averse to social change, for social innovation might upset their comfortable existence. They have a dominant material interest in letting things alone.

Veblen's Canon of Pecuniary Efficiency means that many persons conceive of efficiency largely in terms of price. The person who can induce his fellows to pay him well is accounted efficient and serviceable.⁶⁷ The man who gains much wealth at little cost is rated high in his neighbor's esteem. The investor who at the turn of his hand reaps \$100,000 in a stock or bond deal is praised widely. In other words, there is a common tendency to rate people high in direct proportion to the amount of money that they are able to extract from the aggregate product.

The Canon of Bellicoseness refers to the enthusiasm for war which the hereditary leisure class displays. The very wealthy, not being obliged to work for a living, find that time drags. Therefore, they seek excitement and relief from ennui, and find these conditions in various things, especially in war.

The Canon of Pecuniary Education covers the tendency to demand "practical" education, which, upon examination, is education that will guarantee individual success. "Success," for which education is to fit young people, turns out to be, in the eyes of the practical man, a pecuniary success. "Practical" means useful for private gain. The test that many persons would give to a course in education is this: Will it help one to get an income? The Canon of Pecuniary Thinking denotes that many occupations lead to habits of pecuniary thought. For numbers of people the beginning and end of their more serious thought is of a pecuniary nature.

The Canon of Machine Process Thinking is that mechanical employments produce a type of thinking that is

⁶⁷ Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, Macmillan, 1914, p. 349.

based more or less on material cause and effect. The Machine knows neither morality nor dignity nor prescriptive right. The machine-process laborers, working in a world of impersonal cause and effect, "are in danger of losing the point of view of sin."

Professor Veblen has developed the concept of the instinct of workmanship at considerable length. According to this contention, it is natural for individuals to do, to construct, to achieve, to work. Through activity the individual expresses himself and, in so doing, develops and attains happiness. Every individual is a center of unfolding impulsive activity; he is possessed of a taste for effective work.⁶⁸ Labor acquires a character of irksomeness by virtue of the indignity that is falsely imputed to it by a hereditary leisure class.⁶⁹ It was the instinct of workmanship which brought the life of mankind from the brute to the human plane.

The contributions of Veblen to social thought are always of a thought-provoking nature. Sometimes they give rise to invidious comparisons, often they antagonize, but as a rule, they are unique. No brief reference such as is given in the foregoing paragraphs can do justice to Veblen's pungent criticisms of societal foibles.

HOWARD

It would be a decidedly incomplete treatment of the nature of psycho-sociologic thought that did not make reference to the work of George Elliott Howard, political scientist, historian, sociologist, and also, social psychologist. In each of the fields in which Dr. Howard has achieved fame, his method of approach is psychological. He has prepared an excellent outline of the field of social psychology, together with a scholarly bibliography of the same. Perhaps the best way to treat Professor Howard's socio-psychologic thought, is to give a sample of it, as found in his address before the American Sociological

⁶⁸ *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, p. 15.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

Society when he was president of that body. The theme was, "Ideals as a Factor in the Future Control of International Society." This *magnum opus* served as an excellent introduction to the series of papers on the subject of social control which were read at the annual meeting of the Sociological Society in 1918, and which have been published together with the presidential address as Volume XII of the Publications of the Society.

By social control, Professor Howard means the standard conception of the "ascendency of the social consciousness."⁷⁰ In the same volume, however, Professor Carl Kelsey interprets social control as "the organization and utilization of our wealth and citizens for private purposes."⁷¹ Professor Hutton Webster is inclined to believe that the main feature of primitive social control is "the superstitious fear of the new."⁷² Professor F. Stuart Chapin sees the essential element of primitive social ascendency in the pressure upon the individual of social conditions, customs, and conventions.⁷³ Without giving additional interpretations of social control, the reader will be referred directly to Volume XII of the Publications as the best symposium that is available on the subject.

In discussing ideals as a phase of international control, Professor Howard makes clear that certain ideals exert a baneful influence. The ideal of the nation-state appears to be unmoral if not immoral.⁷⁴ Of four prevailing standards of ethics, namely, personal morality, business morality, national morality for home consumption, and "standards of international morality for use with outlanders," the scale is descending, and the fourth type is the lowest. Nationalisms have been overdeveloped — at the expense of a needed internationalism.

Another false ideal of which society needs to rid itself is its conception of the function of war and militarism.

⁷⁰ Publications of the American Sociological Society, Vol. XII, p. 2.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

War is not a good in itself. War as war is not heroic. Race values constitute a third false ideal. "Every race deems itself superior to every other race and every race is mistaken."⁷⁵ Race conceit is contrary to the Christian ideal and has steadily been supplanted by the new doctrine of the potential equality of all races.

The ideal of democracy, on the other hand, rings true to the needs of progress. It makes for peace. Democracy, however, must rid itself of blemishes. Hereditary and class privilege must be abolished; political corruption and race riots must be defeated; woman, "the original social builder, the mother of industry, the first inventor of the arts of peace," must be granted a full voice in social control.

The ideal of education is exceedingly delicate, for it involves the process of the changing of ideals. Education may properly prepare a people to admire autocracy or to build a self-governing democracy.

Dr. Howard enters a strong plea for social idealism—the most effective that has yet been written.⁷⁶ "The idealist is the inspired social architect, who dreams a plan for the sanitary or moral cleansing of a great city; the campaign for purging politics of graft; a law for saving little children from the tigerish man of the factory or the sweatshop; a referendum for banishing from the commonwealth the saloon, that chief breeder of pauperism, sin, and crime; a conference for the rescuing from the hands of predacious greed, for the use of the whole people, of the remnant of our country's natural wealth. The idealist is the statesman—the head of a nation—who dreams a scheme for safeguarding democracy and guaranteeing peace throughout the world."

The psychologist in his discussions of social psychology begins with the "individual" and after developing that concept extensively, gives attention to the individual in his

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

social relationships as a vital but not necessarily dominant factor. Instinctive tendencies, conditioned reflexes, and so forth, are the main desiderata. Social psychology is treated partly as a phase of applied psychology.⁷⁷

The behavioristic movement in psychology is exerting considerable influence in social psychology. Behavior patterns (systems of neurones, operating mechanistically upon being stimulated appropriately) are both inherited and acquired. Prepotent reflexes, countless numbers of them, constitute the inherited equipment.⁷⁸

A recent synthetic presentation of psycho-sociologic thought has been made by L. L. Bernard,⁷⁹ who describes the organic bases of behavior, the nature of behavior patterns, of habit mechanisms, and of the functional organization of consciousness. Personality is integrated under the influences of the psycho-social environment. Social psychology is defined as "the science which studies the development of collective or social adjustment patterns in the individual as the result of his contacts with his various environments, especially with the most important of all of these environments, the psycho-social." The concept of "instinct" in the traditional sense is annihilated. After showing that it has been used in several hundreds of different senses, and hence made valueless as a tool, Professor Bernard contends that much which has been labeled "instinct" is habit formation, and substitutes for an instinct theory, a theory of environmental processes acting upon highly sensitized protoplasm that can respond, and a theory based on biological formulae combined with concepts of objective social control.⁸⁰

"Instincts" are ruled out by many writers, notably John Dewey, whose emphasis on habit is well known. Habit shares with impulse the major rôles in human conduct.

⁷⁷ Cf. R. H. Gault, *Social Psychology*, Henry Holt and Company, 1923.

⁷⁸ Cf. F. N. Allport, *Social Psychology*, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1924.

⁷⁹ *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Henry Holt and Company, 1926.

⁸⁰ An extensive study has been made of the wide variety of different senses in which the term, instinct, has been used and the results published under the title *Instinct*, by L. L. Bernard, Holt and Company, 1924.

Under social stimuli impulses become organized into habits. And "the nature of habit is to be assertive, insistent, self-perpetuating."⁸¹ Even thinking is habit.

The social process has been analyzed by W. I. Thomas in terms of social attitudes, and social values,—and thus a new emphasis has been given to psycho-sociologic thought. An attitude is a process of individual consciousness that determines "the real or possible activity of the individual in the social world."⁸² A social value, on the other hand, is any datum that has an empirical content accessible to the members of a social group and a meaning which may make it an object of activity. Activity is thus the bond between a social attitude and a social value. The value is the meaning which a material or spiritual datum may have. An attitude is a real or implied going out after value. Social psychology is the science of social attitudes.

The social process, according to Park and Burgess in their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, is normally composed of four stages: (1) competition, or unconscious struggle, (2) conflict, or open struggle, (3) accommodation, or conscious adaptation, and (4) assimilation, or unconscious unification. Social interaction is the starting point of the social process.

It is evident from the introduction to the history of psycho-sociologic thought that has been given in this and the preceding chapter, supported by the materials in the chapters on social conflict and social cooperation concepts, that psycho-sociologic thought holds a place of first rank in the field of sociology. It bids fair to become the central force in social thinking and to lead the social sciences. It deals with the most vital concepts, namely, groups, personality, behavior, conflict, cooperation, and process. Of all the main approaches to an understanding of societal problems, it promises most.

⁸¹ *Human Nature and Conduct*, Holt, 1922, p. 58.

⁸² Thomas and Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, University of Chicago Press, 1918, I: 22.

THE GREAT SOCIETY⁸³

During the last hundred years the external conditions of civilized life have been transformed by a series of inventions which have abolished the old limits to the creation of mechanical force, the carriage of men and goods, and communication by written and spoken words. One effect of this transformation is a general change of social scale. Men find themselves working and thinking and feeling in relation to an environment, which, both in its world-wide extension and its intimate connection with all sides of human existence, is without precedent in the history of the world.

Economists have invented the term "The Great Industry" for the special aspect of this change which is dealt with by their science, and sociologists may conveniently call the whole result The Great Society. In those countries where the transformation first began, a majority of the inhabitants live either in huge commercial cities or in closely populated industrial districts threaded by systems of mechanical traction and covering hundreds of square miles. Cities and districts are only parts of highly organized national states, each with fifty or a hundred million inhabitants; and these states are themselves every year drawn more effectively into a general system of international relationships.

Every member of the Great Society, whether he be stupid or clever, whether he have the wide curiosity of the born politician and trader, or the concentration on what he can see and touch of the born craftsman, is affected by this ever-extending and ever-tightening nexus. A sudden decision by some financier, whose name he has never heard may, at any moment, close the office or mine or factory in which he is employed, and he may either be left without a livelihood or be forced to move with his family to a new center. He and his fellows can only maintain their standard wage or any measure of permanency in their employment if the majority of them judge rightly on difficult questions put to them by national political parties and national or international Trade Unions. Even in those English villages into which the Great Industry may seem to have scarcely penetrated the change of scale is already felt. The widow who takes in washing fails or succeeds according to her skill in choosing starch or soda or a wringing-machine under the influence of half a dozen competing world schemes of advertisement. The boys playing football on the village green think of themselves as possible members of a champion English team. The spectacled young schoolmaster who looks on is brooding, with all his future

⁸³ Reprinted by permission from Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, Macmillan Company, 1914.

happiness consciously at stake, on his chances of advancement in the Transvaal or West Australia or on the relation between his own religious opinions and an analysis of Hebrew eschatology by a German professor.

The English factory girl who is urged to join her union, the tired old Scotch gatekeeper with a few pounds to invest, the Galician peasant when the emigration agent calls, the artisan in a French provincial town whose industry is threatened by a new invention, all know that unless they find their way successfully among world-wide facts which reach them only through misleading words they will be crushed. They may desire to live the old life among familiar sights and sounds and the friends whom they know and trust, but they dare not try to do so. To their children, brought up in the outskirts of Chicago or the mean streets of Tottenham or Middlesborough, the old life will have ceased to exist, even as an object of desire. (pp. 3-5)

In the presence of mere stupid social inequality we feel comparatively hopeful. We can contrive schemes for dealing with rows of broken men waiting for the casual ward to open, or the dull fat women who pass in their uselessly efficient motor cars. But all our schemes involve an increase in the number of clerks and mechanics and teachers with no essential change in their way of life. Even the parks and picture galleries and libraries and the other mitigations of the new environment, for which during the rest of the year we are working and voting, seem to us, for the moment, to be tragically inadequate.

Those who have watched the more rapid change from the old to the new in the East describe themselves as having the same feeling in a sharper form. A Hindoo peasant, who exchanges the penury and uncertainty of village agriculture for the steadier work and better pay of a Bombay cotton factory, never looks, they say, as if he had thereby attained greater satisfaction for the inner needs of his nature. Lafcadio Hearn wrote in 1894, when the resolute determination of the Japanese to enter the Great Society was already beginning to take effect: "The new Japan will be richer and stronger and in many things wiser, but it will be neither so happy nor so kindly as the old." (Quoted in *Collier's Weekly*, March 7, 1910.) (pp. 7-8)

SOCIAL HERITAGE⁸⁴

Our nurture, may, again, be divided into two parts. The first part consists of that which each one of us acquires for himself, without learning it from other human beings. The second part con-

⁸⁴ Reprinted by permission from Graham Wallas, *Our Social Heritage*, Yale University Press, 1921.

sists of the knowledge and expedients and habits which were originally the personal acquisition of individuals, but which have been afterwards handed down from one generation to another by the social process of teaching and learning. It is this second part of our nurture which I shall call our "social heritage." (p. 14)

The process of social inheritance, is, as far as I know, not necessary for the existence of any wild non-human species or variety. The swallows, or the London rats, might, if they forgot all that they had learnt from their parents, sink, for a few generations, to one-half, or one-quarter, of their present numbers. But the most important and progressive of the human race would probably, if social inheritance were in their case interrupted, die out altogether. If the earth were struck by one of Mr. Wells' comets, and if, in consequence, every human being now alive were to lose all the knowledge and habits which he had acquired from preceding generations (though retaining unchanged all his own powers of invention, and memory, and habituation), nine-tenths of the inhabitants of London or New York would be dead in a month, and 99 per cent of the remaining tenth would be dead in six months. They would have no language to express their thoughts, and no thoughts but vague reverie. They could not read notices, or drive motors or horses. They would wander about, led by the inarticulate cries of a few naturally dominant individuals, drowning themselves, as thirst came on, in hundreds at the riverside landing places, looting those shops where the smell of decaying food attracted them, and perhaps at the end stumbling on the expedient of cannibalism. (pp. 15-16)

After a few years mankind would almost certainly disappear from the northern and temperate zones. The white races would probably become extinct everywhere. A few primitive races might live on fruit and small animals in those fertile tropical regions where the human species was originally evolved, until they had slowly accumulated a new social heritage. After some thousands of generations they would probably possess something which we should recognize as a language, and perhaps some art of taming animals and cultivating land. They might or might not have created what we call a religion, or a few of our simpler mechanical inventions and political expedients. They probably would not have re-created such general ideas as "Law," or "Liberty"; though they might have created other general ideas which would be new to us.

Man has been increasingly dependent on his social heritage since the beginning of conventional language and of the art of flint-chipping, that is to say, for perhaps half a million years. This fact has brought about important modifications in our biologically inherited nature. We have become biologically more fitted to live with the

help of social heritage, and biologically less fitted to live without it. We have become, one may say, biologically parasitic upon our social heritage. (pp. 16-17)

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY⁸⁵

Social psychology, as the writer conceives it, studies the psychic planes and currents that come into existence among men in consequence of their association. It seeks to understand and account for those uniformities in feeling, belief, or volition—and hence in action—which are due to the interaction of human beings, i. e., to social causes. No two persons have just the same endowment. Looking at their heredity, we should expect people to be far more dissimilar and individual than we actually find them to be. The aligning power of association triumphs over diversity of temperament and experience. There ought to be as many religious creeds as there are human beings; but we find people ranged under a few great religions. It is the same in respect to dress, diet, pastimes, or moral ideas. The individuality each has received from the hand of nature is largely effaced, and we find people gathered into great planes of uniformity.

In shifting attention from the agreements in which men rest, such as languages, religions, and cultures, to the agitations into which they are drawn, it is natural to change the metaphor from *plane* to *current*. The spread of the lynching spirit through a crowd in the presence of an atrocious criminal, the contagion of panic in a beaten army, an epidemic of religious emotion, and the sympathetic extension of a strike call up the thought of a *current*, which bears people along for a time and then ceases.

Social psychology differs from sociology proper in that the former considers planes and currents; the latter, groups and structures. Their interests bring men into cooperation and conflict. They group themselves for the purpose of cooperating or struggling, and they devise structures as a means of adjusting interests and attaining practical ends. Social psychology considers them only as coming into planes or currents of uniformity, not as uniting into groups. Since the former determine the latter more than the latter determine the former, social psychology should precede rather than follow sociology proper in the order of studies.

Social psychology pays no attention to the non-psychic parallelisms among human beings (an epidemic of disease or the prevalence of chills and fever among the early settlers of river-bottom lands),

⁸⁵ Reprinted by permission from Edward A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, Macmillan Company, 1908.

or to the psychic parallelisms that result therefrom (melancholia or belief in eternal punishment). It neglects the uniformities among people that are produced by the direct action of a common physical environment (superstitiousness of sailors, gayety of open-air peoples, suggestibility of dwellers on monotonous plains, independent spirit of mountaineers), or by subjection to similar conditions of life (dissipatedness of tramp printers, recklessness of cowboys, preciseness of elderly school teachers, suspiciousness of farmers).

Social psychology ignores uniformities arising directly or indirectly out of race endowment—negro volubility, gypsy nomadism, Malay vindictiveness, Singhalese treachery, Magyar passion for music, Slavic mysticism, Teutonic venturesomeness, American restlessness. How far such common characters are really racial in origin and how far merely social is a matter yet to be settled. Probably they are much less congenital than we love to imagine. "Race" is the cheap explanation tyros offer for any collective trait that they are too stupid or too lazy to trace to its origin in the physical environment, the social environment, or historical conditions.

Social psychology deals only with uniformities due to *social* causes, i.e., to *mental contacts* or *mental interactions*. In each case we ask, "Are these human beings aligned by their common instincts and temperament, their common geographical situation, their identical conditions of life, or by their *inter-psychology*, i.e., the influences they have received from one another or from a common human source?" The fact that a mental agreement extends through society bringing into a common plane great numbers of men does not make it social. It is social only in so far as it arises out of the interplay of minds.

Social psychology seeks to enlarge our knowledge of society by explaining how so many planes in feeling, belief, or purpose have established themselves among men and supplied a basis for their groupings, their cooperations, and their conflicts. But for the processes which weave into innumerable men certain ground patterns of ideas, beliefs, and preferences, great societies could not endure. No communities could last save those held together by social pleasure or the necessity for cooperation. National characteristics would not arise, and strife would be the rule outside of the group of men subject to the same area of characterization.

It seeks to enlarge our knowledge of the *individual* by ascertaining how much of his mental content and choice is derived from his social surroundings. Each of us loves to think himself unique, self-made, moving in a path all his own. To be sure, he finds his feet in worn paths, but he imagines he follows the path because it is the

right one, not because it is trodden. Thus Cooley⁸⁶ observes: "The more thoroughly American a man is, the less he can perceive Americanism. He will embody it; all he does, says, or writes will be full of it; but he can never truly see it, simply because he has no exterior point of view from which to look at it." Now, by demonstrating everywhere in our lives the unsuspected presence of social factors, social psychology spurs us to push on and build up a genuine individuality, to become a voice and not an echo, a person and not a parrot. The realization of how pitiful is the contribution we have made to what we are, how few of our ideas are our own, how rarely we have thought out a belief for ourselves, how little our feelings arise naturally out of our situation, how poorly our choices express the real cravings of our nature, first mortifies, then arouses us to break out of our prison of custom and conventionality and live an open-air life close to reality. Only by emancipation from the spell of numbers and age and social eminence and personality can ciphers become integers.

Social psychology falls into two very unequal divisions, viz., *Social Ascendency* and *Individual Ascendency*, the determination of the one by the many and the determination of the many by the one; the moulding of the ordinary person by his social environment and the moulding of the social environment by the extraordinary person. Thus the knightly pattern, the ideal of romantic love, the Westminster Catechism, and the belief in public education are at once achievements of superior persons, and elements in the social environment of innumerable ordinary persons. (pp. 1-5)

THE INDIVIDUAL⁸⁷

A separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when regarded as something apart from individuals. The real thing is Human Life, which may be considered either in an individual aspect or in a social, that is to say, a general aspect; but is always, as a matter of fact, both individual and general. In other words, "society" and "individuals" do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing, the relation between them being like that between other expressions one of which denotes a group as a whole and the other the members of the group, such as the army and the soldiers, the class and the students, and so on. This holds true of any social aggregate, great or small; of a family, a city, a nation, a race; of mankind as a whole; no matter how extensive, complex, or enduring

⁸⁶ *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 36.

⁸⁷ Reprinted by permission from Charles H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922.

a group may be, no good reason can be given for regarding it as essentially different in this respect from the smallest, simplest, or most transient. (pp. 36-37)

Of course, the view which I regard as sound, is that individuality is neither prior in time nor lower in moral rank than sociality; but that the two have always existed side by side as complementary aspects of the same thing, and that the line of progress is from a lower to a higher type of both, not from the one to the other. (p. 45)

PRIMARY GROUPS⁸⁸

By primary groups I mean those characterized by intimate face-to-face association and cooperation. They are primary in several senses, but chiefly in that they are fundamental in forming the social nature and ideals of the individual. The result of intimate association, psychologically, is a certain fusion of individualities in a common whole, so that one's very self, for many persons at least, is the common life and purpose of the group. Perhaps the simplest way of describing this wholeness is by saying that it is a "we"; it involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which "we" is the natural expression. One lives in the feeling of the whole and finds the chief aims of his will in that feeling.

It is not to be supposed that the unity of the primary group is one of mere harmony and love. It is always a differentiated and usually a competitive unity, admitting of self-assertion and various appropriate passions; but these passions are socialized by sympathy, and come, or tend to come, under the discipline of a common spirit. The individual will be ambiguous, but the chief object of his ambition will be some desired place in the thought of others, and he will feel allegiance to common standards of service and fair play. So the boy will dispute with his fellows a place on the team, but above such disputes will place the common glory of his class and school.

The most important spheres of this intimate association and cooperation—though by no means the only ones—are the family, the play-group of children, and the neighborhood, or community group of elders. These are practically universal, belonging to all times and all stages of development; and are accordingly a chief basis of what is universal in human nature and human ideals. The best cooperative studies such as those of Westermarck or Howard, show it to us as not only a universal institution, but as more alike the world over than the exaggeration of exceptional customs by an earlier school has led us to suppose. Nor can any one doubt the general preva-

⁸⁸ Reprinted by permission of the publishers from Charles H. Cooley's *Social Organization*, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.

lence of play-groups among children or of informal assemblies of various kinds among their elders. Such association is clearly the nursery of human nature in the world about us, and there is no apparent reason to suppose that the case has anywhere or at any time been essentially different. (pp. 23-24)

Primary groups are primary in the sense that they give the individual his earliest and completest experience of social unity, and also in the sense that they do not change in the same degree as more elaborate relations, but form a comparatively permanent source out of which the latter are ever springing. Of course they are not independent of the larger society, but to some extent reflect its spirit; as the German family and the German school bear somewhat distinctly the print of German militarism. (pp. 26-27)

To return to primary groups: the view here maintained is that human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a *group-nature* or *primary phase of society*, a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind. It is something more, on the one hand, than the mere instinct that is born in us—though that enters into it—and something less, on the other, than the more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that makes up institutions. It is the nature which is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family, the playground, and the neighborhood. In the essential similarity of these is to be found the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and sentiments in the human mind. In these, everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation. (pp. 29-30)

PLURALISTIC BEHAVIOR⁸⁹

Outside my window seven belligerent sparrows make a machine-gun din as they fight over a crust bequeathed to them by an unscientific philanthropist. While I watch them, a motorcycle policeman charging into the streets arrests a speeding automobile flying blue flags and laden with violets and girls. In two minutes the boy "bunch" of the block has assembled to learn whether the car will be permitted to go on to New Haven, in time for "the game."

Of occurrences fundamentally like these life consists. Living bodies "carry on" to sustain and to perpetuate themselves. On occasion they fight. Their activity is more, however, than a struggle for bare existence. It is an endeavor to enlarge life and to enrich

⁸⁹ Reprinted by permission from F. H. Giddings, *Studies in the Theory of Society*, Macmillan Company, 1922.

it. Conscious life is a struggle for satisfactions, including individuation, and for achievement.

Perpetuating itself, life multiplies itself, and the multiplication of individual lives complicates and intensifies the struggle for existence. The casualties are countless. The organisms that are most "fit," in the sense of being best adapted to their circumstances and best equipped to meet crises, survive. There is a natural selection.

The activity of a living body is reaction to stimulus, and reaction is behavior. (p. 249)

The sum of behavior is the total struggle for existence and achievement. By far the greater part of it consists of effort to meet instant needs. A lesser but large part consists of efforts to obtain desired but not imperative satisfactions. The remainder is a free expenditure, "for the fun of it," not at the moment productive, but tending always to become experiment, including exploration of the environment; and experiment leads to discovery, without which there could be no achievement.

In a world of limited inhabitable area the multiplication of individuals (whether cells or organisms), living by trial and error and tending to explore their environment, causes contacts and creates groupings of living units.

The earliest and simplest groupings are an incident of birth.

Usually an organism in its lifetime reproduces itself more than once. Until they scatter, plural offspring are in form a group. They share good and bad fortune. (p. 250)

Accordingly, the multiplication of lives not only intensifies the struggle of each individual for existence and complicates its condition; it also in certain instances creates for all or nearly all individuals of the kind a physically collective life, and in other instances it complicates and organizes behavior and creates for all or nearly all individuals of the kind a behavioristically collective life.

The behavior that constitutes the collective life of swarm, herd, pack, or community is pluralistic. Any one or any combination of behavior-inciting stimuli may on occasion be reacted to by more than one individual; as the bread crust is by the seven sparrows, and as the "cop" and the car are by the gangster boys of the block.

The reactions of the individual of a *plurel* to a stimulation common to them all in the sense that it reaches all may be similar or they may be dissimilar. To the same stimulus or to like stimuli like organisms normally react in like manner, as crows in the cornfield take wing at a gunshot and boys in the street run after the fire engine.

Alike or unlike, pluralistic reactions may be simultaneous or they may "string out" from prompt to dilatory. They may be substantially equal in strength, or unequal. They may be equally or unequally persistent.

Like acts by detached individuals may be competitive, or they may fall into combinations, as when animals in a pack follow the same quarry or beat off a common enemy. When it is often enough repeated, combined action becomes habitual group action.

Whether they are dissimilar or similar, rivalistic or combined, simultaneous or not, equal or unequal, pluralistic reactions to a common stimulation make a strictly individualistic struggle for existence impossible. Above all is this true of human struggle for achievement. It is a pluralistic struggle.

Pluralistic behavior, in distinction from individual behavior, has its own conditions, forms, and laws.

In early youth I often drove cattle on the highway, and I learned that the secret of keeping them moving in good form lay in the "crack" of the stimulus that I relied on. In later youth, conducting and teaching a rural school, I learned that there also one secret of orderly cooperation lay in the cogency of the stimulation applied. Whether physical, utilitarian, or moral, it must be adequate. From these experiences, however, I learned also another thing not less interesting. It was that the part played by resemblances (or differences) among nervous systems is always significant and may be determinative. Two or three unruly steers in a herd could tax the powers of any driver. Two or three conceited morons in a school could tax the ingenuity and the patience of any teacher.

These instances are not oddities; they are representative relations. Always the character of pluralistic reactions (as similar or dissimilar, simultaneous or not, equal or unequal) is determined by two variables, namely, (1) the strength of the stimulation, and (2) the similarity (or the dissimilarity) of the reacting mechanisms.

Pluralistic behavior is the subject-matter of the psychology of society, otherwise called sociology, a science statistical in method, which attempts, first, to factorize pluralistic behavior, and second, to explain its genesis, integration, differentiation, and functioning by accounting for them in terms of the variables (1) stimulation, and (2) the resemblance (more or less) to one another of reacting mechanisms.⁹⁰ (pp. 251-252)

⁹⁰ The psychology of society and social psychology are different things, as I pointed out in the article on "The Psychology of Society," in *Science*, Jan. 6, 1899. One is identical with sociology, the other is not.

PSYCHO-CULTURAL SOCIETY⁹¹

The further we get away from the animal plane, the less does a purely organic or biological way of looking at group life suffice. The human societies that we know are largely of cultural evolution, and human culture is essentially a psychic matter. As we have seen, the continuity which we find in human groups is a continuity maintained by passing on from generation to generation mental patterns—that is, knowledge, ideas, standards, and values—largely by means of language. These mental patterns have gradually accumulated and developed from primitive times to the present. They are a set of inner mental habits acquired in ever increasing complexity by each succeeding generation. They also become a set of objective customs and institutions. Thus human social life presents itself as a developing culture, and human history as a growing tradition, which cannot be understood apart from its content, that is, the concrete ideas, attitudes, and values which make up a particular culture.

This historical and cultural way of looking at human social life is often represented to be opposed to the psychological way, but this is surely a mistake. In its constituent elements culture is psychological, and in the last analysis comes from the individual mind. If culture be analyzed, as Professor Goldenweiser says in effect (Publ. of Amer. School. Soc. 1924), every element in it will be found to have had its beginning in the creative act of an individual mind. Nevertheless, in another sense culture is cumulative, historical, and extra-individual. It is absorbed by the individual, and thus shapes his nature and his behavior. Its carrier is, however, the group. It furnishes the pattern for human group organization and group behavior as well as for individual behavior. Thus many human groups are entirely products of culture. Even though communities are natural genetic groups, all human communities which we know have been profoundly modified by their cultures.

The cultural theory of human social life and the psychological are thus not opposed, except that the psychological is broader in its foundations and makes a place for the conception of social evolution as something broader than cultural evolution. While social life is modified by culture, it existed before culture began and is the carrier of culture. If we neglect that part of social evolution which is brought about through working of the factors in organic evolution—variation, heredity, and selection—then the social process pre-

⁹¹ Reprinted by permission from C. A. Ellwood, "The Cultural or Psychological Theory of Society," *Jour. of Applied Sociology*, Vol. X.

sents itself as a continuous adaptation and re-adaptation in the relations of one individual to another and to physical nature brought about by their mental processes. It is a behavior process mediated by interstimulation. The adaptations which persist in the group give rise to what we have termed group habits, also called folkways, which become crystallized into institutions of law, government, religion, morality, industry, and the like. These institutions mould the life and behavior of human groups. Accompanying them are, of course, uniform ways of thinking and feeling in the group passed along from generation to generation, which we term the tradition of the group, or the inner side of its culture. But all of this necessitates a continuous psycho-social process, a process of interstimulation and response among the individuals of the group. Social interaction, interstimulation, and response lie, therefore, at the basis of the cultural process and hence of the behavior of human groups and of the changes in their behavior.

Consequently, when we look at human society from the standpoint of its culture, that is, from the standpoint of its folkways, its mores, its traditions, its conventions, and its institutions, we are looking at it from an essentially psychological standpoint if we recognize that these things are essentially human behavior and are rooted in the psychic life and development of its individual members. This, we must do, unless we are to separate our whole view of human society from the rest of established scientific knowledge. We cannot view human culture as an abstraction apart from the rest of life. It is an outcome of the total life-processes of human groups. As soon as we recognize this the cultural view of human society blends with a broadly psychological view.

It is the contention of this book that the psychology of human society, in the sense of the study of human group behavior offers a scientific basis for the synthesis of the elements of truth in all contending theories of human society. It makes possible a true synthesis of the elements of truth in both the contract and organic theories, for example, because through the objective study of group behavior it makes possible a wider generalization which includes the facts in the social life which both have emphasized. The psychological theory of human social life is that its explanation is to be sought in three sets of facts: First, in the underlying traits and dispositions of men as furnished by organic evolution; second, in the influences of the environment, especially the psycho-social environment which acts upon the plastic natures of individuals; and third, in the resultant habits, attitudes, and values which individuals develop. (pp. 10-12)

The psychological theory of human society is that society is the behavior process which arises from living together. It is a process in which the psychic elements of impulse, habit, feeling, and ideation, and their social expressions in communication, imitation, suggestion, sympathy, and other types of mental interaction, function as the vital constituent elements. It is a process which becomes unified necessarily on its psychic not less than on its physical side. Because human group life is mediated by these psychic processes, it must be interpreted, if interpreted scientifically, in terms of these processes. That is, it must be interpreted in psychological terms. It is for this reason that the sociological theory of society coincides with the broadly psychological.

The psychological theory is often misrepresented to be the imitation-suggestion theory, the sympathy theory, or even as we have seen, the contract theory. Scientific psychology, however, takes into account not only the strictly psychic elements in human behavior, but also biological processes and environmental conditions. It takes account not only of the organism but of its environment. It would be absurd, therefore, to describe as a scientific psychological theory of human society a theory which is dominantly in terms of some one psychic element, such as imitation or sympathy, or even in terms of a whole class of psychic elements, such as the instincts or the intelligence. The psychological conception of society is a distinct conception, not to be confused with these one-sided conceptions, nor with the contract or organic conceptions. Like the organic conception it gives a fundamental place to organic factors, but unlike it, it gives a large and increasingly important place to psychic processes as we ascend in the scale of social evolution. The psychological view of the social life as essentially a collective behavior process mediated by conscious interstimulation and response furnishes, therefore, a basis for the synthesis of other theories, and so becomes itself the sociological view. It is a synthetic theory of the social process.

The psychological conception of human social life has more than a mere theoretical value. As soon as we understand that human life is a behavior process, we begin to understand how it may be modified. We understand that such a behavior process is not so much the result of inborn traits plus the influence of physical environment as of the mental patterns in the minds of the individuals of the group. We see that in almost every case these mental patterns have been embodied in customs, traditions, and institutions, and have been transmitted to the existing members of the group by previous generations. We see that these mental patterns have been acquired by the individuals of the group by a *learning process* and that, therefore, they can be modified through modifying the learning

process. Human institutions, sociology and psychology show, are in every case *learned* adjustments. Most group behavior, therefore, as well as the more highly conscious individual behavior, is learned. As such it can be modified, provided we can control the learning process. The social custom or tradition out of which an institution is formed is easily enough changed, provided we can effectively teach all concerned a better way, and provided also we can change those material conditions which support the institution and make it advantageous for individuals or a class of individuals to maintain it. This may be difficult to do in practice, but it has been done often enough in history, so that we have every reason to conclude that the social and institutional life of man is indefinitely modifiable, in the way of more rational adjustments to the requirements of social existence.

The problem of modifying the social life, according to the psychological view, is essentially a problem of modifying habits and beliefs in vast masses of individuals. This can be done most easily through the education of the young. The easiest approach to the modification of human society, therefore, is through making changes in the psycho-social environment or the culture of the group. While it is difficult to change this quickly, on a wide scale, it can be changed in small select groups, which become breeding places, so to speak, for new habits, ideas, and standards for the larger group. Thus, through the school and the church, it is possible to manipulate the ideas, attitudes, and values of individuals, especially the young. The rational direction of these in the individual can certainly be counted upon to change the whole mass of habits, social attitudes, customs, and institutions of the larger group, even of human society at large.

As soon as we perceive that the problem of modifying human society is a problem of modifying culture, we see that the limits of the possibilities of social change cannot be set. It is certain from anthropological science that human culture is still in its earlier stages of development. Civilization, in the sense of higher culture, is just beginning. When science has perfected our understanding of the principles of human psychology and sociology, especially when it has established a scientific sociology, the civilizing process will be rationally directed, and social progress will be beyond anything which the world now dreams to be practical. (pp. 14-16)

FORMATION OF PUBLIC OPINION⁹²

Irresponsible power is the antithesis of democracy. The power of the press is often regarded as the greatest of all powers in modern life. It is largely irresponsible. The production of the modern news-

⁹² Reprinted by permission from E. C. Hayes, "The Formation of Public Opinion," *Jour. of Applied Sociology*, Vol. X.

paper is necessarily a capitalistic enterprise and for that reason, as well as for others, the power of the press is in natural alliance with the power of wealth. It may even be regarded as one form of the power of wealth. And if the power of wealth absorbs the power of the press, then wealth, which has also many other forms of power, is the greatest of all powers.

It has only one rival, namely, the power of ideas, or of ideas and sentiments. The advancement of democracy depends upon the supremacy of this form of power. The power of ideas and sentiments may become tyrannical if the ideas and sentiments of only one class find free and adequate expression. But when all classes have adequate means of expression then this power cannot be tyrannical. Indeed, the rule of those ideas and sentiments which result from free discussion is the very ideal of democracy. If freedom in the form of public opinion be secured, then the facts become the decisive factor in argument.

The success of a democracy does not require that the average man shall be able to originate wise politics. If it did it would fail. It requires only that the average man shall be able to recognize what is good for him and for the society to which he belongs when he is clearly told. But he must be told. Those who speak in the interest of the majority and in the common interest of all must have adequate avenues of communication with the public if democracy is to succeed.

We have thrown off those forms of tyranny which were founded mainly upon physical force and this was a great advance. But we are far from having thrown off those forms of tyranny which are founded on the power of wealth, largely through control of the avenues of approach to the minds of men. This, too, must be thrown off in order that the third form of power—the power of ideas and sentiments that result from free discussion—may come into its own.

It was one great advance toward democracy when we provided for a free, universal, and secret ballot. And many think that this constitutes democracy. But it does not. Of what avail is it to provide for the free expression of public opinion unless we provide also for *the free formation of that public opinion which is to be expressed?* This is the next essential step in developing the technique of democracy. It is as essential as throwing off the tyranny of force, or as providing for free expression of public opinion through the ballot. Without solving this problem in the technique of democracy, democracy cannot be achieved.

By democracy we understand a social organization that is devised and administered in the interest of all who participate in the organization, in contrast with an organization that is devised and admin-

istered in the interest of the organizers. In the nature of things the organizers will organize in their own interest unless all the interests affected have a free medium of expression by which to appeal to the minds of their fellow citizens. And above all, those who speak not for particular interests but with vicarious regard for the interests of society as a whole and of all its members, must have free and adequate access to the minds of the citizens.

It is essential that the minds of the citizens in general shall be freely reached, not only by those who speak for a particular set of policies, or who appeal to a particular set of prejudices, but by the representatives of different parties who advocate the claims of conflicting interests and viewpoints. Otherwise, even if the writers of every interest, group, and party had adequate access to the minds of their own party and their own interest group, it still would be easy to convert society into a number of mob-minded divisions. Perhaps one should say rather that it will then be easy to continue the condition in which society is divided into a number of such mob-minded groups, save for a small minority of less mob-minded individuals. Even if all citizens are adequately supplied with the representations and misrepresentations, honestly intended but biased arguments and selections and portrayals of facts that come from their own party leaders, but say of the opposition paper—"I would not have it in my house," it is impossible to escape from this condition. This method will never secure that public opinion which results only from free and fair discussion and which is essential to the success of democracy.

It is as essential that democratic constitutions provide for the formation of public opinion as that they provide for the free expression of public opinion. And to achieve this end the constitutions of all our forty-eight states require amendment. Since the newspapers exercise so vast a power they should be held to corresponding responsibility. Since they are the public *par excellence*, they should be subject to a public regulation adequate to secure the public welfare. Pure food laws are as necessary and as thoroughly justified in respect to what the mind feeds on as in respect to what is put into our stomachs. Since the press enjoys so inestimable a privilege in its access to the mind of the public, it should be made to pay a franchise which will serve the purpose of the necessary control and make the press perform its indispensable function as a part of the technique of democracy. It should pay for its franchise, not in money, but in space. Every daily paper that enjoys more than a specified circulation should by constitutional amendment be required to place a certain amount of space in every issue at the disposal of

each of the four parties—whenever there are four—that cast the highest vote at the last State election.

Then each of these parties would employ the best talent it could command to plead its cause before the bar of public opinion. Lies would be exposed in the parallel column or in the next issue. Arguments would be answered. The man who could not have an opposition paper in his house would be led by curiosity and the zest of discussion to read what he found in his own paper representing unfamiliar points of view. The monopoly of access to the minds of men that wealth can command would be dissolved. It would cost the papers nothing. On the contrary they would get the best of matter without expense. And their interest and circulation would be increased. So also would be their power. But it would be a power, not for the promotion of privileged interests, not for befuddling and misleading the public mind by biased propaganda, but the power of fair play, of that free discussion which is the breath of life of democracy. And we should have taken a long step forward in the development of free institutions.

SOCIAL ATTITUDES AND VALUES⁹³

If social theory is to become the basis of social technique and to solve these problems really, it is evident that it must include both kinds of data involved in them—namely, the objective cultural elements of social life and the subjective characteristics of the members of the social group—and that the two kinds of data must be taken as correlated. For these data we shall use now and in the future the terms “social values” or simply “values” and “attitudes.”

By a social value we understand any datum having an empirical content accessible to the members of some social group and a meaning with regard to which it is or may be an object of activity. Thus, a foodstuff, an instrument, a coin, a piece of poetry, a university, a myth, a scientific theory, are social values. Each of them has a content that is sensual in the case of the foodstuff, the instrument, the coin; partly sensual, partly imaginary in the piece of poetry, whose content is constituted, not only by the written or spoken words, but also by the images which they evoke, and in the case of the university, whose content is the whole complex of men, buildings, material accessories, and images representing its activity; or, finally, only imaginary in the case of a mythical personality or a scientific theory. The meaning of these values becomes explicit when we take them in connection with human actions. The meaning of the food-

⁹³ Reprinted by permission from Thomas and Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Vol. I.

stuff is its reference to its eventual consumption; that of an instrument, its reference to the work for which it is designed; and that of a coin, the possibilities of buying and selling or the pleasures of spending which it involves; that of the piece of poetry, the sentimental and intellectual reactions which it arouses; that of the university, the social activities which it performs; that of the mythical personality, the cult of which it is the object and the actions of which it is supposed to be the author; that of the scientific theory, the possibilities of control of experience by idea or action that it permits. The social value is thus opposed to the natural thing, which has a content, but, as a part of nature, has no meaning for human activity, is treated as "valueless"; when the natural thing assumes a meaning, it becomes thereby a social value. And naturally a social value may have many meanings, for it may refer to many different kinds of activity.

By attitudes we understand a process of individual consciousness which determines real or possible activity of the individual in the social world. Thus, hunger that compels the consumption of the foodstuff; the workman's decision to use the tool; the tendency of the spendthrift to spend the coins; the poet's feelings and ideas expressed in the poem and the reader's sympathy and admiration; the needs which the institution tries to satisfy and the response it provokes; the fear and devotion manifested in the cult of the divinity; the interest in creating, understanding, or applying a scientific theory, and the ways of thinking implied in it—all these are attitudes. The attitude is thus the individual counterpart of the social value; activity, in whatever form, is the bond between them. By its reference to activity and thereby to individual consciousness the value is distinguished from the natural thing. By its reference to activity and thereby to the social world the attitude is distinguished from the psychical state. In the examples quoted above we were obliged to use with reference to ideas and volitions words that have become terms of individual psychology by being abstracted from the objective social reality to which they apply, but originally they were designed to express attitudes, not psychological processes. A psychological process is an attitude treated as an object in itself, isolated by a reflective act of attention, and taken first of all in connection with other states of the same individual. An attitude is a psychological process treated as primarily manifested in its reference to the social world and taken first of all in connection with some social value. Individual psychology may later re-establish the connection between the psychological process and the objective reality which has been severed by reflection; it may study psychological processes as conditioned by the facts going on in the objective world. In the

same way social theory may later connect various attitudes of an individual and determine his social character. But it is the original (usually unconsciously occupied) standpoints which determine at once the subsequent methods of these two sciences. The psychological process remains always fundamentally a *state of somebody*; the attitude remains always fundamentally an attitude *toward something*. (pp. 20-23)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The chief contribution that Cooley has made to sociologic thought.
2. The meaning of the statement: An individual has no separate existence.
3. The difference between self-consciousness and social consciousness.
4. The significance of the concept, primary group.
5. The importance of communication.
6. The disease of the century.
7. The superiority of public opinion to personal opinion.
8. The contribution of the masses to public opinion.
9. Reasons for the sometime failures of education.
10. The weakness of social stratification.
11. Cooley's attitude toward economic determinism.
12. The nature of social psychology according to McDougall.
13. The relation of instincts to social institutions.
14. Social psychology as conceived by Ross.
15. The distinctions between social ascendancy and individual ascendancy.
16. The two most difficult problems of social control.
17. The evils of too much control versus those of too little control.
18. Ossification versus individuation.
19. The checks upon the profits motive.
20. The stimuli of the profits motive.
21. The three canons of reconstruction, as stated by Ross.
22. The principle of anticipation.
23. The principle of simulation.
24. The principle of individualization.
25. The principle of balance.
26. The concept of the Great Society.
27. A major thought organization.
28. Three will organizations.

29. A happiness organization of society.
30. The origin of conscious social change.
31. The function of public opinion.
32. A major method of averting social revolutions.
33. The underlying problems of social control.
34. The most important profession in society.
35. The canon of pecuniary emulation.
36. The canon of pecuniary beauty.
37. The canon of conspicuous consumption.
38. The canon of conspicuous leisure.
39. The canon of leisure class conservatism.
40. The canon of pecuniary efficiency.
41. The canon of bellicoseness.
42. The canon of pecuniary education.
43. The canon of machine process thinking.
44. The instinct of workmanship.
45. Four prevailing ethical standards.
46. The rôle of social idealism as described by George Elliott Howard.
47. The meaning of the term, pluralistic behavior.
48. The formation of public opinion according to Hayes.
49. Distinctions between attitudes and values.
50. Current trends in social psychology.

CHAPTER XXIV

TREND OF APPLIED SOCIOLOGY

IN THE preceding chapters the discussions deal largely with the philosophic and psychologic phases of social thought. Another wide-sweeping field is that known under the loose title of applied sociology. Perhaps the first serious definition of applied sociology was given by Lester F. Ward. "Applied sociology is not government or politics, nor civic or social reform. It does not itself apply sociological principles; it seeks only to show how they may be applied. . . . The most that it claims to do is to lay down certain general principles as guides to social and political action."¹ Whereas pure sociology deals with facts, causes, and principles, applied sociology treats of the object, end, or purpose. One covers the subject matter of sociology; the other, its use. Applied sociology in short "deals with the artificial means of accelerating the spontaneous processes of nature."²

The hosts of persons who have been engaged in dealing directly with societal problems have learned valuable lessons from their personal experiences. Sometimes they have labored according to false theories; often they have scorned theories entirely. At the other extreme, the world has often accepted fine theories, but made a pitiable spectacle of itself in falling away from its idealistic professions.

SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY

As the term implies, applied sociology treats of techniques for improving the quality of human living. The best techniques have been developed experimentally, but

¹ Lester F. Ward, *Applied Sociology*, Ginn, 1906, pp. 9, 10.

² *Pure Sociology*, Ginn, 1903, p. 431.

Two schools of Sociology
Port- theories, observation & relationships of society

by persons who have combined a high estimate of social theory with practical programs of activity. The useful concept of social technology, a more accurate term perhaps than applied sociology, was given to society by Charles R. Henderson, whose balanced thinking, sane judgment, and important ameliorative activities made him in a sense the founder of this branch of sociological science. Dr. Henderson's name is also synonymous with a practical interpretation of both democracy and Christianity, with the spirit of vigorous yet kindly reformation in penology, with the concept of prevention in philanthropic endeavors, and with justice and love in all the fields of human achievement. There are many other important names in the list of those persons who helped to found social technology; for example, such individuals as Canon Barnett, Arnold Toynbee, Jacob Riis, Jane Addams, and many other social welfare saints.

POVERTY

Poverty and crime have been the two chief phenomena with which welfare work has been concerned. Until the present century the attempts to meet the problems of poverty have been largely remedial. Jesus said that the poor are always present in any age of society. St. Francis of Assisi, tiring of monastery life, sought out the poor in the natural walks of life, and dedicated himself in their behalf.

For centuries England has experimented with solutions for the problems of poverty and pauperism. She has learned that when she cares too assiduously for the poor she encourages the spirit of pauperism and increases the numbers of dependents. When she provided liberal aid for illegitimate children, she found illegitimacy was furthered.

England has had a series of important literary leaders who have interested themselves in behalf of the poor and outcast. Dickens drew minute word pictures of poverty. Carlyle, the iconoclast and individualist, pierced repeat-

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edly the shams of society which are partly responsible for the perpetual existence of social misery. In beautiful diction Ruskin spoke in behalf of social justice. In similar fields, France has her Hugo and Balzac; Germany, her Hauptmann; Russia, her Tolstoi and Gorky; Scandinavia, her Björnson, Ibsen, and Strindberg. Individuals of this type, however, cannot be considered social technologists. They have directed public opinion to specific social problems, but rarely offered technological programs of practical value.

Since 1900, the leaders in social technology, such as C. R. Henderson,³ Sidney and Beatrice Webb,⁴ and E. T. Devine,⁵ have made clear the specific conditions under which the poor may be permanently aided.⁶ Remedial care will always be necessary, but it must be offered in ways that will not encourage anyone to make a living by begging. The prevailing thought today regarding poverty is in terms of stimulation of personality. Persons are being shown how to make the necessary economic adjustments for themselves. Educational and personality adjustment processes are emphasized.

Above all else, social technology urges the establishment of justice in economic conditions. As shown in Chapter XIV, Henry George, in his *Progress and Poverty*, made a fundamental analysis of one set of causes of poverty, which he found in the unjust factors in the economic system. He showed how ownership in land may be traced back to force. Shall the first person who acquires a section of land be allowed to fence it in and to keep out all other persons unless they pay him a price that rises rapidly as the number of other persons increases?⁷ Why is there increasing

³ For example, see C. R. Henderson, *Modern Methods of Charity*, Macmillan, 1904.

⁴ See Webb, *The Prevention of Destitution*, Longmans, Green, 1912.

⁵ See Devine, *Misery and Its Causes*, Macmillan, 1913; also Devine, *The Principles of Relief*, Macmillan, 1904.

⁶ Also, see Amos G. Warner, *American Charities*, Crowell, 1919, 3rd edition.

⁷ Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, Doubleday, Page, 1916.

misery amid advancing wealth? The larger the city the greater the degree of squalor—this was George's perplexing observation. Material progress does not improve the condition of the lowest classes. Prosperity under the present economic system appears to be a heavy wedge driven into society. The persons who are below the line of cleavage are crushed down; those who are above this line are hoisted upward into positions of luxury and affluence.

Henry George, despite the large number of followers which his ideas have today, was probably in error in believing that taking the ownership of land out of the hands of individuals, through the method of the single tax, would prevent poverty. However, no one should overlook the fact that increasing land values often result from mere increase in population. Either the birth rate or immigration increases population and sends up land values, which in turn is accompanied by a rising scale of rents with an elevated cost of living and increased poverty.

Poverty is now being viewed as the result of social maladjustment. A wide range of historical institutions has developed to relieve poverty and pauperism. The special classes of dependents run the human gamut from homeless children to the homeless aged. The preventive agencies and methods include socialized neighborliness, socialized education, socialized religion.⁸ Research concerning poverty is now taking the form of case studies. This inductive, scientific gathering of data bids fair to produce a sociology of poverty of a new and fundamental character.⁹

The history of human thought concerning crime has run a vicissitudinous career. It was not until the days of John Howard and Beccaria that a truly scientific approach was made to the problem. John Howard (1726-1790), sheriff of Bedford, became interested in criminals. He visited

⁸ *Poverty and Dependency*, by John L. Gillin, Century Company, 1926, contains a comprehensive discussion of poverty in nearly all its main aspects.

⁹ See Queen and Mann's *Social Pathology*, T. Y. Crowell and Company, 1925.

jails throughout England. He traveled widely in Europe, usually at his own expense, studying the causes of typhus fever and endeavoring to effect a more humane treatment of offenders.

Beccaria (1735-1794), an Italian criminologist, published in 1764 a remarkable book, *Crimes and Punishment*. Beccaria protested against attempting to repress crime by the use of fear. Retaliation is an entirely inadequate motive for administering punishment. Torture is inhuman. Neither retaliation nor repression meets the problem. Reformation was the concept with which Beccaria startled Europe. Punishment should be administered so as to reform.

In modern days the name of Cesare Lombroso (1836-1909) stands out prominently in the field of criminology.¹⁰ Lombroso was a determinist, finding in heredity and environment all the causes of crime, and relieving the individual of moral responsibility. The mental defective, the alcoholic, the frantically angry are irresponsible for the crimes they commit. By defining one irresponsible group after another the Lombrosan school has practically included all individuals in this classification, leaving no one responsible for his conduct.

The remedy for crime, according to Lombroso and his followers, is found in society. Society is responsible for the criminal acts of its members. If society should surround all individuals from infancy with a favorable environment, then crime would end. In the writings of Garofalo, Ferri, de Quiros, Gross, and other Continental criminologists, a broader point of view is usually taken, making the responsibility for crime to rest on three factors, heredity, environment, and individual morality. The margin of choice, and therefore individual responsibility, is usually made very slender. European criminological experts, and even American writers, such as Parmelee, have

¹⁰ Lombroso, *Crime, Its Causes and Remedies*, Little, Brown, 1911.

commonly minimized the importance of moral character and the accountability of persons.

PUNISHMENT

In the United States the trend of interest has been penological. Since the days of William Penn, who had been a prisoner in England, American thought has centered on the problem of prison reform. Barrows and Brockway devoted their lives to the reorganization of prison procedure. Wines and Lane show lucidly the trend in penological thought, paying splendid tribute to the achievements of Z. R. Brockway in establishing the Elmira Reformatory (New York).¹¹

The fundamental principles of the Elmira procedure are as follows: (1) The average prisoner can be reformed. (2) Reformation of the prisoner is the duty of the state. (3) Prisoners must be considered as persons and accorded the treatment which each needs in order to bring him to a normal attitude of life. (4) The prisoner's reformation requires his own cooperation in the process. (5) The prison must have the power to lengthen or shorten the sentence according to the offender's stage of reformation. (6) The entire process of reformation is educational, giving the offender opportunity for psychical, mental, and moral growth. (7) Punishment for crime is administered in the discipline and labor, which are unremitting and exacting.

In recent years, Thomas M. Osborne has been developing the honor system and self-government among prisoners.¹² The idea is dramatized by Burleigh and Bierstadt in *Punishment*.¹³ The conception is that kindly administration and the personal touch of love will win the offender's heart and mind, and effect a reformation.

The last twenty years have seen a remarkable development of the concept of prevention of crime. This theory,

¹¹ Wines and Lane, *Punishment and Reformation*, Crowell, 1919, Ch. X.

¹² T. M. Osborne, *Society and Prisons*, Yale University Press, 1916.

¹³ Burleigh and Bierstadt, *Punishment*, Holt, 1916.

however, takes the problem back to pre-adult years, to the adolescent, to childhood, and even to the pre-natal years of the specific individual. The establishment of the juvenile court, with the success of Judge Ben B. Lindsay, has served to call attention to the fact that criminals are made as a rule before they reach the age of twenty-one.

The contributors to recent thought about delinquency, such as Jane Addams, Healy, Breckinridge and Abbott, W. R. George, Ben B. Lindsay, Mrs. Louise de Koven Bowen, Flexner and Baldwin, are pretty largely agreed that the causes of delinquency, and hence of criminality, are as follows: (1) The defective home—made defective by illness, poverty, shiftlessness, ignorance, immorality, desertion, divorce, death—is the leading causal element. Nearly all criminals begin their careers as disobedient sons. The growing disrespect for parents by children, the youth movement with its reversion to trial and error methods by each new generation, the failure of parents (particularly of overprivileged children) are tendencies requiring careful research. To act as though one could not learn from the experiences of past generations, to flaunt the concepts of self discipline and obedience entirely, to allow the desire for thrills to become the chief standard, to taboo morals and ideals—these current tendencies are by no means new. The results can be predicted.

(2) Emotional maladjustments are leading factors in delinquency. Abnormal environment pressures and inherited stresses unite to create unbalanced personalities. Childhood mistreatment leaves warped feeling tendencies. Diagnoses of emotional disturbances are proceeding apace and proving to be one of the most fruitful sources of understanding delinquency.

(3) Mental defectiveness often causes delinquency. The mentally defective child, if energetic, has great difficulty in withstanding the evil temptations of life. He or she has bodily passions that are further developed than the mental inhibitions. In this connection the public school

has an important function to perform in detecting mental defectives and in segregating them under special educational care. They should be segregated also by sexes, so that they may not reproduce their kind, and they should be kept under educational and institutional direction throughout their lives. They can be made useful and happy under a guarded environment.

(4) Civic neglect is a fourth cause of delinquency and crime. Young people are released from the public schools, often without proper home training and supervision, and drift about in a highly complex urban environment, full of commercialized and vicious devices for preying upon the curious and the unsuspecting. (5) Social injustice, for example, in industry, arouses feelings of hatred of class against class, and leads to criminal acts. (6) Moral thoughtlessness and religious indifference are common causes. A constructive moral and religious attitude gives wholesomeness and obedience in the home and a balanced expression of personality. A deep, constant, and abiding interest in public welfare is an invaluable preventive of sin, vice, and crime.

A growing conception relative to juvenile courts is that a considerable portion of the work that such courts are now called on to perform belongs to the public schools. The compulsory attendance, child welfare, and continuation school departments may well assume responsibility for and direction of many youth who now become court charges. It is urged that a fully organized procedure of constructive work and play activity under the supervision of the schools will greatly reduce juvenile delinquency.

"Delinquency" and "crime" are being supplanted as concepts by "behavior problems." The pioneer work of Dr. William Healy went far to treat personality problems in a scientific way. The life history and case study procedure of behavior problems separates the scientific from the moral aspects of behavior. The scientific procedure follows the established lines of the physician who treats dis-

ease not as a moral but as a natural phenomenon. Psychiatry seeks out emotional maladjustments and attempts to correct these—on the assumption that emotional troubles are at the center of behavior problems.

LABOR

In regard to labor problems, social technology has made notable contributions. Child labor is a term which refers to the employment of adolescent children for wages, when such children are thereby deprived of normal opportunities of mental and physical growth. Children should learn to work, even at unpleasant tasks, but when at an early age they are taken out of or quit school and become gainfully employed, they are deprived of a normal adolescence; they and society both lose.¹⁴

The problem of women in industry is due to the migration of millions of women from the home into industry. While women are entitled to equality of opportunity with men, they are often unmindful that constitutionally they are not fitted to perform all the tasks that men are doing; that if they fail in the bearing and rearing of children rationally, the race dies; and that, if they neglect to make the home attractive, the family as an essential social institution is undermined.

The labor problem, when applied to men, brings forth a multiplicity of contradictory opinions. The idea of industrial democracy is the storm center. While praising modern capitalism for its stimulus to initiative and for its large-scale enterprises that have been highly beneficial in many ways, the social technologist pronounces modern capitalism undemocratic. He declares that it must purge itself or be supplanted by another industrial order; it must take cognizance of social changes and adjust itself accordingly or be routed.

Sharing of management is a rapidly developing concept. Only a small percentage of employees are willing to as-

¹⁴ See G. B. Mangold, *Problems of Child Welfare*, Macmillan, 1924.

sume such responsibility; a still smaller percentage is prepared. Still, these facts are quite natural and do not disprove the validity of management sharing. Time, experience, and experiment will be the main criteria of its efficacy.¹⁵

The injustice in modern capitalism is often stressed in social technologic thought. Only one factor, wealth, is represented in the management of business. The skilled or unskilled laborers, often "the hardest working partners" in the business, are not represented. Labor and capital must both have representation on boards of directors, if capitalism is to prove that it is not undemocratic.¹⁶

Tripartite management of industry is a current phase of industrial thought. Where employers and employees have reached a common ground of cooperation, they have often joined forces in collusion against the public and the consumer. The employer agrees to a rise in wages for the employee, and the employee to an increase in dividends, providing he receives a portion of the added returns—meanwhile the public is apathetic or rages impotently. The best thought today is urging that on boards of directors and managers all three interested parties shall have representation, namely, labor, capital, and the public.

It is a current opinion that the failure of capitalism to democratize itself will result in the rise of socialism by revolutionary means. If capital with its one-sided control of industry is supplanted by labor with another type of control, it is doubtful how much will be gained. The labor standard is manifesting itself as a class standard, and at times arbitrarily. To have society controlled by labor standards, no matter under what form of socialism they may appear, will not guarantee progress. The labor classes, the capitalist classes, the professional classes—all must rule, and cooperatively for the welfare of society.

¹⁵ See *Sharing Management with the Workers*, Russell Sage Foundation, 1924, by Ben M. Selekman.

¹⁶ A. W. Small, *Between Eras, From Capitalism to Democracy*, Inter-Collegiate Press, 1913.

The current socialist thought ranges from a radical dictatorship of the proletariat to a conservative state socialism, like that advocated by John Spargo. Bolshevism has the earmarks of class autocracy. On the other hand, it is not clear that state socialism, with its governmental control of interest-producing capital and rent-producing land, will best guarantee progress. The socialization of human beings is an indispensable prerequisite to industrial progress.

The tendency is toward the elimination of profitism. This negative thought, it is claimed, will relieve capitalism of its worst evils, and allow the educational process of socializing individuals to go forward.

The concept of social insurance has been given a remarkable reception since 1882. Social insurance was introduced as a means of pacifying labor and of making it contented under the rule of capitalism. It was admitted into governmental economy by Bismarck as an agency of forestalling socialism. It spread rapidly. It has met with two setbacks. (1) In the first place it has acquired such momentum that capitalism sees it as the entering wedge of a genuine socialism. (2) In the second place, social insurance is guaranteeing so much security to the workman that he is constrained at times to sacrifice his initiative and even to become shiftless, saying in effect to himself, "I'll be taken care of anyway." It is this second type of antagonistic thought that indicates a real weakness in social insurance. It would be better to have a society in which the workingmen as a class would have an ample opportunity of caring for, and be stimulated to care for, their own old age and for periods of disability. For the individual exceptions, special provisions could be made.

The unemployment problem has produced many reform theories. Unemployment insurance, now being made the subject of experiment, is probably not reaching the main causes. The causal factors are many and deep seated; they range from individual shiftlessness and mental de-

fectiveness on one hand, to economic injustice and social callousness on the other.¹⁷ The prevailing thought urges a more efficient training of the individual; the increasing of the workman's opportunity to enlarge his personality through each day's work; the development of industrial democracy and justice; and a complete socialization program.

THE FAMILY

Another set of problems concerning which applied sociology is endeavoring to find solutions relates to the family, feminism, marriage, divorce, and housing. Professor George Elliott Howard¹⁸ and Dr. Edward Westermarck¹⁹ have traced the development of the family and marriage throughout human history. The primitive relationships between sexes have been described by many anthropological writers. A history of the American family has been written by A. W. Calhoun.²⁰ Single volume treatments of the family as a social institution have been made by Bosanquet²¹ and Goodsell.²² These works essentially agree that the family is an evolutionary product, that the primitive family centered about the mother and child, that patriarchalism introduced a high degree of masculine arbitrariness, and that the family is at present undergoing marked changes whereby the spirit of democracy is gaining ground.

In the new-found spirit of freedom, woman has sometimes been captivated by the desire to follow man into all the man-made occupations. Sex nature predestines woman to the chief occupation or profession of all, that of

17 See W. H. Beveridge, *Unemployment*, Longmans, Green, 1912.

18 George Elliott Howard, *A History of Matrimonial Institutions*, University of Chicago Press, 1904.

19 Edward Westermarck, *History of Human Marriage*, Macmillan, 1902.

20 A. W. Calhoun, *A Social History of the American Family*, Clark, 1917-1919.

21 Helen Bosanquet, *The Family*, Macmillan, 1915.

22 Willystine Goodsell, *A History of the Family as a Social and Educational Institution*, Macmillan, 1915.

motherhood. For woman to rush headlong after men into industry may turn out to be not liberty, but license and deterioration. Current social thought protests vigorously against the idea of women being household drudges, and also against women wasting their time in pluming themselves or in idling away their days in dolls' houses, while being supported as dependents of men. Women are entitled to learn vocations and to live constructive lives, in an atmosphere of the largest possible freedom consistent with the development of themselves and the race. On the other hand, any movement which weakens the home as a societary training institution apparently defies the laws of social advance.

The movement to give a scientific basis to the family has given attention to budgeting. Engels was the founder of this procedure; his studies are still important. Engels' studies of family budgets led him to draw certain average observations. These "averages" are known as Engels' laws, for example: (1) The smaller the income, the larger the percentage of expenditure for food. (2) The percentage of expenditure for clothing, and for lodging or rent, varies directly with the income. (3) The larger the income, the larger the percentage of expenditures for sundries (including luxuries).

The housing problem is provoking urgent thought. With the rise of large cities the economic order favors exorbitant land values and extraordinarily high rents. The social increment goes into the hands of the few. The flat and apartment house life often favors pet bulldogs rather than children, and decreases the efficiency of the home as a social institution. These untoward tendencies, furthermore, are supplemented by an attitude of more or less helpless apathy on the part of the public.

Another field of applied sociologic thought is represented by the terms, race problems, immigration, and naturalization. These concepts are all outgrowths of the population concept which has been treated in an earlier chap-

ter. The human race with its common origin has subdivided and wandered into all the inhabitable parts of the globe. Climate, geography, and social environment have operated to make the race subdivisions distinct and discriminatory. Race pride and prejudice have raised impassable race barriers.

Social research is beginning to attack race problems from new angles. Racial research is investigating "the problem which arises from the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of peoples of a markedly different racial type, as well as standards of living, entering freely and without conflict, into the competitive cooperation of an individualistic and democratic society; that is to say, a society in which there are no generally recognized castes or class distinctions by which free competition is restricted. Competition is used here broadly to include not mere economic competition but competition in the indirect sense of that word—the struggle for existence of races and peoples."²³ By securing life histories of those participating in race conflicts and by ecological studies it is becoming possible for the first time to understand the nature of race problems.

In the United States the leading race problem involves the Negroes. Booker T. Washington²⁴ urged that if the Negro shows himself industrially efficient and morally worthy, the prejudice against him will disappear. W. E. B. DuBois²⁵ asks that the prejudice against the colored race by the white race be removed in order that the Negro may have a fair chance to show himself capable. The Southern white people declare that the colored people must be segregated on a lower plane than that occupied by the white race. Northern people assert that the trouble lies chiefly in an undemocratic attitude of Southern white peo-

²³ Robert E. Park, "A Race Relations Survey," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, VIII: 197.

²⁴ Booker T. Washington, *Up from Slavery*, Doubleday, Page, 1901.

²⁵ W. E. DuBois, *Darkwater*, Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920.

ple toward the colored race. Thus the currents of thought concerning the Negro come into conflict, but without forming a common current of action.

Another phase of the race problem is conveyed by the concept of hyphenated interests. The Americanization movement has assumed momentum because of the need for a more unified spirit within the nation. Although some of the promoters of Americanization have used autocratic means, the opinion is gaining ground that the transference of the loyalty of the immigrant from his home country to his adopted country can best be effected by treating the immigrant sympathetically and democratically in all his contacts—industrial, social, political—with the people of our land. Americanization, Italianization, Russianization are all phases of assimilation. But assimilation cannot be forced. It is largely an unconscious social process, induced by “favorable” social stimuli. By making possible superior living conditions, superior working conditions, superior conditions for personality growth for immigrants they will unconsciously develop new loyalties of the best types.

OTHER SOCIAL THOUGHT TENDENCIES

The public health movement has acquired force because of the belief that only public and widespread action can remove many of the causes of disease. Tuberculosis, for example, is a disease that is caused by a microscopic germ which thrives and multiplies in the tissues of susceptible and weakened organisms. Tuberculosis and unsanitary housing conditions flourish together. The individual is often helpless, but the thought is now well grounded that public action can stamp out the breeding places of the tubercle bacilli and relieve the country of the white plague. An improved economic and educational status for the unskilled laborer and his family would also help to improve the health level of the country. Current social thought supports the contention that the real work of a physician is

to keep people well rather than to cure them after they have fallen seriously ill. Preventive medicine and the public health movement are strongly urged by social technology.

Another phase of applied sociology of current significance is indicated by the term, community organization.²⁶ The idea of this movement originated in the failure of people to develop a democratic consciousness. Community organization in one sense refers to attempts of communities to organize themselves for neighborhood efficiency. When a community organizes its own recreations and amusements, it functions in two important directions: (1) It supplants commercialized amusements, operated for profit and often on a socially destructive basis, by community recreation, maintained by the people themselves in socially constructive ways and at a minimum of expense. (2) In participating in and building up community enterprises such as community recreation, the people of the community develop a cooperative democratic consciousness. The problem of the use of leisure time is growing in proportion to the extent that the laboring classes are winning a shorter work day. In addition to community recreation, community health movements, community newspapers, community cooperative stores, community committees for securing needed legislation and for breaking the force of economic monopoly, are attracting widespread attention. The social unit and the block system of community service, are terms which indicate variations of the community organization concept, originally a product of the need of meeting the leisure time problem constructively with the very important result of re-creating democracy.

Community in a real sense refers to as large a number of people as have a common understanding and feeling on any given point. One's community thus extends as far

²⁶ J. F. Steiner, *Community Organization*, Century, 1925; J. K. Hart, *Community Organization*, Macmillan, 1920.

as his voice and word are heard and readily understood or responded to.

By the same token, community organization is to be looked upon as "an essential and continuous part of the social process, and not merely as an administrative device."²⁷ Community organization is a phase of social change and to a large extent "goes on without conscious or at least intelligent direction"—it "does not become a matter for public consideration until the maladjustment of groups leads to community disorganization and makes effective and united action impracticable."²⁸ The different community organizations of the unskilled Chinese, Mexican, Japanese immigrants in the United States when compared with each other and with American community organization are significant. The first has a family-clan-village type of community organization; the second an unorganized simple peon community; the third, a feudalistic-bureaucratic. American community organization is industrial-individualistic.²⁹ A mere statement of these facts makes clear why racial, political, and other social misunderstandings may easily arise and are potentially present at all times.

In recent years social case work has acquired an important rank in the field of applied sociology. Social reform deals with methods for improving the whole mass of persons and for raising the level of the entire group; social case work on the other hand stimulates individuals to improve the quality of their lives, to adjust themselves more adequately to their environment, and to transform their environments. Social case work insists that sound social reforms can be effected only on the basis of first-hand experiences with the needs of individuals who are the victims of social imperfections or their own shortcomings. Social

²⁷ J. F. Steiner, *ibid.*, p. 327.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Chapter X, "Analyzing Community Organization and Opinion," *The New Social Research*, by E. S. Bogardus, Jesse Ray Miller, 1926.

work with persons has provided a body of specific facts of first magnitude as a foundation for measures of social amelioration and progress; it has mirrored life which is under the harrow of circumstances; it has portrayed life where living conditions are harshest.

Social work is now emphasizing "the person." "The person is an individual who has status. We come into the world as individuals. We acquire status and become persons."³⁰ To help people acquire status and become persons, or to regain status and become persons again is the main function of social work.

Applied sociology represents methods of social attack. It furthers progress by planning for society on the basis of past societal experiences and current facts and tendencies. It fulfills the demands of social telesis.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF DELINQUENCY³¹

Sociology is now undergoing a transformation like that which has almost completely changed psychology from metaphysics to an experimental science. From a philosophy of society sociology is emerging into a science of society. Consequently the interest of the new sociology is now turned to defining the experimental point of view, to classifying problems for investigation, and to developing a technique of research.

Not only criminality, but all social problems, indeed the entire area of group behavior and social life, is being subjected to sociological description and analysis. The person is conceived in his interrelations with the social organization, with the family, the neighborhood, the community, the society. Explanations of his behavior are found in terms of human wishes and social attitudes, mobility and unrest, intimacy and status, social contacts and social interaction, conflict, accommodation and assimilation.

The study of the delinquent as a person opens up a fertile field. Materials in the form of case-records, personal documents, and life histories, are now available for analysis. Psychiatry and psychology

³⁰ Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, University of Chicago Press, 1921, p. 55.

³¹ Reprinted by permission from E. W. Burgess, "The Study of the Delinquent as a Person," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXVIII.

in attacking the problem of the criminal from the standpoint of individual behavior have made contributions of high value, which have prepared the way for sociological research. The psychiatric, psychological, and sociological methods of investigation are not in conflict with each other but rather complementary and interdependent. The sociologist will continue to rely upon the findings of these other sciences of behavior for a knowledge of individual differences in mentality and temperament, while they in turn will be disposed to look to sociology for light upon the adjustment of the person in the social organization.

In conclusion, the point may be raised that this article deals with the sociology of personality rather than of delinquency. The criminal, however, is first of all a person, and second a criminal. Therefore, it is well to study him primarily as a person and secondarily as an offender against the laws of organized society. The basic fact to an understanding and control of the criminal seems to be that the lawbreaker is a person, that is, an individual with the wishes common to all human beings and with a conception of his rôle in group life. (pp. 678-680)

In sociology the distinction is now clear between the individual and the person. The study of the individual, of the reaction of the organism to its environment, falls in the fields of psychiatry and psychology. The study of the person, the product of social interaction with his fellows, lies in the domain of sociology. Park thus defines the person:

The person is an individual who has status. We come into the world as individuals. We acquire status and become persons. Status means position in society. The individual inevitably has some status in every social group of which he is a member. In a given group the status of every member is determined by his relation to every other member of that group. Every smaller group, likewise, has a status in some larger group of which it is a part and this is determined by its relation to all the other members of the larger group. (pp. 662-663)

Among the types of mutation of status, the simplest example is perhaps that caused by movement, as by change of residence. Moving from one group in order to acquire a new status is a familiar fact. A person who has lost status in his home town by failure, misconduct, or crime, may take refuge in a distant community "to make a fresh start" or "to begin life over again." Healy found, in cases of delinquent children, that a change of neighborhood by the family was correlated with a high ratio of success in reformation.

The person, as previously defined, is the individual with status. Personality may then be regarded as the sum and coordination of those traits which determine the rôle and the status of the individual in the social group. Certain traits of the individual—as his physique, mentality, and temperament—definitely affect his social standing.

Primarily, however, his position in the group will be determined by personal relations such as his group participation, his character, his personal behavior pattern, and his social type. The following outline offers a scheme for studying behavior in terms of individual and personal traits. (pp. 664-665)

The threefold division of personal behavior patterns into objective or direct, introspective or indirect, psychopathic or perverse, is one made tentatively by the writer of this article. These differential types of behavior are not personality, and are not even the spontaneous expressions of temperament, or other traits of human nature. They seem to be what the general term personal behavior patterns implies, namely, characteristic types of the behavior of the person fixed in the matrix of social relations in infancy and childhood. Naturally original differences in mentality, in temperament, and in volition enter into the determination of the form of personal behavior patterns, but their organization and fixation occur in social interaction.

Mentality, affectivity, temperament, and will are not uninfluenced by social experience. They are all more or less profoundly modified by education and social contacts. But personal behavior patterns like egocentrism, instability, and secretiveness take form and become fixed in the social interactions of the family and the play group. These personal patterns of behavior are not biologically transmitted as temperament seems to be. Nor are they derived by imitation of others as is the social type or the philosophy of life of the person. The personal reaction of the individual to his social world is the resultant of the play of social forces in infancy and early childhood. Whether the fixed responses of the person to his social environment will be in the main (a) direct, (b) indirect, (c) or perverse are apparently determined by the rôle which he assumes, or which is forced upon him in his earliest social interactions. In the molding of a social type of personality and in the acceptance of a philosophy of life the influence of the group is definitely exerted. At the same time, the social copies which the person takes for models appear to him to be but the realization of his most ardent wishes. (pp. 667-668)

The status of the person in the social group is in the last analysis a matter of social attitudes: (a) the individual's conception of his own rôle, and what is even of greater significance (b) the attitudes toward him of the fellows in his group, of the community and of society.

This complex of the attitudes of others toward one is subject to change. These changes may be gradual or abrupt. Gain or loss of status is naturally of absorbing interest to the person. Since all of

us begin life as infants, and since in some one trait at least, if not in many, every one of us is surpassed by his fellows, it is inevitable that consciousness of inferiority is a universal experience. The inferiority complex tends to become organized about deficiency in a characteristic that has a value in the group which constitutes the social world of the person. The possession of this trait gives superior status to the group. Adler in *The Neurotic Constitution* analyzes the phenomena of compensation in instances of conditional or psychogenic inferiority. (pp. 671-672)

Status, as has been indicated, is to be studied from the standpoint of social attitudes, social forces, and social processes. Wholesome conditions of normal social development require a congenial social world in which the wishes of the person find expression. The attempt at absolute suppression of the wishes tends to their expression in perverted form. The technique of social work devised from the common-sense observation of a situation has too often lacked the refinement requisite for adaptation to differences in folkways and mores, for detection of subtle personal attitudes, or for appreciation of the surging and changing wishes of the person. The kind of sympathetic insight which literature gives into the manifold expressions of human nature so perplexing in their multitudinous superficial variations, so alike in their fundamental simple patterns does not come from the typical training in the narrow routine of the principles of case-work. Too often the "blame" is placed by the social agency upon the refusal of the person or of the family to cooperate in spite of the many "good chances" offered. In the case of a delinquent girl who was said by a welfare agency to have as many chances "to reform" as any girls in its history, a sympathetic analysis clearly proved that not a single one of the alleged "good chances" afforded a real opportunity for reformation. The following case is a telling illustration of the difference between the surface and the reality of a so-called "good" environment for a delinquent girl. (p. 674)

A final case deals with a situation which becomes significant when the career of a delinquent is considered as a person and not as an individual. Sudden loss of status, or "the collapse of one's social work" is perhaps the greatest catastrophe in the life of the person. Few persons ever recover, or in slang parlance "come back," after a complete loss of status. (p. 677)

SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL DISTANCE³²

All social problems may be thought of in terms of social distance, and applied sociology in terms of the principles involved in the necessary decreasing of social distance. Social distance accounts for

³² Reprinted from E. S. Bogardus, *The New Social Research*, Jesse Ray Miller, Los Angeles, 1926. Excerpt especially revised for reprinting in this book.

the rise of misunderstandings and hence for the real underlying factors which create social problems. The capitalist in denouncing the labor unionists displays social distance traits. The wealthy landlord condemning the tenants of his unsanitary and congested tenements is maintaining social distance. The survey of any untoward conditions, no matter how objective and concrete, such as the wage problem, strikes, race prejudice, juvenile delinquency, requires an analysis of the social distances involved before the situation is fully understood. *In fact, the analysis of social distance in all of its personal aspects usually makes clear why any given problem exists.*

In race relations problems people generally express an increasing degree of misunderstanding and prejudice, as social distance becomes greater. English, Scotch, Welsh, for example, put their own races near the top of the "friendly" column, and Orientals at the bottom. Orientals likewise put Orientals high, and Nordics low. Boys in trouble put members of the "gang" high and teachers low. At every turn social distance is a vital factor.

Illustrations of the relation of social distance and social problems may be drawn from our race relations studies. Race conflicts, like other conflicts, are characterized by adverse personal reactions of either one or both parties to the conflict. To understand these adverse personal reactions is to understand the social distance which accounts for the existence of the given problem.

1. The first and largest grouping of materials offered by life history data of the persons expressing the greatest social distance reactions is composed of tradition and accepted opinion. It is clear after reading the data that hearsay evidence coming from both one's personal friends and from relative strangers in one's own "universe of discourse" who possess prestige in one's eyes is widely influential in creating social distance.

The person giving the second-hand hearsay racial reports has usually entered *imaginatively* into them so often and so thoroughly that they seem to have become his own personal experiences. Three large chances for error enter into these handed-down traditions and opinions, namely: (1) the possibility of erroneous observations in the first places; (2) the likelihood of errors creeping into the repeating of these statements, and (3) the probability of entering into them imaginatively from one's own peculiar biases and experiences rather than from the viewpoint of the persons about whom they center. It is factors such as these which rule hearsay evidence out of civil and criminal courts; and yet, in studying the origins of race antipathy it appears that handed-down traditions and opinions greatly predominate.

"When I was a young child my father one night at the dinner table spoke of some of the cruel practices of the Turks, which made a deep impression on me and perhaps started my aversion to the race.

"Another thing is a picture in a book of my father's, in which a Turk is selecting a woman for his harem. His prejudiced attitude of explanation together with the picture made a lasting impression on me.

"In studying geography in school I learned of the Turks' attitude toward women and this caused me to hate the race. In history classes in high school I studied the Crusades and the Turks' cruelty impressed me. Later I have read of the terrible massacres the Turks have committed.

"Parent, teacher, and reading are the main sources of my hatred of the Turk."

"All my store of unpleasant reactions against the Turks is not based on any personal knowledge of them. I do not even know a representative of this people; never have glimpsed a Turk in gentle or savage mood, never, except in imagination. But I have much second-hand knowledge. I have derived it from the lurid headlines of newspapers, from magazine articles on revelations of pseudo-political intrigue, from the stories dealing with the exotic life behind the mysterious veil and barred window. In church I have heard of Turkish atrocities to helpless missionaries. I have heard of the Turkish aversion to our culture and ideals talked of at dinner, at club meetings, and on the street. Nowadays I hear of the young Turk, with his intellectual veneer but who is the same unspeakable old Turk underneath."

2. Unpleasant sense impressions *personally experienced* in *childhood* and *adolescence* are many. Sometimes *fear* is aroused; and again, *disgust*. *Fear* is the more dynamic and predominant factor. In either case there is a sensory image that is often described as "horrifying." The fact that these images were experienced in childhood gave them a more or less permanent character.

"We lived in a town in the Middle West. My father was having some improvements made about our residence and hired a negro to do the work. This negro was an old darkey of perhaps fifty-odd years. He lived alone, in a little shack on the outskirts of town. We children always called him 'nigger Martin' and our older brothers and sisters used to use this name when they wanted anything done. 'Nigger Martin will get you if you aren't good' meant more than words to us.

"The negro Martin was digging a large ditch around our house. Of course, child fashion we were there and observed everything

that went on. After awhile it became tiresome to us so we thought we'd have some fun. As he threw up shovelfull after shovelfull of dirt we picked up pieces of dirt and threw at him. He became angry (I don't blame him) and told us that if he ever caught us we'd 'catch it.' We ran and did not bother him again.

"The next day he came and continued the work. We came to watch, and without the slightest warning he grabbed me into the ditch. I was frightened and I cried and screamed while the others went to tell father. When he came and 'saved' me I was a most happy but frightened girl. The name 'nigger' of any sort always frightened me from that day on. That incident and all our training about the negro has naturally made me dislike and fear them."

"When I was about eight years old I went for a hike in the hills and on returning I had to pass through some Chinese vegetable gardens where a Chinese was seemingly picking strawberries. When I came along he jumped out and grabbed at me, but I started running with him running close after me. He yelled something at me in Chinese. Finally I reached home, but ever after that I have been much afraid of Chinese."

3. Unpleasant race impressions *personally experienced* in *adulthood* are also common. As a rule the anti-racial attitudes in these cases represent a generalization of experiences with a few individuals of the specific race. Although there may be a recognition that the given experiences have been related to the less socially developed members of the race in question or from non-typical individuals, the aversion is likely to spread to the whole race. Adult experiences show a reversal of emphasis when compared with childhood reactions. *Disgust* is the prevailing emotion experienced, although *fear* may be aroused.

"'Let the Chinese be damned of body and soul' has been the byword of the English toward my innocent people for more than half a century. Although one of the oldest and outstanding Christian nations of the world, she has poisoned the body and mind of a generation of Chinese through the opium traffic. She is continuing this treachery today with greater effort. This is unthinkable; that a God-fearing, out-and-out Christian nation is peddling a drug of that nature in this day and age. I cannot tolerate hypocrisy in any individual; then should I tolerate a nation as such? Decent society outlaws dope peddlers; therefore decent civilization in like manner should outlaw nations as such."

It is to be noted first of all that social contacts do not necessarily eliminate social distance, and that intimacy today is no guarantee of intimacy tomorrow. Intimacy may be followed by distance

and antipathetic feelings. This is the main difference between neutral social distance and antipathetic distance — the former is not preceded by social contacts and intimacy while the latter may be so preceded.

The fact that race antipathy is often preceded by two or three outstanding unfavorable experiences is interesting because these experiences are usually accompanied by powerful sense impressions and strong emotional reactions of fear, disgust, or repulsion. Touch, smell, sight, and even taste appear in race aversion. "Touching phobia" is especially interesting. The physiological bases require further investigation.

In many instances of aversion the primary reaction is not a desire to be heartless, but a seeking to maintain "distance." A person may fail to enter sympathetically into another's mood. He does not know and perhaps does not care what the other person is thinking about. He may even think in effect: "How dastardly are people who have different views from my own; they ought to be stamped out." This is social distance. In other words, as Dr. R. E. Park has stated, "society begins where you care about the presence of other people, where their attitudes have a significance for you. Social distance, in the particular sense, measures in other words the extent to which you are disposed to treat others personally."

"Social" becomes related to "distance" when personal relations exist. "If I am perfectly naïve with regard to the attitude of the other person, or if I am indifferent then the distance between us is very great. Social distance may be thought of in terms of social contacts. Where there are no social contacts of any kind whatever, complete isolation exists, and the social distances are indeterminable. Where the simplest perception by one individual of another individual exists, the distance, is great, but where this perception passes into communication of feelings, sentiments, and ideas then social distance becomes greatly shortened. The greater the *intimacy of association the shorter may be the social distance*. But intimacy is no guarantee that social distance will remain short. It may be followed by mutual disgust and open hostility. Closeness of social contact makes possible either the growth of good will or of ill will. Increasing attraction or repulsion may be the outcome.

Social distances are of two kinds. One is due to absence of perception and communication. The other is a recoil from acquaintance and intimacy in which differences in attitudes, sentiments, and beliefs were discovered and in which conflicts developed. Conflicts thus may arise from a feeling or an awareness of difference, or from an

absence of knowledge of the other person's or persons' experiences and origins of attitudes.

Viewed from a social distance an individual takes on the characteristics of his group or groups. His traits are not distinguished from his group's tastes. "All Chinese look alike to me" — when they are socially distant. On the other hand a person upon close acquaintance reveals his individuality, or his distinguishing marks. But this individuality may produce either favorable or unfavorable attitudes. Intimacy may lead to arousal of disgusts or to ennui caused by repetition of tiresome stimuli. Where there is no caste system, individuals are continually getting "out of place" from the standpoint of somebody, and hence arousing unfavorable reactions on the part of the "somebody."

Pity illustrates an anomalous character that social contacts may assume. At first thought it appears that where pity exists social distance has been annihilated, but this observation is superficial. *Pity implies distance, as shown when one puts himself in the place of the "pitied."* Only pseudo-social persons want to be pitied. The normal person does not want condescension; in fact, he reacts against it and away from the one showing it toward him. Only the socially perverted accept it.

Social distances are deliberately maintained by an auto-aristocratic society. *Those in authority maintain personal "reserves" and social conventions which hinder the rank and file from becoming intimate with them, and from entering imaginatively into the minds of the leaders.* Democracy, on the other hand, theoretically strives to overcome the factors which create or support social distance.

The special significance of social distance is its relation to social status. For example, Japanese immigrants are ambitious to improve their status, and in so doing, they get "out of place." Hence, they irritate people who want an established order. They, however, are more willing to take rebuffs than to accept inferior status. Herein, we have the whole problem of social distance summed up. Distance means inferior status. Attempts to climb out of the lower status levels bring persecution and conflicts. The dilemma is represented by the choice between inferior status and peace on one hand, or recognized status and conflict on the other.

The Exclusion Law barring Japanese altogether is interpreted by intellectual Japanese as lowering their status in the eyes of the world. They are not put on the same level as other races, but on a lower level. This increasing of social distance by legislation is interpreted as a demotion in status — something which is intolerable to a proud people.

Social distance results from the maintenance of social status, that is, of the *status quo* in social relationships. A person by keeping *others* at a distance maintains his standing among his friends. One can bear the loss of almost anything in life easier than loss of social status, hence, the *raison d'être* for maintaining social distances.

Status has usually originated in force, and social distance likewise has been established by force, war, misrepresentation, and subtle propaganda devices. The status of groups has usually been determined in the same manner. Moreover, any group or person will ordinarily fight to maintain status once it has been achieved — even when acquired unjustly. They will usually struggle to improve status, although perhaps by less direct means. Status and social distance are precious partly because they have usually been struggled for.

Boys in a gang fight for status and even to maintain subtle forms of social distance. Once achieved they are held fast to until a successful challenger appears. But this is an unstable basis for the group, so that on higher group levels we find status and distance ingrained in laws, hereditary precedence, a social caste system, and the mores. Professional ethics is a maintenance of distance between those who accept standards and those who do not — by those who do. Restrictive immigration laws promote social distance. Patriotism, or group loyalties, further social distance as much as they diminish it. Secret societies maintain social distance. The buying off of justice depends upon eliminating social distance and establishing intimate relations with a friend of the court. Vast appropriations go where social distances are short. "Pull" means that social distance has been overcome. To understand social distance is to understand social problems.

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The meaning of applied sociology.
2. The meaning of social technology.
3. The chief lesson learned by England in dealing with poverty.
4. The preventive method of treating poverty.
5. The relation of increasing land values to poverty.
6. John Howard's relation to the problem of crime.
7. Beccaria's contribution to the study of crime.
8. Lombroso's main thesis regarding crime.
9. The responsibility of society for its criminals.

10. Elmira Reformatory methods as personality adjustment procedures.
11. T. M. Osborne's major thesis regarding criminals.
12. The relation of the family to juvenile delinquency.
13. The relation of social injustices to delinquency attitudes.
14. The relation of moral and religious ideals to delinquency.
15. The relation of the juvenile court to the public schools and to domestic relations courts.
16. The attitude of applied sociology toward child labor.
17. A scientific attitude toward the gainful employment of women in industry.
18. The values in a tripartite control of industry.
19. The effects of the elimination of profitism in industry.
20. Social insurance as a solution to the labor problem.
21. The main difficulty in solving the housing problem.
22. The meaning of socialized medicine.
23. The nature of community organization.
24. The trend of social case work.
25. The difference between case work and social reform.
26. The social distance theory of social problems.
27. The rôle of the "person" in a social problem situation.

CHAPTER XXV

SOCIOLOGY OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY

IN A FOREGOING chapter the valuable contribution of the Hebrews to social thought was presented; the attack of the prophets on social injustice was the outstanding feature. In another chapter the emphasis by Jesus upon love as a dynamic societal principle was described. In the centuries which followed the beginning of the Christian era, the Church apotheosized beliefs, creeds, dogmas. Near the close of the nineteenth century a renaissance of the social teachings of Jesus occurred.

This renaissance and its current sequels constitute an important chapter of applied sociology. Religious motivation has often been dynamic in securing social amelioration. When scientific sociology gets energized by social Christianity the results in terms of progress become noteworthy. The serious problem is to get scientific sociology and social Christianity harnessed and working together. They are as complementary, however, as they seem to be different in the eyes of each other. If they can learn to cooperate they will make an invincible team in securing progress.

SOCIAL IDEALS

The trio of writers who brought forward the social ideals of Christianity in a new, positive, and stimulating way in the closing decades of the last century were Washington Gladden, Josiah Strong, and Richard T. Ely. All three of these men began about 1885 to discuss in print the social content of Christianity. These men had been aroused by the apparent impotence of the Christian Church in face of the increasing power of capitalism. While many church leaders allowed themselves to be carried along in the powerful arms of capitalism, there were a few who perceived

the wreck of human lives that was often left in the wake of the capitalistic movement. These persons, while not blind to the social values of capitalism, were in touch with the laboring man, and by these contacts caught the social need of the hour. In this social crisis they heard the still, small voice coming down through the centuries, even the voice of Jesus as he spoke in behalf of the poor and outcast.

It was Washington Gladden who startled and even angered the world of religious and economic thought by protesting against the acceptance of "tainted money." By this term he referred to money which had been made under a capitalistic system at the expense of the lives of men, women, and little children in the industrial processes. Dr. Gladden weathered the storm of protest and gave the capitalistic world a new concept which, while it aroused anger, also brought introspection and a new type of social conscience into the lives of many Christians.

It was Dr. Gladden's contention that employer and employee ought to be friends, because they are so closely associated. It is a very large part of the business of the employer to maintain sympathetic relations between himself and his employees.¹ If the business man will not let his fellow men share in his prosperity, he will become in spite of himself a sharer in their adversity.

The attitude of Dr. Gladden toward the acceptance of railway passes by the clergy attracted widespread attention. He came to the conclusion that a railroad company is bound to render an equal service to all the people; its business is not to show special favors to the representatives of either religion or charity.² "What it has no right to give me, I have no right to take, and for several years I have not taken it; I pay regular fare as all my neighbors do or ought."

Dr. Gladden urged the abolition of city slums by governmental action. Inasmuch as slums are rife with moral

¹ Gladden, *Social Facts and Forces*, Putnam, 1897, p. 37.

² *Ibid.*, p. 152.

miasmas and are breeding-places of pauperism and crime, the city has the same right to abate such curses as to drain a morass. Moreover, individuals ought to have no property rights "in premises which breed death and engender vice. When they have proved that they lack the power to keep their property from falling into such conditions, their property must be summarily taken away from them."³

Without minimizing the importance of conflict as a principle of social progress, Dr. Gladden stressed the concept of cooperation. For example, in industrial matters he advocated the idea of a true trades union—"the union of employers and employed—of guiding brains and willing hands—all watchful of each other's interests, seeking each other's welfare, working for the common good."⁴

In his well-known treatise on *Social Salvation*, Dr. Gladden asserts that, in order to be soundly converted, a person must comprehend his social relationships and strive to fulfill them, as well as set up right relationships with God.⁵ Sanctification consists in fulfilling one's social as well as one's divine privileges, and in living according to the needs of human society as well as according to the needs of the human soul. A person can no more be a Christian by himself than he can sing an oratorio alone.⁶

It is no purely social gospel that Dr. Gladden taught. He was correct in protesting against the attitude of certain reformers who hold that changing environment is all sufficient. It is possible to go too far in removing temptations from the pathway of men; it would be unwise to neglect the problem of equipping men to resist temptation, and hence to weaken the sense of moral responsibility.⁷

In the field of practical social reform Dr. Josiah Strong did effective work. He also re-interpreted the social prin-

³ Gladden, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Gladden, *Social Salvation*, Houghton, Mifflin, 1902, p. 14.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 136; cf. Rauschenbusch, *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, Macmillan, 1918, pp. 8, 91.

ciples of Jesus, and boldly proclaimed the spirit of love as the cardinal principle for the organization of human society.⁸ He indicated that people have stressed properly the importance of *believing* the truth, but underestimated the importance of *living* the truth.⁹ He protested against the tendency to separate the sacred and the secular, and to divorce doctrine from conduct. He believed that the prevailing religious tendency to neglect the second commandment, of loving one's neighbor as one's self, has led to a narrow individualism on the part of many religious people.

The contributions to social thought by Gladden and Strong were ably supported by the social ideas of Richard T. Ely. Professor Ely remonstrated against the tendency of many church people to think that they can serve God without devoting their lives to their fellow men.¹⁰ He made vivid the complaint of American workingmen that church membership on the part of employers and landlords does not necessarily insure just and considerate treatment of employees and tenants.¹¹ Professor Ely insisted that it is as holy a work "to lead a crusade against filth, vice, and disease in slums of cities, and to seek the abolition of the disgraceful tenement houses of American cities, as it is to send missionaries to the heathen."¹²

The pioneer work of Gladden, Strong, Ely, and others in rejuvenating the social meaning of Christianity in the closing years of the nineteenth century has been carried forward in the present century by a host of able writers. The list includes the names of well known socio-religious thinkers such as Peabody,¹³ Matthews,¹⁴ Rauschenbusch,¹⁵

⁸ Strong, *The New Era*, Baker and Taylor, 1893, p. 121.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

¹⁰ Ely, *Social Aspects of Christianity*, Crowell, 1889, p. 17.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 73.

¹³ See Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, Macmillan, 1900.

¹⁴ See Matthews, *The Social Teachings of Jesus*, Macmillan, 1897; *The Church and the Changing Order*, Macmillan, 1907; *The Gospel and the Modern Man*, Macmillan, 1910.

¹⁵ See Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crises*, Macmillan, 1913; *Christianizing the Social Order*, Macmillan, 1912; *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, Macmillan, 1918.

Batten,¹⁶ Ward,¹⁷ Atkinson,¹⁸ Ryan,¹⁹ Stelzle,²⁰ and Taylor.²¹ Special attention will be given to the contributions of Rauschenbusch and Ward, because each has been a storm-center in socio-religious matters.

SOCIAL RELIGION

In his *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, Professor Rauschenbusch gave a brief history of Christianity and its Hebrew antecedents, showing first that "the essential purpose of Christianity was to transform human society into the Kingdom of God by regenerating all human relations and reconstituting them in accordance with the will of God."²² He then raised the question, why has Christianity not undertaken the work of social reconstruction? He believed that if the Church were to direct its full available force against any social wrong, probably nothing could withstand it.²³ Despite the fact that Christianity has played a leading part in lifting woman to equality and companionship with men, in changing parental despotism to parental service, in eliminating unnatural vice, in abolishing slavery, in covering all lands with a network of charities, in fostering institutions of learning, in aiding the progress of civil liberty and social justice, in diffusing a softening tenderness throughout human life, in taming selfishness, and in creating a resolute sense of duty, it has not yet undertaken a reconstruction of society on a Christian basis.²⁴ It has been engaged in suppressing some of the most glaring evils in the social system of the time.²⁵

¹⁶ See Batten, *The Social Task of Christianity*, Revell, 1911.

¹⁷ See Ward, *The New Social Order*, Macmillan, 1919.

¹⁸ See H. A. Atkinson, *The Church and the People's Play*, Pilgrim Press, 1915.

¹⁹ See John Ryan, *Distributive Justice*, Macmillan, 1910; and *Social Reconstruction*, Macmillan, 1920.

²⁰ See Charles Stelzle, *The Workingman and Social Problems*, Revell, 1903.

²¹ See *Religion in Social Action*, Dodd, Mead, 1913.

²² *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, supra, p. xiii.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 149.

Dr. Rauschenbusch pointed out several historical factors which have prevented Christianity from entering upon a program of reconstructing society, many of which no longer obtain.²⁶ These hindering factors have been: (1) the resentment of the classes whose interests are endangered by a moral campaign; (2) the belief in the immediate return of Christ, which precluded a long outlook; (3) the primitive attitude of fear and distrust toward the state; (4) the other-worldliness of Christian desire; (5) the ascetic and monastic ideals; (6) ceremonialism; (7) dogmatism; (8) the monarchical organization of the church; (9) an absence of the intellectual prerequisites for social reconstruction. To the extent that Christianity is no longer hampered by these characteristics it is ready to undertake the task of making over society.

The main danger in the present crisis which demands the attention of social Christianity was found by Professor Rauschenbusch in the autocratic, unjust phases of capitalism, with its somewhat undemocratic wage system. To this expression of autocracy there is a threefold class reaction.²⁷ First, there are those classes which are in practical control of wealth; they have no reformatory program; they are anxious to maintain the present social order intact. Second, there are the middle social classes, which, sharing partially in the advantages of the present social adjustment, are also chafing under social grievances which their ideals do not allow them to attack vigorously; they want reform work by peaceful and gradual methods. Third, there are the disinherited classes, which see a widening chasm between themselves and the wealthy, a chasm that "only a revolutionary lift can carry them across." It is around the condition and attitudes of the masses that the social crisis revolves. This social attitude is like a tank of gasoline, which by a single explosion will blow a

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 201 ff.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

car sky-high, or which, by a series of little explosions will push a car to the top of a mountain.²⁸ Which process does Christianity wish to further? If the latter, then Christianity must socialize first the classes of wealth and social power. Unfortunately, wealth often grows stronger than the man who owns it; it may own him and rob him of his moral and spiritual freedom.²⁹ Can Christianity dissolve this dilemma?

The principle that a Christian should seek an ascetic departure from the world of life and work is no longer acceptable. He has two other possibilities. He can either condemn the world and try to improve it, or tolerate it and gradually be conformed to it.³⁰ By these sharply drawn alternatives, Professor Rauschenbusch awoke the Christian world. While many Christians did not believe that the situation was as crucial as thus depicted, they nevertheless were jarred from a state of moral lethargy.

As a pastor for eleven years among the working people of New York City, Dr. Rauschenbusch learned to understand the heart throbs and yearnings of the masses, and dedicated his life through Christian service to easing the pressure upon the working classes and to stimulating the forces that bear them up. He saw the solution of the social problem in a Christian socialism that would destroy the autocracy of wealth and establish a democratic form of industrial relationships. He believed in the social or public ownership of the natural resources of the earth. "It is preposterous to think that an individual or a corporation can have absolute ownership in a vein of coal or copper. A mining company owns the holes in the ground, for it made the holes; it does not own the coal, for it did not make the coal. The coal is the gift of God and belongs to the people."³¹

²⁸ Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis*, p. 91.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 342.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 386.

Another difficulty is found in the fact that business methods and the principles of Christianity have always been at strife.³² Individuals are struggling to get the better of their fellows. This tendency has been institutionalized in the form of business enterprise. Private persons have been permitted "to put their thumbs where they can constrict the life blood of the nation at will."³³ Christianity, on the other hand, lauds the principle of socialized service, and of ranking the person the greatest who gives most. Christianity is awakening to its gigantic task of stopping the nation on "its headlong ride on the road of covetousness."

It is in this connection that Professor Rauschenbusch has made famous the phrase, "Christianizing the social order." This term means "bringing the social order into harmony with the ethical convictions which are identified with Christ."³⁴ Such a program involves attacking "the last intrenchment of autocracy," namely, in business,—and Christianizing business. The struggle is already on. In many of the phases of the conflict, capitalism is swallowing up Christianity. The church becomes traditional, narrowly ecclesiastical, dogmatic, opposing science and democracy. Where capitalism is strongest, the churches as virile social forces are weakest.³⁵

In reply to the often repeated charge that socialized Christianity is no Christianity at all, Professor Rauschenbusch shows that personal religion, instead of being defeated by a socialized religion, will gain strength and be able to present a much stronger appeal than it now does. The advocate of the social teachings of Jesus is not attacking personal religion, but rather endeavoring to give personal religion a new dynamic, especially in those phases of modern life where personal religion has lost most of its

³² *Christianizing the Social Order*, p. 1.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

appeal.³⁶ The opponents of social Christianity cannot afford to neglect the fact that the often one-sided, mechanical, and superficial gospel and methods of evangelism have created a religious apathy, if not a definite reaction against religion.³⁷ It is blind foolishness to try to fence out the new social spirit from Christianity instead of letting it fuse with the older religious faith and "create a new total that will be completer and more Christian than the old religious individualism at its best."³⁸

Dr. Rauschenbusch insisted that there must be a Christianizing of international relations, that individuals must be taught to see the sinfulness of the present social order, and that the popular conception of God must be democratized.³⁹ He reinterpreted the organic unity of human society,—asserting that when one man sins, other men suffer; and that when one class sins, other classes bear a part of the suffering.

SOCIAL CREEDS

In 1908, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America was organized at Philadelphia. The Council adopted with slight modifications the resolutions which some months earlier had been accepted by the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church (North), and which Harry F. Ward and others had drawn up.

This Bill of Rights, as the Resolutions have been called, imposed upon the members of the more than thirty Protestant denominations the duty of obtaining industrial justice for the cause of labor. It spoke for (1) the principle of arbitration in industrial dissensions, (2) the adequate protection of workers in hazardous trades, (3) the abolition of child labor, (4) the safeguarding of physical and moral health of women in industry, (5) the suppression of the "sweating system," (6) the reduction of the hours of labor to the lowest practicable point, (7) a living wage in

³⁶ Rauschenbusch, *op. cit.*, pp. 113, 114.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 121, 122.

³⁸ *A Theology for a Social Gospel*, pp. 4, 5, 48.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

all industries, (8) one day of rest in seven for all workers, (9) the most equitable division of the products of industry that can ultimately be devised, (10) suitable provisions for old age or disability of workers, and (11) the abatement of poverty.

At the meeting of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America at a special meeting held at Cleveland, Ohio, May 6-8, 1919, the foregoing platform was reaffirmed; and in addition, as a means of meeting the needs of the reconstruction days following the World War, the following notable resolutions were adopted. The Council declared not only that labor is entitled to an equitable share in the profits of industry, but took the new step of expressing the belief that labor is entitled also to an equitable share in the management of industry. "The sharing of shop control and management is an inevitable step" in the attainment of an ordered and constructive democracy in industry. The Council asserted that the first charge upon industry should be wages sufficient to support an American standard of living.

In 1919, the Committee on Special War Activities of the National Catholic War Council published a brief but important document on social reconstruction. In this pamphlet the defects of the capitalistic system are declared to be: "Enormous inefficiency and waste in the production and distribution of commodities; insufficient incomes for the great majority of wage-earners; and unnecessarily large incomes for a small minority of privileged capitalists."⁴⁰ The Committee urged that employees shall exercise a reasonable share in the management of industrial enterprises, and that the State should inaugurate comprehensive provisions for health insurance and old age insurance. It recognized that the true line of progress is in the direction of cooperative production and of copartnership arrangements. "In the former, the workers own and man-

⁴⁰ "Social Reconstruction," National Catholic War Council, Washington, 1919, p. 22.

age the industries themselves; in the latter, they own a substantial part of the corporate stock and exercise a reasonable share in the management."⁴¹ The Catholic pronunciamento demands that the spirit of both labor and capital be reformed. The laborer must give up the desire of a maximum of return for a minimum of service; he must remember that he owes society an honest day's work for a fair wage. On the other hand the capitalist must learn that wealth is not possession but stewardship, and that "profit-making is not the basic justification of business enterprise."⁴²

RELIGIOUS SOCIAL SERVICE

Inasmuch as Harry F. Ward has written more extensively on social Christianity than any other person, save Rauschenbusch, and has created widespread and heart-searching discussions, his contributions to socio-religious thought will be considered next. Dr. Ward does not believe in social service as a bait for drawing people into the church. He objects to bribing people in order to get them into an evangelistic meeting. To him social service is a natural phase of religion, expressing itself freely and without sinuous designs. In his estimation, soup kitchens are not to be established as a means of enticing the laboring man inside the church walls, but as a cooperative expression of the Christian's desire to be true to the Christ spirit. Social service is not a selfish program, on the part of the church, for increasing its membership. It is as natural to Christianity as personal evangelism, and equally intrinsic and vital. It has won more than national recognition. While it is radical in the eyes of the conservative, it contains an analysis of social conditions that many of its critics have not appreciated. It breathes a sincerity and a straightforwardness that compels the fair-minded reader to give heed.

Slavery was rejected as the economic basis of civilization, and monarchy has recently been rejected as the polit-

⁴¹ *Loc. cit.*

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 24.

ical basis. In each instance the world came to a junction where idealistic impulse overthrew entrenched power. It is Dr. Ward's contention that the world is now reaching a similar junction point, a point where idealistic impulse will dethrone autocracy in capitalism. The idealistic impulse, to which reference has been made in the foregoing lines, is germinal in the teachings of Jesus.

With prophetic vision, more organized than the vision of Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, but equally sincere and fearless, Dr. Ward points out the principles of the new social order which he believes is almost upon the world. He then describes the various factors which are struggling each in its own way to inaugurate the new order.

The five principles of the new social order are equality, universal service, efficiency, the supremacy of personality, and solidarity. (1) Equality is the old word which won attention in the American and French Revolutions. It grew out of the theory of natural rights which was discussed in Chapter XI. The American emphasis on the principle of equality is shown in the admiration that is accorded the achievements of energy and toil, in the common struggle for more wealth and luxury, in foreign missionary activities, in the rise of the democratic conscience and the idealistic impulses of the people.

On the other hand, the principle of equality is being violated when, instead of trying to remove the natural inequalities among folks, "we increase them by giving special privileges to the strong as the reward of their strength." The United States is at the crossroads. One highway is characterized by luxury and extravagance on one side, and by poverty and slavery on the other; it leads to revolutionary attempts on the part of the masses to overthrow the privileged classes. It ends in national decadence. The second highway is characterized by justice. Those in economic authority are willing to grant representation to labor in the management of industry and to further the rise of the cooperative spirit. They are willing to sacrifice their

own special privileges for the sake of the welfare of the disinherited.

The intellectuals of the middle class hold vast power. In crises, they usually join the privileged classes rather than the masses; and hence, their influence often swings to the side of injustice.⁴³

(2) Universal service is the principle of equal obligation. Equal rights, by itself, may mean equal rights to cheat, to exploit. It needs to be checked by its complement of equal obligation. During the World War there was a frequent demonstration of the principle of universal service. "We are engaged in helping the boys at the front" became the slogan. At the front as well as in the home town and cities, wealthy and poor, capital and labor, served together. The end of the War gave prominence to this question: Will the universal service idea spread or will it be discarded? Will industry go back to the unashamed pursuit of private gain?⁴⁴

Dr. Ward makes a careful distinction between the service of democratic mutual helpfulness and the service of a governing class, no matter how excellent.⁴⁵ It is a low type of service which grants Christmas dinners to the poor with the result that the poor are thereby made contented with their lot in life.

(3) Efficiency is a term which is the product of the mechanical era, which originated in the business world, and which is now being applied to all phases of social organization.⁴⁶ Its aim is perfection in social mechanics. Social efficiency includes not only social engineering but social knowledge, social philosophy, social ethics, and social religion. Evidences of social inefficiency are common; for example, the failure to use and apply the social knowledge that we have, and the loss of energy through an over-

⁴³ Ward, *The New Social Order*, p. 74.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

emphasis on competition. Democracy will never be able to succeed merely because of its splendid ethical ideals.⁴⁷ The need is for an efficiency in government that is scientific and not simply a business efficiency.⁴⁸ Scientific efficiency includes "the spirit of service to the common interest by which alone democracy can live."⁴⁹

(4) The supremacy of personality is a principle of life that conflicts today with the current emphasis on economic efficiency. It is because the latter is so often reckless of human values that the new social order will stress the development of things of the spirit rather than material goods; even business must practice this ideal. The World War raised the estimate which the common people put on their own lives; but the ultimate result will depend on whether or not people took part in the war voluntarily and conscious of high moral purposes, and whether or not the peace which follows shall bring a new world organization that conserves all the advances in human living that have thus far been made.

Institutions possess an inherent fallibility. They tend to become mechanical, and repressive, even those dedicated to high purposes, such as institutions of democracy, of education, and of religion. The supreme object of any social institution and organization, no matter in what field it may exist, should be the increase of personality.⁵⁰

(5) The new social order will be governed by a sense of solidarity, that is, by a community of feeling and thought which arises when persons are associated together in working for a common end. World solidarity will come when all peoples learn to work together for public welfare, and subordinate all egoistic desires to this end. Christianity is moving in this direction when it advances the concept of "comradeship of all men with each other and

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

⁴⁸ *Loc. cit.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

with the Great Companion," when it gradually unfolds the idea of a unified world life, when it applies its doctrines of brotherhood of man to the relations of the employer and employee or to the relations of white and black races, when it seeks the democratic solidarity of the human race rather than the imperialistic solidarity of an overhead religious control, when it endeavors to spread love and faith, rather than to spread dogmas and promote organizations.⁵¹ Class cleavage, nationalism as distinct from nationality, race prejudice, ignorance, and egoism are the main opponents of the world brotherhood principle.

Dr. Ward, having defined what he considers the chief principles that will govern the new social order, proceeds to measure current movements by certain standards. He reviews the declarations of the British Labor Party, the Russian Soviet Republic, the League of Nations, and the labor movements in the United States. These tendencies are all expressions of a more or less blind desire for justice. In all countries of the world the masses are restless, stirring, and experiencing a keen sense of injustice. Their leaders are struggling, unscientifically as a rule, toward the light of a new day of democracy. The trend which this struggle takes depends on the given social environment and the attitude of the persons in authority. If undue repression and autocracy are exercised for a long period of time, as in Russia under the Czars, revolution is the only means of escape open to the masses. Schooled for a long time under the lash of autocracy, when they themselves come into control, they will use the only means of control that they know, the lash of autocracy.

The British Labor Party is moving in the direction of guild socialism, which includes the organization of industry into large units, in charge of the workers and relatively free from the rule of the politicians. The national government is to have a general oversight over the large industrial

⁵¹ Ward, *The New Social Order*, p. 159.

units. As immediate steps in this direction, the Labor Party demands the nationalization of the railroads, mines, and of the production of electric power. Municipalities participate in the common ownership program. The method of transformation is to be gradual, largely based on political action.

In regard to the League of Nations Covenant, which was agreed upon in Paris in 1919, Dr. Ward takes a negative attitude. Although he believes firmly in an organization of good will, in international friendship and in world solidarity upon democratic bases, he asserts stoutly that the Paris Covenant is "a symbol of the sacred right of private property,"⁵² that it provided for an international organization of capitalism with all the force of powerful national governments behind it, that it represented a series of compromises between nationally selfish units, that it was an expression of the wishes of the rulers of the democratic states who are essentially of "the same moral caliber as the ruling class of imperialistic militarism, and bear a similar sinister relationship to the future welfare of the common folk."⁵³

The weakness of Dr. Ward's treatment of the programs for the new social order is that it discusses almost entirely programs, platforms, ideals, without discussing the relations between the programs and the actual practices of the various organizations. In contrasting the best phases, moreover, of the British Labor Party with the worst phases of capitalism, an incomplete picture is given. However, this weakness in method does not weaken the strength of thought which Dr. Ward displays. Some of the most thought-provoking deductions are:

1. That individualistic Christianity is losing ground.
2. That the middle class is becoming a class of privilege.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 287.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 363.

3. That the intellectuals of the middle class, while keenly aware of the evils in the capitalistic system, are so much indebted to that system that they would consider themselves ingrates if they spoke out against it, or they are simply afraid to speak out.

4. That jails and machine guns will not stop the laboring classes in appealing for a democratic reorganization of industry, but will rather hasten revolutions, with resultant dictatorships of the proletariat.

5. That capitalism is passing, as it is bound to do, because it is organized selfishness—its fundamental principle is wrong.

6. That political democracy is fighting for its life to-day, being attacked on the one flank by economic imperialism and on the other by the dictatorship of the proletariat.⁵⁴

7. That unless the struggle can be ended by a process of reason and orderly progress, the world is doomed to devastation by universal conflict.

8. That the goal of social development is, in broad terms, "a fraternal world community, the great loving family of mankind, knit together by common needs but most of all by loyalty to common ideals, and by the power of its common love efficiently directing and controlling its common life."⁵⁵

Current social Christianity speaks prophetically on the war question. Rev. Harry Emerson Fosdick asserts that in connection with the World War "we found ourselves, as Christians, powerless to lift effective protest against the oncoming perdition. We had made ourselves part and parcel of social attitudes, from whose inevitable consequence we felt it immoral to withdraw. We had consented to the necessity of war and the righteousness of war too long to be conscience-clear in refusing to accept the brunt

⁵⁴ Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

of it."⁵⁶ It is necessary to right about face in peace times. "We must make clear our certain conviction that, save for our corporate senselessness, war in the modern world is as needless as it is suicidal, that only the folly and selfishness of diplomats and the stupid willingness of the people to be led like beasts to the shambles, make it seem necessary."⁵⁷

The churches should refuse to give their approval to any future war, according to Kirby Page, for three reasons: (1) Because war is inherently and essentially a supreme violation of Jesus' way of life; (2) because war is ineffective as a means of furthering Christ's Kingdom and is self-defeating in its very nature; (3) because the absolute repudiation of war by individuals, groups, and corporate bodies is the most effective way of compelling governments to abandon the war system and to discover more adequate means of securing safety and justice."⁵⁸

There is a rising demand that war be outlawed. Murder by nations and murder by persons are judged to be in the same class. The latter is outlawed,—why not the former? The resort to arms to settle disputes is clearly as inane on the part of nations as on the part of persons—this is the judgment of many religious leaders.⁵⁹

SOCIO-RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

An important question arises: How shall the social teachings of Jesus become widely taught? Evangelistic Christianity, with its personal emphasis, cannot be expected to carry the social message. Preachers, theologically trained, are bound to give the social phases of Christianity a secondary place. In recent years, however, a movement known as religious education has been acquiring momentum. Moreover, a social theory of religious

⁵⁶ *War*, by Kirby Page, Doran and Company, 1923, Introduction.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ *Ibid.* pp. 73, 74.

⁵⁹ See the writings of Sherwood Eddy and others along this line in *The Christian Century*.

education has been formulated. In this connection, Dr. George Albert Coe has perhaps done the most significant work. Our life, Dr. Coe believes, gets its largest meaning not from the fact of individual self-consciousness alone, but from the equally important fact that life is social.⁶⁰ Without a belief in social consciousness, an endless existence after death, in terms of self-consciousness primarily, would be meaningless and probably valueless. Religion must solve the problem of establishing a Kingdom of Heaven on earth, and also train its votaries for a societal life in Heaven. The latter problem will be met easily when the former is solved. It is well illustrated by a young Christian lady who asked: Won't there have to be a separate Heaven for Negroes, since we hate them so here? In other words, will there not have to be a thousand or a million Heavens in order to accommodate happily all the antagonistic Christian groups now on earth? How can the Protestant Ulstermen and Catholic Irishmen live together lovingly in Heaven? The problem goes back to solving the social implications of Christianity in earthly relationships.

The social aims of Christian education, according to Dr. Coe, are as follows: (1) Social welfare, or the control of the non-human environment in the interest of human life. (2) Social justice, or the inauguration of fair play in all the dealings of every individual, no matter how strong and shrewd, with every other individual, no matter how weak and ignorant. (3) A world society, or the promotion of a code of conduct that leads to "the integration of all peoples into a single, democratically governed mankind." Nationalism must melt into a larger regard for human beings; and that which is "a climactic expression of the selfishness, that is to say, the injustice that is organized in our legal systems and our national sovereignties," must be revealed to all, even in the Sunday schools.⁶¹

⁶⁰ Coe, *Psychology of Religion*, University of Chicago Press, 1916, p. xiv.

⁶¹ Coe, *A Social Theory of Religious Education*, Scribner, 1917, pp. 59, 58.

The implications of a sound social theory of religious education are met by the religious doctrine of personal fellowship between God and man, and between man and man; by a reorganization of the church as a religious institution in a way which shall put religious education on as scientific a basis as the ordinary day school education; and by training the church pupils in the principles of social justice, cooperation, and love, as well as in matters pertaining to personal salvation.

Another current development is religious social service work. For some time the religious education director has been a recognized force in church work. Social service work in church life is coming into the foreground, including social welfare programs for the church services, the training of the membership in volunteer social work, the inauguration of religious social surveys, and the carrying of the social message of the church into all the church activities.

The social service activities of the church have often been used as a net for catching the churchless. Social service as a bribe, however, will fail. Genuine religious social service is that which emanates naturally and easily from the lives of the church members and of the church itself, asking no pay and possessing no sinuous ends. The church that inaugurates a social program for building up the family life, the play life, the moral life, the economic life, as well as the religious life, in the community in which it is located, most truly represents a socialized church. The church, however, that uses its social welfare program merely in order to build itself up, fails to understand its social calling as a religious institution.

Religious social research is in process of development. The Institute of Social and Religious Research, of New York City, has been conducting many studies. A number of volumes have been published, chiefly in the form of statistical surveys. *Diagnosing the Rural Church*⁶² is one of

⁶² By C. Luther Fry, Doran, 1924.

the more important for it uses new methods in church analysis. Research work in religious attitudes and in changes of these attitudes remains to be made.

The social thought of the Hebrews revolved about the idea of social justice; of Jesus, about the concept of active love; and of modern Christianity, at its best, about a social program for bringing about a just, cooperative, and harmonious life, ranging in its operation from the person in his family and local community life to the person as a functioning unit in a new world society.

Another culmination of social thought in this field is in the sociology of religion. A number of European writers have contributed to this field, notably Emile Durkheim, who holds for instance, that religious ideals are a reflection of society and social conditions. Evil in society is reflected in the concept of "devil" in religion. The emphasis on a "paradise" in heaven is brought about by experiencing a "hell" on earth. Religion, in short, expresses a collective ideal.⁶³ Again, the sociology of religion implies the rôle of group consciousness in religious professions. To the extent that a religious group gives a person status and recognition it has an effective appeal. The sociology of religion is at the point now of organizing projects for determining how far and in what ways the group and collective behavior functions in personal religion.

RELIGION A SOCIAL REFLECTION⁶⁴

All religions, even the crudest, are in a sense spiritualistic; for the powers they put in play are before all spiritual, and also their principal object is to act upon the moral life. Thus it is seen that whatever has been done in the name of religion cannot have been done in vain; for it is necessarily society that did it, and it is humanity that has reaped the fruits.

But, it is said, what society is it that has thus made the basis of religion? Is it the very real society, such as it is and acts before our

⁶³ Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, Allen and Unwin, translation by J. W. Swain, 1915, p. 423.

⁶⁴ Reprinted by permission from Emile Durkheim, *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*, Allen and Unwin, translation by J. W. Swain, 1915.

very eyes, with the legal and moral organization which it has laboriously fashioned during the course of history? This is full of defects and imperfections. In it, evil goes beside the good, injustice often reigns supreme, and the truth is often obscured by error. How could anything so crudely organized inspire the sentiments of love, the ardent enthusiasm and the spirit of abnegation which all religions claim of their followers? These perfect beings which are gods could not have taken their traits from so mediocre, and sometimes even so base a reality.

But, on the other hand, does someone think of a perfect society, where justice and truth would be sovereign, and from which evil in all its forms would be banished forever? No one would deny that this is in close relations with the religious sentiment; for, they would say, it is towards the realization of this that all religions strive. But that society is not an empirical fact, definite and observable; it is a fancy, a dream with which men have lightened their sufferings, but in which they have never really lived. It is merely an idea which comes to express our more or less obscure aspirations towards the good, the beautiful, and the ideal. Now these aspirations have their roots in us; they come from the very depths of our being; then there is nothing outside of us which can account for them. Moreover, they are already religious in themselves; thus it would seem that the ideal society presupposes religion, far from being able to explain it.

But, in the first place, things are arbitrarily simplified when religion is seen only in its idealistic side; in its way, it is realistic. There is no physical or moral ugliness, there are no vices or evils which do not have a special divinity. There are gods of theft and trickery, of lust and war, of sickness and of death. Christianity itself, howsoever high the idea which it has made of the divinity may be, has been obliged to give the spirit of evil a place in its mythology. Satan is an essential piece of the Christian system; even if he is an impure being, he is not a profane one. The anti-god is a god, inferior and subordinated, it is true, but nevertheless endowed with extended powers; he is even the object of rites, at least of negative ones. Thus religion, far from ignoring the real society and making abstraction of it, is in its image; it reflects all its aspects, even the most vulgar and the most repulsive. All is to be found there, and if in the majority of cases we see the good victorious over evil, life over death, the powers of light over the powers of darkness, it is because reality is not otherwise. If the relation between these two contrary forces were reversed, life would be impossible; but, as a matter of fact, it maintains itself and even tends to develop. (pp. 420-421)

For our definition of the sacred is that it is something added to and above the real; now the ideal answers to this same definition;

we cannot explain one without explaining the other. In fact, we have seen that if the collective life awakens religious thought on reaching a certain degree of intensity, it is because it brings about a state of effervescence which changes the conditions of psychic activity. Vital energies are overexcited, passions more active, sensations stronger; there are even some which are produced only at this moment. A man does not recognize himself; he feels himself transformed and consequently he transforms the environment which surrounds him. In order to account for the very particular impressions which he receives, he attributes to the things with which he is in most direct contact properties which they have not, exceptional powers and virtues which the objects of everyday experience do not possess. In a word, above the real world where his profane life passes he has placed another which, in one sense, does not exist except in thought, but to which he attributes a higher sort of dignity than to the first. Thus, from a double point of view it is an ideal world.

The formation of the ideal world is therefore not an irreducible fact which escapes science; it depends upon conditions which observation can touch; it is a natural product of social life. For a society to become conscious of itself and maintain at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which it thus attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself. Now this concentration brings about an exaltation of the mental life which takes form in a group of ideal conceptions in which is portrayed the new life thus awakened; they correspond to this new set of psychical forces which is added to those which we have at our disposition for the daily tasks of existence. A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself without at the same time creating an ideal. This creation is not a sort of work of supererogation, for it, by which it would complete itself, being already formed; it is the act by which it is periodically made and remade. Therefore, when some oppose the ideal society to the real society, they materialize and oppose abstraction. The ideal society is not outside of the real society; it is a part of it. Far from being divided between them as between two poles which mutually repel each other, we cannot hold to one without holding to the other. For a society is not made up merely of the mass of individuals who compose it, the ground which they occupy, the things which they use and the movements which they perform, but above all is the idea which it forms of itself. It is undoubtedly true that it hesitates over the manner in which it ought to conceive itself; it feels itself drawn in divergent directions. But these conflicts which break forth are not between the ideal and the reality, but between two different ideals, that of yesterday and that of today, that which has the authority of

tradition and that which has the hope of the future. There is surely a place for investigating whence these ideals evolve; but whatever solution may be given to this problem, it still remains that all passes in the world of the ideal.

Thus the collective ideal which religion expresses is far from being due to a vague innate power of the individual, but is rather due to the school of collective life that the individual has learned to idealize. It is in assimilating the ideals elaborated by society that he has become capable of conceiving the ideal. It is society which, by leading him within its sphere of action, has made him acquire the need of raising himself above the world of experience and has at the same time furnished him with the means of conceiving another. For society has constructed this new world in constructing itself, since it is society which this expresses. Thus both with the individual and in the group, the faculty of idealizing has nothing mysterious about it. It is not a sort of luxury which a man could get along without, but a condition of his very existence. He could not be a social being, that is to say, he could not be a man, if he had not acquired it. It is true that in incarnating themselves in individuals, collective ideals tend to individualize themselves. Each understands them after his own fashion and marks them with his own stamp; he suppresses certain elements and adds others. Thus the personal ideal disengages itself from the social ideal in proportion as the individual personality develops itself and becomes an autonomous source of action. But if we wish to understand this aptitude, so singular in appearance, of living outside of reality, it is enough to connect it with the social conditions upon which it depends.

Therefore it is necessary to avoid seeing in this theory of religion a simple restatement of historical materialism; that would be misunderstanding our thought to an extreme degree. In showing that religion is something essentially social, we do not mean to say that it confines itself to translating into another language the material forms of society and its immediate vital necessities. It is true that we take it as evident that social life depends upon its material foundation and bears its mark, just as the mental life of an individual depends upon his nervous system and in fact his whole organism. (pp. 422-423)

Thus there is something eternal in religion which is destined to survive all the particular symbols in which religious thought has successively enveloped itself. There can be no society which does not feel the need of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and the collective ideas which make its unity and its personality. Now this moral remaking cannot be

achieved except by the means of reunions, assemblies, and meetings where the individuals being closely united to one another, reaffirm in common their common sentiments; hence come ceremonies which do not differ from regular religious ceremonies, either in their object, the results which they produce, or the processes employed to attain these results. What essential difference is there between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principal dates of the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the exodus from Egypt or the promulgation of the decalogue, and a reunion of citizens commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or legal system or some great event in the national life? (p. 427)

SOCIAL SCIENCE AND RELIGION⁶⁵

Moreover, the social scientist discovers that religion on its human side deals with the same social facts and conditions which he himself studies. To be sure, it deals with them differently. It aims not to understand them, but to control them. But as understanding must be the basis of wise control; and inasmuch as the social scientist knows that understanding is for the sake of control, he sees that the ultimate aim of both religion and science must be the same—to benefit man. If both come to aim at the same sort of control in the interest of the widest possible service of humanity, he sees no inconsistency in their cooperation. Indeed, he perceives *that just as there must be a synthesis of practical politics and social science, so there must be a synthesis of practical religion and social science*, if both are not to be sterile. (pp. 2-3)

The great object of ethical religion is to redeem mankind from a life of sin and to bring men into harmony with themselves and with their universe. This cannot be done without knowledge of the forces which make and mar the lives of men. In other words, religion cannot perform its work without science—without trustworthy knowledge of the forces at work in human life. Now, science reveals that these forces which shape human life are mainly social in nature. Therefore, religion must seek the aid of social sciences if it is to create a better human world. Religion must enlist the scientific spirit and employ scientifically tested knowledge of human life if it is successfully to accomplish its work. We may rest assured that the religion of the future will be at one with science in that it will make practical application of scientific ideas and achievements, especially in the human sciences, and will welcome the scientific habit of mind as its necessary ally.

⁶⁵ Reprinted with permission from C. A. Ellwood, *Christianity and Social Science*, The Macmillan Company, 1923.

But if science stands for knowledge, for carefully sifted and tested knowledge, what more is needed? May we not trust that such knowledge will be utilized as need for it arises? What need is there for religion in a fully scientific world? Will not science be able to satisfy both the ethical and philosophical desires of men which have hitherto been satisfied by theology and religion? The answer is plainly that the problem which life presents is much more than a problem of knowledge. It is even more a problem of motives and of will attitudes—of aspirations, desires, and determinations. The human world is governed not alone or mainly by thought, but even more by emotion. Knowledge alone does not suffice to motivate the human will in a socially right direction. We have, also, to find a way of diffusing among men right aspirations and right desires—right emotional attitudes—before we can be sure that they will use knowledge rightly. Now religion stands for this element of aspiration and emotional value in human life. It is in this way intensely concerned with social values. At its best, religion is a setting of the affections upon the highest personal and social values and ideals which we know, that is, upon what we may call divine things. It is the cultivation of faith, hope, and love in human life. The religious spirit is the spirit of devotion to ideal social and personal ends and of the consecration of the individual life to these ends.

Science, if it is to benefit man in an idealistic social way, is consequently helpless without religion. Religion needs science to give it knowledge of the best means to reach its end, but science needs religion not less to move men effectively to use aright the truth which it discovers. "Each," says Professor Harry Ward, "is impotent to change mankind without the other; one for lack of technique and one for want of power." Social science needs the aid of religion if it is to become something more than a polite amusement, and religion needs the aid of social science if it is to become practical for human living. Of course, the social science needed is one which is not afraid of value-judgments, which is broadly synthetic of all the facts and values of human life, and so humanitarian in the best sense—the sense in which science as a whole has always claimed to be of benefit to man. In other words, science needs to become socialized quite as much as religion. "If," says Professor Ward, "the future of mankind depends upon religion becoming scientific and therefore social, it equally depends upon science becoming social and therefore religious."

The spiritual regulation of man's social life, moreover, has always been largely a matter of religion. If at times the social basis and social purpose of religion have been lost sight of, that should not obscure the essentially social nature of religion, or the necessary

functions which it performs in energizing and stabilizing personal and social life. If there is one thing which the scientific study of social life has revealed clearly, it is the power of religion over the social and personal life of man; and we have no right to assume that man will be able to dispense with its power in the future. Science has discovered no substitute for religion as a spring of social idealism. Religion, therefore, must continue to furnish the inspiration, the motive, for the realization of ideal social ends; but science must draw the plans and furnish the means. Obviously, the religious spirit cannot work intelligently and beneficially in human affairs unless it uses to the full the established knowledge which science offers to mankind. (pp. 9-11)

Modern sociological research has shown beyond the shadow of a doubt the plasticity or modifiability of human nature in social life. Much of the incubus of doubt which has rested upon the program of ethical religion in the past has been due to the supposition that human nature was unmodifiable; but the studies among all the peoples of the world of anthropologists and sociologists show human nature to be one of the most modifiable things we know. We are almost justified in drawing the conclusion that it may be indefinitely modified by social traditions, social institutions, and the social environment. (p. 13)

The scientific study of institutions reinforces ethical religion, in that it inspires men with faith in the possibility of remaking both human nature and human social life. If the sum total of researches of the scientific students of human society is taken into account, I venture to assert that there is nothing in those researches which should discourage any reasonable attempt at social amelioration. On the contrary, a just understanding of the results of these researches would release the energies of men for rational attempts at the remaking of their world, quite as much as the inspirations and intuitions of moral and religious enthusiasm; and such energies released by a rational understanding of the nature and possibilities of human society would have the advantage of being from the start directed and controlled by intelligence. Here again, then, social science turns out to be the strongest ally of ethical religion. (pp. 19-20)

But if ethics must find its firmest root in scientific social knowledge, then it is evident that rational religion must also find rootage in social knowledge—in a scientific understanding of the conditions and needs of human life. While it is wrong to think that sociology will displace theology, yet it is evident that in so far as religion becomes a program for the transformation of this world, it must depend increasingly upon sociology. Theology itself is, indeed, being so

modified in a scientific and social direction today that it is now sometimes difficult, in the case of the more socially-minded of our theological thinkers, to tell where their sociology ends and their theology begins. We may safely conclude, therefore, that sociology, while not a substitute for theology, will become the ally of scientific theology in attempts at the interpretation and practical development of the religious life of man. (p. 23)

If both human nature and human institutions are plastic and modifiable, if both can be moulded to suit the requirements of our social life, what then are the sociological principles which should guide us in our attempts to control individual character and to build better institutions? They are many, but I shall emphasize three.

The first is the principle of socialization. Sociology shows that it is the incorporation of the individual into the group and the growth in capacity and will to act together of groups of individuals which develops personal character and community life. It is this process of socialization which has produced human culture. It has made the unity and the life of human groups from the family to humanity. As we ascend in the scale of human social evolution, we find widening socialization of individuals and increasing cooperation, both in extent and in complexity. On the other hand, unsocializing agencies produce internal conflicts within groups and destroy group life. The principle which underlies social progress would therefore seem to be a widening and increasing socialization of individuals. Objectively this increasing socialization shows itself in the maximization of harmony and cooperation and the minimization of hostility and conflict among men. Religion should therefore strive to develop a socialized character in individuals, and to build institutions along lines which favor the proper socialization of individuals.

The second is the principle of mutual service. Sociology demonstrates that cooperation is the main building principle of social life on the objective side. The simplest study shows that social life is carried on by the continual exchange of services on the part of the members of a group. Where cooperation is harmonious, it involves an equal exchange of services, and hence it benefits equally all members of a cooperating group. If exchange of services grows unequal, it tends to become exploitation, and exploitation sooner or later weakens or destroys those who are exploited, and thus puts an end to cooperation and even to social life. The equal exchange of services, the equal conferring of benefits, on the other hand, promotes cooperation and social life, and is what we ordinarily call social justice. Human history shows beyond question a struggle for social justice and a widening and intensification of mutual service. Increasing mutual service with decreasing exploitation is therefore in-

volved in social progress. Therefore, religion should strive to develop in individuals the attitude of mutual service, to decrease exploitation, and to mould our institutions so as to promote social justice.

Third is the principle of good will or love. Many sociologists have been loath to recognize this principle. Indeed, a certain school of sociologists, as is well known, refuses to recognize any subjective element whatsoever as at work in social life. But the great majority of sociologists, as we have seen, recognize that in these subjective elements, that is, in the inner attitudes and dispositions of individuals, lies the real key to their social behavior. The emotional attitudes of men count for as much in social life (if not for more) as the objective forms of social organization. "Sentiment," says Professor Cooley, "is the chief motive-power of life." Back of cooperation and mutual service, in other words, stand sentiments and inner attitudes which are favorable to them. Deeper than the socialization of conduct or behavior is the socialization of the emotions and the impulses, because these are what usually motivate our conduct. Now, the inner attitudes which are favorable to our fellows have been called by various names such as sympathy, altruism, and good will. The traditional name employed in religion, however, is "love," and this I shall use, as on the whole the term best suited to characterize that *inner attitude of devotion to the welfare of others* which we shall find to be a chief motive working both for social unity and social progress. Without it cooperation and mutual service in any high degree are impossible. It has often been remarked that service becomes slavery when rendered under compulsion, even though the compulsion be only a sense of duty. We must have an inner attitude of love to prompt us to untiring service. So, also, sympathy and understanding are necessary for the higher forms of human cooperation. Social progress depends, as Kidd has rightly contended, not simply upon increasing in society the fund of accurate knowledge, but even more upon increasing the fund of altruism or of effective sympathy and good will. Another social thinker has asserted after a survey of all social evolution that the law of progress is the law of increasing sympathy.⁶⁶ I shall endeavor also to show that the spiritual progress of human society, and *so all lasting progress, does depend upon widening and increasing love and good will*; that love is pre-eminently the social passion and so the main dynamic upon which we can rely for the improvement of social conditions; that it is capable of being greatly increased in human relations; and that the extending and conserving of love and good will is one of the chief tasks of practical religion. (pp. 28-31)

⁶⁶ Sutherland, *Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, Vol. I, p. 10.

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The origins of the social phases of current Christianity.
2. The leaders of the modern renaissance of social Christianity.
3. The arguments for and against the acceptance of "tainted money."
4. The right of a city to abolish slums by legislation.
5. Gladden's idea of a true Trade Union.
6. The weakness of being a Christian simply as an individual.
7. Josiah Strong's conception of the weakness of current Christianity.
8. The leading social achievements of Christianity according to Rauschenbusch.
9. Important factors preventing Christianity from entering in a full program of social reconstruction.
10. Distinctions in the attitudes of the wealthy, the middle classes, and the disinherited classes toward social reform.
11. The meaning of "Christianizing the social order."
12. The explanation of the statement that where "capitalism is strongest, the church as a virile social force is weakest."
13. The interrelations of social Christianity and personal Christianity.
14. The main emphasis of the Social Creed of the Churches.
15. The meaning of the Catholic pronouncement that "profit-making is not the basic justification of business enterprise."
16. Two leading attitudes towards the purpose of religious social service work.
17. H. F. Ward's principles of equality, universal service, efficiency, supremacy of personality, and solidarity.
18. The chief reasons why educated people usually support the privileged classes rather than the masses.
19. The current Christian attitudes toward the League of Nations.
20. H. F. Ward's major conclusions regarding social Christianity.
21. The nature of a social theory of religious education.
22. The latest tendencies in religious-social thought.

CHAPTER XXVI

THE RISE OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

IN RECENT decades educational leaders have been thinking in sociological terms. In its experimental phases educational sociology constitutes a phase of applied sociology. The principles of modern educational sociology have a thousand sources.

Pestalozzi (1746-1827) may be considered a forerunner of current social theories of education. He was interested in humanity for humanity's sake. Like St. Francis of Assisi, he lived with the poor in order that he might teach them to be thrifty and worthy citizens. In his *Leonard and Gertrude*, he described the life of the poor, and formulated an educational procedure for educating the poor. He was a lover of little children, of poor people, of anyone in trouble, of all humanity. He spoke in dignified terms of the function of a good woman, no matter how humble her station in life. Her first duty is to educate her children and to meet the needs of her family. She has, also, obligations to her neighbors and community. Others, seeing her constructive work, will be inspired and motivated to do likewise.

In opening an industrial school for the poor, Pestalozzi recognized that the poor have the least opportunities for development and the largest numbers of problems to solve, —therefore they are in the greatest need of educational advantages. He held that all phases of human personality should be trained and that there should be “a harmonious development of all human powers.” Hence, education is the greatest gift that anyone, rich or poor, can receive. In urging that the child should be educated in

company with other children, that is, in groups, he took an attitude superior to that of Rousseau but presaging that of Froebel.

Froebel (1782-1852), the founder of the kindergarten, considered little children "as plants in a garden." He recognized the educative importance of the early years of life. He perceived the possibilities of teaching through the use of plays and games. He understood the "interests" of little children. His most important conception, perhaps, was his recognition of the gregarious impulses as an effective setting for the educative processes. While neo-Froebelians have sometimes turned all work into play and have neglected to train the child in doing some things in which he is not interested at the particular time, the utilization of the gregarious and play impulses as vital backgrounds for education is not unworthy. The evils in this connection are no greater than when the Montessori method is followed with its emphasis upon a maximum of individual choice.

In Horace Mann (1796-1859), American education found a new social emphasis. Education in a democracy, according to Mann, should be public and open equally to all classes of people. Moreover, in a democracy, education is not a mere acquisition of knowledge; it is not concealed in college degrees as such; it is not aristocratic. It was Mann's contention that education should be an actual training for rearing worthy families, for living a cooperative social life, for being a public spirited citizen in one's daily activities.

Mann asserted that the common school is the bulwark of the nation. He believed that education should encourage true religion. He inaugurated the normal training school,—in support of his theory of specially trained teachers. His social philosophy is contained in a statement from his last public address: "Be ashamed to die until you have won a victory for humanity."

SOCIAL EDUCATION

During the intervening decades since the days of Horace Mann, the social conception of education has been assuming new practical phases. Professor John Dewey has pointed out that all communication is education; that the terms, common, community, and communication, possess more than a verbal relationship.¹ Anything is educative which produces similar emotional and intellectual dispositions, that is, like ways of responding to stimuli. Societal life, hence, is unusually educative. Education consists of processes of self-development, of self-continuation, of social continuation. These processes are possible only on bases of common means of communication. It is these means, as Professor C. H. Cooley has indicated, which make even the powerful factors of suggestion and imitation so universal.

It is not the environment which directly implants certain desires in individuals.² The environment sets up conditions which stimulate certain ways of acting. The child gets a real idea of a hat, not by seeing a hat, or by being told of its uses, but by actually using a hat. The social environment, in other words, forms "the mental and emotional disposition of behavior in individuals by engaging them in activities" that arouse various impulses, purposes, and other consequences.³

As society becomes exceedingly complex, it is essential that society provide a simplified social environment through which the child may pass, in order that he may adjust himself the more quickly and easily to the complex societal environment. To this end the school serves a valuable purpose. However, in order to function best, the school must be a replica in as many ways as possible of real society.⁴

¹ *Democracy and Education*, Macmillan, 1916, p. 6.

² *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 26, 27.

The special social environment, namely, the school, must simplify and arrange in an orderly way the dispositional factors it wishes to develop in children. It must present the existing social customs in purified and idealized forms. It must create a wider and better balanced environment for the young than they would have if they were not in school.

Imitation, according to Dr. Dewey, is a less useful term than many persons believe. What objectively is a process of imitation is subjectively a process of like response to like stimuli. The term imitation does not explain; it simply describes—objectively. The fundamental fact that the sociological student needs to keep in mind is that “persons being alike in structure respond in the same way to like stimuli.”⁵ This conception is similar to ideas that Professor Giddings and Cooley have elaborated. The societal significance of this interpretation can be stated best in terms of social control. The highest type of social control is that which plans for a common mental disposition, a common way of understanding objects, events, and acts, common sets of socially constructive stimuli.

Professor Dewey argues for a school life which fully connects theory and practice. While pragmatic, he emphasizes the necessity for a correct theory, but more particularly the combining of theory and practice—in the school life itself. In other words, anything which sets school life apart from actual life is a disutility; it is educationally harmful. Hence school life must include the actual occupations, nature study, and the like. It must relegate formal education to a secondary position. The moral atmosphere of the schoolroom must change from one primarily of discipline, even formal discipline, to one of cooperation.

School life, in other terms, is properly an embryonic community life. It is the business of the school to train each child into membership of a little community that is

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

a counterpart of society at large, "saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction."⁶ Professor Dewey would make the school a miniature society, fitting its members by their daily activities in the schools for normal membership in "a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious."

The literature on educational sociology is growing rapidly. Within recent years several books on educational sociology have appeared. In the list of the authors of these works are the names of O'Shea, Snedden, Smith, King, Clow, Betts, Dutton, and others of equal importance.⁷ Professor Walter R. Smith, for example, in applying sociological principles to educational work, contends that normal school graduates have been taught to look to psychology alone for the key to sound pedagogy, whereas sociology is perhaps an equally important key to effective teaching. Education is not entirely a matter of training the mind of the individual; it is also a process of acquainting the individual with the needs of society and of helping him to participate in improving the quality of societal life. Dr. Smith urges training not *for* citizenship, but training *into* citizenship.⁸

Educational psychology is turning to educational sociology and looking to the social environment as an explanatory source of personality, as well as a field in which individuals may exercise influence. "Social consciousness," says Charles H. Judd, "instead of being something vague and intangible is one of the most active and potent facts in the world."⁹ This social consciousness becomes ex-

⁶ Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 416.

⁷ See M. V. O'Shea, *Social Development and Education*, Houghton Mifflin, 1909; David Snedden, *Sociological Determination of Objectives in Education*, Lippincott, 1921; W. R. Smith, *Educational Sociology*, Macmillan, 1917; Irving King, *Social Aspects of Education*, Macmillan, 1921; also King, *Education for Social Efficiency*, Appleton, 1913; F. R. Clow, *Principles of Sociology with Educational Applications*, Macmillan, 1920; G. H. Betts, *Social Principles of Education*, Scribner, 1913; S. T. Dutton, *Social Phases of Education*, Macmillan, 1907.

⁸ Smith, *Educational Sociology*, p. 669.

⁹ C. H. Judd, *The Psychology of Social Institutions*, Macmillan, 1926, p. 2.

pressed in social institutions, which are defined by Dr. Judd as "all those accumulations of social capital which have been produced in the course of community life." Moreover, education has come to be a process whereby society "aggressively imposes its institutions on the individual."¹⁰

In 1893, Dr. W. T. Harris, then United States Commissioner of Education, contributed a review of a book on Froebel to the *Educational Review*¹¹ and in it he said: "But no philosophy of education is fundamental until it is based on sociology—not on physiology, not even on psychology, but on sociology." Three years later he again said: "It has been a motto of my theory of education for a great many years, that education is founded on sociology."¹²

EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY

Inasmuch as men and women live and develop and work as members of groups, it is vital, according to Dr. Snedden, that children be taught as integral units of group life. It is sociology that must determine the aims of education.¹³ By sociological standards it has been proved that existing curricula in the United States are excessively individualistic in aim as well as in method. Their purpose has been to encourage the individual to win against, rather than with, his fellows. Our curricula provide self-culture studies and self-development studies, but few social culture and social development studies. The former are indispensable, but if not properly balanced by the latter they are positively dangerous.

The responsibilities of individuals for collective thinking and acting have never been taught to any degree in

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 333.

¹¹ Vol. 6, p. 84.

¹² Addresses and Proceedings, National Educational Association, 1896, p. 196.

¹³ Snedden, *American Journal of Sociology*, 25:132 ff.; see also, Snedden, *Sociological Determination of Objectives in Education*, Lippincott, 1921, p. 15.

the schools, and yet these responsibilities, not only in time of war, but increasingly so in time of peace, must be assumed widely, else democracy itself will collapse. By training pupils in the principles of individual success primarily, the schools have turned out a generation of persons who are unready to meet the new world problems that are at hand, and who are unable to promote "constructive programs making for international cooperation and friendliness."¹⁴

Custom, not social needs, has too often controlled school curricula. The *Anabasis* and Caesar's *Commentaries*, although splendid bits of literary composition, "are about as significant to the realities of a nineteenth or twentieth century as bows and arrows would be in modern warfare, or Roman galleys in the naval contests of tomorrow."¹⁵ The study of forgotten tongues and antiquated fragments of literature falls far short of training twentieth century youths for the conscious cooperative direction of the social forces of the future.

Vocational education is not all-sufficient. Youth must be taught to be socially and morally efficient — no less than physically and vocationally.¹⁶ In addition to the current emphasis upon vocational education, attention must be given to a moral education in the schools that can produce in individuals the moral character required to meet the needs of a highly developed democracy.

Educational sociology has viewed with alarm certain recent tendencies in vocational guidance. It has supported heartily the plans for giving every child an occupational training and of enabling him to earn his own living. On the other hand, it has deplored the idea that a vocation or earning a living is an end in itself. It has insisted that the main reason for teaching a boy a trade is that the boy may have a larger opportunity for developing his personality and for serving society.

¹⁴ Snedden, *Sociological Determination of Objectives in Education*, p. 94.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 107.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 109, 267.

Likewise, educational sociology has often looked askance at scientific management, or the movement for educating all workingmen to the point of highest productive efficiency. Such a training has frequently produced a maximum in profits for those who have promoted it and a minimum of increase in wages for the workers, besides tending to turn the latter into mere machines, instead of into human leaders with increased capacities for enjoyment and spiritual service.

The studies in all school curricula must be evaluated in terms of social worth.¹⁷ For example, what is the purpose of teaching history? Is it to give the pupil a chronology of dates and a catalogue of ignoble kings and bloody battles, or is it to give the pupil the meaning of social evolution, social progress, social inheritances, the rise of social needs?¹⁸

Educational sociology holds the theory that training for sociological living is as important as training for individual pecuniary success.¹⁹ It is engaged at the present time in working out techniques for introducing every member of the public schools to the sociological viewpoint. The names under which such techniques appear is immaterial, whether as community civics, American history studies, elementary social science, or elementary sociology. The next few decades will undoubtedly be marked by the rapid spread of educational sociology.

COMMUNICATION AND EDUCATION²⁰

Society not only exists *by* transmission, *by* communication, but it may fairly be said to exist *in* transmission, *in* communication. There is more than a verbal tie between the words *common*, *community*,

¹⁷ In F. R. Clow's *Principles of Sociology with Educational Applications*, Macmillan, 1920, will be found a valuable discussion of education in terms of social processes. A sane treatment of education as a solvent of social problems is given in E. R. Groves' *Social Problems and Education*, Longmans, Green and Co., 1925.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 228.

¹⁹ An important work replete with concrete applications of sociology to education is *Foundations of Educational Sociology*, by C. C. Peters, Macmillan, 1924.

²⁰ Reprinted by permission from John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, The Macmillan Company, 1916.

and *communication*. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; and communication is the way they come to possess things in common. What they must have in order to form a community or society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge—a common understanding—like-mindedness as the sociologists say. Such things cannot be passed physically from one to another, like bricks; they cannot be shared as persons would share a pie by dividing it into physical pieces. The communication which insures participation is one which secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions—like ways of responding to expectations and requirements.

Persons do not become a society by living in physical proximity, any more than a man ceases to be socially influenced by being so many feet or miles removed from others. A book or a letter may institute a more intimate association between human beings separated thousands of miles from each other than exists between dwellers under the same roof. Individuals do not even compose a social group because they all work for a common end. The parts of a machine work with a maximum of cooperativeness for a common result, but they do not form a community. If, however, they were all cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that they regulated their specific activity in view of it, then they would form a community. But this would involve communication. Each would have to know what the other was about and would have to have some way of keeping the other informed as to his own purpose and progress. Consensus demands communication.

We are thus impelled to recognize that within even the most social group there are many relations which are not as yet social. A large number of human relationships in any social group are still upon the machine-like plane. Individuals use one another so as to get desired results, without reference to the emotional and intellectual disposition and consent of those used. Such uses express physical superiority, or superiority of position, skill, technical ability, and command of tools, mechanical or fiscal. So far as the relations of parent and child, teacher and pupil, employer and employee, governor and governed, remain upon this level, they form no true social group, no matter how closely their respective activities touch one another. Giving and taking of orders modifies action and results, but does not of itself effect a sharing of purposes, a communication of interests.

Not only is social life identical with communication, but all communication (and hence all genuine social life) is educative. To be a recipient of a communication is to have an enlarged and changed experience. One shares in what another has thought and felt and in

so far, meagerly or amply, has his own attitude modified. Nor is the one who communicates left unaffected. Try the experiment of communicating, with fullness and accuracy, some experience to another, especially if it be somewhat complicated, and you will find your own attitude toward your experience changing; otherwise you resort to expletives and ejaculations. The experience has to be formulated in order to be communicated. To formulate requires getting outside of it, seeing it as another would see it, considering what points of contact it has with the life of another so that it may be got into such form that he can appreciate its meaning. Except in dealing with commonplaces and catch phrases one has to assimilate, imaginatively, something of another's experience in order to tell him intelligently of one's own experience. All communication is like art. It may fairly be said, therefore, that any social arrangement that remains vitally social, or vitally shared, is educative to those who participate in it. Only when it becomes cast in a mold and runs in a routine way does it lose its educative power.

In final account, then, not only does social life demand teaching and learning for its own performance, but the very process of living together educates. It enlarges and enlightens experience; it stimulates and enriches imaginations; it creates responsibility for accuracy and vividness of statement and thought. A man really living alone (alone mentally as well as physically) would have little or no occasion to reflect upon his past experience to extract its net meaning. The inequality of achievement between the mature and the immature not only necessitates teaching the young, but the necessity of this teaching gives an immense stimulus to reducing experience to that order and form which will render it most easily communicable and hence most usable. (pp. 5-8)

It is the very nature of life to strive to continue in being. Since this continuance can be secured only by constant renewals, life is a self-renewing process. What nutrition and reproduction are to physiological life, education is to social life. This education consists primarily in transmission through communication. Communication is a process of sharing experience till it becomes a common possession. It modifies the disposition of both the parties who partake in it. That the ulterior significance of every mode of human association lies in the contribution which it makes to the improvement of the quality of experience is a fact most easily recognized in dealing with the immature. That is to say, while every social arrangement is educative in effect, the educative effect first becomes an important part of the purpose of the association in connection with the association of the older with the younger. As societies become more complex in structure and resources, the need of formal or intentional

teaching and learning increases. As formal teaching and training grow in extent, there is the danger of creating an undesirable split between the experience gained in more direct association and what is acquired in school. This danger was never greater than at the present time, on account of the rapid growth in the last few centuries of knowledge and technical modes of skill. (pp. 11)

FUNCTION OF EDUCATIONAL SOCIOLOGY²¹

The time is ripe to begin a careful examination of the possible contributions of sociology and social economy to education. The two sciences most fundamental to education are sociology and psychology. From sociology must come answers to the question, What shall be the aim of education? From psychology must come answers to the questions, What is the educability of the individual? and, How shall we best instruct, train, or otherwise educate toward predestined goals?

In the empirical fashion characteristic of social action in pre-scientific stages educators have, of course, for thousands of years determined the purposes of conscious education on the basis of such knowledge and belief as was available regarding the needs of the family, tribe, state, army, craft, or church. The education of princes and priests, the training of captains and soldiers, and the instruction of citizens in reading and writing have nearly always been designed partly, if not chiefly, for the good of society or some important group thereof. At times it may have appeared that the good of the individual was the chief goal—in the teaching of Latin to the sons of gentlemen, a trade to the prospective guildsman, arithmetic to the American farmer's boy, or algebra to the minister's daughter. But no serious student would at any time have defended these efforts on purely individualistic grounds. The prevailing beliefs of the time held that the public good was somehow served through the persons thus rendered more cultured, keener, or more upright than they would otherwise have been. We may flatter ourselves that we have discovered the social justifications of public or endowed education; but in reality we have only restated ancient purposes in slightly more modern terms. Lester F. Ward, Herbert Spencer, and some other prominent sociologists, have indicated some of the possibilities of educational sociology. (pp. 15-16)

Quite possibly we shall have to wait on the sociologists themselves, for some new methods of analyzing and evaluating the objectives of

²¹ Reprinted by permission from David Snedden, *Sociological Determination of Objectives in Education*, Lippincott, 1921.

social and, therefore, of educational action. For, obviously, we can have no satisfactory set of working principles in the construction of curricula until we possess fairly acceptable analyses, qualitative and quantitative, of the *values* of social life. Granted that such words as security, health, righteousness, wealth, knowledge, beauty, sociability, extension of race, and communion with God express valuable ends of social action to be achieved partly through education, we are still confronted by endless problems of relative values. We cannot have everything within the space of a few years; what shall we emphasize, what ignore? Every educator knows today that, after we leave the lowest grades, the most serious difficulties are encountered in choosing among the embarrassment of riches presented to us. Here especially do we find ancient faith standards of values in conflict with modern aspirations for a scientific criteria (always condemned, of course, by conservatives, a conflict between idealism and materialism). But in spite of the meagerness of sociological support yet available, it is certain that scores of the hundreds of problems of educational aim now confronting educators are capable of being at least somewhat elucidated by sociological methods. (pp. 19-20)

It should, for example, prove easily practicable, given sufficient working resources, to analyze, classify, and at least crudely, to evaluate the habits, knowledge, appreciations, aspirations, and ideals promotive of such values as health, wealth, sociability, and righteousness which given groups or classes of adults possess, and to trace to their respective sources in original nature, environmental influence (including by-education), and school education these various qualities. It could be ascertained how far such of these qualities as are demonstrably valuable to the possessor himself, or indirectly through him to society, have been produced by school education or, in its absence, through by-education or fostered development. (p. 20)

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. Pestalozzi as a forerunner of educational sociology.
2. Froebel's leading contribution to educational sociology.
3. Educational sociology's indebtedness to Horace Mann.
4. The meaning of Dewey's assertion that communication is education.
5. The school as a simplified social environment.
6. The claim of sociology to an equal place with psychology in the training of teachers.

7. Snedden's statement regarding the place of sociology in education.
8. The chief purpose, sociologically, of teaching a boy a trade.
9. The major purposes of education according to sociology.
10. The distinctive field of educational sociology.

CHAPTER XXVII

METHODS OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

IN ANY line of thought or endeavor a correct method of procedure is all-important. Inaccurate theories of procedure have wrecked nations, hindered civilization for centuries at a time, and flooded the world with negative and harmful ideas. It will be worth while, therefore, to consider the methods by which sociology has advanced.

PRE-SCIENTIFIC

The ancient makers of social proverbs crystallized what they had individually observed many times to be true, or what they had heard repeated on many occasions as being true. Such methods were based on observation and generalization, carelessly used. Moreover, the data at the command of the makers of social proverbs were very limited.

The Hebrew prophets, fired by exalted ideas concerning the nature of Jehovah, insisted upon a practical application of these ideas to the daily life of the people of their time. When they perceived that the actions and living conditions of the people fell far below the implications of the pattern-ideas for which the name of Jehovah stood, they vehemently proclaimed definite social ideals, and condemned all who hindered the realization of these ideals. This method of creating social thought is noteworthy because of the religious dynamic behind it, and because of the social pattern-ideas which it produced.

Plato and Aristotle were pioneer social philosophers who took cosmic views of life. One followed the method of abstract reasoning and centered his thought in a world of

Ideas; the other viewed life pragmatically, employing a method of empirical tests. While sociology will always have a place for methods which interpret the daily facts of individual and social experience in their relationships to the whole human society and to the universe, it will insist that as large a body of societary data as possible be gathered together regarding any social problem before interpretations are ventured.

In the teachings of Jesus a rare insight in human nature is manifested. Jesus studied persons as individuals and, perceiving their egoistic natures, proclaimed a remedy in an inner transformation through consecration to objective factors, such as persons and ideals. Jesus was peculiarly happy in his method of moving among all classes of people, of studying their needs, and of testing in practice his social principles. While his acquaintance with human life was limited to small groups of one race, he sought universal as well as particular human tendencies. His method included a cooperative spirit, a search for truth, a broad viewpoint—all of which are thoroughly scientific.

The *Utopia* of Sir Thomas More, preceded to be sure by Plato's *Republic*, introduced another social thought method. The utopian formula consists in setting forth a set of ideals which presumably are distinctly in advance of current standards. The method of arriving at utopian ideas is largely through the use of the imagination. Standards are postulated so far in advance of current conditions as to make them of little value. Utopian social thought, however, does have some scientific merit. The imagination may be used in revealing reality to otherwise blind persons. A utopian thought may startle a person out of narrow attitudes of life. A utopian idea possesses the power which is inherent in indirect suggestion; it may arouse without antagonizing.

In the approach to the social question through an analysis of the natural rights of the individual, the seventeenth and eighteenth century social writers fell into a deductive

and a priori procedure which led them far astray. Like the theory of individual rights, the correlative doctrine of the social contract contained more error than truth.

The method of positivism, first advanced in the writings of Comte, essayed a scientific approach to social questions. It insisted upon accuracy, induction, and upon sequence and coexistence. But positivism, even in the hands of its exponents, became deductive and philosophic. It promised well scientifically, but fell into nearly all the errors which it condemned. It was, however, a factor in producing the nineteenth-century humanitarianism.

The organic analogy method of studying human society attracted widespread attention, appealed strongly to the imagination even of scholars, but resulted in findings of negligible value. The parallelisms between an organism and society proved to be scientifically valueless, except as they revealed some of the connections between organic evolution and social evolution. They created a considerable vocabulary of bio-social terminology which has been more of a hindrance than a help in social thinking.

The individual rights doctrine, the social contract theories, the concept of positivism, and the organic analogies belong to the unscientific age in sociological methodology. In the main these sets of social theories were philosophic, deductive, a priori, and argumentative. They were based chiefly on opinions, positivism alone leaning to observation and induction but failing to live up to its promises.

The psychical approach to the study of societal life, introduced by Lester F. Ward, and made scientific by the findings of inductive and behavioristic psychology, has proved thus far to be the best method of understanding social processes and of arriving at statements of sociological laws. This method has revealed human life as a series of social conflicts and accommodations, and of forms of social control designed to regulate individuals for all types of group purposes. Although he possessed an entirely inadequate knowledge of psychology, Lester F. Ward laid

the foundations of modern sociology when he insisted that society is a psychical affair, capable of mastering itself. As a result of this contribution to method, not by a psychologist but by a paleontologist, social thought moved forward into the field of scientific sociology.

There are many writers who would class Ward with the pre-scientific contributors to sociological thought. His methods, it is true, were largely deductive; his psychology was seriously faulty; his philosophy was inefficient. Nevertheless, he pointed the way for sociologists so clearly that in this treatise his work has been considered as giving the trend to recent sociology, rather than as being the last word of discredited types of social thought.

SOCIAL STATISTICS

Then there are other types of sociological methodology of which mention should be made, notably, the statistical, and the classificatory procedures. The statistical approach had its origin in the early census. There are evidences that rulers and kings, at least two or three millenniums before Christ, had enumerations of their subjects made. In connection with poor-law administration, people as early as the Roman Era were counted. But it was not until the eighteenth century that statistics became scientific, with statistical laws drawn from a study of tabulated facts. Quetelet gives 1820 as the birth year of statistical science. It was Frederick William I of Prussia who is reported to have had an enumeration made of occupational facts; and Frederick the Great, with having established a system for making regular statistical studies of population. It is said that early in the eighteenth century the University of Jena began to offer courses in statistics.

In England, in the latter part of the seventeenth century, Captain John Graunt is credited with applying methods of counting, measurement, and induction to the births and deaths in London. His studies were referred to as politi-

cal arithmetic, and were a forerunner of the current investigations in vital statistics. Malthus made use of statistical methods in his work (1798) on population changes.

Quetelet (1796-1875) is usually considered the founder of statistical science. He not only applied the method of counting to the study of the members of human society (the census method in its common form), but he tried to get at the problem of causation, and to indicate rules of procedure for making causal studies in statistics. Although this celebrated Belgian statistician tabulated and analyzed facts ranging from the astronomical to the societary fields, his ideas can be mentioned here only so far as they contributed to the subject of social thought. Quetelet pointed out certain of the pitfalls in the way of gathering accurate data. He improved the methods of census taking, and undertook the difficult tasks that are involved in qualitative human studies.

Among the results of Quetelet's work, the concept of "the average man" is well known. Quetelet defined the law of averages and described types, especially the average individual. Although it is very important and useful to know about the "average man," the term is practically fictitious, since no one even in a large group exactly fits the description. All individuals are either "above" or "below" the average.

The contributions of Quetelet in the field of social statistics were admirably supplemented by the achievements of Le Play (1806-1882). This French sociologist and mining engineer applied the methods of physical science to social science. He insisted upon observation of data and the use of induction in making generalizations. His method is illustrated by his studies in family budgets. In order to secure accurate data he lived with individual families, studying at first-hand the conditions by which they made a livelihood. Le Play opposed *laissez-faire* theories and urged programs of reform through the journal which he founded, namely, *La Reforme Sociale*. He rejected social-

ism, and advocated the method of conciliation and sympathy for effecting agreements among employers and employees. Similar methods were evolved by Engels and Bücher, German investigators.

The statistical method has been carried forward by a large number of social investigators. With averages, modes, and medians, it is now possible to make accurate quantitative studies. Current statistical methods include the use of index numbers, frequency tables, discrete series, deviations, skewness, correlations. Statistics has thrown a flood of light upon important phases of societary life,¹ such as the economic, where wage scales and price levels are significant concepts. Statistics has been widely utilized in the study of crime and poverty. The various methods of graphic presentations are valuable in interpreting tables of statistical data to the lay mind.

F. H. Giddings has given a far-reaching impetus to the statistical method in sociology, both in the classroom and in books. His *Scientific Study of Human Society*² is built on the statistical method. Societal patterns are to be sought first, and then societal variables. Behavior is pluralistic, involving "the approximately simultaneous reaction of a considerable number of individuals that happen to be in the same situation or circumstance."³ Thus, "every observable phase of human society is statistically a pluralistic field,"⁴ with sampling being necessary because of the multiplicity of factors. Most difficult of all the tasks of the sociologist is that of measuring social energies.⁵ These must be considered in terms of "what they do." "Relations of toleration, the reactions of conflict, and the

¹ M. C. Elmer in his *Social Statistics*, Jesse Ray Miller, 1926, has prepared a book especially for use in applying statistical methods to social problems. Another recent treatise in the same field is C. G. Dittmer's *Introduction to Social Statistics*, A. W. Shaw, 1926.

² University of North Carolina Press, 1924.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Ch. XI.

reactions of adjustment are notoriously contingent upon forms of association, and these contingencies in a great number of instances admit of quantitative determination."⁶

Statistical methods can be used, however, to prove almost anything.⁷ The ordinary person is helpless when statistical methods are treated unscrupulously. On the other hand, it is probably true that social thought will become increasingly accurate by the judicious use of statistical studies.

SOCIAL SURVEY

A recent development, closely related to statistical science, is the social survey. Beginning with the Pittsburgh Survey in 1907-1908, the social survey method has been widely adopted in the United States. Its use has been applied to inventories of a specific community, such as a rural district or a small number of city blocks. There is the specific survey of a given social problem, such as housing or poverty. Then there is the survey of an entire industry or a school system.

Social technology has produced the survey.⁸ The social survey, being related in its origin to the census, is an accurate method of gathering social facts, not merely facts about the numbers of people, the acreage, and the amount of wealth, but the facts about the societary assets and liabilities of a city or community, and concerning the constructive and the destructive forces. By making surveys at regular intervals of five or ten year periods, a community can determine the amount and direction of its own progress. The idea of a survey is similar to that of an inventory of a business house—to find out the gains and

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 240.

⁷ Most social statisticians are aware of these difficulties. R. E. Chaddock, in his *Principles and Methods of Statistics*, Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1925, points out with care a large number of the pitfalls into which the statistical novice is likely to fall.

⁸ M. C. Elmer, *Technique of Social Surveys*, Jesse Ray Miller, Los Angeles, 1927.

losses, and to plan for the future according to the verdict of the inventory.

The social survey is one of the most extensive sources today of social thinking. By it, large quantities of social facts are being collected. Urban and rural surveys, specific and general surveys alike, are the common bases at the present time for inductive social thinking. Some of these results have been indicated in a preceding chapter upon the contributions of applied sociology.

CLASSIFICATION

The nature of the classificatory method has already been indicated in this treatise. The Greeks classified the various fields of knowledge under three heads: physics, ethics, and politics. Francis Bacon classified knowledge according to his understanding of mental operations. He divided mental fields into three, namely, feeling, memory, reasoning; and made a corresponding division of knowledge into art, history, and science. Auguste Comte classified the social elements into four groups: the industrial, the esthetic, the scientific, and the philosophical (previsional). His hierarchal classification of the sciences into mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology has been discussed in an earlier chapter.

Guillaume de Greef may be considered the leading exponent of the classificatory method. De Greef accepted Comte's hierarchy of the sciences with its basic principles of decreasing generality and increasing dependence of parts, assented to Spencer's evolutionary dictum of increasing coherence and heterogeneity, and added his own concept of volitional contractualism.

De Greef argued that social progress is characterized by an increasing degree of volitional activity and freedom. This volitionalism is the basis of rational social control. The telic factors, however, are not well developed by De Greef. His social thought rests upon a certain logical but inaccurate classification of social factors.

The basis of this classification is increasing volitionalism and particularism. De Greef gives the following classification: economic, industrial, genetic, artistic, scientific, moral, juridical, and political. In holding that the economic elements in society represent the least volitionalism, and the political the most volitional activity, with graded degrees of volitional activities represented by the intermediate factors, the weakness of De Greef's analysis becomes evident. While an improvement over Comte's classification and superior to Spencer's mechanistic order, De Greef's contribution possesses only a relative degree of logical merit. It is far from being objectively correct, and is indicative of the difficulties in the way of classifying social elements in an evolutionary or filial order. There is no doubt but that any classification of merit would have to be arranged according to some correlative plan, which would serve the purposes of an exhibit but would not be of much scientific value. Moreover, the classifications that are most useful are classifications of societary forces; these are psychical in nature and may be illustrated by reference to the "four wishes."⁹

De Greef perceived the importance of the principle of socialization.¹⁰ He emphasized the importance of a "we" feeling in societary life. His social unit is the primitive family. In the evolution from the primitive family and state, the evidence of progress is the degree of "togetherness" that has been developed. De Greef advanced the idea that there is an increasing degree of contractualism and hence of freedom in society. De Greef's work may be taken as the best attempt to carry Comte's classification of the sciences to a logical conclusion by furnishing a classification of the elements which function in the field of the "highest" science of all, namely, sociology.

⁹ By W. I. Thomas. Dr. Thomas' development of the "life history" has made a new usage of the term, classification. In studying a new "specimen," the sociologist refers as many items as possible to well-established classifications, and thus enables them to be understood. He then examines the items that cannot be classified, and as a result may create a new classification.

¹⁰ De Greef, *Introduction a la Sociologie*, Paris, T. I, pp. 189, 202. The we-feeling concept of socialization has been extensively and helpfully developed by Edward Alsworth Ross.

At this point the methodology of Albion W. Small will be considered. Professor Small's other contributions to sociological thought have been indicated at appropriate places in earlier chapters. The correct method for pursuing sociological analyses is to treat human society in terms of process. The main current in all sound sociological study is the social process. The significant test of progress in this social process is achievement.¹¹ According to Professor Small's classification, there are six main phases of social progress, namely:

1. Achievement in promoting health.
2. Achievement in harmonizing human relations.
3. Achievement in producing wealth.
4. Achievement in discovery and spread of knowledge.
5. Achievement in the fine arts.
6. Achievement in religion.

These grand divisions are the expressions of certain interests,¹² discussed in a previous chapter, that human beings possess: (1) health interests, (2) wealth interests, (3) sociability interests, (4) knowledge interests, (5) esthetic interests, and (6) rightness interests. As a result of the operation of these interests, social problems are produced. Sociology is "the science of human interests and their workings under all conditions."

In this classification human interests serve as the main key forces to an understanding of the social process. Upon psychological examination, however, the interests are found to be bafflingly complex. The psychologist has not given a satisfactory description of interests. And yet it is clear that what people are interested in is a fair criterion of the direction which their evolution will take. Furthermore, the changes in interests of people are fundamental in telic social progress. With a correlation of interests as a subjective criterion, and of achievement as an objective test, Professor Small has shown the dualistic nature of the social process. Those methodologists who would measure

¹¹ *General Sociology*, pp. 718 ff.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 442.

all things human in purely objective terms are scientifically negligent of important human elements. Mind is not simply matter; the social process is not entirely behavior.

Professor Small has sharpened three important tools for the use of the sociological investigator. These are: the social process, personal interests, and the group. His analyses are sound, except as he does not show how "interests" usually possess social origins. Otherwise he speaks consistently and helpfully in terms of groups and group processes.

Concepts are important tools in sociological research. Without accurate usage of such concepts no progress in research can be expected. At the present writing the following classification of representative sociological concepts is offered as a basis for discussion.

Sociological research may be thought of in terms of (1) agencies participating, (2) methods of gathering data, (3) types of materials that are collected, (4) methods of treatment of the collected data, and (5) products that result from the methods of treatment.

SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

1. Agencies participating.
 - (a) Departments of sociology and related social science departments.
 - (b) Psychology, biology, and related departments.
 - (c) Social research societies and foundations.
2. Methods of gathering data.
 - (a) Observation and notation.
 - (b) Experimentation, projects, control groups.
 - (c) Intensive case-studies.
 - (d) Making social surveys and community studies.
 - (e) Personal interviewing and securing life histories.

3. Types of materials.
 - (a) Ecological data.
 - (b) Culture-history facts.
 - (c) Life histories.
4. Treatment of materials.
 - (a) Statistical.
 - (b) Logical and comparative.
 - (c) Classification and interpretation.
5. Products of treatment.
 - (a) Averages and trends.
 - (b) Coexistences and sequences.
 - (c) Social processes.

There is particular need for the agencies taking part in social research to cooperate. The future bulks large when the results of cooperative sociological research are anticipated. Individual research, however, even with university departments, is still the rule.

The methods of gathering sociological research data are still inchoate. Common agreement has not yet been reached. Experimentation with methods is the rule. In fact, much sociological research involves the search for better tools with which to work.

Culture-history materials range from the earliest anthropological data to recent historical happenings. Ecological data include physical conditions, economic resources, and culture complexes. Life histories give natural accounts of personal experiences involving the interplay of social processes.

The comparative treatment relates particularly to the weighing of different traits in different culture areas. Statistical treatment includes the application of mathematical methods to any social data subject to being counted. Classification refers to relating the unknown differences to the known classes of knowledge and thus of securing understanding.

Coexistences and sequences in culture-history phenomena lead to important generalizations. Averages and

trends locate social problems and tendencies. Processes of change and growth in attitudes are sociological fundamentals.

Sociological research culminates in both personality studies and community studies. The latter are tributary to the former, and vice versa. Both involve culture-history backgrounds.

COMMUNITY

1. Psycho-social Areas and Boundaries.
2. Material Resources and Dominance.
3. Industrial Demarcations and Structures.
4. Racial and Cultural Traditions.

PERSONALITY

1. Experiences.
2. Opinions.
3. Attitudes and Values.
4. Behavior Patterns.

Personality research is an extensive boring-in process. Heavy layers of defense reactions, and of "too-personal-to-tell" factors must be penetrated. No complete personal life history has ever been written. Some things are bound to be withheld.

Personal experiences are the first stratum. These and accompanying opinions are near the surface. They are fairly easy to obtain. Beneath are the persons' real attitudes. Influencing all are the basic wishes. Complete personality research gives a cross section of all the major personality elements.

SOCIAL STATISTICS¹³

Statistics are facts expressed in numbers and classified for study. We may include under this term, any presentation of social and other facts, activities and conditions which can be presented in their different aspects by counting the characteristic factors. (p. 15)

¹³ Reprinted with permission from M. C. Elmer, *Social Statistics*, Jesse Rav Miller, 1926.

Social statistics are such statistical data as are of significance in the analysis and understanding of group activities and the interrelationship of group activities. These may vary from time to time. Vital statistics which pertain to those events which have to do with the "origin, continuation, and termination" of life, are always of great social significance. Many statistics, however, are of social significance only when an additional factor is involved, that is, when the facts enumerated appear either as results of social activity or as conditions affecting social activity. For example, there is a certain marshy section in Michigan where frogs abound. When the number of frogs is considered with regard to the question of their reproduction and the nature of the flora and fauna of the area, the data have no social significance. When the number of frogs is considered in relation to the prospects for securing bait for catching fish, or if they climb on the railroad tracks and are considered in relation to the impeding of railroad trains, the data relating to frogs takes on social significance inasmuch as they become conditioning phenomena which influence social activities. That is, there are many things which are entirely separate from social activities, but which under specific conditions attain social significance because of their bearing upon the functioning of some particular social phenomenon. The idea of what constitutes social statistics is relative and is dependent upon the circumstances under which the phenomena are considered. Data concerning the existence of iodine in any region do not constitute social statistics, but when the absence of iodine is shown to have a causal relationship to the presence of goiter, the data relating to the extent of the presence of iodine in any region becomes of social significance. The data compiled by the Weather Bureau regarding changes in temperature, rainfall, and air currents, are not social statistics. But when the variations in temperature, in rainfall, and in air currents affect the activities of man they become working data for the social statistician. Data which enumerate the extent of various elements in the soil are not considered to be social statistics, but when these data are considered in their relationship to the production of food, or minerals, or the construction of roads or other social activities, they become of importance in the statistical study of social phenomena. When we find that certain phenomena affect social activities in a marked degree, and that the tendency to respond to such phenomena is constant to a certain degree, we trace the basis for statistical analysis of social causation and we may begin to measure and compare effects produced upon social processes in concrete terms based upon objective data. Until we are able to do so, much of our sociological explanation will be based upon individual observations interpreted subjectively, and hence will not be of such a nature that

we can make scientific comparison, since each observation will be recorded according to the particular reaction it caused in the mind of the observer, rather than being a record of the occurrence in terms of a definitely established standard of measure.

There must be sufficient knowledge of statistical methods and processes to select the particular method most suitable for the interpretation and analysis of different types of data. The ultimate purpose of statistical methods applied to the study of sociology is to establish the principles underlying group activities and their inter-relationship through the analysis of all the facts presented by a study of social activities themselves and of all the facts by which social activities are conditioned or in which they result.

One who deals practically with the problem of social statistics must first understand statistical methods. However, his chief interest is not the development of formulae as is the case with the methodologist, but rather with the application of principles in understanding and interpreting the results of investigations of social phenomena. Statistics should throw light on the different social structures and processes in society which constitute the objectives of sociological study. (pp. 17-19)

The problem which social statistics must meet includes measuring the functioning of group activities. We have seen that it is not possible to measure social activities in their psychic aspect in terms of a unit which may be applied as a measure to specific group activities and permit of the accurate recording of all possible variations. It is, however, possible to measure many of their overt manifestations in conduct as well as the conditions which determine the nature of a group activity and also the results of activities in terms of a definite unit. This is true in the case of social activity, just as it is in the case of an explosion, where the nature of the explosive activity was unknown, but where conditioning factors were known in terms of definite units of measure, and where results were equally measurable.

The nature of conditioning phenomena especially is often such that they may be definitely determined by reason of their measurable attributes and thus we secure "attribute statistics," by which we measure the conditioning phenomena. And the activities themselves can be measured by the number of repetitions of overt acts and by the resultant phenomena, that is, their measurement is based upon attribute statistics, in order to find the correlation between the conditioning phenomena and social movements. The social movements are made up of variable qualities, which may be expressed as variable statistics, when once they are determined by their correlation

with the measurable conditioning and resultant phenomena. When this is established we may with a knowledge of the conditioning phenomena, predict or determine the form and nature of the social activity, resulting in connection with the known measurable conditions. (pp. 27- 28)

The effect of the work of the public school or of any other social activity upon other group activities constitutes a set of problem phenomena, for every social activity is itself a condition of other social activities. However, it is possible on the one hand to establish standardization tests of group activities and on the other hand to determine the nature and functioning of activities by our knowledge of the results of the activity and by the association of a measurable factor or factors, conditioning or resultant, with any given activity. Just as we are able to determine with a reasonable degree of accuracy, the variable qualities of a public school, or the extent of an explosion by means of our knowledge of attribute qualities, or conditioning and resultant phenomena associated therewith, so we are likewise enabled to measure the functioning of social phenomena in general. (p. 29)

Since the actual functioning is sometimes impossible of being measured, we must often find the measurable phenomena which determine or condition such functioning and the resultant factors. Take for example, the following problem: What effect does the ownership of homes have upon the activities of daily life? The ownership of homes is an economic condition. The data concerning ownership of homes is of value to the sociologist if it in any way affects the functioning of the social activities of the family. If the ownership of homes is of sociological significance, what is that significance? How does the functioning of the family vary with an increase or decrease in home ownership?

The need of understanding correlations of this nature has long been recognized, and in fact all scientific plans for the development of group activities must be based upon such correlations. It has, however, been generally felt that since social phenomena were so varied, and because the problems resulting from human variation were involved, that they could not be reduced to measurable terms. Consequently, to a very large extent, social statistics have been limited to the bare enumeration of specific facts, and to the calculation of the degree of correlation of separate sets of facts. "This has made up the bulk of data in most surveys, community studies, and specific studies of social activities in which enumeration of statistical data played the major part. While it is true that there is usually a high correlation between such concrete conditioning phenomena and the part the related activity plays in the life of the

group concerned, the weakness of this type of data as a basis for evaluation is due to the fact that it does not have any actual information concerning the functioning of agencies and activities within the group." The possibility of measuring the social activity has been, as a rule, ignored. It has generally been assumed that there was no way of measuring the functioning of social phenomena with any degree of accuracy. It should now be clear, however, that this is not necessarily the case. The apparent complexity of social phenomena has discouraged students from attempting to work out exact methods of measuring them. However, the problem is not different from that of measuring activity in the natural sciences. If a certain building is rocked by an explosion, it is possible to estimate with a considerable degree of accuracy the extent of the explosion. It will not be possible to measure the movement of the explosion which has taken place, but if we are given the data of the conditioning factors, if we know the type, quality and quantity of explosive, the type of container, the location, and nature of the surrounding part of the structures, and similar facts, which are not part of the explosion, but which have an important bearing on it, and between which and the explosive force there is a known correlation, we shall be able to describe the explosion with a considerable degree of accuracy.

In order to develop sociology scientifically, we must carry measurement as far as possible, and it will be necessary to understand conditioning elements which have a direct and indirect relationship to group activities. We must also be able to measure definitely these conditions in terms of exact units of measure, and establish the degree of correlation between these conditions and the problem phenomena, that is, the group activities, in terms of resultant phenomena. We can also, in at least a large proportion of cases, state the results of these activities in measurable terms. Moreover, we can measure the social activities themselves. Not in their psychic aspect as they exist for the consciousness of the actors, but in their overt aspect, as forms of conduct. When this is accomplished and we have determined measurable correlations between social activities in their overt aspect and conditions influencing them, and the results that flow from them, in short, when the statistical methods are applied to the study of social phenomena, we shall have made the next step in the scientific development of sociology. (pp. 30-33)

COMMUNITY STUDIES¹⁴

The community, as distinguished from the individuals who compose it, has an indefinite life span. We know that communities come into existence, expand and flourish for a time, and then de-

¹⁴ Reprinted by permission from paper by Robert E. Park in *The Urban Community* (edited by E. W. Burgess), University of Chicago Press, 1926.

cline. This is as true of human societies as it is of plant communities. We do not know with any precision as yet the rhythm of these changes. We do know that the community outlives the individuals who compose it. And this is one reason for the seemingly inevitable and perennial conflict between the interests of the individual and the community. This is one reason why it costs more to police a growing city than one which is stationary and declining.

Every new generation has to learn to accommodate itself to an order which is defined and maintained mainly by the older. Every society imposes some sort of discipline upon its members. Individuals grow up, are incorporated into the life of the community, and eventually drop out and disappear. But the community, with the moral order which it embodies, lives on. The life of the community therefore involves a kind of metabolism. It is constantly assimilating new individuals, and just as steadily, by death or otherwise, eliminating older ones. But assimilation is not a simple process, and, above all else, takes time.

The problem of assimilating the native-born is a very real one; it is the problem of the education of children in the homes and of adolescents in the schools. But the assimilation of adult immigrants, finding for them places in the communal organization, is a more serious problem: it is the problem of adult education, which we have just in recent years begun to consider with any real sense of its importance.

There is another aspect of the situation which we have hardly considered. Communities whose population increase is due to the excess of births over deaths and communities whose increase is due to immigration exhibit important differences. Where growth is due to immigration, social change is of necessity more rapid and more profound. Land values, for one thing, increase more rapidly; the replacement of buildings and machinery, the movement of population, changes in occupation, increase in wealth, and reversals in social position proceed at a more rapid tempo. In general, society tends to approach conditions which are now recognized as characteristic of the frontier.

In a society in which great and rapid changes are in progress there is a greater need for public education of the sort that we ordinarily gain through the public press, through discussion and conversation. On the other hand, since personal observation and tradition, upon which common sense, as well as the more systematic investigations of science, is finally based, are not able to keep pace with changes in conditions, there occurs what has been described by Ogburn as

the phenomenon of "cultural lag." Our political knowledge and our common sense do not keep up with the actual changes that are taking place in our common life. The result is, perhaps, that as the public feels itself drifting, legislative enactments are multiplied, but actual control is decreased. Then, as the public realizes the futility of legislative enactments, there is a demand for more drastic action, which expresses itself in ill-defined mass movements and, often, in mere mob violence. For example, the lynchings in the Southern states and the race riots in the North.

So far as these disorders are in any sense related to movements of population—and recent studies of race riots and lynchings indicate that they are—the study of what we have described as social metabolism may furnish an index, if not an explanation, of the phenomenon of race riots.

One of the incidents of the growth of the community is the social selection and segregation of the population, and the creation, on the one hand, of natural social groups, and, on the other, of natural social areas. We have become aware of this process of segregating in the case of the immigrants, and particularly in the case of the so-called historical races, peoples, who, whether immigrants or not, are distinguished by racial marks. The Chinatowns, the Little Sicilies, and the other so-called "ghettos" with which students of urban life are familiar are special types of a more general species of natural area which the conditions and tendencies of city life inevitably produce.

Such aggregations of population as these take place, first, upon the basis of language and of culture, and second, upon the basis of race. Within these immigrant colonies and racial ghettos, however, other processes of selection inevitably take place which bring about segregation based upon vocational interests, upon intelligence, and personal ambition. The result is that the keener, the more energetic, and the more ambitious very soon emerge from their ghettos and immigrant colonies and move into an area of second immigrant settlement, or perhaps into a cosmopolitan area in which the members of several languages and racial groups meet and live side by side. More and more, as the ties of race, language, and of culture are weakened, successful individuals move out and eventually find their places in business and in the professions, among the older population group which has ceased to be identified with any language or racial group. The point is that change of occupation, personal success or failure—changes of economic and social status, in short—tend to be registered in changes of location. The physical or ecological organization of the community, in the long run, responds to and

reflects the occupational and the cultural. Social selection and segregation, which creates the natural groups, determine at the same time the natural areas of the city.

The modern city differs from the ancient in one important respect. The ancient city grew up around a fortress; the modern city has grown up around a market. The ancient city was the center of a region which was relatively self-sufficing. The goods that were produced were mainly for home consumption, and not for trade beyond the limits of the local community. The modern city, on the other hand, is likely to be the center of a region of very highly specialized production, with a corresponding widely extended trade area. Under these circumstances the main outlines of the modern city will be determined (1) by local geography and (2) by routes of transportation.

Local geography, modified by railways and other major means of transportation all connecting, as they invariably do, with the larger industries, furnish the broad lines of the city plan. But these broad outlines are likely to be overlaid and modified by another and a different distribution of population and of institutions, of which the central retail shopping area is the center. Within this central downtown area itself certain forms of business, the shops, the hotels, theaters, wholesale houses, office buildings, and banks, all tend to fall into definite and characteristic patterns, as if the position of every form of business and building in the area were somehow fixed and determined by its relation to every other.

Out on the periphery of the city, again, industrial and residential suburbs, dormitory towns, and satellite cities seem to find, in some natural and inevitable manner, their predetermined places. Within the area bounded on the one hand by the central business district and on the other by the suburbs, the city tends to take the form of a series of concentric circles. These different regions, located at different relative distances from the center, are characterized by different degrees of mobility of the population.

The area of greatest mobility, i.e., of movement and change of population, is naturally the business center itself. Here are the hotels, the dwelling-places of the transients. Except for the few permanent dwellers in these hotels, the business center, which is the city *par excellence*, empties itself every night and fills itself every morning. Outside the city, in this narrower sense of the term, are the slums, the dwelling-places of the casuals. On the edge of the slums there are likely to be regions, already in process of being submerged, characterized as the "rooming-house area," the dwelling-places of bohemians, transient adventurers of all sorts, and the unsettled

young folk of both sexes. Beyond these are the apartment-house areas, the region of small families and delicatessen shops. Finally, out beyond all else, are the regions of duplex apartments and of single dwellings, where people still own their homes and raise children, as they do, to be sure, in the slums.

The typical urban community is actually much more complicated than this description indicates, and there are characteristic variations for different types and sizes of cities. The main point, however, is that everywhere the community tends to conform to some pattern, and this pattern invariably turns out to be a constellation of typical urban areas, all of which can be geographically located and specifically defined.

Natural areas are the habitats of natural groups. Every typical urban area is likely to contain a characteristic selection of the population of the community as a whole. In great cities the divergence in manners, in standards of living, and in general outlook on life in different urban areas is often astonishing. The difference in sex and age groups, perhaps the most significant indexes of social life, are strikingly divergent for different natural areas. There are regions in the city in which there are almost no children, areas occupied by the residential hotels, for example. There are regions where the number of children is relatively high: in the slums, in the middle-class residential suburbs, to which the newly married usually graduate from their first honeymoon apartments in the city. There are other areas occupied almost wholly by young married people, boy and girl bachelors. There are regions where the people almost never vote, except at national elections; regions where the divorce rate is higher than it is for any state in the Union, and other regions in the same city where there are almost no divorces. There are areas infested by boy gangs and the athletic and political clubs into which the members of these gangs or the gangs themselves frequently graduate. There are regions in which the suicide rate is excessive; regions in which there is, as recorded by statistics, an excessive amount of juvenile delinquency, and other regions in which there is almost none. (pp. 6-12)

In order to make comprehensible the changes which take place in society it is necessary to reckon with the changes which take place in the individual units of which society seems to be composed. The consequence is that the social element ceases to be the individual and becomes an attitude, the individual's tendency to act. Not individuals, but attitudes, interact to maintain social organizations and to produce social changes.

This conception means that geographical barriers and physical distances are significant only when and where they define the con-

ditions under which communication and social life are actually maintained. But human geography has been profoundly modified by human invention. The telegraph, telephone, newspaper, and radio, by converting the world into one vast whispering-gallery, have dissolved the distances and broken through the isolation which once separated races and people. New devices of communication are steadily multiplying, and incidentally complicating, social relations. The history of communication is, in a very real sense, the history of civilization. Language, writing, the printing press, the telegraph, telephone, and radio, mark epochs in the history of mankind. But these, it needs to be said, would have lost most of their present significance if they had not been accompanied by an increasingly wider division of labor.

I have said that society exists in and through communication. By means of communication individuals share in a common experience and maintain a common life. It is because communication is fundamental to the existence of society that geography and all the other factors that limit or facilitate communication may be said to enter into its structure and organization at all. Under these circumstances the concept of position, of distance, and of mobility have come to have a new significance. Mobility is important as a sociological concept only in so far as it insures new social contact, and physical distance is significant for social relations only when it is possible to interpret it in terms of social distance.

The social organism—and that is one of the most fundamental and disconcerting things about it—is made up of units capable of locomotion. The fact that every individual is capable of movement in space insures him an experience that is private and peculiar to himself, and this experience, which the individual acquires in the course of his adventures in space, affords him, in so far as it is unique, a point of view for independent and individual action. It is the individual's possession and consciousness of a unique experience, and his disposition to think and act in terms of it, that constitutes him finally a person.

The child, whose actions are determined mainly by its reflexes, has at first no such independence and no such individuality, and is, as a matter of fact, not a person.

It is this diversity in the experiences of individual men that makes communication necessary and consensus possible. If we always responded in like manner to like stimulation there would not be, as far as I can see, any necessity for communication, nor any possibility of abstract and reflective thought. The demand for knowledge arises from the very necessity of checking up and funding these

divergent individual experiences, and of reducing them to terms which make them intelligible to all of us. A rational mind is simply one that is capable of making its private impulses public and intelligible. It is the business of science to reduce the inarticulate expression of our personal feelings to a common universe of discourse, and to create out of our private experiences an objective and intelligible world.

We not only have, each of us, our private experiences, but we are acutely conscious of them, and much concerned to protect them from invasion and misinterpretation. Our self-consciousness is just our consciousness of these individual differences of experience, together with a sense of their ultimate incommunicability. This is the basis of all our reserves, personal and racial; the basis, also, of our opinions, attitudes, and prejudices. If we were quite certain that everyone was capable of taking us, and all that we regard as personal to us, at our own valuation; if, in other words, we were as naïve as children, or if, on the other hand, we were all as suggestible and lacking in reserve as some hysterics, we should probably have neither persons nor society. For a certain isolation and a certain resistance to social influences and social suggestion is just as much a condition of sound personal existence as of a wholesome society. It is just as inconceivable that we should have persons without privacy as it is that we should have society without persons.

It is evident, then, that space is not the only obstacle to communication, and that social distances cannot always be adequately measured in purely physical terms. The final obstacle to communication is self-consciousness.

What is the meaning of this self-consciousness, this reserve, this shyness, which we so frequently feel in the presence of strangers? It is certainly not always fear of physical violence. It is the fear that we will not make a good impression; the fear that we are not looking our best; that we shall not be able to live up to our conception of ourselves, and particularly, that we shall not be able to live up to the conception which we should like other persons to have of us. We experience this shyness in the presence of our own children. It is only before our most intimate friends that we are able to relax wholly, and so be utterly undignified and at ease. It is only under such circumstances, if ever, that communication is complete and that the distances which separate individuals are entirely dissolved.

This world of communication and of "distances," in which we all seek to maintain some sort of privacy, personal dignity, and poise, is a dynamic world, and has an order and a character quite its own. In this social and moral order the conception which each of us has of himself is limited by the conception which every other individual,

in the same limited world of communication, has of himself, and of every other individual. The consequence is—and this is true of any society—every individual finds himself in a struggle for status; a struggle to preserve his personal prestige, his point of view, and his self-respect. He is able to maintain them, however, only to the extent that he can gain for himself the recognition of everyone else whose estimate seems important; that is to say, the estimate of everyone else who is in his set or in his society. From this struggle for status no philosophy of life has yet discovered a refuge. The individual who is not concerned about his status in some society is a hermit, even when his seclusion is a city crowd. The individual whose conception of himself is not at all determined by the conceptions that other persons have of him is probably insane.

Ultimately the society in which we live invariably turns out to be a moral order in which the individual's position, as well as his conception of himself—which is the core of his personality—is determined by other individuals and by the standards which the group upholds. In such a society the individual becomes a person. A person is simply an individual who has somewhere, in some society, social status; but status turns out finally to be a matter of distance—social distance.

It is because geography, occupation, and all other factors which determine the distribution of population determine so irresistibly and fatally the place, the group, and the associates with whom each one of us is bound to live that spatial relations come to have, for the study of society and human nature, the importance which they do.

It is because social relations are so frequently and so inevitably correlated with spatial relations; because physical distances so frequently are, or seem to be, the indexes of social distances, that statistics have any significance whatever for sociology. And this is true, finally, because it is only as social and psychical facts can be reduced to, or correlated with, spatial facts that they can be measured at all. (pp. 14-18)

THE SOCIAL BASE MAP¹⁵

The map is a device for studying the spatial distribution and movement of social phenomena. Persons, institutions, peoples, attitudes, may be viewed as interesting social forces which mutually repel or attract each other. Their location and movement in space at any given moment is the resultant of mutually modifying social forces plus the effect of geographic forces. Like iron filings under

¹⁵ Reprinted with permission from article by Erle F. Young, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, IX:202-206.

the influence of a magnet they behave in characteristic ways and assume characteristic forms and patterns. A study of these social patterns is at once a clue to the character of the social forces in question and to the effect of geographic forces. The study of the geography of a given form of social behavior is, therefore, a first step in the analysis of the forces which determine that behavior.

Humans, like plants and animals, sort themselves out into territorial groups which may be classified by the particular combination of elements they contain. Compatibles live peaceably side by side; incompatibles are avoided or driven out. A survey of a bit of prairie, or swamp, or woodland, reveals a variety of competing and cooperating forms of plant and animal life. These forms are in a constantly changing state of equilibrium or approximate equilibrium with reference to soil and climatic conditions and with reference to each other. Maps showing the distribution and movements of the various forms of life in an area are analogous to the graphic formulae of the chemist by which the relations of the constituent elements of a chemical compound are represented. Each such map or formula shows a phase of the whole process whose course the student is following. From the standpoint of any particular form of life found within the area, the map is a picture of conditions under which it maintains itself.

Humans behave in a somewhat similar manner. Within the slum, for example, are found a number of interrelated persons and institutions. Unemployed hoboies, soap box orators, criminals, prostitutes, cheap restaurants, employment agencies, missions, all find there a congenial habitat. Along the "Gold Coast" the Four Hundred, social climbers, "four-flushers," "hall-room boys," caterers, exclusive shops, apartment hotels, flourish. If any considerable area of a large city is mapped it will be found to consist of a number of sub-areas, each with its peculiar life. Each area represents a more or **less distinct** form of communal organization which can be distinguished from that of adjacent areas. Each has boundaries which mark it off as in some sense a world apart. In contra-distinction to the arbitrarily determined political, statistical, and administrative areas these areas may be called "natural areas."

The distribution of forms of social behavior, say juvenile delinquency, non-voting, pauperism, or race rioting, needs to be studied with reference to these natural areas. Are these forms of behavior characteristic of certain types of areas? What are the associated phenomena within the given area? Under what local conditions does the phenomenon in question tend to appear and disappear? And so on.

In the search for causal factors the student soon notices that some aspects of the community are more permanent and in a sense more

fundamental than others. Most obvious among these are certain outstanding natural geographic features. Rivers, lakes, the lay of the land, and so on, determine many of the natural boundary lines and fix the avenues of communication. Of equal importance are human geographic elements, such as the location of thoroughfares, street plans, canals, railroads, industrial areas, parks, tunnels, bridges, buildings, and so on. Once constructed these act as forces which determine in part the forms of activities which can be advantageously carried on thereafter within the area. They direct, or inhibit, or accelerate growth and movement. They meet peculiar needs of various economic, racial, or language groups. They encourage or prevent various types of disorganization.

The physical structure of the area as it now stands has been determined by the character and activities of its past and present occupants but in turn it determines the character and activities of its future occupants. Slow changes occur whose cumulative effect may be very great, but for considerable periods we may regard the present geographic elements, whether natural or human in origin, as basic forces in communal life. Where zoning laws have been enacted still greater permanency of the communal structure is assured.

It is desirable therefore, in mapping social data, to use a base map which will enable the student of community life (1) to make graphic correlations of the data with the more permanent significant geographic elements of communal structure, and (2) to plot the data so that its relation to the various natural areas is immediately apparent.

A social base map which will serve this dual function will, of course, show features not usually shown on maps, such as rivers, lakes, hills, and other topographic aspects, street layout, bridges, tunnels, and transportation systems. In addition it should show some important relatively permanent aspect of communal organization. For this purpose land usage presents certain advantages. A convenient classification is: (1) railroad property; (2) industrial property; (3) commercial property; (4) public and private parks and boulevards, cemeteries, golf links, and so on; (5) residential areas; and (6) vacant property. Each type of usage should be distinguished by some convenient symbol which will not interfere with the plotting of data directly over it.¹⁶

¹⁶ In preparing maps of Chicago the following symbols were used: railroad property, solid black; industrial property, medium weight diagonal cross-hatched line; commercial frontage, by a heavy solid line along the front of the block; parks, boulevards, cemeteries, and so on were stippled; vacant blocks were put in with a broken line; and residential areas with a full line. Blue line prints (white prints) were made of this base from the tracing and colored inks used for plotting data on these prints.

The particular advantage of this classification by land usage lies in the fact that it reveals much of the fundamental structure of the community. Railroad property and the flanking industrial property generally lie on the periphery of residential areas owing to the nature of the industrial processes. They act as barriers between adjacent residential areas. The movement of racial and language tides across the city is checked, if not completely stopped by them. Frequently, widely different levels of economic and cultural life occur on opposite sides of these barriers. They are not infrequently the battleground for adjacent incompatible racial or language groups. Large parks, boulevards, large enclosed vacant spaces are also frequently dividing lines between communities. Main thoroughfares with their commercial activities and lines of transportation, on the other hand, run through the heart of the community. Where two such thoroughfares cross a focus of community activities will generally be found. Here land values and rentals are high and the most important economic institutions of the community are located.

EXPERIENCE AND RACE RELATIONS¹⁷

In the study of race relations, we are concerned with more than the formal facts. We are concerned with experiences and with personal reactions of individuals and races.

It is not sufficient to know what happened; we want to know how the transaction looked through the eyes of individuals seeing it from opposing points of view. If there were not racial points of view there would be no race problems.

What is experience? How shall we distinguish experience from other forms of knowledge? The same experiences may be data for both the historian and the sociologist, but these different sciences deal with these data differently. How differently and why?

Experience, in the limited sense in which we ordinarily use that term as distinguished from other forms of knowledge, is concrete, personal, and unique. To say that it is personal is merely to say that it is the result of action rather than reflection. We may describe experience, from this point of view, as James Harvey Robinson has described history, as "the reaction of man's instincts and traditions to new conditions."

To say on the other hand that experience is unique is merely to say that experiences do not repeat themselves. We sometimes say

¹⁷ Reprinted by permission from article by R. E. Park, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Sept.-Oct., 1924.

that we had today the same experience that we had yesterday or a week before. This, however, is never quite accurate. We never have the same experience twice. An experience is like an historical fact; it always has a date and a location and it happens only once. Ideas on the other hand, as Plato first of all observed, are timeless and not located.

Experience is not fact, not even historical fact. It is merely A's or B's personal reaction to, and interpretation of, an event. Until A's experience has been checked up with B's and with C's experiences of the same event we would not call it an historical fact.

WHERE HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY PART

This is, however, just the point of view at which the historian and the sociologist part company. The historian is quite as interested in the experiences of individuals, and groups of individuals, as is the sociologist, but for a somewhat different reason. The historian wants to know what actually happened. His material is, to be sure, the *naïve* narratives of the persons participating in the transaction. Out of this mass of circumstance he seeks to disentangle and interpret the actual transaction.

The sociologist is not primarily concerned with the event itself. He rather takes that for granted. What he is more particularly concerned about are the attitudes of the persons involved, as they are reflected in their very differing accounts of the same historical event. He is interested in anything, in fact, that will throw light upon these attitudes and make them intelligible. It is just this difference in the points of view of the different groups,—racial and political,—that he seeks to discover and record. It is not the event but the attitude—the individual or the group mind—that the sociologist, as distinguished from the historian, is seeking to describe and explain.

For that reason, any expression of those different points of view, whether it pretends to be fact or not, just so long as it fairly reflects the sentiments and attitudes, is interesting and important.

MYTH AND LEGEND AS SOCIOLOGICAL DATA

Much that the historian might characterize as myth and legend, much that is pure poetry, even gossip, so far as it reflects the dominant attitude of the races and parties involved, may furnish material for the student of race relations—may, in fact, furnish material for the student of society. What is society, finally, but just this whole vast complex of human relations in which parties, races, and nations are involved?

The value of "experiences" to the sociologist is then that they are sources, not the only, but perhaps the best, from which the student can gain a knowledge and an understanding of the attitudes of strange and unassimilated peoples.

Attitudes, however, are not opinions. An individual's own account of his attitude is his opinion; but opinions are after all what the psycho-analysts call a "rationalization." They are his explanations and justifications of his attitudes, rather than his actual "tendencies to act."

It is certain, at least, that every man's opinion becomes more intelligible if we know the particular circumstances under which it was conceived; particularly if we knew also, the circumstances that have reaffirmed and intensified it. It is for this reason that, in studying opinions, we seek to go back to the point of genesis, seek to define the concrete circumstances under which opinions took form, and the motives which inspired them. Knowing these things we may say we not only *know* an opinion but we *understand* it. An opinion becomes intelligible in one sense at least, not when we approve of it, but when, knowing the *circumstances*, we are able to appreciate the motives that inspired it.

WHAT IS MEANT BY MAKING MOTIVES

To make an opinion intelligible in the sense here indicated is to discover and describe the concrete experiences in which it is imbedded. There is always some sort of complex behind every motor tendency, every motor tendency that is not a mere reflex.

To make an attitude intelligible it is necessary to study its natural history; to reproduce the circumstances under which it arose so completely that the observer can enter imaginatively into the situation and the experience of which the attitude is a part. This, at any rate, is the first step.

Reproducing an experience in such a way that it can be made an object of observation involves what Ellwood calls "sympathetic introspection." Let us see how this reproduction, and the subsequent *interpretation* and *explanation*, actually take place. The experience *contains*, so to speak, both the event and the attitude. As students of race-relations, we are not concerned primarily with the event. The event is what actually happened.

What actually happened is a matter for historical investigation. What the student of race-relations wants to know is: (1) the social situation, (2) the individual's reaction in that situation, as reflected in his experience.

What is a social situation? Well, it is always something more general than an historical situation. I may begin a narrative by saying: "I once had the experience of an earthquake in Java." The social situation here is defined by "earthquake," not by the fact that it was in Java, although the fact that it took place in Java may be found later to introduce some important modification in the situation that it is necessary to take account of. However, in general this is an "earthquake situation" and I go on to tell how I felt and acted in that situation.

Some one else relates a similar experience. The two experiences are different but they have points of comparison. The student of human nature is interested in this comparison, in the similarities and in the differences. He gathers from a comparison of these experiences something about the way people in general behave in earthquakes.

Here again the sociologist parts company with the historian. The historian is interested in these generalizations about human nature in so far as they enable him to determine just what actually happened in a given place and at a given date. The historian *interprets* the experience. The sociologist is interested in the particular experience only so far as it enables him to say something about human nature in general, irrespective of any particular time and place. The sociologist classifies the experience and so *explains* it. Let us return for a moment to our earthquake in Java.

If the experiences in the earthquake are peculiar and quite foreign to ordinary experiences, the student may want to gather a number of cases to see how true to type the individual cases are. Having found the type, he is interested mainly in the variations from it. The question he asks is: Taking account of the variations in the situation, how far can they be reduced to certain general types?

The procedure here is just the same as in any of the natural and explanatory sciences. We explain things by putting them under some general category, classifying them, in short, and then discovering where we can, the reason for the deviation from type.

Of course, the situation cannot always be defined so simply and so explicitly as we have sought to do here. It might be described, for example, as "earthquake plus fire, general terror, and crowd excitement." The crowd excitement might have so intensified the reaction as to almost totally change it.

Most of the experiences of the alien and oriental population will fall under certain general and familiar categories, there will be certain modifications that need to be explained by further observation and analysis. The presumption is that they will be explained

by differences in the situation. These differences may be (1) the physical appearance of the Oriental, (2) his traditions, (3) minor changes in the situation defined by time, place, and circumstance.

TYPICAL EXPERIENCES

The general assumption is that experiences are likely to be more intelligible than opinions, which are the inferences we draw from them. If we are able to reproduce the experiences we will be able to appreciate the motives and share the feelings that entered into them. Ordinarily the behavior of another individual becomes intelligible as soon as we are able to reproduce all the circumstances, including perhaps the previous history of the individual involved.

Ordinarily explanation of an experience does not mean more than such an imaginative reproduction of it. If the thing is still strange, if it is still unintelligible, we need more details and we ask further questions. If, however, we can bring ourselves to feel how, under the circumstances, we might have behaved the same way: as soon, in short, as we can reduce this new and strange experience to some pattern that we are familiar with, it becomes intelligible.

The fact is, however, that as soon as we are able imaginatively to reproduce an experience, we have already classified it. Our general class or category, under which the particular experience is subsumed, may be explicitly stated, may in fact be quite below the level of clear consciousness—still it is there and functions as a category.

When the class or general pattern under which the particular experience is subsumed is explicitly stated, we have an explanation of the experience in the more formal sense of that word.

We may re-state the matter this way: We explain opinions when we refer them to the attitudes of which they are a rationalization. We make attitudes intelligible when we are able to reproduce the experiences in which they are imbedded. We explain experiences as we are able to reduce them to general types—types of human behavior—where behavior includes not merely the external act but the feelings ordinarily associated with it.

THE RESEARCH INTERVIEW¹⁸

The social research interview, while referring in part to the types of interviews already discussed aims particularly at discovering human attitudes and adequate bases for interpreting these. The research interviewer is a social reporter, seeking first of all an accurate

¹⁸ Reprinted by permission from E. S. Bogardus, *The New Social Research*, Jesse Ray Miller, 1926.

account of human experiences; of the experiences in which attitudes, opinions, prejudices, are embraced; of experiences that lie behind conflict and accommodation situations alike; of experiences that are different. To make personal experiences objective is the main problem. To get what is in the back of persons' minds out into the open is the chief task. To find out what is behind the faces of the people one meets is the goal. It is important to get pertinent experiences put down in writing by persons concerning themselves,—to get individuals "to pour out their souls."

Personal experience materials are not to be thought of as final; they are simply source materials to be analyzed. Like historical documents they are to be treated objectively, and evaluated critically. When a stock of experience materials has been acquired by the interview method, research work proper is not completed, but merely ready to be started.

To secure personal experience materials orally and write them out afterward is the simplest process, but this involves the special problem of overcoming one's own biases in judging what is fundamental. To get people to write out their experiences regarding a specific social situation is more difficult, for there arises in the interviewee's mind the special inhibition that these statements, in his own handwriting, may rise up some day to plague him. To get others to write out a complete "life history" is the most difficult and worthwhile undertaking of all.

THE PROBLEM: SECURING MENTAL RELEASE

The most frequent and general problem is that of overcoming the inhibitions, due to whatever cause, of the interviewee. Sometimes the assurance that the materials will be treated impersonally and that substitute names may be used will produce a favorable response. The reticence and inhibitions of the immigrant interviewee, for instance, may be due to lack of understanding, a deep-seated suspicion, or pure stubbornness. Sometimes looking up previous residences of the interviewee will give a clue to the different dissatisfactions and the new experiences that he has had, and serve as an adequate basis for a successful interview. Again, the friends that a person has, the newspaper that he reads, the places where he spends his leisure time are an index to his interests and to openings for successful interviews.

Then, there is the person who is not interested in social problems, who does not want to express an opinion at all, who feels that his own experiences are insignificant, and who, in short, does not want to be interviewed. There is the person who feels that a statement of

his experiences would be "too personal," and who has a resultant tendency to deal in "glittering generalities" and to refrain carefully from anything of a personal experience nature.

An occupational psychosis is often a controlling factor. Executives and those accustomed to putting other persons to work or to instructing others, are interested in getting others to give personal data but decline to offer help from their own experiences. The occupational habit of getting others to do things hinders free response on the part of the executive or teacher himself. One of the most difficult persons to get any written materials from was one of our race-relations interviewers. He could get others to give him materials, but did not give anything himself. The "intellectual tightwad" is one of the most difficult persons to interview.

Sometimes the personalities of the interviewee and the interviewer clash. When the former turns against the latter it is difficult to obtain results. Until our knowledge of the nature of personality becomes greatly increased the adjustment of clashing personalities will remain a problem. (pp. 107-109)

PRINCIPLES OF PROCEDURE

The principle of *consideration* requires that the interviewer have a sympathetic understanding of the interviewee, and particularly of his peculiarities and special experiences, and that these be treated respectfully.

"Frequently the interviewee feels that I have asked something too personal. Then I have to back up and secure his confidence all over again. Hence I have learned never to overplay my hand."

"I never argue with an interviewee," is common testimony. Argument arouses defense reactions and dangerous inhibitions. Data of personal delicacy may be led up to, but not directly sought.

The interviewee, who always manages to be expected, who makes appointments, finds that the plan not only saves a great deal of time for himself, but prevents him from "breaking in" upon the interviewee in inopportune or even embarrassing moments.

Often the busy person says that he can give only ten minutes or even "a minute," but even that is accepted appreciatively. The interviewer must rely on his ability to arouse the interviewee's interest. After the latter becomes interested he may give an hour, urging the interviewer not to go.

Consideration for an interviewee's feelings and possible inhibitions relates to place and number of persons present. It has already been noted that the interviewee's home is usually unsatisfactory, for it contains inhibitory symbols. The interviewer's office is poor, be-

cause of its official implications. Sometimes only the freedom of a vacation camp will suffice.

An interview is best conducted when only the two parties concerned are present.

"A friend of the interviewee joined us, but at once the attitude of the latter changed. He became general and less personal. He lost his freedom of speaking."

"Yesterday I had an interview arranged but a third party joined us and I waited a half hour for him to go. I did not feel free to start the interview, for it seemed that the presence of the third party and the things for which he stood would hinder the interviewee from giving a complete personal statement. So, rather than have an important interview spoiled, I gave it up entirely for that trip and decided to try again."

The principle of consideration may be illustrated in another way, that of meeting with a too talkative interviewee, who "rambles on and off," but mostly off the subject, and of listening patiently to him.

"I got an interviewee started the other day, and I could not stop him. He started off on a long line of reminiscence which soon left our race relations subject entirely. Whenever I could get a question in edgewise, I brought him back to the subject, but he would soon be off in another direction that had no connection with our main theme. I spent two and one-half hours and obtained almost no materials. What can I do?"

Part of the answer is found in the report of the interviewer who said she had lost an afternoon in listening to a garrulous old man, but that she kept cool and went back the next day and was entirely successful. The first day the interviewee had "talked himself out," and the second day he gave an account of the experiences that were being sought. Another research reporter says that even when a person is talking "off" the subject he is often able to learn a great deal.

The principle of *gradation*, or gradual approach, must be observed, otherwise the interviewee will react in feelings if not in words as follows: What are you here for? Why are you so interested in me so suddenly? A Boys' Survey interviewer was greeted: "What are you doing here, you old hookey cop?" And another as follows: "Who told you to help me, anyway?"

"I usually talk first and then ask questions. As a rule I begin by asking something not very important. As the interview proceeds, I usually add a remark now and then, which tends to release new memory mechanisms."

"I usually come as a friend, or from a friend of the interviewee," says an interviewer. "I never come in an official capacity if I can

help it." Boys' Work Survey cards of introduction were printed, but their use was soon discarded. The term "Survey" aroused deadly suspicions and inhibitions.

"Give me your life history," said a crude interviewer to a Japanese, who did not respond. Another with a pencil and paper in hand began with the first words of the interviewee to take down everything that was said, but soon found the interview ended. "I came from the Race Relations Survey," said another interviewer, and wondered why the interview was a failure, not recognizing that the mention of the Survey was inhibiting to any one who did not understand it. The difficulty was partly in mentioning the Survey, and partly in the fact that the interviewer did not have full prestige in the eyes of the interviewee.

The principle of *identification*, whereby interviewee develops a fellow feeling for interviewer, is widely useful. Sometimes an interviewer may secure the desired data by confessing something about himself, by telling of his own misconduct and thus identifying his experiences with those of an interviewee. "On occasion I tell something very bad against myself, and that brings results." Again, the interviewer after telling some of his own experiences may ask: "How do those fit in with your experiences?"

"As the boy 'sensed' that I had experiences and anxieties similar to his own, he 'loosened up' and talked 'like a blue streak,' amazing me beyond expectation, for I thought him stupid and taciturn."

This sometimes has been called the subjective method of securing an interview. It is indirect, sympathetic, and establishes that confidence born of mutual experience.

A related principle is that of *reference*. By connecting himself with some prominent person in good standing in the eyes of the interviewee, the interviewer achieves prestige and secures the desired *entrée*.

"If I could mention someone 'higher up' and indicate that I had been at his home or dined with him, that would give me prestige at once."

The wider the experience of a person the more likely will he succeed in arousing in the interviewee a sense of identification. A Race Relations interviewer seeing three Hindus standing in front of a store in an Imperial Valley town stepped up to them and addressed them in Hindustani. They were agreeably surprised and smiling, asked: "Where did you learn Hindustani?" The interviewer replied, "In India," whereupon an interview of three hours followed. The principle of *indirect interrogation* regulates the trend that per-

sonal interviews may take. The best interviewer asks the fewest direct questions. He "starts off" the interviewee by "chance remarks" and comments. Moreover, these are interposed when the conversation of the interviewee becomes irrelevant. Often, a mere phrase, "Excuse me, but I don't understand what you said a moment ago about——," will suffice.

In holding an interview, it is important that the interviewer safeguard himself from his own biases and preconceived notions. "All of us notice the things that we are interested in," and overlook the things not within the range of our field of values. Two interviewers will obtain different materials from similar reports. It is essential, therefore, that the interviewer safeguard himself against that which he "expects" to see and hear. The principle of exploration extends even to one's attitude as to what is interesting or uninteresting. It is necessary to use both the most general type of question as well as specific questions. In fact, it is wise not to ask questions but to make remarks which will keep the interviewee talking about anything within the field of study. The interviewer who makes out his questions first and then, just a block before he arrives, goes over them again "so that when I reach the interviewee I know just what I want to find out," illustrates a commendable degree of preparedness, but also an important weakness. If one knows too definitely what he is going after, he may miss a number of valuable points.

The phrasing of one's questions brings out variations in answers. A study of the logic of questioning will prevent one from falling into needless errors.²⁸ In the first place, there is the expectative question, that is, the one which implies an expected answer, which suggests its own answer. For example, "You were disappointed in the United States when you first arrived, weren't you?" An immigrant who does not fully grasp a question will likely answer "Yes," out of sheer human courtesy, and thus may give a wrong impression. At least he may be stimulated to exaggerate in his own mind the implication of an expectative question.

There is the disjunctive question: Do you like or dislike Americans? As a matter of fact, there is a third possibility which is left entirely in the background, namely, a possible neutral feeling.

The implicative question asks: How was the exploiter dressed? when the man in question was not necessarily an exploiter at all. This is the type of question that Iago used when he wished to imply to Othello that Desdemona and Cassio were unfaithful to Othello.

²⁸ The following analysis was developed in connection with Race Relations Survey but was suggested by G. M. Whipple's "The Obtaining of Information: Psychology of Information and Report."

The indeterminate question gives the one interrogated an unbiased opportunity to answer, and hence it is the best. How do you like working in the steel mills? The answer may be favorable, unfavorable, or any shade in between, and leaves a full measure of judgment to the questionee.

It is important that remarks and questions be "intelligent."

"A Survey investigator waited on me, showed a great interest in me, but soon his questions and comments showed that he knew little about the subject he was talking on. I concluded that his interest in me was false, so I stopped talking."

"I treated him with great respect. I thought he was a learned gentleman, but when in conversation he indicated he didn't know any of the prominent men in my country and seemed so provincial I was no longer awe-struck. I was utterly disappointed and concluded not to talk."

It is essential not to be bent overmuch on even interrogation, and thus direct the interview to the oversight of unanticipated data. Rich mines of experiences are often pocketed in places that questioning will not likely pierce. "At the most unexpected moments, and when I am anticipating least, I often secure the most valuable materials."

"I am always watching for leads," that is, as the interviewee proceeds, the undercurrents of his statements are noted. What sounds most insignificant is often fraught with precious suggestions. "I watch for 'leads' and then more 'leads'," discloses the exploring attitude of interviewing and implies that the way a person tells his experiences is fraught with tell-tale data.

The principle of *discrimination* must be continually invoked. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the interviewee's past experiences and his prejudices. It is more difficult usually to get him to make these discriminations. Moreover, he does not always distinguish between what he has learned in a first-hand way and that which he has received second-hand. In this case, the interviewee usually employs the phrase, "I think," repeatedly.

In order to be accepted as authentic the results of an interview require some kind of corroboration. Sometimes a mere cross-examination of the interviewee is sufficient. Sometimes the problem can be met by interviewing other persons who are involved.

Where interviewees contradict each other it is necessary to examine antecedent happenings and to approach the situation from one new angle after another until the results fall into similar explanations. Occasionally, it is necessary to bide one's time, and at a later time, to start all over again.

Another problem is found in the errors which people unintentionally make in remembering past experience narratives. These discrepancies are often significant in themselves for they may account for many misunderstandings.

To the student of social attitudes erroneous remembering is as significant as correct remembering, for a distorted remembrance influences a person's current opinion just as truly as an exact remembrance. If it includes a feeling of injustice, a great sorrow, a piece of good fortune, or any striking emotional experience, the greater the distortion is likely to be, and the more seriously one's current opinions are affected. While the distortion may not disclose anything regarding the nature of one's deepest attitudes, "it reveals something of the intensity of them." Hence the distortion and the errors of remembering may be far more important than the original experience itself.

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The chief method, historically, of social investigation.
2. The Hebrew method of social thought expression.
3. The Greek method of social thought expression.
4. The method of social investigation followed by Jesus.
5. The two striking methods of social thought expression used by Jesus.
6. The Utopian method of social thought expression.
7. The positivist method of social thought derivation.
8. Spencer's social thought approach.
9. Ward's social thought approach.
10. The strong and weak points of the statistical method.
11. The strengths and weaknesses of the social survey method.
12. The "classification" method.
13. The "natural history" method.
14. The life history of a community.
15. The meaning of personality research.
16. The significance of culture factors.
17. The social base map procedure.
18. Principles of research interviewing.
19. Comparison of statistical and case-work methods.

CHAPTER XXVIII

DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT

THE RISE of social thought has culminated in several scientific thought movements synonymous with the social sciences. One of these culminations has been in the development of sociological thought. Despite its youth, inchoateness, and naïveté, sociological thought is exerting a vital influence in the world. It is giving a new rating to all the established values of life, undermining some, strengthening others, and creating still others.

The chief values in sociological thought are that it constitutes a center of all worth-while thought; it gives balance and proportion to thinking in any field; it defies race prejudice and social intolerance; it smites egoistic living; it rivets attention to the essentially human values; it stimulates personal development in harmony with group and societary welfare. At the same time, it postulates group advancement, not upon paternalistic or autocratic grounds, but upon a constructive projection of personalities that harmonizes with cooperative group service.

For centuries genuine social thinking was confined largely to a few of the intellectually élite. These few lived, and did even their social thinking, in a more or less isolated way. It was not until the first decades of the last century that social thought began to be scientific in character, that is, became sociological. Sociological thinking, however, was isolated and uncorrelated for many years. In the last decade of the nineteenth century, sociology began to develop a considerable body of thinkers and a new morale. There were many disagreements that tended to break the new science asunder. The opening decades,

however, of the twentieth century witnessed a development of sociological thought that was followed by the establishment of the teaching of sociology as a profession.

TEACHING OF SOCIOLOGY

With the rise of technical sociology, the dissemination of sociological thought became noteworthy. For a long time sociology was considered only as a post-graduate study. In the last few years, however, sociology has been making its way downward in college and university curricula, until it is being widely taught to college freshmen and sophomores. In this connection there is a variety of textbooks that have been written to meet the needs of beginning students. There are some teachers who would introduce sociology through anthropological studies, beginning with the origins of man. Others would give a survey or prospectus of social institutions, processes, and problems.¹ Still others would deal only with social problems. Then there are those persons who would build a textbook around a central theme, tracing it through a series of social relationships. One of the more advanced approaches is the conceptual. Park and Burgess' *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*² makes this approach, dealing with "human nature," "isolation," "social contacts," "social interaction," "competition," "conflict," "accommodation," "assimilation," and so forth.

For high schools, the technique of sociological teaching is in the beginning stages. The importance of teaching social science in high schools is generally recognized, but there has been great difficulty in effecting an agreement among the various social science branches. Some high school teachers prefer a "social problems" course, although the demand is growing for "social science" courses, divid-

¹ Blackmar and Gillin's *Outlines of Sociology* illustrates well this type of textbook in sociology.

² University of Chicago Press, 1921.

ing the time more or less evenly between human geography, economics, sociology, and civics. There are other high school teachers who contend that sociology can be taught best in a general "citizenship" course. One of the specific difficulties is that the high school curriculum is full, and that the representatives of none of the established courses are willing to see the subjects in which they are interested crowded out. Another difficulty is the power which the self-culture and self-development concepts possess. The equal importance of the social culture and social development concepts is being recognized, but with amazing slowness.

In the grades the teaching of social science is gaining ground. In the sense that there is an advanced group of mathematical studies for university men and women and an elemental mathematics for the grades, so there is advanced sociology, and also an elemental sociology centering around the activities of the primary groups, such as the family, play, neighborhood, and school groups. A child who is old enough to learn to obey is old enough to begin elemental sociology, in fact, when he learns to obey, he is already beginning to experience the meaning of social if not sociological concepts.³ Simple social studies are being prepared for the grades, even beginning with the first grade.

The dissemination of sociological thought is a practical question to which in the last score of years special attention has been given. The universities and colleges began to establish chairs of sociology in the closing years of the last century. The movement has acquired a remarkable momentum in the United States. Normal schools and high schools have adopted the movement. Many churches are promulgating a socialized gospel. Literature is gradually assuming an appreciation of the sociological viewpoint.

From the social proverbs of primitive man to treatises such as Ross' *Principles of Sociology*, or Park and Burgess'

³ Such as superordination and subordination (according to Simmel).

Introduction to the Science of Sociology, with their analyses of significant societal processes — this is the main span of social thought. Social thought began in the simplest form of observations about social relationships between individual and individual, between chieftain and tribal member, between master and servant. It experienced various stages of denunciation of social wrongs. It produced perspectives of perfect societies. It moved profoundly forward in the form of social philosophies. Now it is proceeding either as the investigator of new social facts, or the psychological interpreter of these facts in terms of social processes. It is assuming a scientific procedure, although a portion of the results of its undertakings finds expression in social philosophy. It is beginning to formulate sociological laws. It is inaugurating a technique for preventing the maladjustments that produce social evils; it is establishing a teaching technique.⁴ Although the masses of the human race are beginning to feel blindly the meaning of social values, they have not yet been able to make their highest social aspirations rationally articulate. Until that time comes, democracy will remain an experiment, and world progress a toy of autocratic forces.

A history of social thought is essentially a review of an irregular but positive acceptance of socialized values. Individual after individual, leader after leader, profession after profession, group after group, have felt and accepted the challenge of the sociological viewpoint. They have changed from living egoistically to living socially. They are giving up the ideal of service for self advancement, setting up in its place the ideal of service for the welfare of others. In so doing and living they are finding expansion of personality and contributing to the advancement of society. Since the days of Comte in particular, the social sciences have been increasing in variety and scope until

⁴ The struggles involved in the rise of sociological thought are succinctly stated by George Elliott Howard in his article, "Sociology: its Critics and its Fruits," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. VI, No. 4

they number a score or more, and sociological influence has been widening until the related sciences are inviting sociology, which is the scientific study of collective behavior, to define their objectives for them. In fact, sociological concepts are permeating the farthest reaches of personal living and societal control.⁵ A history of social thought is a history of the processes involved in the socializing of human attitudes and values, presaging a human society in which personal achievement and group progress are equally and supremely sought.

RISE OF SOCIOLOGY⁶

Scarcely any event in the history of learning is more dramatic or more enlightening than the struggle of sociology for recognition as a science and especially for its acceptance as an academic discipline worthy of full rank and privilege. Yet the event is not unique. It is but the latest—perhaps the most remarkable—example of a contest which many a new—many an upstart or plebeian—science has had in order to win a place beside the older disciplines. In its rise did not even astronomy leave martyrs by the way? This “jealousy of science” is a very curious phenomenon; but it is perhaps not hard to explain. Is it not due at once to the pride and to the conservatism of learning? Like the ancient *trivium* and *quadrivium*, it is perhaps natural that the orthodox or time-honored studies should become a privileged oligarchy, assuming that they have explained all the phenomena of the cosmos worthy or capable of scientific treatment; and that their votaries should feel it their duty to challenge the credentials of any new claimant of scientific honors.

How rich and varied is the program of studies which the college or university now displays compared with the meager list of a few decades ago! What an amazing transformation has taken place within my own years of college study and teaching! Biology, for instance, was long excluded from full academic franchise. It was criticized as a study devoid of genuine discipline or scientific value; and, besides in some quarters biology was anathema; for did it not reek with the tainted breath of evolution and Darwinism? In the

⁵ A comparative statement involving the present tendencies of sociological thought in the light of history has been made by Charles H. Cooley in “Now and Then,” *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. VIII, pp. 259-262.

⁶ Reprinted by permission from George Elliott Howard, “Sociology: its Critics and its Fruits,” *Journal of Applied Sociology*, Vol. VI, No. 4.

colleges of the eighteen-seventies—often in those of a much later time—modern languages were grudgingly admitted as by-activities, if indeed any place at all could be found for them in their cramped curricula. Even the English language and English literature were denied an honorable place in the schedule of prescribed studies; for did they not lack the mysterious quality of “scientific discipline” which the “classics” were supposed to possess to a pre-eminent degree? Occasionally, to still the rising clamor of rude philistines for something more recent and more useful than that provided by the conventional programs, a sop was tossed to the crowd in the form of a “side-line” of subjects consisting usually of a melange of English literature, modern science, and French or German, seasoned perhaps with a “pinch” of history; but the half-ashamed graduate was not decorated with the proud title of “bachelor of arts.” He had to content himself with some such humble degree as “bachelor of philosophy”; although that label might imply as little of philosophy as the more aristocratic badge implied of art.

HOSTILE CRITICISM OF SOCIAL STUDIES

However, it is the case of the social sciences which at this time chiefly challenges our attention. In America it is scarcely four decades since the oldest of these subjects won a really important place in college education. First history, then economics, and then political science, each reluctantly, was admitted to full academic franchise; but each had to run the gauntlet of hostile criticism. Each was challenged to validate its scientific quality and to demonstrate its relative fitness to be accredited as an educative discipline. In fact, with very few exceptions, it was not until about 1885 that separate chairs of history began to appear. “It is all very well,” sadly conceded my colleague, a professor of Greek in those days, “that students should *read* some history; but is it quite right to induce them to spend so great a share of their precious time on an easy culture subject to the neglect of the really scientific disciplines?” Surely you recognize the tone! The portentous hegira had already begun!

Great trouble was at hand. The differentiation of the social sciences was not yet complete. A still more audacious claimant for scientific recognition now sought admission to the temple of learning. For the study which Auguste Comte placed at the head of his “hierarchy” of the sciences, and which in 1838 he named “sociology” had for its function the boldest, the hardest task which the human mind had thus far conceived: the exploration and explanation of social life as a whole. General and persistent has been the militant reaction of conservatism. The attempt of the sociologist to reveal law

and cause; to disclose orderly process in the molding of personality and group-behavior in their mutual interrelations; to demonstrate the reality of the social control of phenomena, of institutions, commonly regarded as beyond the limits of human power—such hardihood, it is not surprising, has evoked wide-spread criticism, sometimes calm and helpful, often violent, and occasionally lapsing into ridicule, even among disciples of the sister social sciences. (pp.1-3)

It is surely needless to multiply examples. Unintelligent opposition has been absolutely futile to stay the swift process of social reconstruction which chiefly the sociologists have inspired. Humanity has gained a new point of view. Society has become self-conscious. It has found itself! It is perceived that social habits, beliefs, institutions, conditions, have been made by men and therefore may be changed by men for good or for ill. Humanity is discovering how very much the control of its destiny rests in its own hands. The social conscience has quickened; and therefore it is not easy to shift responsibility for social evils, for social sinning, to the shoulders of the Almighty. Now this release of the human mind from the paralyzing sway of the ancient fatalism is due largely to sociological teaching; and already how vast and varied are the results! Especially during the last three decades organized efforts for human betterment have appeared in almost every phase of social life; and these efforts are in reality forms of applied sociology even in cases such as economic or political reforms, for which it does not always occur to the "man in the street" to give credit to the sociologist. Indeed the new social intelligence is pervasive. Tasks are undertaken as a matter of course which a few years ago would have seemed futile or almost impiously daring. A vast and swiftly growing literature records the achievements of sociological theory and research in many fields. Marriage and the family, with their many related problems, have been revealed as social institutions to be handled as freely as other social products according to human needs. An intelligent public interest in the welfare of mother and child has been aroused. Various safeguards for maternity are being provided; and the mother's pension enables the poor widow to keep her family together. Many effective child-saving institutions have arisen. A ban has been placed on child labor. The delinquent child is cared for in the juvenile court and the detention home. Elementary education is secured for the child by compulsory laws. The causes of infant mortality are being exposed; and through the beneficent alliance of sociology, wise sanitation, and socialized medicine the span of the human generation has been more than doubled in the western world, chiefly through the saving of babies from needless death. Most significant victory of all in the campaign for child welfare, an

efficient Federal Children's Bureau has been established; and its many-sided efforts are starting a veritable revolution throughout the land in methods of child nurture and preservation. A successful warfare is being waged on the "great white plague"; while the age-long superstition that vice should be segregated has been exposed; and the "social evil" is being abated. Through organized efforts the unborn child and the innocent wife and mother are beginning to be protected from the deadly taint of venereal disease. The danger and injustice of the dual standard of sexual ethics are being realized. Slowly eugenic marriage laws, for the safe-guarding of the family, are appearing on the statute book. The economic needs of the household are being promoted through the minimum wage and social insurance. Even more helpful in advancing the material welfare of the family are the myriad schools and departments of household science which throughout this land and elsewhere have recently sprung up as if by magic. Through the persistent and courageous efforts of social workers, nation-wide equal suffrage has been secured; and is not this in effect an immense stride in the process of socializing both men and women; in preparing them for teamwork in the world's business? Not less dramatic through the same forces is the fall of "king alcohol"; for the banishment of the saloon is doing more than is any other influence to lessen poverty, misery, and crime. In the treatment of criminals the age of social vengeance is giving way to the age of social justice; for has not the sociologist demonstrated that the causes of crime are chiefly bad social conditions and that the true function of punishment is remedial rehabilitation of the offender?

Especially significant are the three great modern processes of socialization, each of which, clarified by a vigorous literature, seems likely, judging from the good results already obtained, greatly to advance human welfare:

1. Through the "socialization of education" our schools and colleges, freed in part from the hindering fetters of the "classical" and other superstitions, are beginning in new and more enlightened ways to minister to the real needs of men. (pp. 7-8)

2. The rising call for the "socialization of religion and the church," which is winning encouraging response, may eventually, let us hope, effect a new Reformation in these fields. Aroused to its ethical responsibility, the church is beginning to take a direct hand in efforts for the betterment of world conditions.

3. There is need, nowhere, among the great nations so urgent as in the United States, that the movement for a "socialized jurisprudence," should be successful. (p. 10)

Moreover, education, the church, and the law are not the only great fields of thought which have benefited by socialization. In particular, the sister social sciences have been enriched. Recently the notable contributions of sociology to political science have been acutely examined in an able monograph.⁷ Research would doubtless reveal equally striking results for economics. Economists are extending their activities more and more to the welfare side of social life, especially are they sharing with the sociologists a keen interest in the ethics of the consumption of wealth. History is being vitalized and transformed into an agency for social good. (pp. 10-11)

TREND OF SOCIOLOGY⁸

It has occurred to me that it might not be inappropriate in an elderly sociologist to offer some impressions regarding the state of the subject when he began to study it, contrasted with that at the present time, and perhaps to draw some inferences regarding the nature and value of what has been accomplished during the interval.

If we go back, then, to about 1890, we find that for most American students sociology was to be sought in the works of Herbert Spencer, supplemented, perhaps, by the earlier writings of Lester F. Ward, although the latter were very little known.

I will not attempt at this time to estimate the contribution of Herbert Spencer—he certainly had a vast and on the whole salutary influence—but I will call attention to one aspect of his work which is pertinent to what I have to say. His sociological theories, it seems to me, were not well suited to the starting point for detailed scientific investigation on account of the somewhat remote and analogical character of their relation to actual life. They did not spring primarily from social observation; they sprang rather from the wish to extend over the social field conceptions drawn from physics and biology. As they were not tools forged to deal with social facts they could not readily be used for the purpose by other students.

I take it, then, that the younger generation of students at that time, felt, vaguely perhaps, that the right start had not been made, that there was no practicable basis for applying the evolutionary ideas of the time to human life, and that it still remained to build a satisfactory framework upon which the growth of a modern social science could proceed.

⁷ Harry Elmer Barnes, "Some Contributions of Sociology to Modern Political Theory," in *American Political Science Review*, Vol. XV, Nov., 1921, pp. 487-533.

⁸ Reprinted by permission from Charles H. Cooley, "Now and Then," *Jour. of Applied Sociology*, Vol. VIII, pp. 259-262.

It was natural, therefore, that this second generation should occupy themselves for the most part with somewhat extensive studies, rather than intensive, at the same time endeavoring, by a first-hand and disinterested study of facts, to ensure that their generalizations should have the character of working scientific hypotheses.

Now it is my suggestion that this has, on the whole, been the fact, that the principle endeavor and achievement of the generation to which I belong has been to build up a framework of workable hypotheses, to cover the field of sociology with a network of provisional generalizations, not firmly established but sufficiently supported by fact to invite verification or modification by more limited and intensive studies.

Of course this was too big a task to do completely or finally, but we felt that it had to be done, because the whole subject was so organically connected that our work could not safely advance far at any one point unless it was supported by a corresponding advance all along the line.

My point is, you see, that thoroughness of detailed investigation was not at that time a practicable ideal, because if attempted, it would have proved unsound for lack of sound general premises to base it on. We all feel, I think, that a great deal of detail work has actually been done, by biologists or others not in touch with the program of sociology, which is nearly or quite worthless because not soundly based.

Coming then to what I may call the third generation of American sociologists, the student of today has ample reason to find fault with the work of his elders if he judges it from the point of view of that thorough working out and verification of each detail which is one of the tests of scientific method. At the same time, he has reason, perhaps, to be thankful that they did not devote themselves to precisely that aspect of the scientific ideal at a time when the more urgent need was to formulate a system of problems. As it is we have a literature which leads the student directly into the maze of social fact which surrounds him and offers him clues which he may follow until he is ready to drop them and make a trail of his own.

At the present time no man with any gift of research need lack a problem, and in working out that problem he may have the assurance that he is one of many who are working cooperatively, and are prepared to appreciate and fulfill one another's endeavors. This cooperative situation is due largely to the possession of a common background of what I may call factual ideas, derived mainly from a study of the contemporary literature of their subject.

Concerning the future I ought not perhaps to speak. The rising generation is the best judge as to what its task is. It would seem,

however, if what I have said is sound, that not much of its best energies is likely to get into general works on the principles of sociology. Textbooks we shall have no doubt—a constant flow of them—and that is well because a teacher can be most effective when he uses his own book. But I conceive that original work is likely to take the direction of more limited but thorough studies. This work will be theoretical—I for one am not interested in any work that is not—but the theory will spring from a more circumscribed and penetrating study of fact. There is room for many such books, and, if they are really well done, a technical public is ready to appreciate them.

Let me ask, finally, whether the time has not come for a more stringent criticism of our product? We elders have “got by” and now we would like to raise the standard. When everybody was trying to do everything we were all so superficial that no one ventured to cast stones at any one else. But the new generation will not tolerate “armchair sociology.” There is altogether too much foundation for the impression prevailing in other fields that work in sociology is hasty and pretentious. Let us have no journalism, but insist that whatever a man’s subject, or whatever his conception of scientific method, he gives us no work that is not, in one way or another, a thoroughly good job.

GROUP DISCUSSION TOPICS

1. The chief values in sociological thought.
2. The paternalistic principle of group control.
3. The personalistic principle of progress.
4. Major reasons for the downward movement of social thought courses in school curricula.
5. A summary of three or four main phases of the history of social thought.

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